At present, the historical process of the separation of North and South Korea through the 38th parallel is recognized as part of an ideological and political conflict. However, the constant search for reunification and the promotion of peace through dialogue on the peninsula leads to a descriptive analysis of the background related to the political and ideological conflict resulting from the Korean War (1950-1953) and its impact on the international economy up to the present day. The above is done through a qualitative methodological approach with a descriptive approach; which allows identifying one of the most important findings around the policy of denuclearization of North Korea, the role of the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, in the six-party dialogues. ; En la actualidad el proceso histórico de la separación de Corea del Norte y Corea del Sur, a través del paralelo 38° se conoce como parte de un conflicto ideológico y político, sin embargo, la constante búsqueda de la reunificación y la promoción de la paz a través del diálogo en la península, lleva a analizar de manera descriptiva los antecedentes relacionados con el conflicto político e ideológico, resultado de la guerra de Corea (1950 a 1953) y su impacto en la economía internacional, hasta la actualidad. Lo anteriormente mencionado se realiza a través de un abordaje metodológico cualitativo con un enfoque descriptivo; que permite identificar uno de los hallazgos más importantes alrededor de la política de desnuclearización de Corea del Norte, el papel de Estados Unidos, China, Japón, Corea del Sur y Rusia, en los diálogos de las seis partes.
The beginning of modern history and the subsequent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina coincide with the institutional beginnings of the European Union common foreign and security policy. At that time, Europe did not have a single position, nor could it have achieved a political consensus on any issue. In addition, it lacked appropriate instruments, as well as readiness and willingness to actively engage to put an end to war in BiH. The war in BiH was stopped, however, thanks to the efforts of the United States. This was a crucial moment for Europe to modify its common foreign and security policy. The European Union has passed a thorny path of establishing common foreign and security policy. On this path, however, the EU has experienced some progress and achieved good results, although not sufficient, just as BiH has made some progress in reforms. In order for BiH to joint the family of modern democratic countries, it will need a stronger engagement of the European Union and its more decisive common foreign and security policy, because only together we can cope with global challenges. Peace and prosperity in Bosnia and Herzegovina will also help build free and stable Europe.
Satisfied with some important progress being made in health care reform on the home front, these past few days President Obama turned his full attention to foreign policy. In a week packed with international speeches, bilateral meetings and joint declarations, he succeeded in establishing a new ambitious agenda for international cooperation and wasted no time in getting started. In his speech to the UN, he outlined his main foreign policy goals based on four pillars: non-proliferation, climate change, Middle East peace and economic stability. He spoke clearly about his determination to put an end to the international skepticism and distrust the United States faced during the Bush years and enumerated the changes already made: banning the use of torture, closing the Guantánamo base, drawing down forces in Iraq, renewing efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict by naming a special envoy, seriously addressing climate change and abandoning plans for a land-based missile defense in Eastern Europe. He challenged other leaders to respond in kind by joining US efforts at non-proliferation, fighting terrorism, taking measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combating poverty. A day later in Pittsburgh for the G-20 summit, the President, flanked by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Sarkozy, revealed a new nuclear facility built by Iran in the city of Qum and called for further sanctions on the Islamic Republic. This well-timed revelation is supposed to give the administration some more leverage when talks with the Iranians start later this week. As it happens, the US had known about this new uranium enriching plant for more than a year but had kept the information secret for later use. In Pittsburgh, with France and Britain safely on his side, the President had further opportunity to press the other two members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, to cooperate with the new sanctions regime that will most likely include imports of refined oil into Iran. While Russia appears to be leaning towards cooperation (perhaps as a quid pro quo of Obama's decision not to deploy the anti-missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic), it is not as yet clear whether the Chinese will too. This week has been a good one for China, which seems to be coming of age as an international player both in climate change and as a partner for economic stability in the G-20. But the revelation at Qum was certainly a pre-emptive coup that put the Iranians on the defensive, and gave Obama an opportunity to publicly test the other Permanent Members of the Security Council to prove their commitment to non-proliferation.As the United States moves aggressively to engage with the rest of the world and vows to renew its pledge to international law and institutions, the expectation is that others will take their share of responsibility and respond to global