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Het doel van dit artikel is het begrip 'patronage-relaties' te verduidelijken. Er wordt daarbij gesteld dat deze kunnen worden gekarakteriseerd als particularistisch, diffuus en verworven. Verscheidene andere geregistreerde eigenschappen, blijken uit deze drie kenmerken voort te vloeien. Deze karakterisering laat bovendien toe : 1. een onderscheid te maken tussen een sociale relatie als een modus van uitwisseling en een sociale relatie als een normatief paradigma, en de onderlinge afhankelijkheid hiervan te bestuderen;  2. het ontstaan van patronage te relateren aan factoren endogeen aan het verwantschapssysteem;  3. de rol van patronage te belichten in de structuratie van sociale ongelijkheid.  Dit artikel vormt een inleiding tot een analyse van het voorkomen, de evolutie en de huidige rol van patronage als modus van uitwisseling.

Patronage Politics Divides Us: A Study of Poverty, Patronage and Inequality in South Africa is the culmination of a research project that forms part of MISTRA's first suite of eight priority research projects. The research explores the relationship between patronage, poverty, and inequality with a particular focus on its impact on the conduct of local politics. The overall aim of the study was to explore the possibility of constituting public institutions in a manner that enables them to become legitimate arbiters between the various interests, rather than as instruments that are captured by c

Political patronage is defined as political actors appointing individuals at their discretion to key positions in the public sector. The book examines this practice in the bureaucracies of 11 Asian countries through the use of a typological framework of patronage types. The framework is based on two key criteria: basis of trust and the major role of political appointees. Several countries with well-developed civil service systems showed minimal levels of patronage (Japan, Singapore and South Korea). Two countries with a weak civil service showed very high levels of patronage appointments (Bangladesh and India). Sandwiched between those extremes are countries with formal civil service systems that are heavily influenced by political parties and by social ties to society (Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and China). The book concludes that not all patronage is the same and what is important is the tasks being performed by appointees and the nature of the trust relationship.

Front Matter -- Introduction -- Civic Patronage in the Late Republic -- Augustus and Civic Patronage -- Civic Patronage in the Principate -- Civic Patronage in the Verrines -- Civic Patronage in Roman Law -- Civic Patronage in the Epigraphical Record -- Patronage and the Patrons of Canusium: A Case Study -- Reflections on the Evolution of Civic Patronage -- Select Bibliography -- Indexes.

"Document No. 8." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

AbstractThis paper empirically investigates the link between political patronage and bank performance for Ukraine during 2003Q3–2005Q2. We find significant differences between politically affiliated and non‐affiliated banks. The data suggest that affiliated banks have significantly lower interest rate margins and increase their capitalization. Furthermore, we show that the level of activity of affiliated deputies in parliament has a positive (negative) impact on banks' capitalization ratio (interest rate margin). Our findings imply, in line with the related literature, that political affiliation has important effects on banks' behaviour.

This study makes the following contributions to the study of the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America: Conceptually it adopts Kopecký, Scherlis, and Spirova's (2008) distinction between clientelistic and nonclientelistic types of patronage politics and widens these authors classification of patrons' motivations for making appointments, specifically as a lens for the study of patronage practices within Latin America's presidentialist regimes. Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments based on the roles that appointees' play vis-à-vis the executive, the ruling party, and the public administration - one that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage. Empirically, it applies this taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under two left-of-center administrations. Theoretically, it contributes to theory-building by relating the findings of our research to the differences in party systems and presidential powers within the two countries under study, and to agency factors associated with the respective governments' own political projects. The article concludes that differences in patronage practices are a manifestation of two variant forms of exercising governmental power: a hyper-presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and a party-centered, social-democratic one in Uruguay.

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader's patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader's patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader's being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader's coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.

A test of the hypothesis that patronage is necessary to strong pol'al parties, using as a source of data competitive party systems at the state level of gov in the US. The method used to determine which competitive states have strong state party org's is outlined. Table 1 presents data on statewide primary elections in the 20 competitive states which use that nomination procedure for candidates for statewide public office, 1950-60, & table 2 constructs a 4-fold classification of competitive states according to degree of party strength of both major parties. A comparison is then made of state party strength to the incidence of patronage within the state. Due to limitations of measurement, the study is confined to a comparison of state admin'ive patronage with state party strength based on mean/average state admin'ive employment figures for the period 1954-60. Reliance is placed on the % of state admin'ive employees not under a merit system as a measure of patronage. The hypothesis tested is that states in which both pol'al parties are strong will have a high % of state admin'ive employees not covered by merit systems. The hypothesis is not supported by the Chi-square test for distribution, & 'therefore, it would seem that a state pol'al party can maintain a great deal of strength without having a great deal of admin'ive patronage to disperse. The difficult problem of measuring other forms of patronage will have to be solved before it can definitely be said that a state party can be strong without having large amounts of natronaae of anv form available.' E. Weiman.