Suchergebnisse

Tämän tutkimuksen sysäsi liikkeelle kuilu, jonka havaitsin politiikkaideaalien ja kehitysyhteistyön käytännön välillä. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten laajaan turvallisuuteen sekä kehityksen ja rauhaan liittyvät ideaalit heijastuvat käytäntöön. Tutkimuskohteena on kehitysyhteistyö konfliktista kärsineellä alueella. Tutkimus on luonteeltaan tapaustutkimus. Se tarkastelee Suomen ja Nepalin kahdenvälisen vesi- ja sanitaatiohankkeen toteutusta. Tutkimus kysyy, millä tavoin Rural Village Water Resources Management -hanke huomioi konfliktin vaikutukset toimintaympäristöönsä. Tavoitteena on tuottaa politiikkarelevanttia tietoa avunannosta konfliktialueilla. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen ja käsitteellinen perusta ammentaa keskustelusta, joka pohtii turvallisuuden ja kehityksen välistä yhteyttä. Keskiössä ovat ajatus siitä, että rauha, turvallisuus ja kehitys muodostavat tiiviin yhteenliittymän, sekä keskustelu avunannon ja konfliktien välisestä yhteydestä. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen viitekehys pohjaa näihin teemoihin. Siinä määritellään kehitysinterventioita neljän ulottuvuuden kautta. Ensimmäinen on kehitysinterventioiden määrittely suhteessa konfliktiin: toimivatko ne konfliktissa, pyrkivätkö ne vaikuttamaan konfliktiin vai kiertäväktö ne sen. Muita ulottuvuuksia ovat ajatus konfliktisensitiivisyydestä ja riskienhallinnasta sekä interventioetiikka. Tutkimus perustuu narratiiviseen tietämiseen. Se tuo hankkeessa toimivat yksilöt esiin kansainvälisen politiikan legitiimeinä tietäjinä. Samalla tutkimus tarjoaa ruohonjuuritason näkökulman siihen, millaisena kansainvälisyys näyttäytyy kehitysyhteistyön käytännöissä. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu hankedokumentaatiosta, arkistomateriaalista, haastatteluista ja tutkimuspäiväkirjan merkinnöistä. Tutkimuksessa on käytetty tarinoihin pohjaavaa narratiivista analyysiä. Työtä ovat ohjanneet arvostavan kyselyn (appreciative inquiry) periaatteet. Tuloksena on tapaushanketta koskeva retrospektiivinen narratiivi. Tapaustutkimuksella on kolme käytännön ulottuvuutta. Yhtäältä se liittyy suomalaisiin, kehitysyhteistyötä koskeviin politiikkalinjauksiin, toisaalta taas Nepaliin konfliktista kärsineenä alueena, etenkin yhteen kaukolännen kyläkehityskomiteaan, Bhatakatiyaan Achhamin maakunnassa. Kolmas ulottuvuus on Suomen ja Nepalin välinen kehitysyhteistyö. Narratiivisen analyysin avulla syntynyt tarina valottaa, miten monin tavoin toimintaympäristöä kohdannut konflikti on vaikuttanut tutkittuun hankkeeseen. Hanketta koskevassa dokumentaatiossa mainittiin toistuvasti, että hanke edistää rauhan rakentamista. Hankkeen vaikutusta rauhaan ei kuitenkaan monitoroitu eikä arvioitu, ja väitteet osoittautuivat pitkälti tyhjiksi. Narratiivi osoittaa, että tavat, joilla hanke vastasi ympäristön haasteisiin olivat enimmäkseen reaktiivisia, eivät ennalta suunniteltuja. Syitä tähän olivat muun muassa paikallisten analyysien puuttuminen ja ohueksi jäänyt toimintaympäristön ymmärrys, hankkeessa toimineiden henkilöiden epätasainen ja heikko konfliktisensitiivisyyden tuntemus sekä puutteelliset politiikka- ja ohjelmaohjeistukset konfliktialueilla toimimiseen. Tarina paljastaa, että hankkeessa painotettiin riskien hallintaa. Tästä huolimatta hankkeessa ei tehty systemaattisia konfliktianalyysejä eikä riskiarviointeja. Toisaalta narratiivi osoittaa kuinka hanke toimi myös proaktiivisesti suhteessa identifioituihin riskeihin. Esimerkkejä tästä ovat läpinäkyvyys, osallistavuus sekä toimintatapa, joka painotti paikallistuntemusta ja yhteyksiä hankkeen edunsaajiin. Tarina tuo myös esiin sen, että hanke kykeni vastaamaan rakenteellisen epäoikeudenmukaisuuden haasteisiin. Keinoina olivat paikallista omistajuutta ja sosiaalista inkluusiota korostava lähestymistapa. Empiirinen narratiivi käsitellään työn diskussiossa teoreettisen viitekehyksen kautta. Tutkittu hanke kuvaillaan siinä ensin konfliktia kiertäväksi ja konfliktista huolimatta toimivaksi. Konflikti koettiin hankkeessa kehityksen esteenä ja välteltävänä asiana. Toiseksi tutkimus paljastaa, että riskienhallintaan liittyvä ajattelu oli yksisuuntaista. Hankeeseen kohdistuneet riskit huomioitiin, mutta hankkeen mahdollisesti aiheuttamia riskejä ei arvioitu lainkaan. Kolmanneksi hanke määritellään semisensitiiviseksi suhteessa konfliktiin. Määrittelyssä huomioidaan intuitiiviset tavat toimia konfliktista kärsineellä alueella. Hankkeen toimijat tunnustivat konfliktin olemassaolon ja heidän toimintaansa ohjasivat kokemukset aiemmasta suomalaisesta kehitysinterventiosta Nepalissa sisällissodan aikana. Neljänneksi tutkitun hankkeen voi myös nähdä vaikuttaneen