Suchergebnisse

The U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship is being transformed by the revolutionary events in Europe—culminating in the end of the Cold War—and by dynamics internal to the Soviet Union. The relationship is, at present, asymmetrical: with the United States at the apex of its global influence and the USSR at its nadir, the superpowers remain equal only in their enduring capability to destroy each other. The future, however, holds more peril than promise. First, the USSR seeks to fundamentally redefine what its armed forces will look like and how they will be prepared to fight. This potential for a long-term surge in Soviet combat effectiveness must be factored into the U.S. national security calculus; now is not too soon to identify and pursue the emerging technologies upon which the U.S. trans-century agenda should be anchored. Second, the breakdown of central authority in the Soviet Union threatens to sweep away the stability and predictability that have, hitherto, defined the superpower relationship. Insofar as empires do not fade away peacefully, the disintegration of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union might emerge as the most dangerous threat to U.S. security.

Book reviewed in this article:Melvin J. Dubnick and Barbara S. Romzek. American Public Administration.Peter Augustine Lawler and Robert Martin Schaefer, eds. American Political Rhetoric: A ReaderPaul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections.Robert P. Clark. Power and Policy in the Third WorldRaffaella Nanetti, Robert Leonardi, and Piergiorgio Corbetta, eds. Italian Politics: A ReviewAlexandre Raab. The Manifesto of Entrepreneurial Democracies.Christians, F. W. Paths to Russia: From War to Peace.Laqueur, W. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations.Kerry S. Walters. The Sane Society Ideal Tn Modern Utopianism. Lewiston, NY:Gregory S. Mahler. Israel: Government and Politics in a Maturing State. San Diego:William J. Keefe. Parties, Politics and Public Policy In America.David M. Wood. Power and Policy in Western European Democracies.

The aim of this article is to identify some conditions for peaceful coexistence between the state and populations in multi-cultural societies. Initially, the concepts of ideology, nationalism and ethnicity are examined briefly. It is argued that a successful ideology, such as a nationalist or an ethnic one, must simultaneously legitimize a social order, i.e. a power structure, and provide a meaningful frame for the articulation of important, perceived needs and wishes of its adherents. A few empirical cases are then considered. These examples, ranging from the multi-cultural island-states of Mauritius and Trinidad & Tobago to the Saami (Lappish) minority situation in northern Norway, involve conflicts between nation-states and ethnic groups, and between different ethnic groups within the nation-state. Some conflicts, and the methods employed to resolve them, are compared. The uniqueness of nationalism as a modern, abstract `binary' ideology of exclusion and inclusion, and its powerful symbolic as well as practical aspects, are stressed and contrasted with `segmentary' ethnic ideologies. Finally, the article proposes a list of necessary conditions for the peaceful coexistence of culturally diverse groups within the framework of a modern nation-state. The conclusion is that the main responsibility lies with the state insofar as it possesses a monopoly of political power and the legitimate use of force. State policies should genuinely attempt to decentralize power while at the same time recognizing the right of being culturally distinctive, even in matters relevant for political discourse. State nationalism should not be symbolically linked with the collective identity of only one of the populations. The culturally homogenizing tendencies of nationalism must in other words be counteracted through institutional arrangements which secure some form of ethnic autonomy and encourage cultural pluralism. The alternatives are violent suppression and the enforced assimilation of culturally distinctive groups.

In his recent book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas Franck defines "legitimacy" as it applies to the rules applicable among states. "Legitimacy," he writes, "is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.In adopting Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, implicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq in response to Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council made light of fundamental UN Charter precepts and thereby flirted precariously with "generally accepted principles of right process." It eschewed direct UN responsibility and accountability for the military force that ultimately was deployed, favoring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States. And, in so doing, it encouraged a too-hasty retreat from the preeminently peaceful and humanitarian purposes and principles of the United Nations. As a consequence, it set a dubious precedent, both for the United Nations as it stands today and for the "new world order" that is claimed for tomorrow.

