Reformation became an important moment of democratization in Indonesia. The two important political changes that occur in reformation era are the freedom to establish political parties and the electoral system. Such changes have an impact on the emergence of a coalition phenomenon in Indonesia, because general elections with multiparty systems are unable to produce a majority vote in parliament. This paper aims to map and analyze the dinamic of the political party coalition in Indonesia' presidential election in the reform era within coalition theories by Riker, Katz&Mair and Swaan. Using a qualitative approach and secondary data from media and literature, the main factor that influence the formation of coalitions in the presidential elections in the reform era is political pragmatism. It Political pragmatism makes political partiesparty politics as a cartel party that becomes the agent of the state and employ the resources of the state to ensure their party' survival. Pragmatism ultimately makes the ideology is not a binding factor in building a coalition, but simply to maximize power.
Information systems of political parties (Sipol) as a set of information systems and technologies used to support the work of Political Parties and Election Organizers in registering, administrative research and factual verification ofthe fulfillment ofthe requirements of political parties toparticipatein the elections. But in its application,Sipolactually becomes an obstacle for certain parties to become election participants. In this research, the method used is normative juridical. The result of his research isSipolis not as the main element in determining the political partyto bethe eligible participant, especially in the political party which becomesthe participant ofthe election in the previous election. However,Sipolis only a supporter of work forKPUand political parties in completingthe registration ofpolitical parties as eligible participants.
[cat] Aquest article vol refutar la hipòtesi que els partits decideixen sistemes electorals majoritaris i que decideixen també mantenir-los invariables, sempre que el sistema de partits s"aproximi al bipartidisme i cap dels dos grans partits pugui perdre la seva posició a favor d"un nou competidor. De manera inversa, els sistemes electorals proporcionals són la conseqüència del multipartidisme, en el qual cap partit té opcions de rebre la majoria dels vots. El cas valencià, però, confirma només parcialment la hipòtesi: els partits van aprovar el 1982 regles proporcionals perquè les eleccions dels parlaments autonòmics eren considerades secundàries, no només pel multipartidisme existent aleshores. En canvi, sí que es confirma que el canvi iniciat el 2006 amb la reforma estatutària manté, de moment, l"status quo per no alterar la formació de majories parlamentàries. Encara queda pendent, però, que es modifiqui la Llei Electoral, de la qual depèn quin mínim de vots per entrar a les Corts s"establirà. ; [eng] This article aims to refute the hypothesis that political parties decide majority electoral systems as well as ensure their constancy, whenever they approach a two-party-system and none of them loses its position in favour of a new one. On the contrary, proportional electoral systems are a consequence of multi-party-system, since none of them have been able to obtain the majority votes (Colomer, 2003; 56). Nevertheless, the Valencian case partially confirms this hypothesis: The parties approved proportional rules in 1982 because autonomic parliament elections were considered to be secondary due to the existing multi-party-system at that time. Otherwise, it has been proved that the change that started in 2006 with the statutory reform maintains currently the status quo in order not to alter the formation of parliament majorities. Significant modifications of the Electoral Law are still to be determined. Anticipated changes to the Electoral Law will establish the minimum of votes necessary to enter parliament. The article includes three parts: The first explains the origin of the electoral system by analyzing the political debate and the options defended by each party during the approval of the Statute in 1982. The draft bills of Unió de Centro Democrático (ucd), Partit Socialista del País Valencià-Partido Socialista Obrero Español (pspv-psoe), Partit Comunista del País Valencià-Partido Comunista de España (pcpv-pce) i Alianza Popular (ap) are analyzed. These draft bills depended on the assumption that the Valencian electoral map will follow the results of the 1977 and 1979 elections at the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, the process of the statutory bill is analyzed. This included electoral rules derived from the autonomic agreements in 1981, which were based on the assumption of a multi-party-system balancing the lack of proportion in the Chamber of Deputies.