challenges. Obama's moral authority flows not only from what he says, and how he says it, but also by virtue of who he is: in his case, the man is the message and the intended drastic cut with his predecessor could not be more apparent. However, as Realists constantly remind us, foreign policy is about national interest defined as power, and while the change of tone and of emissary is well-noted, we are likely to see some change, but also a lot of continuity in US foreign policy. Barack Obama's first speech at the United Nations General Assembly was well-received around the world but had less impact on a home audience whose main concerns are unemployment, health care reform and economic recovery. Inevitably, the usual suspects accused him of treason for recognizing America's past mistakes in public and for socializing with tyrants. Others denounced his narcissistic impulses, for trying to portray American foreign policy as "all about Obama". While it is easy to dismiss the extreme critics, it is important for the rest of the world to realize how much the United Nations' legitimacy and prestige has suffered in the United States during the last ten years, and not only due to derisions by Bolton and Bush. TV images of the UN headquarters in New York seem distant and irrelevant to most Americans, who view the organization as an anachronistic shibboleth that embodies all fluff and no substance and whose activities are hard to take seriously in most cases, be it when it deals with Rwanda, Darfur or with Iranian sanctions. At this year's opening session, the General Assembly room, with a badly lit podium and a very unbecoming blue-greenish background, was showing its age in spite of a 2002 facelift (it was built in 1952). And while Obama was as dynamic and articulate as usual, his televised speech was followed by that of Mohammad Khadafy from Libya, which lasted one hour and a half and included bizarre statements and phrases that can only be accounted for by a serious onset of senility. Besides calling for a UN investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination, and surreally complaining about how far most of those present had had to travel to get to New York (was jetlag his excuse to explain away his own state of mental confusion?), he repeatedly called President Obama "my son" (I cringed at imagining the right wing blogs reaction to that) and referred to the UN Security Council as the "Terror Council". His difficulty to find a place in New York where he would be allowed to pitch his tent was followed with amusement by the media and further added to his own oddity, and by extension, to the inadequacy of the UN as a serious forum. While later Prime Minister Netanyahu's excellent, Churchill-like speech brought the audience back to the 21st century and restored some respectability to the venue, the UN lost credibility again when Iranian president Ahmadinejad went on a new rant later in the day and again and proceeded once more to deny the Holocaust's existence. In addition to this rarified atmosphere, the main foreign policy topic that is of concern for the American public, and the one that would have made them pay attention, namely, the war in Afghanistan was hardly mentioned by Obama in this occasion. After eight years of war in Afghanistan, the effort seems to be unraveling on all fronts. European NATO members, whose soldiers are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, are unwilling or unable to commit more troops; the Taliban has renewed its offensives with new intensity in the south and the east of the country, and the Afghan election was plagued with corruption, proving what many already suspected, that President Hamid Karzai is an extremely unreliable partner and a corrupt leader who will not be able to hold the country together. At the same time, Al Qaeda has found refuge in neighboring Pakistan so the US initial counterterrorist mission, namely to hunt down and exterminate Al Qaeda, has mutated into one of counterinsurgency against an indigenous group, the Taliban, fighting against the government and the foreign forces to regain its power. All this in a country that has never been a nation, a narco-state whose economic base is the production and trafficking of opium, and where several empires, from the Macedonians to the British and the Soviets were once defeated. The President's plan so far has been to train the Afghan army so that it can hold off the Taliban, support government institutions, gain the trust of villagers and create structures of governance in rural areas so that Al Qaeda won't be able to move in again. This week a Pentagon memo by General Crystal was leaked by Bob Woodward of Watergate fame. Published in the Washington Post on September 21st, it presents a grim picture of the war and warns that success is uncertain. It calls for new resources and a new counterinsurgency campaign. While the number of troops requested is not specified, it warns that "under-resourcing" the effort could be fatal. Woodward, never one to sell himself short, has called his leaked memo the equivalent of the 1971 Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in the New York Times, which revealed the expansion of the Vietnam War from 1965 on, that had been kept secret from the American public. Of course the memo is not the equivalent of Ellsberg and Russo's revelations, but still, it refocused attention on the intractability of this war. The President's response has been that after the Afghan election, the White House is re-assessing its strategy and that until he is satisfied with a new strategy he will not send more troops. It is clear that the administration is having doubts about a conflict it once called a war of necessity. Public opinion is also turning against