This analysis of one-party systems in three different settings — the American South, the Eastern Bloc, and the Third World - ponders the circumstance that both interparty competition and intraparty competition among subparty components (organization, office, and electorate) are on the rise in all three settings. This bodes well for the chances of democracy in each setting, regardless of whether one expects to find democracy in between the parties, as Schattschneider did, or expects that democracy should order the parties internally, as classical democratic theorists do. The analysis also commends Southern leadership succession institutions (competitive primaries and run-offs) as devices for attaining democracy while still in the one-party mode, and credits broader, pervasive structural and politocultural features of the American polity for the workability of those institutions.
Do electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems separately or jointly? We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the number of electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables (district magnitude and proximity of presidential and legislative elections), one intervening variable (effective number of presidential candidates), and two new measures of ethnopolitical cleavages based on constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups (fragmentation and concentration). Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently reduces the number of parties but, interactively with ethnopolitical concentration, increases it. However, the additive and interactive combinations of both measures with electoral institutions explain the largest amount of variance in the number of parties. These results emphasize the importance of ethnopolitical cleavages in mediating the effects of electoral institutions on the structure of party systems, with important implications for the stability of Africa's emerging democracies in which parties are weak and multiethnic coalitions are fluid.
Kurt Jefferson calls for the utilization in Eastern Europe of party system models developed in the western part of the Continent. By doing so, he highlights a fundamental tension that runs throughout the literature on political parties and, for that matter, much of comparative politics: the delicate balance between making generalizations through inductive reasoning and the pursuit of detailed knowledge by way of in-depth study of specific cases. Professor Jefferson squarely confronts this analytical balancing act. He thoughtfully envelops his focus on the Czechoslovak case within a stimulating proposal for one means through which to generalize about political parties. While engaged in microanalysis of a party system in a democratizing polity, his sensitivity for generalization takes form in his recommendation to apply western European models in analyzing eastern European party systems, even suggesting we should refer to "European politics" in lieu of the political-geographical prefixes of "west" and "east." Toward such ends, Jefferson illustratively applies Giovanni Sartori's (1990) party systems framework to Czechoslovakia.
The collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Central Europe has provided the basis for new democracies. Competitively elected parliaments, accountable executives, independent judiciaries, enforceable civil liberties and a free press have rapidly emerged through a relatively short transitional period. The formation of political parties and interest groups, however, is taking much longer, and has proven a much more complex process than the change of the political system.
Do electoral institutions in Africa's emerging democracies impact the strategic coordination among voters, candidates and parties and shape the structure of party systems independently or are their effects mediated by contextual variables? The paper attempts to answer this question through analysis of systematic data on 99 national legislative elections held under 55 electoral systems in 37 countries. Specifically, it examines how two contextual variables – (1) institutional variables related to presidential elections and (2) patterns of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration – mediate the direct effects of electoral institutions on the structure (degree of fragmentation or concentration) of party systems. Regression analysis shows that electoral institutions have negligible independent effects, while contextual variables independently and interactively with each other and with electoral institutions account for the largest amount of variance on the degree of fragmentation or concentration of party systems. The conclusion discusses the implications of the results for the consolidation of Africa's emerging democracies in the context of ethnopolitical diversity
Do electoral institutions in Africa's emerging democracies impact the strategic coordination among voters, candidates and parties and shape the structure of party systems independently or are their effects mediated by contextual variables? The paper attempts to answer this question through analysis of systematic data on 99 national legislative elections held under 55 electoral systems in 37 countries. Specifically, it examines how two contextual variables – (1) institutional variables related to presidential elections and (2) patterns of ethnopolitical fragmentation and concentration – mediate the direct effects of electoral institutions on the structure (degree of fragmentation or concentration) of party systems. Regression analysis shows that electoral institutions have negligible independent effects, while contextual variables independently and interactively with each other and with electoral institutions account for the largest amount of variance on the degree of fragmentation or concentration of party systems. The conclusion discusses the implications of the results for the consolidation of Africa's emerging democracies in the context of ethnopolitical diversity.
The literature on fiscal institutions has established a connection between the design of fiscal institutions and a country's political fundamentals. The paper includes a review of the party and electoral systems in the Central and Eastern European countries (the CEECs) and then reaches conclusions on what modes of fiscal governance ("commitment", "delegation", "fiefdom") these countries should have developed based on their political fundamentals. Two major conclusions stand out. First, all of the countries have multi-dimensional social cleavage space which, together with the dominance of proportional electoral systems, suggests diverse party systems. This is a recipe for multi-party governments. Indeed, coalition governments have been dominant in the CEECs suggesting in turn that the majority of these countries should be leaning towards commitment approach. Second, the collapse of communism and consequent social changes led rather unsurprisingly to a certain political turmoil. This was evident especially during the first half of the 1990s. Some countries were affected more than others. Party structures have been in a constant change and reforms in the electoral laws have not been uncommon resulting in some countries to frequent shifts between different government types. This suggests that these countries have not been able to develop a coherent way to tackle the common pool resource problem. The reality largely confirms these expectations. The results therefore indicate that no "onesize- fits-all" solutions exist in fiscal management. Consequently, the design of such institutions should pay due attention to the political factors, alongside with the economic ones. The results indicate further that a certain degree of political stability is a prerequisite for stable fiscal conditions.
