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All treaties, akin to contracts between nations, formalize the promises of their parties. Yet the contents of those promises differ, with important consequences. One particular difference is underappreciated and divides treaties into two fundamentally different categories. In one category of treaty, nations agree that they themselves will act, or refrain from acting, in certain ways. For convenience, I call these "resolution" treaties because they demand that states resolve to act. In the second category, nations make promises they can only keep if nonstate third parties also act or refrain from acting. These are what I term "persuasion" treaties because they require states to persuade third parties to do something differently, through regulatory or other means. Significantly, each type of treaty carries a unique set of execution and compliance problems. Persuasion treaties are both distinctly important and distinctly challenged. Identifying the difference between these types of treaty commitment provides conceptual clarity that organizes treaty critiques, clarifies conditions for treaty success, and helps resolve critical persuasion treaty pathologies. This Article seeks to unearth the execution and compliance problems that drive the privatization critique, analyze the nature of those problems, and identify means of ameliorating them. I propose that the answers turn on identifying and understanding the class of treaties to which the problems inhere. Part I outlines the privatization critique and explains why it merits our attention; Part II constructs and defends the persuasion treaty theory; Part III illustrates the theory with preliminary empirical support; and Part IV shows how the theory frames problems and identifies possible solutions.

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We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. We show that Kamenica & Gentzkow's (2011) concavification approach to characterizing optimal signals extends to these settings.

In familiar accounts of power, if agent i can induce j to change their beliefs then i has power over j to induce belief change. Does that mean that all deliberation is simply a power game? This article examines two connected 'reliability conditions' that distinguish when such persuasion is coercive or manipulative: common reason and the intentions of the persuader. It considers three problems, (1) testimony, (2) authority, (3) trust, and why these do not belie the account. While the conditions are strict and perhaps no actual deliberation or persuasion fully abides by them, they constitute normative conditions for making judgements about the degree of manipulation in any deliberation. I also briefly consider the power of discourse as an activity in itself.

The American Political Science Association is returning to Chicago, Illinois, for the 2013 APSA Annual Meeting and Exhibition. Join APSA in this exciting and beautiful city to share and discuss the latest scholarship in political science and address issues related to the theme "Power and Persuasion." The 2013 APSA Annual Meeting and Exhibition will have something for scholars in every stage of their careers, including an exhibition of publishers, eJobs placement service, plenary sessions, and networking receptions. More than 6,000 political scientists, publishers, and other scholars are expected to travel to Chicago to take part in this largest annual gathering of political scientists.

Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Introduction -- PART I A CONTINUING JOURNEY -- 1 Pathways from the Past: The Evolution of Employee Communication -- 2 Pathways to the Future: Five Converging Forces Shaping the Future of Work -- PART II SIGNPOSTS FOR THE ROAD AHEAD -- 3 Changing Minds: The Basic Principles of Principled Persuasion -- 4 Happiness at Work: The Principles of Hedonic Persuasion -- 5 Harm at Work: The Principles of Mindful Persuasion -- 6 The Good Life at Work: The Principles of Ethical Persuasion -- PART III MAKING CONVERSATION ALONG THE WAY

The book presents a variety of philosophical and socio-political perspectives related to the relationship between persuasion and compulsion in democracy. It meets the need of the present time, in America and in Europe, to re-read and discuss the basic assumptions of democracy and the role of individual within it in the context of institutional persuasions that can become factual compulsions for other institution and, first of all, individuals

109th APSA Annual Meeting, Chicago, August 29–Sept. 1, 2013The APSA returns to Chicago, Illinois, and its roots, for the 2013 APSA Annual Meeting and Exhibition. In 1904, the association held its first Annual Meeting at Northwestern University and the University of Chicago. Home to these and other top colleges and universities, Chicago is again a fitting host for this leading intellectual gathering of political scientists.