what will soon be the longest war in American history, as casualties continue to increase and there is no end in sight. As the term "military surge" is being increasingly used to denote McCrystal's new demands, comparisons with the war in Iraq are inevitable. Similarly to the Iraq war, elections have represented a turning point. But the surge in Iraq began with the so-called Sunni awakening, when the Iraqis themselves decided they had had enough of the violence and organized against those that insisted on it (mainly outsiders, Al Qaeda-in-Iraq). Also, in Iraq's leader Al-Maliki, the US found a relatively reliable and legitimate partner, one who instigated the political class to resolve their differences by political means. Finally, Iraq had an economic base that could be restored to produce substantial national wealth, and a mostly urban, well-educated population with some institutional experience. In contrast, Afghanistan is a mainly rural country, a tribal society which repudiates any attempts at centralization and profoundly distrusts the government in Kabul more, in some cases, than the foreign troops. The central government is rotten and weak, Karzai an unreliable leader who stole the election and whose brother is the head of the drug mafia. Can more US troops make up for all these weaknesses?Obama is thus in a delicate situation: he can't be "at war" with his own generals (indeed, General McCrystal was appointed by Obama only in March, after he dismissed the previous general in charge). On the other hand, if he allows more troops to be deployed, there is danger that Afghanistan may become his Vietnam. He therefore needs to choose between continuing a counterinsurgency operation, training more Afghan forces, protecting the local populations, getting into their villages and gaining their trust, or withdrawing ground troops and focusing on counter-terrorism, using drones and other off-shore means and special forces to go after the terrorist bases. Vice-President Biden is advocating a middle ground strategy: leaving enough troops on the ground to prevent Al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, but redefining the mission as one of narrow counter-terrorism and move away from nation-building and a protracted counter-insurgency operation that would signify more US casualties and more discontent at home. After all, the main reason why the US went to Afghanistan was to confront and eliminate Al Qaeda, which has since then moved across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. As several domestic arrests have demonstrated this week, Al Qaeda threats are just as likely to come from Springfield Illinois, Queens New York or Dallas Texas as from abroad or from the virtual Al Qaeda organizing through the worldwide web. Recalibrating his approach to Afghanistan is thus imperative, and it must be done for the right reasons, regardless of personal gain or saving face.Obama has had a very successful September, but his ambitious agenda both at home and abroad faces many pitfalls ahead. A youthful president, brimming with self-confidence, with a huge electoral mandate and with the best team of experts in history, can still be thwarted by unsolvable problems, domestic and foreign enemies and by serendipity itself. As a student of history and a John F Kennedy admirer, Obama knows this, and he should measure his decisions and temper his ambitions accordingly. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
After several coups assisted by US agencies since the fifties in Latin America, and deep economic crises in the eighties and the nineties in South America explained by "the rule of markets" enforced by multilateral organizations, the US leadership in the Americas has been lost, and democratic countries have turned against neoliberalism with wide popular support inside a new "South American revolution" with important projects of integration. Colombia has become the capital in South America for US leadership in economics and politics, and the only country that still has guerrillas, paramilitary armies, and internal conflict. What has been the role of the US in Colombian conflict? What is in stake with the new peace process in Colombia? How this process will affect the US leadership in Latin America? These are some questions that will be reviewed by Noam Chomsky, one of the most influential thinkers of our times.
Well-intended policies often have negative unintended consequences if they fail to foresee the different ways in which individuals may respond to the new set of incentives. When widespread and persistent, these may lead to a net reduction of social welfare. Focusing on the case of anti-drug policies, in this paper we show that the recent unprecedented surge in the growing of illicit coca crops in Colombia was the result of a naive and untimely policy announcement during peace negotiations between the government and the FARC guerrillas. On May 2014, the parties¿ peace delegations issued a press release announcing that coca-growing farmers would receive material incentives for voluntary crop substitution once a final agreement had been reached. To evaluate the anticipation effect of this announcement we exploit the cross sectional variation on both the cost advantage of growing coca (using an ecological measure of coca suitability) and the expected benefits of doing so (using a predicted measure of where the material benefits would h ave b een t argeted). Coca plantations levels remained high even after the implementation of the announced incentives¿ scheme. We explain this persistence by documenting that the surge in coca growing is differentially higher in areas with presence illegal armed groups, that benefited financially from availability of a key input in the drug trade.