One of the prime incentives for this dissertation was the renewed interest in the role of party agency for the emergence and structuring of party systems that came up in the course of the discussions about the third wave of democracy and the concomitant challenges to the theoretical fundamentals of common party system theory. In addition, scholarly discourse on the third wave brought up again the question as to how the party system as an independent variable impacts on processes of democratic consolidation, national integration and socio-economic development.Trying to examine the role of party agency in this regard and to assess the role of the party system as the independent variable, the dissertation deals with two regional and temporal contexts and a political phenomenon pertinent to these contexts that most often have ranked as unique or paradoxical in scholarly assessments. Academic accounts of post-colonial India are interspersed with references to a deviant case of, or an empirical anomaly to, party system and democratic theory, and the conventional vocabulary used to describe post-apartheid South African political development frequently resorts to such terms as political miracle or societal exceptionalism. A similar confusion and vagueness prevails with regard to the specific configuration of a democratic and competitive party system characterised by the towering and prolonged dominance of one party. The study is an attempt to shed light on these contexts and their party systems by departing from the conventional �paths� of party system theory as well as from the relativist assessments of post-independent India (1947-67) and post-apartheid South Africa (1994-). This is done by means of a diachronic comparison of the two countries� party systems with a distinct focus on the role of party agency in the shaping and maintenance of one-party-dominance and on the role of the two party systems as independent variables. Chapter 1 deals with the conceptual, theoretical and methodological problems, incentives and questions inherent in the kind of cross-national and diachronic comparison attempted in this study. Chapter 2 gives a brief outline of the regional settings at the time democratic party competition was beginning to take shape, outlines the institutional boundaries within which the two party systems were/are located, looks at the main characteristics of the electorate in post-independent India and post-apartheid South Africa and �takes stock� of the two party systems in terms of a broad outline of the dominant party and the relevant opposition parties. The next three chapters present the bulk of the empirical analysis and deal with the emergence, working and functions/effects of one-party-dominance in India and South Africa respectively. Each chapter refers to the basic outline of the analytical framework depicted above and combines theoretical arguments with empirical, as well as historical, givens of the two party systems under examination. Whereas chapter 3 examines how the two party systems were �shaped from above�, i.e. how party agency helped to achieve the dominant position of the INC and ANC respectively, chapter 4 examines the mechanisms of control employed to maintain dominance and the mechanisms of party competition prevailing in the two regional contexts. Both chapters deal with the party agentive factors identified in the analytical framework as responsible for the achievement and maintenance of one-party-dominance in the form of short analytical narratives. The last of these three chapters (chapter 5) sums up and discusses the effects and (redefined) functions of party systems in changing societies and gives an account of how both countries� party systems have fared with regard to these effects and in terms of fulfilling these functions. Chapter 6 takes up the differences and similarities of the two regional contexts as they have emerged out of the preceding three chapters, relates the �lessons� of the Indian experience to the prospects of one-party-dominance in South Africa by means of a comparison and reassesses the two key theses of the study, namely that a) party agency and strategy were among the most decisive factors in the formation and development of the two regional contexts� systems of one-party-dominance and are, in general, crucial for party system formation and development (they are especially relevant in the shaping of one-party-dominance in changing societies); and that b) systems of one-party-dominance have a potentially (but not necessarily) benign effect on processes of democratisation, national integration and democratic development in the crucial period of changing societies� transition to democracy and democratic consolidation.
