Suchergebnisse

Both because the United Nations (UN) spectacularly failed in Rwanda and because of the dose links between the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the continuing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) -- formerly the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) -- constitutes an important test-case for UN peacekeeping. However, since MONUSCO is ongoing, it is too early to assess whether or not it has passed this test. This article, however, focuses on a particular issue that may ultimately cause the mission to fail, namely contradictions within its ever-expanding mandate. It argues that MONUSCO itself is helping to fuel these tensions through its flawed approach to one of the key components of its mandate, namely DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) and DDRRR (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration). It thus suggests how MONUSCO might revise its approach to these processes, particularly through a more 'bottom-up' focus that engages directly with local communities and with former combatants as individuals. Adapted from source document.

Though UN peacekeeping has changed dramatically since its inception, peacekeepers are still ostensibly committed to the "holy trinity" of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. Impartiality has come under special pressure, as peacekeepers are increasingly expected not only to observe the situation, but to take forceful action against "spoiler" groups that threaten the peace or human rights. This essay draws on official statements, outside analysis, and a number of interviews with peacekeepers conducted by the author and his research assistant, to demonstrate that a wide variety of understandings of "impartiality" currently exist, potentially undermining peacekeeping operations. The author attempts to systematize these variations according to how they understand the standard of impartiality, the process for making impartial decisions, and the scope of operations that fall under the concept. Ultimately, the author argues for an understanding of impartiality that is practically focused on achieving peace and includes structured consultations with all parties as a conceptual necessity, not just a helpful technique.

Participation in UN peace operations has increased differences in civil-military relations in South America. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have internalized and implemented divergent defence policies, even as they have increased their troop contributions and been involved in similar or identical peacekeeping missions. This is caused not only by the fact that these countries have very different motivations for participating in peace operations; they have also drawn very different lessons from their exposure to peacekeeping. Adapted from the source document.

Women are being encouraged to join peacekeeping operations as sexual violence problem-solving forces while simultaneously undertaking a complex role as 'protectors' of local women from local men and male peacekeepers. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 in 2000, the UN has urged states to deploy more women. Among the implicit assumptions underlying these calls are that an increase in the representation of women in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) will lead to a decrease in the cases of HIV/AIDS, a decline in the number of brothels around peacekeeping bases, and a reduction in the number of babies fathered and abandoned by peacekeepers after their mission comes to an end. Evidence suggests that the presence of women peacekeepers can and does foster a change in male behaviour when women are deployed in PKOs. This article argues, however, that countering abuse should not be a substitute for the more encompassing goal of improving gender balance and equality in PKOs. While there is a need to combat sexual violence in PKOs, the responsibility for prevention should be on troop-contributing countries, which need to exercise accountability and prosecute sexual violence committed by their peacekeepers. Diverting responsibility to women does not address the problem of sexual violence in PKOs, or help eradicate its causes. Adapted from the source document.

The author compares the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the crimes against humanity and possible genocide in Darfur (since 2003). He finds one main common point: the basic incapacity to turn the Responsibility to Protect from a virtuous doctrine into a practical reality. On the basis of his wide experience as a scholar of African politics, the author gives his answer to the question why. His conclusion is that in both cases there was either no 'peace' to keep for the 'peacekeepers', or several of the actors had no intention of respecting the peace agreement. He then sums up seven commonly held illusions about peacekeeping: a) Parties stop fighting because they recognize the inanity of conflict; b) "Give war a chance" is wrong c) A bad peace is better than a good war; d) A peacekeeping military force on the ground changes the reality; e) A pro-forma stabilization of peace is enough to start a peacekeeping operation; f ) 'Conflict' is an operational concept; and g) We deal with the present, the past belongs to historians. He concludes that in many ways the failed peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Darfur are exemplary, not because of what peacekeeping advocates hope are technical mistakes, but because the basic concepts of why the operations were undertaken at all. He argues there are no quick-fix solutions, because the basic concepts are wrong, or at the very least wrongly applied, and that if we cannot do something properly, we should not do it at all.

This article examines the debate surrounding the responsibility to protect [R2P] with particular reference to the use of peacekeeping forces in that regard. Post-Cold War, human protection had expanded into a matter of international concern. Yet, where formerly humanitarian intervention was the mot du jour, a change in conceptual vocabulary led to the introduction of R2P and to a redefinition of sovereignty. Accordingly, the primary responsibility to protect its citizens rests with the sovereign state but, owing to international solidarity, the residual responsibility rests with the international community. Contextually, R2P is embedded in a continuum of responsibilities: prevent, react and rebuild. Proponents of the concept already see a norm in development. Still, divisions and confusion remain concerning the concept's legal basis, its scope and its parameters. This is particularly relevant in view of peacekeeping forces, which have been increasingly deployed for humanitarian purposes. Because of ill-defined mandates and an overextension of resources, however, traditional peacekeeping is no longer suitable, lacking the resources, the personnel and the necessary expertise. To be able to fulfil the goals of R2P, peacekeeping will have to be redefined and the forces equipped with more robust mandates or fail.