The crisis in Communism and the apparent end of the Cold War have provoked a resurgence of liberal optimism and Western triumphalism. Recent visions of a peaceful world have been conjured up, only to be overtaken by war in the Persian Gulf and the threat of global recession. Awareness of the dark side of international relations in the twentieth century persists despite the irrepressible hopes of many of its students. At this juncture in history, therefore, when eternal hope once again collides with recurrent despair, it is timely to consider the international relations thought of Oswald Spengler, the author of The Decline of the West and 'pessimist extraordinary'.

This paper synthesizes recent trends in the development of critical criminology into a new theoretical direction in thinking about crime. It rejects approaches to criminological theory that reduce crime to an outcome of micro causes or macro contexts. It suggests instead that thinking about crime should be reconsidered as the coterminous discursive production by human agents of an ideology of crime that sustains it as a concrete reality. It argues that this coproduction occurs when agents act out criminal patterns, when others seek to control criminal behavior, and when yet others attempt to research, philosophize about, and explain crime. The paper argues that reducing crime will only come about with a reduction of investment by human agents in the ideology of crime production. Such a reflexive re‐conceptualization requires the development of a replacement discourse, rather than an oppositional one, a peacemaking discourse rather than a conflicting one. We call this new theoretical direction constitutive criminology.

Two issues have dramatized the revived potential for a decisive UN contribution to diplomacy in the 1990s. One is the rise of the environmental agenda as an issue at once, both genuinely global, and politically divisive. Conflict is generated because global warming, acid deposition, ozone depletion and marine pollution create real but also differential costs to the states of the world. The second issue, apparent since 1989, is the renewed opportunities for peacekeeping, and the credibility of economic sanctions created by the end of the Cold War and the onset of the Gulf Crisis. Some environmental threats, such as the potential consequences of rising sea-levels, also impinge on traditional military-territorial concepts of security. The fusion of these issues has given rise to the idea of environmental security which generates both an opportunity and a test for the UN's revival as a focus of multi-lateral diplomacy.

The implementation of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts must be considered in the light of three basic problems.First, in time of peace no one wants to think about the kind of situation where this body of law is put into practice. Nor is it easy to foster enthusiasm for legal rules which are beyond people's personal experience. But unless certain efforts are made and steps taken in peacetime, it cannot be expected that these rules will be implemented in time of crisis or war.

Though the issues of the 1989 Senegal–Mauritania conflict were deep-rooted, the unexpected passions unleashed within the respective populations caught both Governments off-guard, leading to a total stand-off and the failure of all attempts at resolution. This occured among states which previously had experienced peaceful relations, were making progress in joint economic development efforts, and whose markets were intertwined through trade and labour migration.

The fall of the East European regimes as a result of denying their peoples freedom has delivered them over to reactionary politics of the right. If Africa is to avoid the same fate, a peaceful transition to stable democratic systems is urgently required that means immediate freedom of association and a free press. But it also means society must prosper and that in turn still dictates structural transformation. Building democracy continues to constitute political and economic tasks.

Art. 1 [Guiding Principles] - I.L.M. Page 506 [Sovereign equality; territorial integrity; political independence; human rights; environmental preservation; non-interference; prevention of war; precedence of the rule of international law]Art. 2 [Territorial Integrity] - I.L.M. Page 507 [Neither State has any territorial claims against any other State]Art. 3 [Peaceful Settlement Of Disputes] - I.L.M. Page 507 [Non-use of the threat or use of force except for collective self-defense]

This article provides a conceptual rationale for the potential complementarity of international mediation and third party consultation or problem-solving within the context of a contingency model. Social conflict is viewed as a dynamic process involving a mix of objective and subjective factors which changes over time, thus creating opportunities for different third party interventions. In the model, the various methods of intervention (conciliation, pure mediation, consultation, power mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping) are matched to one of four stages of conflict escalation where they are deemed to have the most influence on de-escalation. In addition, third party interventions are sequenced within the model to show how combining different methods might work toward the eventual resolution of the conflict. Within this context, mediation and consultation are seen as having two main points of complementarity. In the first instance, consultation which improves the relationship between the parties can serve a useful prenegotiation function. The second point occurs at a higher stage of escalation wherein power mediation, which is deemed useful to control hostility and gain settlement on some substantive issues, is followed by consultation to analyse and de-escalate the conflict to a less intense level. The potential of the contingency model is illustrated through reference to the Cyprus conflict and the numerous third party interventions that have attempted to address it. The analysis indicates that the model helps provide some possible reasons for the success and failure of different interventions over a thirty-five year period. The article concludes that the matching and sequencing of different third party interventions may be necessary for positive influence, especially in highly escalated and protracted conflict.

