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International audience ; When it comes to studying the problems of secularism today, philosophers are not the most competent of individuals for doing so. They can, however, study the idea of secularism in itself in order to avoid overly severe divisions that result in misunderstandings in the use of concepts. Secularism is a response to current nihilism, but it cannot be a pure criticism of religion. Religion is not a purely private matter. Moreover, secularism is greater than any particular historical achievement. Not only is secularism evolving, but one must accept the great diversity of its possible expression depending on the situation. Secularism should not be an act of excluding certain people; it must also be a space of expression for religions. Interreligious dialogue and reciprocal recognition between the state and religion make secularism possible, which is the foundation of the unity of a people. Philosophers cannot eliminate all of the difficulties involved, but they can bring them to light. ; Le philosophe n'a pas de compétence particulière pour étudier les problèmes contemporains de la laïcité, mais il peut étudier l'idée de laïcité en elle-même de manière à éviter les séparations trop brutales comme les confusions dangereuses. Si la laïcité se veut une réponse au nihilisme actuel, elle ne peut pas être simplement le rejet de la religion dans la sphère privée ; elle ne peut pas non plus s'identifier totalement à l'une de ses formes historiques particulières et il est nécessaire d'envisager non seulement une évolution de la pratique de la laïcité, mais également une très grande diversité de sa réalisation. Toute la difficulté est de ne pas transformer la laïcité en un processus d'exclusion de toute une catégorie de la population. Cela suppose de concevoir la laïcité aussi comme un espace d'expression des religions. Cela n'est possible que par un dialogue interreligieux et par une reconnaissance réciproque du religieux et du politique, en ayant bien soin de donner un sens large au religieux. Il ne s'agit pas de lever toutes les apories, mais au moins de parvenir à les mettre en lumière.

International audience ; When it comes to studying the problems of secularism today, philosophers are not the most competent of individuals for doing so. They can, however, study the idea of secularism in itself in order to avoid overly severe divisions that result in misunderstandings in the use of concepts. Secularism is a response to current nihilism, but it cannot be a pure criticism of religion. Religion is not a purely private matter. Moreover, secularism is greater than any particular historical achievement. Not only is secularism evolving, but one must accept the great diversity of its possible expression depending on the situation. Secularism should not be an act of excluding certain people; it must also be a space of expression for religions. Interreligious dialogue and reciprocal recognition between the state and religion make secularism possible, which is the foundation of the unity of a people. Philosophers cannot eliminate all of the difficulties involved, but they can bring them to light. ; Le philosophe n'a pas de compétence particulière pour étudier les problèmes contemporains de la laïcité, mais il peut étudier l'idée de laïcité en elle-même de manière à éviter les séparations trop brutales comme les confusions dangereuses. Si la laïcité se veut une réponse au nihilisme actuel, elle ne peut pas être simplement le rejet de la religion dans la sphère privée ; elle ne peut pas non plus s'identifier totalement à l'une de ses formes historiques particulières et il est nécessaire d'envisager non seulement une évolution de la pratique de la laïcité, mais également une très grande diversité de sa réalisation. Toute la difficulté est de ne pas transformer la laïcité en un processus d'exclusion de toute une catégorie de la population. Cela suppose de concevoir la laïcité aussi comme un espace d'expression des religions. Cela n'est possible que par un dialogue interreligieux et par une reconnaissance réciproque du religieux et du politique, en ayant bien soin de donner un sens large au religieux. Il ne ...

Family is not only a private place but a political place too. This is why it concerns public life of state. We demonstrate that our familal life makes us sitizens. Furthermore, like inner and private, family is too the place of existence of severalfeelings wich are important in social and political life of us and of the potical society. Then our feelings of member of family answer to social norms. They make family an ethic community well-ordered by a civil contract. ; La famille n'est pas seulement le lieu de la vie privée mais aussi un lieu hautement politique. Dans cette mesure, elle concerne la vie publique de l'État. Nous montrons que notre vie familiale nous engage en tant que citoyens. De plus, et comme lieu de l'intime et du privé, la famille est aussi le lieu d'expression de nombreux sentiments qui ont leur importance dans la vie sociale et politique de tout un chacun et de la société politique. Ainsi, les sentiments que nous ressentons comme membre de notre famille sont normés socialement. Ce sont eux qui font de la famille une communauté éthique régie par un contrat civil.