Este texto surge de los resultados de un proceso investigativo de incidencia llevado a cabo en el municipio de San Carlos durante los años 2016, 2017 y 2018 desde la Red Interuniversitaria por la Paz REDIPAZ e IPECAL, en el que se trazó como objetivo inicial comprender los significados construidos por las comunidades alrededor de la paz, el territorio, el conflicto armado y socioambiental, además de sus procesos y proyectos de vida colectivos; todo ello en el marco del inicio del proceso de implementación de los acuerdos de paz firmados entre el gobierno colombiano y las FARC-EP, dado que este municipio ha sido uno de los más afectados por el conflicto armado y a la vez, por el modelo económico extractivista que, de la mano de políticas estatales en alianza con multinacionales y capital privado, crean condiciones que atizan los fenómenos de violencia. Con base en esto, a medida que la investigación se fue desarrollando, fueron emergiendo otros interrogantes, entre ellos si puede ser el turismo una alternativa al modelo de desarrollo extractivista que no interfiera con las formas que tienen las comunidades para habitar sus territorios y que esté en línea con sus nociones de paz.
Este libro está dirigido a un público amplio que desee pensar la salida negociada del conflicto colombiano a partir de otras experiencias de procesos de paz y negociación anteriores y exitosas. El lector va a encontrar los aportes que hizo el Dr. Óscar Arias Sánchez, Premio Nobel de la Paz en 1987, sobre el proceso de negociación de paz en Colombia, durante su visita a la undécima Feria Ulibro, organizada por la Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga, el 26 de agosto del año 2013. El ex presidente de Costa Rica mostró en su discurso, en el encuentro que sostuvo con investigadores y las entrevistas que concedió, lo que para él serían algunos puntos fundamentales de la agenda del actual proceso de paz en el país. Recordemos que desde el 18 de octubre de 2012 se iniciaron formalmente las negociaciones entre el gobierno del presidente Juan Manuel Santos y la guerrilla de las FARC. El actual proceso de negociación se sustenta en un "Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera", y gira en torno a cinco puntos de discusión: 1) Política de desarrollo; 2) Participación política; 3) Fin del conflicto; 4) Solución al problema de Introducción: Las cicatrices de América las drogas ilícitas; y 5) Víctimas. Los diálogos se realizan en Cuba, con el apoyo de dos países facilitadores, Venezuela por parte de la guerrilla y Chile por el gobierno ; LAS CICATRICES DE AMÉRICA.5 DISCURSO PREMIO NOBEL ÓSCAR ARIAS SÁNCHEZ EN LA UNAB.19 CONVERTIR SUEÑOS EN REALIDADES.31 QUE CALLEN TODAS LAS ARMAS.45 LIBERTAD, ANHELO COMPARTIDO.59 Bibliografía.65 ; This book is aimed at a wide audience that wants to think about the way out negotiated the Colombian conflict from other experiences of previous and successful peace and negotiation processes. The reader will find the contributions made by Dr. Óscar Arias Sánchez, Prize Nobel Peace Prize in 1987, on the peace negotiation process in Colombia, during his visit to the eleventh Ulibro Fair, organized by the Autonomous University of Bucaramanga, on August 26, year 2013. The former president of Costa Rica showed in his speech, in the meeting he had with researchers and interviews that granted, which for him would be some fundamental points of the agenda of the current peace process in the country. Let us remember that since October 18, 2012, formally the negotiations between the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC guerrilla. The current process of negotiation is based on a "General Agreement for the termination conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace ", and turns around five points of discussion: 1) Development policy; 2) Political participation; 3) End of the conflict; 4) Solution to the problem Introduction: 1 The scars of America 1 The titles of the chapters of this book include some phrases of the speech pronounced on December 11, 1987 by Dr. Óscar Arias upon receiving the Nobel Prize peace. 5 illicit drugs; and 5) Victims. The dialogues are held in Cuba, with the support of two facilitating countries, Venezuela by the guerrilla and Chile for the government
Between 2006 and 2010, the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCSD) was implemented in Colombia, which, as a continuation of the Democratic Security Policy (PSD) (2002-2006), will guarantee territorial control and security in broad territories of the country; achieving historic reductions in security. This article analyzes the implementation of these policies by the National Navy, through the actions of the Marine Corps in Montes de María, and the military victory that led to obtaining military control in the area. ; Entre 2006 y 2010 se implementó en Colombia la Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática (PCSD), que, como continuación de la Política de Seguridad Democrática (PSD) (2002-2006), permitió asegurar el control territorial y la seguridad en amplios territorios del país; logrando reducciones históricas en materia de seguridad. El presente artículo analiza la implementación de esas políticas por parte de la Armada Nacional, a través del accionar de la Infantería de Marina en Montes de María, y la victoria militar que supuso la obtención del control militar en la zona.