Neben der Beschäftigung mit zwei aus parteien- wie demokratietheoretischer Perspektive im allgemeinen als singuläre Fälle oder Paradoxa rezipierten Regionalkontexten und den diesen zugehörigen Parteiensystemen, fand die vorliegende Dissertation ihre primäre Anregung zum einen in der Diskussion über eine Neuorientierung der Parteiensystemforschung im Zuge der dritten Welle der Demokratisierung hin zu einer stärkeren Fokussierung auf die Rolle der Handlungsmacht von Parteien bei der Strukturierung des Parteiensystems. Zum anderen warf die Diskussion um die dritte Welle der Demokratisierung wieder verstärkt die Frage nach dem Einfluß des Parteiensystems als unabhängige Variable auf die für Transitionsgesellschaften so elementaren Prozesse der demokratischen Konsolidierung, nationalen Integration und sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung auf. Die Dissertation identifiziert Systeme der Einparteiendominanz in Transitionsgesellschaften als fruchtbare Untersuchungseinheiten, da diese Konfiguration des Parteiensystems, bei der die groben Konturen des Parteienwettbewerbs im Sinne der dauerhaften Dominanz einer Partei trotz eines kompetitiven Umfelds weitestgehend konstant gehalten werden, auf einen erheblichen unabhängigen Einfluß politischer Eliten und parteipolitischer Strategien verweist und im Kontext von Transitionsgesellschaften der Handlungsspielraum für politische Akteure angesichts des fluiden institutionellen wie gesellschaftlichen Kontextes notwendigerweise größer ist. Aufgrund der engen Konzeptionalisierung von Systemen der Einparteiendominanz als kompetitiven Parteiensystemen und der Debatte um den Einfluß des Parteiensystems im Kontext von Transitionsgesellschaften, ergab sich die Beschränkung auf die diachrone vergleichende Perspektive auf die Periode des Kongreßsystems im post-kolonialen Indien (1947-67) und das sich konsolidierende System der ANC-Einparteiendominanz im Südafrika nach der Apartheid (1994-). Theoretisch-konzeptionell folgt die Arbeit einer (rationalen) Akteurs- und Prozeßorientierung - ohne dabei ...
This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger's hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behaviour of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoral system coincides with the median party's position. On the othoer hand, with quasilinear utility, the distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule.
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.
An ongoing debate in political science research focuses on the degree to which democratic party systems are stable. One camp of authors argues that political cleavages in party systems endure, and thus party systems themselves show few significant signs of increased instability. Another group of authors argues that since the 1970s, political cleavages have weakened, and accordingly, system stability has decreased. My research continues this debate. I suggest that part of the uncertainty surrounding the direction and magnitude of stability trends results from the contrasting methodologies researchers have employed. I solve this difficulty by replicating the data and methods that Rose and Urwin employed in their 1970 study. By using identical measures of electoral change, I can ensure that any trends I find are not due to measurement artifacts. I compare their results from the period 1945-1970 with a new set of results for the 1970-1995 period for the same countries, extending the analysis far beyond other recent studies of partisan stability.
This article is conceived of as a contribution to the process of refining the discussion on the concept and typology of several Central Eastern and Southern European post–communist party systems through an analysis of issues of polarity. It concentrates on conceptualisation of poles and polarity in consolidating party arrangements. The effective political parties–poles or alliances–poles must be "visible", separate formations, i.e. distant from each other in the given ideological and political continuum, with a sufficient and at the same time adequately consolidated electoral basis. Moreover, poles have to act as coherent operational units , which are relevant for the shape and working of the party system. Polarity (the number and configuration of poles) is closely related with both the party system format and the "ideological" diversity, but is not identical with them. The article suggests that the study of polarity of party arrangements is a necessary point of departure towards their typological characteristic. This applies to both "mature", institutionalised systems of political parties, and to "immature", insufficiently or only weakly structured or "settled" party arrangements. ; This article is conceived of as a contribution to the process of refining the discussion on the concept and typology of several Central Eastern and Southern European post–communist party systems through an analysis of issues of polarity. It concentrates on conceptualisation of poles and polarity in consolidating party arrangements. The effective political parties–poles or alliances–poles must be "visible", separate formations, i.e. distant from each other in the given ideological and political continuum, with a sufficient and at the same time adequately consolidated electoral basis. Moreover, poles have to act as coherent operational units , which are relevant for the shape and working of the party system. Polarity (the number and configuration of poles) is closely related with both the party system format and the "ideological" ...
The evolution of the party arrangement in Montenegro in the 1990s is an interesting subject of research in post-communist party systems both for the formation and metamorphosis of political pluralism, the polarity and patterns of party interactions in an apparently changing "post-communist" context, and within a broader perspective favouring analysis of links between nation-building processes and the transformation of political system including the (re)structuring of the respective party landscape. This article is a contribution to the interpretation of the genesis of present day party pluralism in Montenegro. It also pursues the objective of providing stimuli for further discussion about structural and conjunctural factors influencing the evolution of post-communist multipartisms. The transformation of the Montenegro party arrangement cannot be satisfactorily analysed or interpreted on the basis of presumably universal schematics overestimating the determining impact of "communist legacies"; this case study therefore provides – at least indirectly – arguments in favour of an open research perspective which would take in due consideration dynamic aspects of the formation and transformation of post-communist multipartisms, including the formative role of political elites. ; The evolution of the party arrangement in Montenegro in the 1990s is an interesting subject of research in post-communist party systems both for the formation and metamorphosis of political pluralism, the polarity and patterns of party interactions in an apparently changing "post-communist" context, and within a broader perspective favouring analysis of links between nation-building processes and the transformation of political system including the (re)structuring of the respective party landscape. This article is a contribution to the interpretation of the genesis of present day party pluralism in Montenegro. It also pursues the objective of providing stimuli for further discussion about structural and conjunctural factors influencing the ...