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This article examines how patronage networks operate in subnational governments in Indonesia paying particular attention to how they have affected human resource management (HRM) practices in education and health services. Corrupt practices were found in varying degrees in all the provincial public services studied. They were associated with patronage systems and involved illegal payments for entrance exam results, recruitment and selection, placement, promotion, and transfer. These practices had an adverse effect on the quantity and quality of service delivery and represented a challenge to social justice.

This research examines how single-party regimes share power among ruling elites. An examination of land institutions in China suggests that the ruling party takes advantage of a statist and partially centralized land regime to distribute land development rights (land quotas). This institutional arrangement allows central regime elites to use land as patronage to build their clientelistic networks, which further constitutes a patronage-based power-sharing scheme that allows central elites to share power among themselves. Based on a data set of land-use conversion, the empirical analysis finds that central elites channel land quotas to their political followers in provincial governments and the power to influence land quota distribution is shared among several central elites. Moreover, land quota distribution also reflects an effort to curb local governments' discretion in land use. These findings contribute to the literatures on authoritarianism and land politics, and have important implications for land institutional reforms in China.

This article argues that Hindu temples in Hyderabad, a city in a territory ruled by Muslims from the fourteenth century until the 1948 incorporation of the princely state of Hyderabad into independent India, were resources in a multi-religious landscape, institutions that reflected the political power of their patrons and often performed functions for the state. Temples were built and managed as part of the Indo-Muslim or Mughlai urban court economy in Hyderabad, and temple patronage reflected the shifting patterns of prominence as one high-ranking Hindu noble or official replaced another and secured state support for major temples. Rather than defending Hyderabad state's policies and practices with respect to Hindu institutions and events, this article shows the development and implementation of an Indo-Muslim ruling tradition as Muslim rulers interacted with non-Muslims to become part of a distinctively South Asian tradition of secularism or pluralism. Rather than syncretism or synthesis, I emphasize 'translation', appropriate to the time and place, as the concept best able to capture the pluralism of India's historical Indo-Muslim cultures.

This article argues that Hindu temples in Hyderabad, a city in a territory ruled by Muslims from the fourteenth century until the 1948 incorporation of the princely state of Hyderabad into independent India, were resources in a multi-religious landscape, institutions that reflected the political power of their patrons and often performed functions for the state. Temples were built and managed as part of the Indo-Muslim or Mughlai urban court economy in Hyderabad, and temple patronage reflected the shifting patterns of prominence as one high-ranking Hindu noble or official replaced another and secured state support for major temples. Rather than defending Hyderabad state's policies and practices with respect to Hindu institutions and events, this article shows the development and implementation of an Indo-Muslim ruling tradition as Muslim rulers interacted with non-Muslims to become part of a distinctively South Asian tradition of secularism or pluralism. Rather than syncretism or synthesis, I emphasize 'translation', appropriate to the time and place, as the concept best able to capture the pluralism of India's historical Indo-Muslim cultures.

The patron-saint of the Sovereign Military and Hospitaller Order of St John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta is St John. At present it is clear that, at least since the papal bull of Paschal II of February 1113, St John refers to St John the Baptist. Historians of the past have occasionally mentioned the existence of two patron-saints of the Order, namely St John the Baptist and St John the Almoner. With regard earlier patron-saints of the Order, there may be some difficulty in establishing who was and who was not a patron-saint, especially when it comes to St John the Almoner. ; peer-reviewed

Public spaces and buildings in Roman Cities served many functions including, but not limited to, religious gatherings, economic activity, political propaganda, and entertainment. Such vital infrastructure could not exist without the financial generosity of wealthy elites. Though most of these elite were men, some women used their wealth and status, both derived from their families, to shape public space. This study looks at female patronage of public space among women of imperial, senatorial, and equestrian standing, as well as women in both the Greek East and Latin West. It also aims to discern the level of political influence these benefactresses gained as a result of their donations.

The paper focuses on the conceptualization of party patronage. The analysis of the usage of the term party patronage reveals several challenges: scholars from different fields use different definitions of party patronage, in addition same phenomena can be described by different concepts making it difficult to compare data from different surveys or analysis. Furthermore the term itself must be revised continuously as it can become out dated due to changing aspects of party patronage in modern world. To clarify the usage of term party patronage it is important to define contiguous phenomenon such as clientelism, politicization, state capture, pork barrel and corruption. Hence this paper suggests slightly modified conceptualization used by Kopecky et al.: party patronage as power of political parties to make personnel decisions in the public sector for Lithuanian social sciences. Party patronage is defined by three dimensions: who makes the decision, what are the decisions and where those decisions are made? In case of party patronage political parties acts as collective patrons and they make decisions of the personnel matter (hiring, promoting and transferring of public servants) in public sector. This conceptualization enables to show differences between party patronage and contiguous phenomenon. In short clientelism should be understood as an electoral resource of the political party, while party patronage should be understood as an organizational and governmental resource. Concept of politicization is closely connected to party patronage, however politicization is more suitable for public administrative studies as it is directed to the separation of bureaucrats and politicians while party patronage in political science puts attention on the political power of parties to make personal decisions. State capture is defined as systematic influence of business to government in order to obtain favorable legal and regulatory decisions. Pork barrel politics means direction of funding and legislation towards certain ...