Family is not only a private place but a political place too. This is why it concerns public life of state. We demonstrate that our familal life makes us sitizens. Furthermore, like inner and private, family is too the place of existence of severalfeelings wich are important in social and political life of us and of the potical society. Then our feelings of member of family answer to social norms. They make family an ethic community well-ordered by a civil contract. ; La famille n'est pas seulement le lieu de la vie privée mais aussi un lieu hautement politique. Dans cette mesure, elle concerne la vie publique de l'État. Nous montrons que notre vie familiale nous engage en tant que citoyens. De plus, et comme lieu de l'intime et du privé, la famille est aussi le lieu d'expression de nombreux sentiments qui ont leur importance dans la vie sociale et politique de tout un chacun et de la société politique. Ainsi, les sentiments que nous ressentons comme membre de notre famille sont normés socialement. Ce sont eux qui font de la famille une communauté éthique régie par un contrat civil.

The Hippocratic Collection presents this remarkable feature that technical medical texts are strewn with ethical precepts with no apparent link between the two registers. The essay that I am submitting attempts to support the following hypothesis: if the Hippocratic doctors did not distinguish, in their writings, ethics and technique, it is because these ethical precepts are derived from medicine in the same way as the techniques of care .Hence the general question of my work: What is Hippocratic medicine, as long as it produces not only healing techniques, but also ethics? What is this ethics, insofar as it is produced by medical thought?The essay is primarily devoted to the first of these two questions. He tries to show that Hippocratic medicine is not a simple technique which would have recourse to philosophy, morals, religion or politics with regard to the relative problems, upstream, to its epistemological foundations or those relating, downstream, to the regulation of its applications.Indeed, unlike techniques, Hippocratic medicine cannot produce a defined object. Medical concepts apply in all fields. The only possible definition of Hippocratic medicine concerns its end: human health. Hippocratic physicians have developed a thought which enables them to attempt to give human life the greatest amplitude and the longest duration. Medicine as a whole is an ethic of health. This attitude which I call the medical resolution is opposed, in my opinion, to the philosophical approach which arose around the same time. Indeed, only medicine is the human assumption of the value promoted by life itself, namely health. Philosophy, for its part, seeks to justify life by enclosing it in a network of logos which exceeds it on all sides.All medical thought is directed towards this end: to give life its widest range. Now, if it is true that we do not treat man, but the individual, medicine has had to develop a method targeting the singular. Plato testifies, in the Phaedrus, of this method. It is a matter of relating the part ...

The Hippocratic Collection presents this remarkable feature that technical medical texts are strewn with ethical precepts with no apparent link between the two registers. The essay that I am submitting attempts to support the following hypothesis: if the Hippocratic doctors did not distinguish, in their writings, ethics and technique, it is because these ethical precepts are derived from medicine in the same way as the techniques of care .Hence the general question of my work: What is Hippocratic medicine, as long as it produces not only healing techniques, but also ethics? What is this ethics, insofar as it is produced by medical thought?The essay is primarily devoted to the first of these two questions. He tries to show that Hippocratic medicine is not a simple technique which would have recourse to philosophy, morals, religion or politics with regard to the relative problems, upstream, to its epistemological foundations or those relating, downstream, to the regulation of its applications.Indeed, unlike techniques, Hippocratic medicine cannot produce a defined object. Medical concepts apply in all fields. The only possible definition of Hippocratic medicine concerns its end: human health. Hippocratic physicians have developed a thought which enables them to attempt to give human life the greatest amplitude and the longest duration. Medicine as a whole is an ethic of health. This attitude which I call the medical resolution is opposed, in my opinion, to the philosophical approach which arose around the same time. Indeed, only medicine is the human assumption of the value promoted by life itself, namely health. Philosophy, for its part, seeks to justify life by enclosing it in a network of logos which exceeds it on all sides.All medical thought is directed towards this end: to give life its widest range. Now, if it is true that we do not treat man, but the individual, medicine has had to develop a method targeting the singular. Plato testifies, in the Phaedrus, of this method. It is a matter of relating the part ...