konfliktin syihin. Keskeisiä tekijöitä tässä oli kaksi: osallistava, paikallista omistajuutta korostava prosessi, jonka avulla laadittiin suunnitelma vesiresurssien hallitsemiseksi sekä toimintatapa, joka korosti sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa ja sosiaalista inkluusiota. Viidenneksi tutkimus osoittaa, että interventioetiikan kannalta tapaushanke toimi pitkälti vastavuoroisuuden, puolueettomuuden, johdonmukaisuuden ja universaalisuuden periaatteiden mukaisesti. Kestävyyden ja täydentävyyden periaatteiden osalta hanke toimi eri vaiheissaan vaihtelevasti. Tilivelvollisuuden ja refleksiivisyyden periaatteiden osalta hanke jäi puutteelliseksi. ; A gap between policy idea(l)s of broad security and a security-development nexus, and their seeming absence in the practice of development cooperation led to this study. This research explores the practice of development in a conflict-affected context. It is a case study of a Finnish-Nepali bilateral water and sanitation project in Far Western Nepal. It asks whether or not and how it was that the Rural Village Water Resources Management Project came to take into consideration its conflict-affected operational context. The aim is to produce policy-relevant insights on the theme of aid and conflict. The theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the study are based on a review of the shifts in security-development thinking. In focus is the notion of a peace-security-development nexus and the debate on aid and conflict. These themes provide a foundation for the four-dimensional theoretical framework, which defines interventions as working in, on or around conflict; as well as through peace and conflict sensitivity; risk management thinking; and intervention ethics. The study is based on storied knowing (narrative cognition). It provides a grassroots perspective into development practice as a representation of the international by bringing individuals involved in the project to the fore as legitimate knowers in the sphere of International Relations. The dataset of the study is composed of project documentation, archival material, interviews and research journal entries. Informed by principles of appreciative inquiry, the research has been carried out as a configurative narrative analysis. The result is a retrospective historical narrative of the studied case project. The studied case is set into context through three intersecting dimensions: Finnish policies guiding development cooperation; Nepal as a conflict-affected area, with focus on the Far West and Bhatakatiya VDC in Achham district; and Finnish-Nepali bilateral development cooperation. The narrative shows that the studied project was affected by its conflict-affected context in several ways throughout its duration, and points to repeated claims within the project documentation of the intervention's contribution to peacebuilding. Yet these claims are found to be largely void of substantial content and wanting of monitoring and evaluation to confirm them. The project's responses to contextual challenges are disclosed as having been predominantly reactive and ad hoc. Reasons for this included thin contextual knowing and absence of local analyses, uneven and weak understanding of conflict sensitivity among project actors; as well as the vague and inconclusive policy and program guidance regarding aid in conflict-affected contexts. Further, despite a strong emphasis in the intervention on risk management, the narrative presents the project as lacking in systematic and localized context and conflict analyses or risk assessments. On the other hand the story tells how transparency in all project work; emphasis on project actors' local knowledge and contacts with local staff and beneficiaries; as well as adopting a participatory approach were used proactively as ways to respond to the risks perceived. Finally, the story reveals how the project was able also to respond to structural injustices and root causes of conflict through its program design based on strong local ownership as well as through its inclusive working modalities. The findings of the empirical narrative are discussed through the theoretical framework, which presents the studied project first as having worked around, and in conflict despite the conflict: conflict was found to have been treated as a constraint to development and something to be avoided. Secondly, the study reveals the primacy of "one-way-street" risk management thinking in the project: only risks presented by the context toward the project were considered, but not vice versa. Thirdly, the project was found to have been semisensitive to conflict and to have worked