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Proceedings of the first conference, November 1917, were never published. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Die wachsende Bedeutung institutioneller Investoren führt zu einer zunehmenden Verflechtung von konkurrierenden Unternehmen über Minderheitsbeteiligungen ihrer Anteilseigner. Diese Verflechtungsstrukturen und ihre möglichen negativen Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb werden seit Kurzem unter dem Schlagwort "Common Ownership" diskutiert. Die Arbeit bietet einen Gesamtüberblick über die wettbewerbsrechtlichen Aspekte von Common Ownership. Ausgehend vom Stand der ökonomischen Forschung werden zunächst mögliche wettbewerbsbeeinträchtigende Wirkmechanismen untersucht. Anschließend werden die Verflechtungsstrukturen anhand des deutschen und europäischen Wettbewerbsrechts beurteilt sowie Regulierungsvorschläge und weitere Lösungsansätze analysiert.

What role do or should US unions play in democratic or worker-owned enterprises? The three major types of US industrial democrats-those favoring collective bargaining, those favoring nonunion, management-run participation, and those favoring setting up alternative organizations-disagree and/or are hostile to each other on this question. This study presents two cases: (1) a set of long-unionized worker-owned companies; and (2) a community-owned economic development organization with unionized workers and union representatives on its board of directors. Qualitative observational and interview data are combined with statistical analysis of attitudinal data. The findings indicate that union presence is problematic for itself and the enterprise. Moreover, the union tends to play a traditional conservative role, emphasizing protection of workers from management abuses, which stem from the imperfect nature of worker/community ownership arrangements and the imperfect nature of democratic management.

Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy