Petro-States' Shaping of International Law
In: Journal of the History of International Law (;forthcoming);
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In: Journal of the History of International Law (;forthcoming);
SSRN
In: The journal of corporate citizenship, Band 2005, Heft 20, S. 53-64
ISSN: 2051-4700
The central argument of this article is that the Chávez government has accentuated the practice of "rentismo" and strengthened the petro-state in comparison to earlier periods.
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In this paper, I argue that even though oil production in Uganda has not yet started, the oil is already relevant in its anticipation. In its "not-yet" state, the oil has gained a discursive presence in politics, media and civil society. I analyse the visions of the future that are created in this oil talk. The government paints a picture of a bright future, in which oil is a blessing to all, while civil society portrays oil as a shadow looming over Uganda. Despite this difference, I show that all the visions refer to the resource curse: Oil can either be a blessing or a curse. I understand the resource curse discourse as a form of risk communication. I propose that for people in the oil regions knowledge of the resource curse as a risk increases existing feelings of uncertainty with regard to the oil. The paper is based on 15 months of fieldwork in Uganda between 2012 and 2015. ; peerReviewed
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petro-state; corruption; extractive capitalism; Hugo Chavez; revolution
In: Studies in International Political Economy 26
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 77, Heft 2, S. 145
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: The round table: the Commonwealth journal of international affairs, Band 109, Heft 1, S. 88-89
ISSN: 1474-029X
In: Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 266
SSRN
Working paper
In: Oil Wars, S. 41-99
In: Environment and security
ISSN: 2753-8796
The literature on petrostates tends to blackbox the state. We argue, in contrast, that not all petro-states are configured equally. They thus respond to external crises differently. Despite sharing similar background conditions, the petro-state of Venezuela responded to the external oil shock of 2014–2015 by turning more authoritarian and predatory, whereas the petro-state of Ecuador tried to become more democratic and developmental. To explain this difference, we focus on three within-state institutional differences between these cases: the cohesion of hardliners, the reach of the coercive military and paramilitary apparatus, and the viability of the public and private sectors. In short, even petro-states operating under similar regimes (in this case, left-populist, semi-authoritarian) can exhibit different institutional make-ups, and these institutional differences help explain responses to similar external shocks.
In: http://hdl.handle.net/11427/31243
It is well-established that oil wealth in weakly institutionalised states tends to undermine development instead of catalysing it. Cross-country regressions, however, struggle to explain why comparably oil-wealthy countries such as Nigeria and Angola experience different political and economic outcomes over time. This thesis explains these differing outcomes through a theoretical lens derived from the New Institutional Economics and Political Settlements literature. Methodologically, it employs analytic narrative - the application of a game theoretic model to a historical puzzle to produce a thin explanation - and treats economic transactions as the key unit of analysis for understanding why particular outcomes obtain and not others. As a comparable site of analysis, I select the oil-for-infrastructure deals that were negotiated in Angola and Nigeria with Asian National Oil Companies between 2004 and 2007. Contrary to expectation, the deals were struck in Angola but failed in Nigeria. I hypothesise that the differential outcome reflects the varying quality of the institutional arrangements in each country for engaging foreign investors. This differential institutional quality resulted in differing commitment credibility over time, which partly accounts for deal failure in Nigeria. Divergent political economy trajectories and political settlements account for these differences. I use a game theory model that explains heterogeneity within authoritarian regimes to test these hypotheses. Application of the model to Angola and Nigeria respectively shows that Angolan dictator, José Eduardo dos Santos, was able to consolidate power within six years of becoming the head of state by successfully eliminating potential threats to his dictatorial ambitions. Under this closed, stable regime, foreign investors perceived greater levels of commitment credibility and struck deals. Nigeria's uneven institutional evolution towards greater openness was punctuated by multiple successful coups and occasional civilian rule between long periods of military autocracy. The resultant instability undermined the perception of credibility, explaining why the deals failed. The thesis closes with a description of how Nigeria and Angola's political economies have evolved since the oil-price crash of 2014, including how dos Santos unexpectedly lost power, and poses questions for future research.