intuitively in the conflict-affected context: aid actors were found to have acknowledged the conflict and to have been guided by experience of a prior Finnish development intervention in Nepal during the time of the civil war. Fourth, this research exposes the intervention design based on a rigid participatory step-by-step process of water use master planning and the approach of gender equity and social inclusion as courses through which the project may be seen as having also worked on conflict. Fifth, through a reflection of a framework of intervention ethics, this study shows how the project largely held with principles of mutuality, impartiality, consistency, and universality; how it held with the principles of sustainability and complementarity in varying degrees during different stages of the project, and how it did not quite fully live up to the principles of accountability and reflexivity.

The warming of the climate system is unequivocal according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and will have a strong impact on the security of humans and states alike. In the past half-century the climate system has changed in unprecedented ways and future climate change and variability will include long-lasting alterations to all components of the climate system. With the warming of the climate system and the recognition of the implications that this has for the availability and quality of renewable natural resources, scholars and policy-makers fear that the impacts of climate change will also increase the risk of violent conflict and affect their dynamics. However, despite the rather large amount of studies in the field, scholars have yet to move beyond a number of interesting patterns to establish results that remain robust across studies. While this is partly a reflection of the inherent challenge of observing links between uncertain structural factors such as climate change and rare social outcomes such as violent conflict, the field has also been repeatedly criticised for a lack of sound theoretical development. This has been exacerbated by the practice of excluding qualitative research from state of the art reviews. The purpose of this report is to fill this gap by contributing to a better theoretical understanding of the linkages between climate change and violent conflict through consulting the combined quantitative-qualitative literature. In this report, we seek to answer the question of how, and under what circumstances, climate change influences the risk of violent conflict in East Africa. We specifically focus on the pathways to violence – explanations that link various phenomena – in this case climate change and variability, and violent conflict – through a continuous and contiguous chain of links. We explore the research question through a systematic review of the climate- conflict literature on East Africa, hence obtaining a manageable amount of relevant studies and ensuring some minimal cross-study comparability. East Africa was chosen because of the frequency of violent conflict in the region, its high livelihood dependence on natural resources, high levels of poverty and limited capacity for climate change adaptation. The region is also especially relevant from a Swedish policy perspective, since Sweden has considerable development cooperation engagements in East Africa, for example in assisting climate change adaptation and peacebuilding. The present analysis builds on 44 peer-reviewed articles published between 1989-2015 that examine the relationship between climate-related environmental change and violent conflict. By focusing on climate-related environmental change, that is a change in biophysical conditions that are or will be affected by a change in the state of the climate or by variations in the mean state of the climate, we widened our analysis beyond climate change to encompass both short- and long-term environmental change. The analysis is summarised in a conceptual framework that identifies five types of pathways from climate-related environmental change to violent conflict in East Africa. In particular, the negative impact of climate-related environmental change on the availability of natural resources can lead to conflict by worsening livelihood conditions, by increasing migration or by changing pastoral mobility patterns. Taken together, these three types of pathways lead to or exacerbate local resource conflicts that sometimes turn violent. Weather conditions and climate variability can also affect the tactical considerations of armed groups and hence contribute to intensified fighting during certain periods. Finally, the analysis shows that local resource conflicts are susceptible