This study investigates the nature of tourism site infrastructure and how it affects patronage in Calabar Metropolis, Cross River State. The specific objectives of the study are to assess the security level, availability of leisure aid, recreation facilities, quantity and quality of historical artifacts, location ambiance, skilled tour guides and their effect on visitor patronage. The study is supported by Qualitative and inferential research design methods to ascertain the predictability of tourist patronage. A sample of one hundred and twenty-five (125) respondents were systematically selected for the study and questionnaires administered. The multiple nonlinear regression test statistic was deployed for validating the hypotheses developed for the study. Results show that security level, leisure and recreation, historical artifact and requisite accommodation were statistically significant in impacting a positive/direct influence on visitor patronage, while location ambiance and skilled tour guides were not statistically significant. It concludes that changes in visitor patronage can be accounted for by changes in tourist site infrastructure, but that location ambiance and skilled tour guides are not sufficient pull-factors for visitor patronage in Calabar Metropolis. It recommends among other things, government and private sector involvement in archeological research, security facilities, affordable accommodation for activities and oppressive use of mass media in portraying the historical significance of the area.

© by De Gruyter 2015. This article presents a model of political insulation of bureaucracies. Political influence can harm competence because it lowers the incentives of bureaucrats to invest in competence. Politicians then want to adopt institutions that insulate the bureaucracy because this establishes a commitment to reward competence. Political leaders insulate the bureaucracy if public good provision is important compared to rent extraction or when political competition forces the political elite to internalize the welfare loss caused by patronage. Through this channel political reforms can lead to reforms of the bureaucracy. The theoretical findings are illustrated with existing empirical studies and data on central bank independence. ; I acknowledge Önancial support from the Ramon y Cajal programme and Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed

By examining a significant corpus of secular and monastic charters, this study provides a more complex understanding of the role of religious patronage in medieval society, specifically offering a glimpse of the experience of female rulers in a period when actions were often constrained and obscured by gender bias. [From the publisher] ; https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_books/1038/thumbnail.jpg

Democratic countries in Southeast Asia are deeply affected by a set of interrelated phenomena that is sometimes colloquially known as 'money politics'. Rather than being based on competition between different programmes, in such a system, politics can become highly personalised. Citizens might end up hoping for personal favours from their politicians while having few expectations that the system as a whole will function in their interests. As a result, such practices are a source of considerable disillusionment with democratic politics.

Democratic countries in Southeast Asia are deeply affected by a set of interrelated phenomena that is sometimes colloquially known as 'money politics'. Rather than being based on competition between different programmes, in such a system, politics can become highly personalised. Citizens might end up hoping for personal favours from their politicians while having few expectations that the system as a whole will function in their interests. As a result, such practices are a source of considerable disillusionment with democratic politics.

As part of a general movement toward the study of complex societies in political anthropology, the last few years has witnessed a proliferation of empirical studies in patron-client ties. Most of this literature has been essentially descriptive in character, but more recently attempts have been made to analyse the problem of the relation between transitions in these ties and the kinds of structural change implied by the notion of increasing social 'complexity' .

Research in comparative politics has shown a renewed interest in the relation between political parties and the state. However, we know comparatively little about patronage - defined as the power of political parties to distribute public sector posts - as a key dimension of the linkage between political parties and the state. This article, based on comparative empirical evidence on patterns of patronage in 15 European democracies, has two central goals. First, it seeks to empirically evaluate commonalities and differences among European democracies with respect to patronage and its pervasiveness, logic and mechanics. Second, it considers the new light that the empirical analysis sheds on the contemporary explanations of patronage. The empirical analysis suggests that it is the interaction of administrative legacy effects with patterns of party system consolidation and crisis that accounts for the differences in contemporary patronage practices.

Scholars of Indonesia are still searching for ways to characterize the ordering principles of the new post-Suharto politics. In the 1950s and 1960s, Clifford Geertz's notion of aliran (stream) politics captured central features of Indonesian political life. In the 1970s and 1980s, the state took center stage, with scholars seeing the New Order state as standing above society, depoliticizing and reordering it. Since reform began in 1998, these analyses are clearly no longer adequate, but scholars have yet to find persuasive alternatives. This article offers one attempt to diagnose the fundamentals of political organization in contemporary Indonesia. It starts by emphasizing the organizational fragmentation that characterizes much contemporary political life. It seeks the origins of this fragmentation in two sources: the ubiquity of patronage distribution as a means of cementing political affiliations and the broader neoliberal model of economic, social, and cultural life in which patronage distribution is increasingly embedded. These two forces are often portrayed as being incompatible, but in practice they are frequently intertwined. This argument is first substantiated by reference to the project (Indonesian: proyek), a mechanism for distributing economic resources that is pervasive in Indonesia. The proyek formally adheres to the expectations of transparency and competition associated with neoliberalism, but is also a major source of patronage. Proyek-hunting drives much of the fragmentation in contemporary Indonesian political and social organization. The argument is then illustrated with examples drawn from four spheres: state structures, political parties, non-governmental organizations and Islamic politics.