Economic analysis of the rental housing market ; Analyse économique du marché du logement locatif
Housing is an economic good in its own right. It is subject to transactionswhere supply and demand have a major impact and determine to a large extent the level of prices. This is one of the most regulated markets. The law, particularly in France, is complex. Its enforcement, which is strongly framed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is even more complex. In this text, we will analyse the rental market exclusively and try to rationalise the existence of deregulation by various market imperfections. In the first part, let us document the length of the tenancy proceedings. In an assistant, we assess the consequences of these deadlines in a context of selection: landlords try to select tenants in function of their (exogenous) propensity to pay rent. In a third part, we consider moral hazard issues, which lead tenants to undertake acts affecting the likelihood of unpaid payments. We conclude on the tool for economists to introduce asymmetrical information questions into urban models, and for lawyers wishing to defend the construction of civil law of French origin to seek economic inefficiencies in order to keep their original mind. ; http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=RECO&ID_NUMPUBLIE=RECO_586&ID_ARTICLE=RECO_586_1247 Housing is fully an economic good. Demand and supply factors play first order roles on prices and quantity exchanged. It is also a heavily regulated market. The law, in particular in France, is complex, its execution described by the « Code de procédure civile » is even more complex. In this text, we focus on the rental housing market and attempt to rationalize the existence of such regulations by various market imperfections. In a first part, we describe the lenght of litigation procedures between landlords and tenants. In a second part, we study the consequences of such delays under adverse selection: landlords attempt to screen tenants according to their (exogenous) propensity to sustain the rent. In a third part, we consider moral hazard issues, whereby tenants undertake actions ...