This paper explores Habermas's political philosophy of personal and collective identity and the role of constitution in building a post-national constellation in his political writings. Habermas's stances on European identity and the role that the European constitution-making process could have on the formation of aforementioned identity are reviewed, with responses to the no-demos thesis through his concept of constitutional patriotism. Author argues that constitutional patriotism and proceduralism in his political and legalistic observations seems to be the more realistic part of his discourse, while his search for European identity as pre-political viewpoint through the model of European political spheres still remains part of the idealistic vision. Adapted from the source document.
(Originally published in German in the journal Wandlungen [1947, 2, 6], & later as a chapter in the book "Ich wunschte ein Burger zu sein." Neun Versuche uber den Staat [("I Wanted to Be a Citizen." Nine Essays on the State) Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967]). First the author discusses the distinction between the homeland & the country. Although a country is not a homeland, nevertheless the attitude of an individual to it is not a natural fact since it contains a spiritual dimension. On the other hand, the notion of the homeland -- besides its political/spiritual elements -- contains a natural element. The author investigates the attitudes that we have towards our homeland & how they can be regulated by law. He claims that only the civil constitution is the homeland constitution, ie, that there is no homeland in despotism. He then uses the example of Prussia, where patriotic sentiments emerged without the republican institutions. The military replaced the republic, & the love for the homeland turned into the willingness to serve & sacrifice, & not into the "love of law." The author promotes the concept of the homeland that is neither nature nor idea but a medium of our own free activity that reinforces the good. One need not serve the homeland as an underling but can manifest their love of it in an informed & free discussion among citizens about the concepts of the just & the unjust. In this way the notion of the homeland is linked not only to the written constitution but to the working constitution in which the citizens partake daily & thus amplify it. Adapted from the source document.
The author analyzes the denotative, the connotative, & the metrical meaning of the term national feeling. Then he goes on to talk about the national feeling of Croats who used to have many problems connected with national identification. Their patriotism was channeled towards the creation of their own state. Because of that they were accused of nationalism, chauvinism, & genocidal tendencies. Despite that, they opted for a state of their own, managed to defend it from the armed aggression of a numerically & technically incomparably stronger enemy, thanks to social integration brought about by patriotism & love of country. However, owing to the constant pressure, the national feeling was accompanied by a feeling of guilt so that one fraction of Croats adopted the negative national identification. 2 Tables, 3 Graphs, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.
This brief note introduces three Croatian translations presented in this journal issue of articles by German authors & identifies the source from which they were taken. Focus is on the pertinence of these essays on patriotism, nationalism, homeland, & state to the current situation in Croatia where both the political Left & Right are zealously engaged in building a state based on unconditional love for the country & its identification with an ethnically homogeneous nation. The nationalism of Nazi Germany & post-Yugoslavian Croatia are also compared. Z. Dubiel
This paper explores Habermas's political philosophy of personal and collective identity and the role of constitution in building a post-national constellation in his political writings. Habermas's stances on European identity and the role that the European constitution-making process could have on the formation of aforementioned identity are reviewed, with responses to the no-demos thesis through his concept of constitutional patriotism. Author argues that constitutional patriotism and proceduralism in his political and legalistic observations seems to be the more realistic part of his discourse, while his search for European identity as pre-political viewpoint through the model of European political spheres still remains part of the idealistic vision. Adapted from the source document.
In light of the dramatic events in Serbian political society, the author looks into the most fundamental question of the political theory of constitutionalism: the way in which a revolution can reach its apogee in a viable form of constitutional government. The liberal revolution in Serbia enabled the collective identity to be redefined on the basis of constitutional patriotism. The author thinks that constitutional patriotism may be a good basis for a reconstruction of the political regime beyond the nation-state. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.
The author has tried to prove that interethnic relations in democracy cannot be handled solely by means of legal, economic, & institutional means; political culture, ie, civic democratic political culture, can have a significant role. The analysis shows that there is room for the build-up of a transnational democratic citizenry, free from all ascriptive criteria & identities such as religion, ethnicity, etc. It also reveals how classic liberalism neglects various identities (ethnic, national, etc) while communitarian liberalism overlooks the excluding force of various identities. It has also demonstrated that there are several concepts of civic identities (liberal, communitarian, & social/group) & that each of these concepts can exert profound influence on the relationship between citizens & their political community. Finally, the relation between patriotism & interethnic relations in democracy are reviewed. Patriotism, in the circumstances of growing social pluralization, & despite a plethora of political integrations, can play a prominent role in bridging the political & cultural atomizations & conflicts in society. It can undertake this role only if constituted in the civic & not the crude (fixed) ethnic sense -- though the national defines the limits & the meaning of this constitution -- provided it evolves into loyalty to one's homeland & goes hand in hand with the development of democracy & human rights. In short, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that it is necessary to expand democratic political culture that might aid in resolving intricate & sensitive relations among various ethnic & cultural communities. Patriotism can assume a decisive role in this. It lays down the limits & legitimacy of each meaningful political discourse & each genuine political subject. Adapted from the source document.