to elite exploitation that often significantly increases the risk and intensity of violent conflict. This highlights the critical role of political and economic elites in explaining how local resource conflicts relate to larger processes of civil war, ethnic cleansing and insecurity. In the discussion, we deepen the analysis by underlining three critical dimensions inherent in the literature: the temporal, spatial and political dimensions. First, the analysis shows that it is essential to reflect on the temporal dimensions of a climate-conflict link, both with regard to temporal scale of the environmental change in question and the expected time lag from that change to the outbreak of violent conflict. There is no reason to believe that all climate-related environmental changes at different time scales generate the same social outcomes. The bulk of the quantitative literature on East Africa measures conflict onset or intensity as an immediate reaction to climate variability, thus studying the implications of climate variability rather than of climate change. To capture the full spectrum, investigations of a climate-conflict link also need to consider the implications of long-term changes in altered livelihood conditions and rapid- onset disasters such as extreme weather events, as these pose a different kind of challenge for societies to mitigate and respond to. Second, the analysis shows the importance of accounting for the spatial dimension. The impacts of climate-related environmental change are unevenly distributed across space and altered livelihood conditions can offset population movements. There is therefore often no merit in assuming that climate-related environmental change will lead to violence in a certain area without considering how people move between areas characterised by resource scarcity and resource abundance. Third, the analysis emphasises that climate-related environmental change and violent conflict cannot be understood in an apolitical vacuum, since socio-political processes affect the relative distribution of natural resources, the adaptive capacity of individuals, groups and societies, and the risk of violent conflict. For example, absent, corrupt or non-functional political institutions often increase the risk of local resource conflicts turning violent. Thus, while climate-related environmental change in itself has not precipitated an East African anarchy so far, it has already played a role in the dynamics of violent conflict and will probably continue to do so, even though the consequences are ultimately mediated by human behaviour. Regarding the implications for policy and future research, three strands of policy implications follow from the analysis. First, since a central claim in the literature is that worsening livelihood conditions make people more likely to engage in violence, efforts that mitigate the impact of climate- related environmental change and that build resilience may also contribute to resilience to violent conflicts. Examples include weather insurance schemes and improved access to markets for pastoralists, income diversification and efforts that improve livelihood conditions. Second, movements across space are a crucial adaptation mechanism for populations affected by climate- related environmental change, particularly for pastoralist groups. This means that efforts that enable and support adaptation to population movements may increase both human security and lower the risk of violent conflict. One example relates to efforts that enable pastoral mobility while providing channels to solve resulting conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. Finally, the analysis shows that institutions, both formal and informal, are crucial for mediating conflicts. Since most communities already have some conflict resolution mechanisms, outside actors should focus on how such local knowledge can be adapted to meet new demands and increased pressure, rather than trying to introduce entirely new mechanisms. Future scholarship should examine the challenges relating to the temporal and spatial dimensions of climate-conflict research by studying the impacts of long-term environmental change rather than climate variability and by accounting for how populations move across space. Future research should also seek to improve data quality, while considering the importance of matching data and methods with the underlying theoretical expectations. ; Finansiär: Utrikesdepartementet ; Climate change and security

