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To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non‐policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.

Frontmatter -- PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- CHAPTER ONE. Introduction: Selection for Public Office -- CHAPTER TWO. Government by Patronage -- CHAPTER THREE. Civil Service Reform -- CHAPTER FOUR. Political Appointments -- CHAPTER FIVE. Administrative Boards -- CHAPTER SIX. Advisory Bodies -- CHAPTER SEVEN. Judicial Appointments -- CHAPTER EIGHT. Administrative Tribunals -- CHAPTER NINE. The Selection of Justices of the Peace -- CHAPTER TEN. Honours -- CHAPTER ELEVEN. Life Peerages -- CHAPTER TWELVE. Church Appointments -- CHAPTER THIRTEEN. The Influence of Patronage -- APPENDIX -- INDEX

Patronage Politics Divides Us: A Study of Poverty, Patronage and Inequality in South Africa is the culmination of a research project that forms part of MISTRA's first suite of eight priority research projects. The research explores the relationship between patronage, poverty, and inequality with a particular focus on its impact on the conduct of local politics. The overall aim of the study was to explore the possibility of constituting public institutions in a manner that enables them to become legitimate arbiters between the various interests, rather than as instruments that are captured by c

Political patronage is defined as political actors appointing individuals at their discretion to key positions in the public sector. The book examines this practice in the bureaucracies of 11 Asian countries through the use of a typological framework of patronage types. The framework is based on two key criteria: basis of trust and the major role of political appointees. Several countries with well-developed civil service systems showed minimal levels of patronage (Japan, Singapore and South Korea). Two countries with a weak civil service showed very high levels of patronage appointments (Bangladesh and India). Sandwiched between those extremes are countries with formal civil service systems that are heavily influenced by political parties and by social ties to society (Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and China). The book concludes that not all patronage is the same and what is important is the tasks being performed by appointees and the nature of the trust relationship.

Front Matter -- Introduction -- Civic Patronage in the Late Republic -- Augustus and Civic Patronage -- Civic Patronage in the Principate -- Civic Patronage in the Verrines -- Civic Patronage in Roman Law -- Civic Patronage in the Epigraphical Record -- Patronage and the Patrons of Canusium: A Case Study -- Reflections on the Evolution of Civic Patronage -- Select Bibliography -- Indexes.

AbstractThis paper empirically investigates the link between political patronage and bank performance for Ukraine during 2003Q3–2005Q2. We find significant differences between politically affiliated and non‐affiliated banks. The data suggest that affiliated banks have significantly lower interest rate margins and increase their capitalization. Furthermore, we show that the level of activity of affiliated deputies in parliament has a positive (negative) impact on banks' capitalization ratio (interest rate margin). Our findings imply, in line with the related literature, that political affiliation has important effects on banks' behaviour.

This study makes the following contributions to the study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America: Conceptually it adopts Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova's (2008) distinction between clientelistic and nonclientelistic types of patronage politics and widens these authors classification of patrons' motivations for making appointments, specifically as a lens for the study of patronage practices within Latin America's presidentialist regimes. Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments based on the roles that appointees' play vis-à-vis the executive, the ruling party, and the public administration - one that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage. Empirically, it applies this taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under two left-of-center administrations. Theoretically, it contributes to theory-building by relating the findings of our research to the differences in party systems and presidential powers within the two countries under study, and to agency factors associated with the respective governments' own political projects. The article concludes that differences in patronage practices are a manifestation of two variant forms of exercising governmental power: a hyper-presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and a party-centered, social-democratic one in Uruguay.

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader's patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader's patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader's being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader's coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.

Does control of patronage jobs significantly increase a political party's chances of winning elections in U.S. states? We employ a differences-in-differences design, exploiting the considerable variation in the dates that different states adopted civil service reforms. Our evidence suggests that political parties in U.S. states were able to use state-level patronage to increase the probability of maintaining control of state legislatures and statewide elective offices. We also find that an "entrenched" party, in power for a longer time, can use patronage more effectively. We consider several alternative hypotheses that might plausibly account for the patterns in the data, but find no evidence to support them.

Dual Masters ; M.SC.CONFLICT ANALYSIS&RES. ; M.A.CONFLICT RES.&MED.STUD. ; The dissertation analyses the interaction between patronage and governance in Southern Europe by looking at two case studies, the Republic of Italy and Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 2005 and 2015. Actively engaging with definitions of patronage and literature of how this phenomenon interacts with governance, the work takes the Southern European frame as a primary point of reference in looking at a particularly 'Southern' conception of political patronage and how this affects societies. Political and social developments in the case study countries, particularly the development of governance structures, has been affected strongly by the logic of patronage in Italy and Bosnia. A synthesis section following the case studies critically examines in comparative focus the overlaps and differences between the countries, proposes a number of findings on patronage and governance, and discusses the limitations of the chosen approaches. In the process, the relevance of patronage to processes of governance and explorations of social and political conflict are elucidated such that policymakers and academics may find conclusions useful to their work. ; N/A

"Soziale Beziehungen bei den Yoruba wurden von jeher durch Sprichwörter, Redewendungen und Lieder (re-)strukturiert. In ihnen spiegelt sich das Denken der Gruppe wider. Dies zeigt sich insbesondere beim Blick auf die Beziehungen zwischen Patron und Klient und den Erwartungen, wie diese Beziehungen aussehen sollten. Durch die Analyse von Sprichwörtern, Redewendungen und Liedern der Yoruba wird gezeigt, wie indigenes gesellschaftliches Denken Werte, Normen und Erwartungen in klientelistischen Beziehungen festlegt." (Autorenreferat)