Suchergebnisse

Time series analytic models are developed to evaluate institutional and political factors affecting the president's ability to appoint same-party members to the federal courts over the period 1869-1992. Controlling for party of the president, the authors examine the percentage of partisan appointments to and voluntary departures from these courts. The authors find that although the outcomes of presidential elections lead to sweeping changes in the partisan composition of the bench, the judiciary itself plays a large role in abetting same-party appointments through politically timed departures. Government control (unified versus divided) also enters the equation, as does the unique politics of filling positions created by omnibus judgeship legislation. The study underscores the importance of interinstitutional relationships to analyses of change in the partisan composition of the judiciary.

This article analyzes paths and patterns of partisan appointments among sector-categories in the executive branch of Brazil from 1986 to 2016. The analysis sought to understand nuances of partisan appointments for ministries in different periods taking into consideration different presidential styles and government coalitions. We applied both qualitative and quantitative research methods and used techniques of document analysis and database construction. The methods also included a complementary discussion from recent researches on partisan ministry preferences. By analyzing partisan appointments among sector-categories, we observed two different patterns. Marked by the existence of smaller coalitions, the partisan appointments in the first period were sparse, except for the Sarney administration. The coalitions were broader in the second period, especially during the Lula and Dilma administrations, when we also observed the appearance of a structural expansion strategy. Bearing in mind the number of ministries headed by the Worker's Party (PT), we claim this strategy allowed the political party of the president to dominate both the social and government sectors. In the party-by-party analysis, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) stands out for its inclusion in all the administrations but it is still more concentrated in infrastructure ministries.

How do prime ministers manage investors' expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is, during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country's borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.

How do prime ministers manage investors' expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments---i.e., during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country's borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.