The central theme of the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) is that violent conflict remains a constant threat to human rights, peace and sustainable development. While the nature of violent conflict maybe changing1 its negative impact on poor people in terms of rights violations, public health, forced displacement and diminution of life chances is the same. Critical to establishing peace and the necessary confidence between state and citizen is providing a sense of security, freedom from fear, and the protection of basic rights and entitlements. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship, overlapping and sometimes contradictory, between a range of approaches to security and justice in conflict affected contexts, and to place these efforts within a broader rule of law framework. This, it will be argued, greatly assists in addressing the kind of frictions and blind-spots that commonly exist in making the transition from violence to peace. The paper will then examine some of the instruments and approaches adopted by governments and international partners in addressing the kinds of stresses which result in violent conflict. Finally, it will examine the gaps in the international arena which continue to persist in this area of support. A series of security and justice-themed papers produced for the WDR 2011 outline in more detail the issues, approaches and lessons of the key components including: security, public security in peacekeeping settings, criminal justice, justice and administrative law, and transitional justice.

In early 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken removed the Houthis from the State Department's lists of foreign terror groups, reversing a last-minute Trump administration move.
"This decision is a recognition of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen," Blinken said at the time. "We have listened to warnings from the United Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among others, that the designations could have a devastating impact on Yemenis' access to basic commodities like food and fuel."
Three years later, the situation in Yemen remains precarious, but the Biden administration has changed its calculus. Amid a Houthi campaign of attacks on ships headed toward Israel, Blinken announced that the U.S. will redesignate the organization as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SDGT) next month. (The Houthis say their attacks would stop if Israel ends its assault on Gaza.)
This designation, though less stringent than the one imposed by the Trump administration, will likely complicate the distribution of aid in Yemen, according to Ashleigh Subramanian-Montgomery, the associate director of the Charity and Security Network. In practice, U.S. and UK airstrikes have already forced some aid groups to cut back operations in the country.
RS spoke with Subramanian-Montgomery to get her take on how the designation and the broader escalation will affect average Yemenis, as well as how political calculations influence national security decision making. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
RS: How are humanitarian groups responding to this decision?
Subramanian-Montgomery: Likely many humanitarian groups and aid groups are responding how they always do when either an SDGT designation or other designations happen, which is to review all of the authorizations that Office of Foreign Assets Control has put out. OFAC put out five general licenses and an FAQ. Organizations are looking into those and understanding what's allowable and what's not allowable then trying to act accordingly. Likely all humanitarian organizations will be forced to have conversations with their banks because any type of designation makes banks very, very hesitant and scared to continue transactions, even when things are authorized and allowed. There are certain places in the world where banks are more hesitant to transact to, and Yemen is definitely one of those places.
RS: Do you have a sense of how the designation might affect the ability of NGOs to distribute aid?
Subramanian-Montgomery: Where we have a little bit of the advantage is that it's not going into place until Feb. 16. So I think there can be some mobilizing around that that's kind of unique. You don't usually get any heads up that that designation will happen.
There are potentials for humanitarian aid organizations to be able to sort of figure out things a little bit ahead of time and find any workarounds that they need to do there. But the big challenge they'll face is the de-risking by banks, which will then make them not be able to do their aid delivery in the places that are going to need it the most, or potentially at all.
RS: Can you tell me more about the history of the relationship between NGOs and their banking partners in the Middle East?
