Suchergebnisse

Aileen Kelly, "What is real is rational" : The political philosophy of B. N. Chicherin.
B. N. Chicherin is generally regarded as one of the foremost theoreticians of Russian liberalism; but there is a wide area of disagreement among historians as to the precise nature of his liberalism and the reasons for his extreme political isolation. The present study attempts to refute the most common view of Chicherin — namely, as a moderate liberal who sought a middle path in a country polarised into extremes of right and left. Through an analysis of Chicherin's doctrine of "liberal conservatism" it is argued that Chicherin cannot be regarded as a liberal at all: the conception of liberty which he developed in the immediate post-reform period on the basis of a doctrinaire right-wing Hegelianism was incompatible with all forms of liberalism, including Hegel's, and ultimately provided an ideological justification for absolute rule.

In this work I study French philosopher Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987) as a philosopher of life. I intend to highlight the path that leads him, from an initial mechanistic conception that reduces life to physical and chemical structures, to a finalist panpsychism that conceives life as a conscious activity common to every individual being. I tried to identify Ruyer's main sources regarding the problem of life : drawing from Cuénot, he aims to overcome mechanism in biology; drawing from Leibniz, he develops a "corrected monadology"; after Butler (and Bergson) he conceives life as conscience and memory; with Schopenhauer, he sees human conscious life as a microcosm leading to the life that puts every being in motion; combining Etienne Wolff's embryology and Ellenberger's psychology, he constructs a platonic biology where Forms-Ideas or transcendent "themes" guide the living. He makes an informed and critical judgement of 20th century early cybernetics, genetics or ethology. I show how Ruyer is driven by his biological ambition to go from a monistic and naturalistic project, trying to overcome mind-body dualism, to a platonic idealism characterized by irreducible dualities (forming/functioning, individual/mass, physical/psychological, etc.). Both tendencies coexist and correct each other, which leads this conception of life to a number of logical, epistemological, moral and political problems, on which I intend to shed a light. ; Nous abordons l'œuvre de Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987) sous l'angle de la philosophie de la vie, pour mettre en évidence la trajectoire qui le conduit d'un mécanisme réduisant la vie à ses structures physico-chimiques jusqu'à un panpsychisme finaliste qui fait de la vie une activité consciente commune à l'ensemble des êtres individués. Nous cherchons à restituer l'apport des principales sources de Ruyer à son traitement du problème de la vie : à la suite de Cuénot, il entend dépasser le mécanisme en biologie ; à la suite de Leibniz, il entend faire une « monadologie corrigée » ; à la suite de Butler (mais aussi de Bergson), il interprète la vie comme conscience et mémoire ; avec Schopenhauer, il remonte du microcosme de la vie humaine à la vie qui traverse tous les êtres ; en associant l'embryologie d'Etienne Wolff à la psychologie d'Ellenberger, il construit une biologie platonicienne guidée par des Formes-Idées ou thèmes transcendants. Il porte un jugement informé et critique sur la cybernétique, la génétique ou encore l'éthologie qui se développent au XXème siècle. Nous montrons comment Ruyer est conduit par ses ambitions en biologie à passer d'un projet strictement moniste et naturaliste, cherchant à dépasser l'opposition corps-esprit, à un platonisme marqué par des dualités irréductibles (formation-fonctionnement, individu-foule, physique-psychique, etc.). Les deux tendances cohabitent non sans difficulté et se corrigent l'une l'autre, ce qui mène cette conception de la vie à un ensemble de difficultés logiques et épistémologiques, mais aussi morales et politiques, que nous tentons de mettre en lumière.

In this work I study French philosopher Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987) as a philosopher of life. I intend to highlight the path that leads him, from an initial mechanistic conception that reduces life to physical and chemical structures, to a finalist panpsychism that conceives life as a conscious activity common to every individual being. I tried to identify Ruyer's main sources regarding the problem of life : drawing from Cuénot, he aims to overcome mechanism in biology; drawing from Leibniz, he develops a "corrected monadology"; after Butler (and Bergson) he conceives life as conscience and memory; with Schopenhauer, he sees human conscious life as a microcosm leading to the life that puts every being in motion; combining Etienne Wolff's embryology and Ellenberger's psychology, he constructs a platonic biology where Forms-Ideas or transcendent "themes" guide the living. He makes an informed and critical judgement of 20th century early cybernetics, genetics or ethology. I show how Ruyer is driven by his biological ambition to go from a monistic and naturalistic project, trying to overcome mind-body dualism, to a platonic idealism characterized by irreducible dualities (forming/functioning, individual/mass, physical/psychological, etc.). Both tendencies coexist and correct each other, which leads this conception of life to a number of logical, epistemological, moral and political problems, on which I intend to shed a light. ; Nous abordons l'œuvre de Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987) sous l'angle de la philosophie de la vie, pour mettre en évidence la trajectoire qui le conduit d'un mécanisme réduisant la vie à ses structures physico-chimiques jusqu'à un panpsychisme finaliste qui fait de la vie une activité consciente commune à l'ensemble des êtres individués. Nous cherchons à restituer l'apport des principales sources de Ruyer à son traitement du problème de la vie : à la suite de Cuénot, il entend dépasser le mécanisme en biologie ; à la suite de Leibniz, il entend faire une « monadologie corrigée » ; à la suite de ...