THE RESEARCH ON THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DISCOURSE OF LOVE IN 15TH CENTURY SPAIN IMPLIES THREE DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF STUDY : SACRED LOVE, LOVE AMONG KIN, AND POLITICAL LOVE ; THE HORIZONTAL RELATIONS OF EQUALITY (FRIENDSHIP) AND HETEROGENE RELATIONS (INTERSEXUAL LOVE). SACRED LOVE KNOWS THE PROGRESSIVE ABANDONMENT OF INDIVIDUAL MYSTICISM IN FAVOR OF A SOCIAL VISION OF RELIGIOUS LOVE. THE DISCOURSE OF LOVE AMONG KIN PROVIDES A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE HIERARCHIC REPRESENTATION OF SOCIETY. THE XVTH. CENTURY BRINGS ABOUT AN EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL MODELS : THE FEUDAL IDEA OF LOVE AS THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL BOND LOSES ITS FORCE EITHER TO SOLELY REPRESENT A KNIGHTLY IDEAL OR TO BECOME ONE OF THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE NEW MONARCHIC MODELS. PRIOR TO THE 15TH CENTURY THE IDEA OF FRIEDSHIP WAS DEVELOPED BY THE DIDACTIC AND JUDICIALS DOMAINS. THIS NOTIONS IS PERCEIVED IN DIDACTICISM AS DANGEROUS IMPLYING MISTRUST. IN THE JUDICIAL REALM TWO DIFFERENT NOTIONS OF FRIENDSHIP COME FACE TO FACE (COMMON LAW AND NATURAL LAW). IN THE 15TH CENTURY THE DISCOURSE ON FRIENDSHIP REPRODUCES THE MODELS OF ANTIQUITY INORDER TO DEVELOP A HUMANISTIC CONCEPTION OF FRIENDSHIP BASED ON VIRTUE. AS CONCERNS INTERSEXUAL LOVE, THE 15TH CENTURY DEVELOPS, THROUGH SCHOLARLY KNOWLEDGE, THE NATURALISTIC IDEAS OF LOVE, CLAIMED BY A. MADRIGAL WHO THROUGH THE EROTIZATION OF SUCH ARGUMENTS COMES TO ESTABLISH THE SPECIFICITY OF HUMAN LOVE, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY AESTHETIC. THE THEORY OF LOVE ALSO SIGNIFIES THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF LOVE : ASTROLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF MANKIND, MAGIC. LIKEWISE, MEDECINE IS CAPABLE OF SCIENTIFICALLY ISOLATING THE PHENOMNON OF LOVE AND OF TRANSMITTING AN EROTIC KNOWLEDGE WITH IMPUNITY. ALL THESE INFLUENCES ALLOW TO ESTABLISH THE DIFFERENT LITERARY TENDENCIES ABOUT LOVE ; La recherche sur les fondements théoriques du discours amoureux dans l'Espagne du XVe siècle implique trois axes d'étude : les relations verticales d'inégalité (amour parental et amour politique), les relations horizontales ...

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Critical Management Education (CME) by drawing on the work of philosopher, Jacques Rancière, whose thinking provides a means of resolving the dilemma underlying CME. It raises fundamental questions regarding the position of authority and the expertise of the critical educator, while at the same time dispelling the illusion of collaboration and consensus with students and managers. By presenting equality as an assumption to be actualised, Rancière invites us to reject the appropriation harboured by expert knowledge and the assignation of positions that this implies. On this basis, we can restructure the place of management and management education as a fertile ground for the emergence of dissensus in order to politicise what was neutralised and to give voice to those who have no voice.