Subramanian-Montgomery: Certain countries are always flagged. Banks will sometimes reject transactions just because of a certain name, like Syria, for instance, or Palestine, even before Oct. 7. Some organizations, if they have that in their name, or they're saying the transaction is going to this country, the transaction will be stopped or delayed. Delayed is the best case scenario, but that's not a good scenario if you need humanitarian aid immediately. Sometimes they'll be stopped altogether, or a bank will drop the relationship completely. Unfortunately, the relationships between humanitarian aid organizations in the region and banks can be really difficult. It's a fraught, challenging relationship. And it comes to be hard for aid organizations to know where in the pipeline the delay or the stopping of the transaction happened. Was it where the funds originated? Was it a bank along the way? That can be really, really challenging.
RS: Can you tell me more about the distinction between the SDGT designation and the FTO designation? My understanding is that they were both put in place by Trump, both reversed by Biden, and now just the SDGT put in place by Biden.
Subramanian-Montgomery: That's exactly right. I will say that it's very, very positive that the FTO designation was not reinstated, and it was just the SDGT. FTO designations are the prohibition on material support to terrorists. When an FTO designation goes into effect, most types of engagement with an FTO are then prohibited. And anybody running afoul of this, any individual organization running afoul of this can face really hefty fines and can face really dire criminal penalties, including up to 10 years of jail time. So it's pretty severe, and they cause a big chilling impact and effect on humanitarian aid. Since you can't really engage with anyone that's designated as an FTO, they also prevent you from then being able to go and negotiate with the Houthis to get humanitarian aid through. So that designation is particularly challenging, and also, as you can imagine, prevents any type of peacebuilding.
SDGT designations can be authorized either by the Department of Treasury or of State, which makes it both a counterterrorism designation, since State can issue can authorize this designation and those CT designations fall under State's purview, and because it has the financial and asset-freezing part of it that's under Treasury's purview. Basically, it means that all property and interests in property in the U.S. or even that later can come within the U.S. are blocked.
RS: We've already seen some impact from this escalation on the ability of aid groups to do their jobs on the ground. Some organizations have said that the bombings from the U.S. and the UK have prevented them from continuing operations normally. What effect would a renewal of hostilities have on the country's humanitarian sector?
Subramanian-Montgomery: A renewal of hostilities would be completely devastating given how dire the humanitarian situation already is in Yemen. It's almost hard to imagine that the situation could be exacerbated further given how bad it is and that it's one of the world's absolute worst humanitarian crises. It would block basic access to infrastructure, impact where and how aid could be delivered, how aid could get into the country, who aid could reach. All of these things will be impacted, and unfortunately, the Houthis are not going to be who suffer most. It's going to be the people of Yemen who are going to suffer the most with any kind of hostilities starting up again and everything that's going to follow on from that with the SDGT designation and whatever else it is to follow.
RS: What's the administration's justification for this decision? Do you see this as a politicization of the terrorist designation system?
Subramanian-Montgomery: Absolutely. Look, when the Biden administration removed the Houthi designation, both the FTO and SDGT designations in Feb. 2021, Blinken said it was "a recognition of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen." As I talked about before, that dire situation still exists today. If the priority for lifting it then in February 2021 was recognizing how bad the humanitarian situation is, and we know that it hasn't really gotten better to date, then how can you say that we're going to reinstate one of the designations that was lifted? It just feels really, really hypocritical. The Biden administration is making choices on political whims rather than realities and needs on the ground, which is unfortunate.
But it's the way these designations work. An example I always give is the Taliban. They've been designated as an SDGT since 2001, and the reason that they continue to be designated as an SDGT rather than as an FTO is because the administration would basically, if they made them an FTO, designate themselves out of being able to engage the Taliban. So the Doha talks in 2016 and 2019 couldn't really have happened because nobody could have engaged with the Taliban as they were an FTO. It's just an example that shows how political these designations are, and that, administration to administration, regardless of who's in power in the U.S., the decisions are always very political. They're very tactical and strategic. I don't mean that in a good way. They're making these very calculated decisions on terrorism designations based on a number of factors that they think will benefit their own self interest.