(Originally published in the collection Wirklichkeit als Tabu [(Reality as a Taboo) Munich: Oldenburg, 1986].) The author argues that the word homeland disappeared from the political language & that it has been replaced by the unpolitical word: identity. This raises a question: what is identity to a German if the state cannot provide it? The consequence of Hitler's legacy is that the tradition is troublesome so that the identity is now linked with the constitution. The author looks into the idiosyncrasies of the German constitutional/legal system by which the old state thinking has been replaced with the "constitutional thinking." In this way patriotism becomes "constitutional patriotism," & the constitution becomes the homeland. The consensus about the constitution -- the result of the general acceptance of antitotalitarianism -- was challenged by students in 1968, when this antitotalitarianism was replaced by antifascism. At the same time, however, an entire political culture of disobedience against institutions evolved, & declared the constitution the "system's life's lie." The system took a long time to recover, but it rehabilitated the state authority within a constitutional state. Nevertheless, this has not restored the individuality of German statehood, ie, the state does not become the homeland. Although the author is aware that this idea is outmoded, he nevertheless points out that the consensual base would be broader if Germans were allowed to be what they are by their history & their position, & not only what they should be according to the constitution. Adapted from the source document.
Tema rada je desni populizam, vrlo jak i raširen na cijeloj sjevernoj polutki; ovdje nas zanima naša zemlja i njoj najbliže. Najprije općenito karakteriziramo populizam, a onda razmatramo njegov odnos s najbližim mu pojavama, nacionalizmom i patriotizmom. Zanimljiv je fenomen u Hrvatskoj odsutnost snažnih jasno populističkih stranki usprkos snažnoj nacionalističkoj orijentaciji u izbornoj bazi; najjednostavnije je objašnjenje da je HDZ uspio preuzeti važne teme desnog populizma, a ipak sačuvati formu i ideologiju parlamentarne demokracije. Koliko je to rješenje stabilno vidjet će se u budućnosti. Uspon populizma promijenio je okvir političkih dilema kod nas i u svijetu; zastupnici suprotnih stajališta sada moraju ponovno promisliti pretpostavke na kojima djeluju i ponuditi nova rješenja. ; The topic of the paper is right-wing populism, strong and widespread throughout the Northern Hemisphere; although the focus is on Croatia and its closest neighborhood. First, the author defines populism and then considers its relationship with its closest phenomena, nationalism, and patriotism. An interesting puzzle about Croatia is the absence of strong, clearly populist parties, despite a strong nationalist orientation in the electoral base; the simplest explanation is that the strongest party, HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) has managed to take on important topics of right-wing populism while still preserving the form and ideology of parliamentary democracy. How stable this solution is will be seen in the future. The rise of populism has changed the frame of political contestation in our country and in the world; proponents of opposing political standpoints must now rethink the assumptions of their political action and offer new solutions.
(Originally published as a chapter in the book Eine Art Schadensabwicklung [(A Way of Managing Losses) Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987].) The author deals with the issue of the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany. The issue can be reduced to the question whether the pro-Western orientation is opportunism or a genuine break with the German political consciousness? By way of introduction, he uses the debate among historians about Germany's national self-understanding. He focuses on the assumptions of the conservative party, that the pro-Western orientation should be based on a renewed national self-assertion & its continuity from the 1930s & the 1940s. The author, however, is of the opinion that historicism & nationalism should not be used as a type of national/historical identity formation. He corroborates this with the example of the failed antitotalitarian consensus from the 1950s, which relied on the discrete attitude to the German history. In order to define the conditions for the new consensus, he turns to Kierkegaard & his concept of personal identity, since it is more appropriate for the post-traditional world. This concept may be complemented by the constitutional patriotism based on the differentiation between the culture & the state politics & not by the nationalism of the nation-state. In line with Kierkegaard's "either-or" in the public process, the author thinks that the decision should be made as to which of the traditions is to be sustained & be prepared to cope with the political & cultural consequences. Adapted from the source document.
Politics is here defined as an activity & an area of human life that concerns power & its exercise. Though power by itself is morally neutral, it often serves as a means of enslaving other people & as such is a moral challenge for Christianity. Christianity does not give precedence to a certain political philosophy nor does it proscribe a certain form of government. However, the Christian understanding of love is a source from which many principles that serve as Christians' guidelines in politics spring: restraint, patience, readiness to compromise, recognition of one's mistakes, not yielding to hate. Christianity equally opposes anational cosmopolitanism & xenophobic nationalism & is in favor of patriotism & altruism as complementary virtues. In conclusion, the author deals with the harrowing political heritage & stresses the importance of a catharsis that should facilitate the transition to a democratic society & politics. Adapted from the source document.
Politics is here defined as an activity & an area of human life that concerns power & its exercise. Though power by itself is morally neutral, it often serves as a means of enslaving other people & as such is a moral challenge for Christianity. Christianity does not give precedence to a certain political philosophy nor does it proscribe a certain form of government. However, the Christian understanding of love is a source from which many principles that serve as Christians' guidelines in politics spring: restraint, patience, readiness to compromise, recognition of one's mistakes, not yielding to hate. Christianity equally opposes anational cosmopolitanism & xenophobic nationalism & is in favor of patriotism & altruism as complementary virtues. In conclusion, the author deals with the harrowing political heritage & stresses the importance of a catharsis that should facilitate the transition to a democratic society & politics. Adapted from the source document.
