Mexico: Petropolitics
In: NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report, Band 11, Heft 6, S. 26-27
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In: NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report, Band 11, Heft 6, S. 26-27
World Affairs Online
In: Economica, Band 79, Heft 316, S. 641-657
ISSN: 1468-0335
We examine empirically the relationship between crude oil prices and the ebb and flow of democratic institutions, in order to test the hypothesis that high oil prices undermine democracy and sustain autocracy. We use a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of country subsamples and time periods, finding strictly no evidence in favour of this so‐called 'First Law of Petropolitics' (Friedman 2006).
In: FP, Heft 198
ISSN: 0015-7228
In a cover story for this magazine, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman proposed what he called the First Law of Petropolitics. The price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states, he wrote, noting that the higher the price goes, the less petrolist leaders are sensitive to what the world thinks or says about them. The law makes a lot of intuitive sense. If you look around the world at countries that are highly dependent on oil profits, many have high levels of authoritarianism and corruption. Stay tuned: As oil prices climb once again amid increased uncertainty across the Middle East, both sides of the debate should soon have plenty more data. Adapted from the source document.
In: FP, Heft 198, S. 25
ISSN: 0015-7228
In a cover story for this magazine, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman proposed what he called the First Law of Petropolitics. The price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states, he wrote, noting that the higher the price goes, the less petrolist leaders are sensitive to what the world thinks or says about them. The law makes a lot of intuitive sense. If you look around the world at countries that are highly dependent on oil profits, many have high levels of authoritarianism and corruption. Stay tuned: As oil prices climb once again amid increased uncertainty across the Middle East, both sides of the debate should soon have plenty more data. Adapted from the source document.
In: Economica, Band 79, Heft 316, S. 641-657
SSRN
In: Korea and world affairs: a quarterly review, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 70-86
ISSN: 0259-9686
World Affairs Online
In: National Security Affairs Monograph Series, 76-1
World Affairs Online
In: The federalist debate: papers for federalists in Europe and the world = ˜Leœ débat fédéraliste : cahiers trimestriels pour les fédéralistes en Europe et dans le monde, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 22-25
ISSN: 1591-8483
In: Review of African political economy, Band 29, Heft 91
ISSN: 1740-1720
International audience ; We investigate the link between resource revenues volatility and institutions. We build a stochastic differential game with two players (conservatives vs. liberals) lobbying for changing the institutions in their preferred directions. First, uncertainty surrounds the dynamics of institutions and the resource revenues. Second, the lobbying power is asymmetric, the conservatives' power being increasing with resource revenues. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in the set of affine strategies. We then examine to which extent uncertainty leads to more liberal institutions in the long run, compared to the deterministic case. We finally explore the institutional impact of volatility using a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973–2005. Focusing on financial liberalization, we find that as oil revenue volatility increases, liberalization goes down. This result is robust to different specifications and sample distinctions.
BASE
International audience ; We investigate the link between resource revenues volatility and institutions. We build a stochastic differential game with two players (conservatives vs. liberals) lobbying for changing the institutions in their preferred directions. First, uncertainty surrounds the dynamics of institutions and the resource revenues. Second, the lobbying power is asymmetric, the conservatives' power being increasing with resource revenues. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in the set of affine strategies. We then examine to which extent uncertainty leads to more liberal institutions in the long run, compared to the deterministic case. We finally explore the institutional impact of volatility using a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973–2005. Focusing on financial liberalization, we find that as oil revenue volatility increases, liberalization goes down. This result is robust to different specifications and sample distinctions.
BASE
We provide an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by means of a stochastic differential game of lobbying with two players (conservatives vs liberals) and three main ingredients. The first one is uncertainty inherent in the institutional process itself. The second considers resource windfalls volatility impact on economic and institutional outcomes. Last but not least, the resource windfall level matters in the relative bargaining power of the players. We compute a unique closed-loop equilibrium with linear feedbacks. We show that the legislative state converges to an invariant distribution. Even more importantly, we demonstrate that the most likely asymptotic legislative state is favorable to the liberals. However, the more volatile resource windfalls, the less liberal is the most likely asymptotic state. Finally, we assess the latter prediction on a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973-2005. We focus on financial liberalization policies. We find that as the resources revenues volatility increases, the financial liberalization index goes down. We also find that this property remains robust across different specifications and sample distinctions.
BASE
We provide an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by means of a stochastic differential game of lobbying with two players (conservatives vs liberals) and three main ingredients. The first one is uncertainty inherent in the institutional process itself. The second considers resource windfalls volatility impact on economic and institutional outcomes. Last but not least, the resource windfall level matters in the relative bargaining power of the players. We compute a unique closed-loop equilibrium with linear feedbacks. We show that the legislative state converges to an invariant distribution. Even more importantly, we demonstrate that the most likely asymptotic legislative state is favorable to the liberals. However, the more volatile resource windfalls, the less liberal is the most likely asymptotic state. Finally, we assess the latter prediction on a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973-2005. We focus on financial liberalization policies. We find that as the resources revenues volatility increases, the financial liberalization index goes down. We also find that this property remains robust across different specifications and sample distinctions.
BASE
We provide an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by means of a stochastic differential game of lobbying with two players (conservatives vs liberals) and three main ingredients. The first one is uncertainty inherent in the institutional process itself. The second considers resource windfalls volatility impact on economic and institutional outcomes. Last but not least, the resource windfall level matters in the relative bargaining power of the players. We compute a unique closed-loop equilibrium with linear feedbacks. We show that the legislative state converges to an invariant distribution. Even more importantly, we demonstrate that the most likely asymptotic legislative state is favorable to the liberals. However, the more volatile resource windfalls, the less liberal is the most likely asymptotic state. Finally, we assess the latter prediction on a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973-2005. We focus on financial liberalization policies. We find that as the resources revenues volatility increases, the financial liberalization index goes down. We also find that this property remains robust across different specifications and sample distinctions.
BASE