For many developing countries, natural resource exports such as oil, diamonds and copper continue to be important drivers for economic growth and provide a unique opportunity for generating revenues for much-needed infrastructure and human development. Dependence on extractive resources, however, may also increase the likelihood of underdevelopment, fragility and conflict. The challenges for managing these resources efficiently are likely to expand, as a growing number of developing countries and fragile states emerge as oil and mineral producers. Thus, there is a need to gain a better understanding of the factors that may help prevent violent conflict in resource rich countries. This paper proposes that one way of gaining such understanding and insight is to "conflict-sensitize" the Extractive Industries Value Chain (EIVC), and use it as a framework for conflict prevention in resource-rich countries. In this context, the report's main objective is to examine the potential opportunities for conflict prevention along the extractive industries value chain. Such a body of knowledge can help the World Bank, the UN and EU, as well as client countries and other partners, in their planning and coordination of complementary activities when implementing their programmes and projects, particularly when working in the same resource-rich countries. This paper aims to demonstrate the feasibility and challenges faced by adopting a conflict-sensitive approach within the World Bank's EI Value Chain. The methodology used was a combined desk review and in-depth interviews with regional and country specialists, especially in governance/conflict prevention and extractive industries (Annex 1). The emphasis is on qualitative analysis. The four countries that were desk reviewed for the project, including Chile, Peru, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zambia, are all copper producers and were selected due to their heavy dependence on revenues from mining. This book is arranged as follows: (i) part one explains extractives, conflict prevention and the value chain; (ii) part two is about the EI value chain as framework for conflict prevention; (iii) part three talks about emerging themes and recommendation; and (iv) part four describes the four country examples and the emerging lessons.

Community-Driven Development (or CDD) projects are now a major component of World Bank assistance to many developing countries. While varying greatly in size and form, such projects aim to ensure that communities have substantive control in deciding how project funds should be used. The proponents of CDD believe that giving beneficiaries the power to manage project resources will lead to more efficient and effective use of financial resources. It is also claimed that project-initiated participatory processes can have wider 'spillover' impacts, building local institutions and leadership, enhancing civic capacity, improving social relations and boosting state legitimacy. This paper briefly reviews the World Bank's experience of using CDD in conflict-affected and post-conflict areas of the East Asia and Pacific region. This paper provides a framework for assessing the impacts of CDD projects in post-conflict and conflict-affected areas. It tries to unpack the potential causal channels through which projects may have their desired, or other, impacts. The paper concludes with a short summary of what we know, what we don't, and potential future directions for research and programming.

Community Driven Development (CDD) projects are now a major component of World Bank assistance to many developing countries. While varying greatly in size and form, such projects aim to ensure that communities have substantive control in deciding how project funds should be used. Giving beneficiaries the power to manage project resources is believed by its proponents to lead to more efficient and effective fund use. It is also claimed that project-initiated participatory processes can have wider 'spillover' impacts, building local institutions and leadership, enhancing civic capacity, improving social relations and boosting state legitimacy. This paper briefly reviews the World Bank's experience of using CDD in conflict-affected and post-conflict areas of the East Asia and Pacific region. The region has been at the forefront of developing large-scale CDD programming including high profile 'flagships' such as the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) in Indonesia and the Kapitbisig Laban Sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) project in the Philippines. As of the end of 2007, CDD constituted fifteen percent of the lending portfolio in East Asia compared with ten percent globally. Many of East Asia's CDD projects have operated consciously or not in areas affected by protracted violent conflict. CDD has also been used as an explicit mechanism for post-conflict recovery in Mindanao in the Philippines and in Timor Leste, and for conflict victim reintegration in Aceh, Indonesia. It then looks at the evidence on whether and how projects have achieved these outcomes, focusing on a range of recent and current projects in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. The analysis summarizes results, draws on comparative evidence from other projects in the region and elsewhere, and seeks to identify factors that explain variation in outcomes and project performance. The paper concludes with a short summary of what we know, what we don't, and potential future directions for research and programming.