The 1980s will go down in history as the Decade of Democracy. Latin America, Europe, and even parts of Africa saw remarkable gains in political pluralism and individual freedoms, but nowhere was this more pronounced than in central and eastern Europe and the Balkans. As Timothy Garton Ash chronicled in his inspiring essays, The Magic Lantern, the movements of a people from totalitarianism to freedom were remarkably peaceful. Once started, the speed was breathtaking. This dash toward freedom is epitomized in Ash's quip made famous by playwright, turned President, Vaclav Havel: "In Poland it took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks: perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!"' It actually took twenty-four days from meetings in the smoke-filled basement of the Magic Lantern Theater (which served as the Civic Forum's headquarters) to the Presidency. The decade of democracy began with a Polish Pope making his first visit to Poland in June 1979, which inspired the courage necessary to form Solidarity in 1980. The decade ended with people poking their heads out from beneath the weight of the Iron Curtain. From the Baltic to the Adriatic, once again people breathed the air of freedom--the freedoms we take for granted: of association, thought, prayer, and to own private property. Today, I would like to reflect on the first year or two of freedom for the emerging economies of east central Europe and the Balkans, and specifically highlight the important role of the financial sector for their future success.

In his 1862 essay "Chiefly about War-Matters" Hawthorne, in the guise of "a Peaceable Man," devotes as much of his attention to the plight of poor Southern whites as he does to the immediate motive for war: the condition of enslaved blacks. In fact, he writes that "[t]he present war is so well justified by no other consideration as by the probability that it will free this class of Southern whites from a thraldom in which they scarcely begin to be responsible beings."1 The Civil War is represented as a sign of the imminent regeneration of the entire brutalized Southern race and, further, as ushering in the long-promised age of genuine American democracy. This essay, in which Hawthorne's sentiments are so deeply buried beneath layers of irony, signifies unambiguously, if nothing else, the pervasiveness of a pro-slavery mentality that has little to do with the geographical division of North and South. His "Peaceable Man" takes pains to establish the historical status of American slavery as a phenomenon of very long standing and so makes us privy to "an historical circumstance, known to a few, that connects the children of the Puritans with these Africans of Virginia, in a very singular way." From the first settlement of New England, alternative destinies have been foreshadowed for the New World: in contrast to the "Cittie upon a Hill" which Puritan leaders interpreted as the glorious destiny of their experiment, ominous tokens of human depravity have suggested an American destiny that is no more than a repetition of Europe's mistakes. Hawthorne uses the vocabulary of typology to stress the historical determination of these alternative visions of national identity and to underline the inescapable nature of the consequences that follow from the choice between them. Together with his concern over the psychological enslavement of white Americans by the ideology of slavery, this passage sets out Hawthorne's attitude towards slavery as a national evil which demands a national penance.

International audience ; French economists address the question of defence only in the budgetary area of military spending. Yet national defence and security are necessary for the economy as a whole, even if, in peacetime, spending is often described as unproductive. The question is then raised of the "burden of defence", as if it did not provide the security necessary for all economic activity. Defence economics has not yet found its place as a fundamental discipline of economic science. ; Les économistes français n'abordent la question de le défense uniquement sur le domaine budgétaire des dépenses militaires. Or, la défense et la sécurité nationales sont nécessaires à l'ensemble de l'économie, même si, en temps de paix, des dépenses sont souvent qualifiées d'improductives. La question est alors posée du « fardeau de la défense », comme si celle-ci n'apportait pas la sécurité nécessaire à toute activité économique. L'économie de la défense n'a pas encore trouvé sa place comme discipline fondamentale de la science économique.