Conforme el nivel de interacción de los actores globales ha avanzado en las últimas décadas, el papel de los medios de comunicación ha aumentado y su papel en la política nacional e internacional se ha hecho más notorio. El impacto que los medios despiertan en la sociedad es una clave para que los ciudadanos opinen y se apropien de los temas que son más cercanos. Este fenómeno ha llamado la atención de varios académicos dispuestos a analizar el rol de los medios como formadores de opinión, como actores políticos y como difusores o exportadores de cultura.1 Aquí se analiza un caso muy particular de influencia y participación de la prensa en la política exterior de los Estados y de manera muy precisa en el proceso de paz ecuatorianoperuano de 1998. ; With the level of interaction of global actors progressing during the past decades, the role of the media has increased, and its relevance both in domestic and international politics has become more notorious. The impact the media exert on the society is key whenever citizens express their opinions and embrace issues that are nearest to them. This phenomenon has called the attention of several academics willing to analyze the role of the media as opinion-shapers, political actors, and disseminators and exporters of culture.2 The article analyzes a particular case of influence and participation of the press in the foreign policy of States and, more precisely, the Ecuadorian-Peruvian peace process of 1998.
La idea de una Colombia que está construyendo paz en medio de la guerra, ha generado sentimientos encontrados y en constante tensión que van desde el escepticismo hasta la esperanza; siendo un aspecto más que sensible la negociación con la guerrilla de las FARC quien ha sido históricamente construido como el enemigo interno. Independientemente de las críticas levantadas contra el modelo de paz que está siendo discutido en la mesa de la Habana entre Gobierno Nacional y FARC, lo cierto es que el país ha iniciado la preparación para un escenario en posconflicto. Desde esta proyección, el presente artículo plantea como reflexión que la construcción de una paz duradera requiere el desmonte de la concepción del enemigo interno y el cambio de la actitud estatal de enfrentar los conflictos sociales desde la represión.
El debate sobre los diferentes escenarios que se abren dentro del posconflicto colombiano remiten a un aspecto central: la solución del problema del acceso de la tierra y la superación de las brechas campo/ciudad. La hipótesis que plantea el presente trabajo entiende que el éxito del posconflicto en Colombia reside, en una parte importante, en la puesta en práctica de una política por parte del Gobierno Nacional que guarde relación con la solución al problema campo previsto en el Acuerdo de paz. El presente texto pretende realizar análisis comparativos entre las medidas para la transformación del campo colombiano contempladas en el Acuerdo de paz y el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo del Gobierno Nacional, principales documentos donde se abordan dicha problemática. ; The debate on the different scenarios that open up in the post-conflict Colombia refer to a central aspect: the solution of the problem of access to land overcoming of the field/city gaps. The hypothesis that the present work proposes, understands that the success of the post-conflict in Colombia resides, in an important part, in the implementation of a policy by the National Government that is related to the solution to the problem area foressen in the Agreement of peace. The present text intends to carry out comparative analyzes between the measures for the transformation of the Colombian countryside contemplated in the Peace Agreement and the National Development Plan of the National Government, the main documents where this problem is addressed.