The Horn of Africa (HOA) is one of the most underdeveloped regions on earth. It is also one of the most conflict-ridden, insecure regions in the world. While Africa as a whole has enjoyed a trend in recent years toward reduction and termination of many of its civil wars, the HOA is the exception to the rule. Indeed, the region's prolonged armed conflicts have spread, engulfing several neighboring states in warfare and partial state collapse. While aspects of the HOA case are obviously unique, and sensitivity to context and complexity must be privileged in both analysis of and policy toward the Horn, the region's crises are not so distinct that they preclude useful comparative analysis. This paper considers conflict dynamics across the entire Horn of Africa, but devotes special attention to the case of Somalia which, because of the depth, length, and significance of its crisis, is a source of particular international concern. Because Somalia's crisis has been so protracted and has gone through several very distinct phases, it provides an opportunity to compare conflict dynamics in a single country over time.

This report is structured in three parts. Part one is a summary document, including: (i) an executive summary (ii) an introduction; (iii) a review of core concepts of reintegration that will be referred to in this study; (iv) a meta-analysis of reintegration process¬es in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) vis-à-vis the conceptual discussion; and (v) conclusions to the summary document. Part two (annex one) comprises an in-depth review and analysis of data on the reintegration process-es of ex-combatants across the GLR. Part three (annex two) is an in-depth analysis of community dynamics across the GLR. In brief, part one of the study is a meta-analytical and knowledge-focused piece that reflects more broadly on the detailed analysis of the datasets presented in annexes one and two, therefore, this part can be read as a freestanding report. However, it's worth noting that any reading will benefit significantly from exploring the detailed findings in annexes one and two.

Violent conflict is the multifaceted and cyclical problem that the international community is trying to grapple with. To date, there has been a clear hierarchy concerning what forms of violence are seen to matter most, with political violence that threatens the state taking pole position. In examining this argument, this paper sets out a number of issues relating to security and justice definitions. It will then examine some of the problems associated with placing conflict into a box-set typology: mass violence associated with war and genocide carries unique features but also spawns new challenges which are often being ignored. The paper will then examine in brief some of the measures used by communities, governmental actors and international partners in contending with violence before outlining some key conclusions and recommendations. In reading this paper two further points need be borne in mind: 1) this does not provide a comprehensive overview of violence and security - that is the role of the World Development Report (WDR) itself, and 2) this paper does not present fresh research, but more an overview, along with the other papers in the security-justice series, of some of the key issues confronting policy makers in the domain of security and development.

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) is an independent unit within the World Bank. The goals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of the Bank's work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. This report on the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) is one of twenty six case studies that have been prepared as source material for the second phase of OED's independent evaluation of the Bank's involvement in global programs. The program objective is to position the Bank through constructive engagement in conflict-affected countries where normal instruments and budget provisions cannot apply. The key findings are as follows : (i) a flexible instrument such as the PCF serves the needs that the Bank's numerous instruments do not fulfill in conflict-affected countries; (ii) yet if the policy guidelines under which it operates are too flexible, and the DGF criteria are ambiguous and insufficiently enforced, the instrument can be less than fully effective; (iii)Programs can continue over several years without a results-based framework and strong monitoring and evaluation; (iv) as currently designed, the country-by-country approach of the program does not sufficiently generate broader cross-country lessons and does not exploit the program's full potential to serve the Bank and its partners strategically; and (v) a global partnership program on conflict-affected countries with partners at the governance level might help the Bank, United Nations (UN) agencies, and other stakeholders to better respond to the transition from relief, to rehabilitation and reconstruction and development. Finally, this being an OED evaluation, it focuses primarily on the Bank's strategic role and performance in playing up to its comparative advantage relative to other partners in each program.