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This article explores relations between popular protests and institutional politics in a petroleum-dependent economy. The 2012-protest against fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria was one of the biggest popular mobilisation in Nigeria's history, and possibly the largest in the wave of protests in Sub-Saharan Africa. This article uses perspectives of contentious politics that bridge structure and agency through a focus on relational dynamics between protests and institutional politics. This article makes four interrelated claims of how the protests are conditioned by and contribute to institutional politics: First, the protests builds on a historical trajectory of labour-led subsidy protests that in itself form part of institutionalised politics. Second, the 2012-protests were historically large due to the particular context of a decade of democracy and oil-led growth, without a popular sense economic justice and real political participation. Third, while new actors came to the scene in 2012, intra-movement fragmentation exposed trade union and civil society weaknesses and failure to build a sustained social movement. Fourth, the 2012-protests inspired civic agency and influenced institutional politics and state-citizen relations, especially reflected in party politics and elections.
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In: Bayreuther Studien zu Politik und Gesellschaft in Afrika v.7
Cover -- Preface -- Acknowledgment -- I. Introduction -- The Making of a Petro-state -- What is at stake? -- Structural overview -- II. The Global Oil Debate -- Afro-pessimism in the oil debate -- a. Oil and government institutions -- b. Oil and authoritarianism -- c. Oil, entitlements and struggles for resource control -- The oil debate in Uganda -- Government -- Foucauldian view of government -- The epistemology of government -- III. Context and Question of methods -- Context -- Uganda's post-independence instability -- a. The era of "fundamental change" -- b. The structure of political power -- c. The national economy under Museveni -- The fundamental change, oil and government -- Question of methods -- The Government of Epistemology -- Practice of governing, governing practices -- a. Power relations and the regulation of petro-practices -- b. The art of creating order and orderability -- c. Critical attitudes and bio-political agenda from below -- IV. Making Oil Production Effective -- Oil as an institutional problem of government -- a. Uganda's Oil Policy -- b. Oil Laws and Regulations -- c. Constituting National Petro-sovereign -- The art of governing oil -- a. Rendering oil technical -- b. Caucusing mentality and petro-politics -- c. Securing national interest -- d. Euphoria of development -- Sovereignty and petro-power -- V. Constituting Petro-order -- Statistical rationalisation of petro-order -- a. The Kabaale Census - Hoima -- b. The Tilenga Census in Buliisa -- Technical problems -- Technical solutions -- a. Territorialisation: the production of spatial petro-order -- b. Bio-politicisation: the production of social petro-order -- c. Strategic Education and Capacity-building Programmes -- d. Improvements in Healthcare Facilities -- Power relations and petro-ordering -- VI. Subaltern Expressions of Petro-order.
In: Bayreuther Studien zu Politik und Gesellschaft in Afrika Volume 7
In: Nomos eLibrary
In: Politikwissenschaft
Dieses Buch veranschaulicht die Art und Weise, wie sich Uganda in ein ölproduzierendes Land verwandelt, das hier als "Petrostaat" bezeichnet wird. Im Gegensatz zur traditionellen Verwendung des Begriffs hebt der Begriff "Petrostaat" hier den bewussten Versuch hervor, die politische Wirtschaft Ugandas auf die künftige Ölförderung auszurichten. Die Erwartung von "Petrodollars" hat den Staat gezwungen, seine institutionelle Infrastruktur zu verändern und zu versuchen, die sozioökonomische und räumliche Orientierung der Bevölkerung zu rekonfigurieren. Der Autor stellt die Machtverhältnisse und die dynamischen Kämpfe dar, in die die Schlüsselakteure im Prozess der Erdölförderung in Uganda verstrickt werden. Ausgehend von einem Foucault'schen Ansatz in der Regierungs- und Machtfrage zeigt er auf, wie die ölbezogenen Entwicklungsprojekte in Uganda die Bevölkerung mehrdimensional fördern sollen.