Suchergebnisse

I / Preliminary Distinctions -- 1. Language and Linguistic Utterances -- 2. Descriptive Statements -- 3. The Use and Mention of Signs -- II / Theories of Meaning -- 1. Realistic Semantic Theories -- 2. Behavioristic Theories of Meaning -- 3. Quine's Philosophy of Language -- 4. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language in the Philosophical Investigations -- III / Theories of Grammar -- 1. Traditional Grammar -- 2. Logical Grammar -- 3. Generative Grammar -- IV / Language and Reality -- 1. The Thesis of the Role Language Plays in Experience -- 2. The Role of Vocabulary -- 3. The Role of Grammar -- 4. The Epistemological Problematic of the Relativity Thesis -- Index of Subjects -- Index of Logical Symbols.

Russell and the linguistic philosophy -- I. The quest for logical form -- Reference and meaning -- Two senses of "logical form" -- Logical form, propositional constituents, and reconstructionism -- The "logically perfect" language -- The theory of acquaintance -- Proper names -- The "minimum vocabulary" -- Summary and conclusion -- II. The uses of reconstructionism -- The theory of descriptions -- The analysis of class-symbols -- The logical construction of physical objects -- Conclusion -- III. Critique of Russell's philosophy of language -- The theory of acquaintance -- The doctrine of logical form -- Philosophical analysis as elucidation of ontological structure -- Selected Bibliography.

One Historical Foundations of the Philosophy of Language -- One The Origin of the Philosophy of Language -- Two The Foundation of the Philosophy of Language -- Chater Three The Exploration of the Range of Language -- Four Language and the Rise of the Modern Era -- Two Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Language -- One Language and Precision -- Two Ordinary Language -- Three The Eminence of Language -- Four The Structure of Language -- Conclusion -- Conclusion.

As in Hobbes' view it is principally the capacity for speech that distinguishes men from even the social animals, so it is in verbal and doctrinal controversies that he usually finds the sources of conflict and sedition. Hobbes analyzes—in the hope of doing away with them—a variety of what he regards as abuses of language, such as metaphor, equivocation, eloquence, and absurdity, which are especially productive of political disorder. He also offers models and, in his own political philosophy, examples of the proper uses of language as science and counsel, which he believes are necessary to the establishment and governance of well-ordered commonwealths in the modern world, characterized as it is by widespread learning and disputatious habits. In the pursuance of his project, however, Hobbes himself is paradoxically forced to resort to the eloquence which he otherwise condemns, and his own observations on language provide grounds for doubts about the success of his enterprise.