De acuerdo a la concepción del poder y de la acción político-estratégica que se conciba dentro de la ciudadanía y la institucionalidad, tendremos un menor o mayor acercamiento a las transformaciones necesarias para la finalización del conflicto armado no internacional colombiano. Es así que, es importante pensar la justicia transicional, el poder y la paz como una ecuación que debería llevar a un renacer de la Nación colombiana
El concejo municipal de Paz (CONPAZ) que se instala en la ciudad de Medellin, como desarrollo de la política de Paz del Estado y derivado de los acuerdos de Paz entre el Gobierno de Colombia y las FARC, genera retos no solo a los concejeros de paz, sino a la administración municipal y a la sociedad.
The foreign policy of neutrality adopted by the Guatemalan government in the eighties, sought to halt the arms race in the Central American region facing the Nicaraguan conflict, to develop a process of democratization as a way to reach peace. It was implemented during the government of Vinicio Cerezo with the initiatives of Esquipulas and was complemented by the Plan Arias with the International Community ́s collaboration. All this process started in 1986 and culminated with the pacification and democratization throughout Central America in 1996, when the Steady and Lasting Peace Accord was signed between the Guatemalan government and Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity guerrilla (Guerilla Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG). ; La política exterior de neutralidad adoptada por el Gobierno guatemalteco en la década de los ochenta, buscó detener la carrera armamentista en la región centroamericana frente al conflicto nicaragüense, para desarrollar un proceso democratizador, como forma de llegar a la paz. Se puso en práctica en el Gobierno de Vinicio Cerezo, con las iniciativas de Esquipulas, se complementó con el Plan Arias y contó con la colaboración de la comunidad internacional. Todo éste proceso que inició en 1986, culminó con la pacificación y democratización de toda Centroamérica en 1996, cuando se firmó el Acuerdo de Paz Firme y Duradera entre el Gobierno guatemalteco y la guerrilla Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).
The historical path of Caquetá has been determined by three basic types of settlement: the indigenous occupation, the process of agrarian colonization initiated with the agrarian reform of López Pumarejo (1936), boosted since 1950; and the urbanization process of the last decades, especially of the Amazon piedmont. Diverse manifestations of violence over territorial control have arisen in Caquetá due to its national and international geographical location, which is favorable to geopolitical economic and spatial interests of the State Armed Forces and the armed insurgent groups (FARC, M-19); its topographic conditions and for being an occupation territory of coca production. Colonization, drug trafficking and guerrilla groups are part of Caquetá´s political and economic identity, with various vicissitudes in the historical development of appropriation and control of liberties of people from Caquetá, by the belligerent actions of the State in its diverse colonization policies, armed conflict, drug trafficking, environmental damage, and mining, at the expense of the government's economic policies. Due to its geographical location in Amazonia, Caquetá is propitious and strategic to become a territory of peace. ; O desenvolvimento histórico de Caquetá foi determinado por três tipos básicos de assentamento: ocupação indígena; Processo de colonização agrária iniciado com a reforma agrária (1936) de López Pumarejo, energizado desde 1950; E processo de urbanização das últimas décadas, especialmente do Piemonte da Amazônia. Nessas etapas do estabelecimento espacial, várias manifestações violentas têm sido associadas ao controle territorial, devido à sua localização geográfica, econômica e espacial geopolítica, nacional e internacional para as Forças Armadas do Estado e os grupos armados insurgentes (FARC, M-19). Condições topográficas; Além disso, como território de ocupação para produção de coque. A colonização, o tráfico de drogas e os grupos de guerrilha são fatores de identidade política e econômica, com várias vicissitudes no desenvolvimento histórico de apropriação e controle das liberdades da população caqueteña, pelas ações beligerantes do Estado em suas diversas políticas de colonização, conflito armado, tráfico de drogas, A deterioração ambiental, a mineração em detrimento das políticas econômicas do governo. Devido à sua localização geográfica na Amazônia, Caquetá é um território propício e estratégico para alcançar um território de paz.
