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This article traces the history of Australian peacekeeping since its beginnings in September 1947. It shows that, while there have always been Australian peacekeepers in the field since 1947, the level of commitment in different periods has varied greatly. The article sets out to explain this phenomenon, chiefly in political terms. It argues that Australia's early involvement in the invention of peacekeeping owed much to External Affairs Minister H.V. Evatt's interest in multilateralism, but that under the subsequent conservative Menzies government a new focus on alliance politics produced mixed results in terms of peacekeeping commitments. By contrast, in the 1970s and early 1980s, for different reasons Prime Ministers Whitlam and Fraser pursued policies which raised Australia's peacekeeping profile. After a lull in the early years of the Hawke Labor government, the arrival of internationalist Gareth Evans as Foreign Minister signalled a period of intense peacekeeping activity by Australia. For different, regionally-focused reasons, Australia was again active in peacekeeping in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In recent years, however, Australia's heavy commitment to Middle East wars has reduced its peacekeeping contribution once again to a low level.

The issue of civilian protection by international actors has gone through significant evolutions over the last decade, with a particular resonance in the African context. First, civilian protection by peacekeepers has become increasingly mainstreamed both in policy documents and in African peacekeeping operations' mandates. In parallel, civilian protection lies at the core of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) adopted by the 2005 UN World Summit. This parallel conceptual development has led to a rapprochement between the two emerging norms. Issue-linkage between RtoP and civilian protection in peacekeeping operations has been observed in the broad policy development, while peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Côte d'Ivoire in particular have provided examples of such a rapprochement. Drawing on developments on the African continent, this article argues that issue-linkage between RtoP and civilian protection in peacekeeping is counterproductive. First, RtoP is characterized by its exceptional nature and narrow agenda – in relation to the four threshold crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing – while the civilian protection in peacekeeping agenda is broad-ranging. Second, the two concepts imply different degrees of use of force that should justify a conceptual caesura. Third, both RtoP and civilian protection in peacekeeping are emerging norms that are resisted because of a suspicion of norm-makers' political agendas. The contentious nature of the two concepts, in particular the coercive dimension of RtoP, is such that issue-linkage is likely to exacerbate norms' resistance rather than provide a mutually reinforcing environment.

Recent literature has argued that a 'dominant peacebuilding culture' has precluded the contextualisation of peacebuilding to local dynamics. The article explores the 'peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus' in practice, where civilian peacekeepers are increasingly considered to be early peacebuilders. Drawing on examples from United Nations (UN) civilian peacekeeping involvement in local peacebuilding in South Sudan, this article argues for a less reductionist and more nuanced view of local peacebuilding and the social interactions and dynamics which take place. It recognises the discrepancies between official UN Headquarters (HQ) policy and action in the "field", and thus explores the relationship between policy and practice and the location of agency and authority in civilian peacekeeping. The article argues that the critique levelled against peacekeeping and peacebuilding for being focused on actors in host country capitals does not sufficiently take into consideration the relationship between capitals and the "field". Rather, local peacebuilding outcomes depend as much or more on negotiations, bargains and compromises between different actors at the "field" level, than on institutional policy decision-making deriving from headquarters.

From a practitioner perspective, the study explores what the three regional peacekeeping missions – UNDOF, UNIFIL and UNTSO - may do 'the day after' peace accords were in place, relative to potential security arrangements on the Syria and Lebanon tracks. The inquiry looks at the 'mechanics' of the security implementation system after peace accords are in place; the role of the UN in assisting peace implementation and potential improvements; the future validity of prior negotiation positions and the possible effect of seminal transitions in the Middle East, prior to an outcome of the Syria conflict. As an example, the study considers the experience of Egypt after the peace treaty with Israel, and the security arrangements in the Sinai. The study finds that the traditional peacekeeping or military monitoring operations are well-suited to post-accord security arrangement facilitation, and highlights the primary value of traditional peacekeeping missions as confidence-building mechanisms, supporting the development of state relationships.

United Nations (UN) peace operations are once again at a crossroads, partly due to overstretched capacities. In the meantime, there are indications that peacekeepers face a new and perhaps less expected challenge. Over the last few years, rulers in Burundi, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have pushed through the reduction of peacekeeping personnel or forced the wholesale withdrawal of peace operations – despite the concerns of the UN. This paper explores whether there is a new hostility to peacekeeping in Africa's weak states. What should and can the UN do if the assistance they offer in support of peace consolidation is rejected by their putative national 'partners', especially when the countries in question continue to face serious post-conflict challenges? Using the cases of UN missions in the DRC and South Sudan, this article examines why the well-established principle of consent of host state governments cannot any longer be taken for granted by peacekeepers. It argues that the increasing hostility towards peace operations is a function of their becoming actors in the domestic power game, as a result of their ever longer and intrusive presence.

The end of the Cold War witnessed the resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Africa, which necessitated the deployment of peacekeeping missions in many crisis contexts. The risk of HIV transmission increases in post-conflict environments where peacekeepers are at risk of contracting and spreading HIV/AIDS. In response, UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000) stressed the need for the UN to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and advice in its training for peacekeepers. However, troops in peacekeeping missions remain under national command, thus limiting the UN prerogatives. This article discusses the risk of peacekeepers contracting or transmitting HIV/AIDS, as well as the role of peacekeeping missions in controlling the spread of the disease, and offers an account of the steps taken within UN peacekeeping missions and African regional peacekeeping initiatives to tackle the challenges of HIV/AIDS. While HIV/AIDS remains a scourge that could weaken peacekeeping in Africa, it seems that inertia has set in, making it even more difficult to tackle the complexity of this phenomenon.

What leads peacekeeping forces to secure the support of the people they serve? This paper answers this question by examining public support for MINUSTAH, the peacekeeping force currently deployed in Haiti. Our analysis of public opinion data finds that in Haiti, peacekeepers have not fared much better than most domestic institutions in terms of legitimacy. We find that both before and after the 2010 earthquake, public support for peacekeepers trailed the low levels of support for domestic institutions. To understand why MINUSTAH has struggled to earn the support of the people it serves, we examine public evaluations of the peacekeeping mission and identify the determinants of support for peacekeepers, focusing in particular on the role of service provision in predicting people's support for MINUSTAH. Adapted from source document.

Private military and security companies increasingly perform services for the UN. The article describes how these companies are used by the UN organization and become part of UN operations. Their participation influences the planning and implementation of UN peacekeeping. By performing tasks such as protective security, security training, peacekeeper training, counselling and intelligence, private companies influence both the epistemological and operational dynamics of peacekeeping. This not only diffuses authority over peacekeeping into the commercial market, it often happens with a very low degree of transparency. Adapted from the source document.

In recent literature on international peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions, attention has been drawn increasingly to local level dynamics and the reciprocal relationships with national conflict dynamics. This article places local social structures and networks at the centre of analysis and action, while unpacking the category of the 'external actor'. Through a case study of UN civilian peacekeeping support to local peacebuilding in South Sudan, it argues that there are important efforts being made to contextualise peacebuilding activities for local circumstances, notwithstanding significant institutional obstacles limiting the impact of these efforts. It also argues for further empirical scrutiny of if and how international peacebuilders are engaging with the local dynamics of conflict, seeking to improve the understanding of the heterogeneity of and interaction between actors at these levels.