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An American envoy and a Bahraini academic posed for the camera at a Washington hotel in October 2020, grinning ear to ear. They held a copy of an agreement between the U.S. State Department and the King Hamad Global Center for Peaceful Coexistence to combat antisemitism in Bahrain. Ellie Cohanim, then the U.S. assistant special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, called it "a model for a society that actively espouses religious freedom, tolerance and diversity of peoples."Thousands of miles away, in Bahrain itself, Sheikh Zuhair Jasim Abbas was sitting in a solitary confinement cell. His family had not heard from him since July. They would not again for several more months. According to a UN panel, the Shi'a Muslim cleric was allegedly beaten, starved, sleep-deprived, chained, attacked with water hoses, forbidden from using the bathroom, threatened with execution, and prevented from practicing his religious rituals.The Abraham Accords, the diplomatic agreements between Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have been hailed as a victory for religious tolerance. The image of Muslims and Jews dancing together has convinced American policymakers from both parties that peace is breaking out across the Middle East. The Biden administration is reportedly offering the Saudi government a huge bribe — perhaps even a commitment to go to war on the kingdom's behalf — to get Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords as well.New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman seems to sum up the Biden administration's logic: that a Saudi-Israeli agreement would "open the way for peace between Israel and the whole Muslim world" and "dramatically reduce the Muslim-Jewish antipathy born over a century ago with the start of the Jewish-Palestinian conflict."But the Abraham Accords are attached to a social order that is deeply unequal, divided along ethnic and religious lines. While Israel allows foreign Muslims to visit Jerusalem, it rules over millions of Palestinians against their will. (That conflict is more about nationalism in the here and now than "Muslim-Jewish antipathy.") And while some monarchies in the Persian Gulf are beginning to embrace foreigners of different religions, those same states — especially Bahrain — treat their native Shi'a Muslims as a potential fifth column.For the past few years, some of the Gulf monarchies have been engaged in a project to replace Israel with Iran as the main enemy of the Arab masses. On one hand, these countries have repressed pro-Palestine activism and promoted an image of Palestinians as parasitic ingrates. On the other hand, they have encouraged fears of Iranian power, often conflating Iran with Shi'a Muslims as a whole. Israel has encouraged both prejudices as part of its outreach to Middle Eastern publics. Rather than a victory for religious tolerance, the Abraham Accords are the culmination of an attempt by Israel and its new Gulf allies to rearrange their official enemy lists.In 2018, as Israel was beginning direct talks with Emirati and Bahraini diplomats, Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee turned into a fountain of anti-Shi'a incitement. Quoting medieval Sunni scholars, Adraee claimed on video that Shi'a Muslims are "fundamentally hypocrites and liars who invent falsehoods to ruin Islam." A few months later, he complained that Iran is "transforming citizens into Shi'a" across the Arab world.After the Abraham Accords were signed, Adraee ranted that Sunni Palestinians who prayed alongside Shi'a were leaving the fold of Sunni Islam: "How do these 'believers' justify praying behind those who stab the back of the Sunni world?" The spirit of Muslim-Jewish reconciliation, with its emphasis on interfaith photo ops, clearly does not apply to Sunni-Shi'a relations.It's worth noting that, although Iran is the largest Shi'a-majority state, most Shi'a Muslims live outside of Iran, in India, Pakistan, and the Arab world. And religious Shi'a have been at the forefront of resisting the Iranian theocracy, both inside and outside Iran. However, casting all Shi'a as Iranian agents serves a political purpose. Unrest in areas like eastern Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, where the majority of the population is Shi'a, can be dismissed as foreign terrorism, rather than a case of Arab citizens demanding equal rights. In the words of one Saudi commentator, Arabs who embrace Shi'a identity politics "have sadly become Persian."While trying to terrify Sunnis about the Iranian menace, the Israeli government has also worked to turn Iranians against Palestinians. Last year, when a few Iranian protesters were filmed stomping on a Palestinian symbol, the Israeli foreign ministry loudly promoted that image. The ministry's Persian-language account is filled with sarcastic jokes about the "oppressed Palestinians," along with claims that "they teach hatred and violence" to their children.As the Abraham Accords were finalized, the Gulf states that moved closer to Israel also began to take more of an anti-Palestinian line. Americans celebrated, and rightfully so, when Saudi television or the Emirati school system presented a more sympathetic view of Jews. At the same time, however, Saudi and Emirati media figures got louder about what they considered Palestinian "treachery." In the words of a Saudi soap opera character, the average Palestinian is an ingrate who "doesn't appreciate you standing by him, who curses you day and night — more than the Israelis." Given the heavy censorship that Saudi and Emirati media are subject to, this change in tone must have reflected official policy. Just as political concerns led Gulf states to tone down anti-Jewish prejudice, different political concerns could lead them to tone down other prejudices. At times when Israeli authorities aggressively asserted their sovereignty over Islamic holy sites — especially under the ultra-nationalist Israeli government elected in 2022 — the Gulf has returned to a more pro-Palestine tone. After Saudi Arabia mended ties with Iran earlier this year, Saudi authorities loosened restrictions on Shi'a pilgrims, and prominent Saudi propagandist Hussain al-Ghawi embraced Shi'a as his Muslim brothers. Ironically, American media did not celebrate the Saudi-Iranian pact as the dawn of religious harmony, but instead raised the alarm that Washington was losing its influence in the region.The American cultural understanding of the Middle East is centered on Israel, and anti-Palestinian racism is normalized in U.S. politics. On the other hand, Washington views Sunni-Shi'a sectarianism as a geopolitical game. During the occupation of Iraq and the decades of war that followed, U.S. policymakers treated "Sunni" and "Shi'a" like pieces on a chessboard, debating which side to favor at any given time. Instead of seeing this sectarianism as a terrible policy failure, U.S. politicians blamed Muslims' own attachment to "tribalism" and "conflicts that date back millennia," as former President Barack Obama put it.And so the Abraham Accords help flatter American elites. Israel and its Gulf allies can make a big show of overcoming Muslim-Jewish tensions — which Americans see as the central moral question of the Middle East — with U.S. support. The other prejudices involved in maintaining the system simply don't register on Americans' radar.Other states are starting to appeal to the West through the same strategy. Azerbaijan is fighting a brutal ethnic conflict against Armenia. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani government has made a big show of hosting foreign Christian and Jewish delegations. Those guests often go on to praise Azerbaijan as an oasis of Muslim tolerance — rather than a secular nationalist dictatorship whose ethnic hatred of Armenians outweighs any religious concern.It's noble to want American diplomats to resolve conflicts and promote harmony between religions. But the Abraham Accords are intentionally misleading in that regard. Under the guise of peacemaking, the alliance helps authoritarian governments maintain divisions, albeit among communities that U.S. elites don't care about. The real path to peace comes through justice and mutual respect, not simply rearranging enemy lists.

After seven years of severed diplomatic relations, the China-brokered renormalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, signed on March 10, marked a major breakthrough in the Middle East's shift toward de-escalation between regional rivals. Nearly six months later, the Iranian-Saudi détente remains on track. Last month, Iran's chief diplomat, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, or MbS, in Jeddah and invited him to Tehran. Then on September 5, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, who was previously the Kingdom's ambassador to Oman, arrived in Tehran. That same day, Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, who previously served as the Islamic Republic's Kuwait envoy, arrived in Riyadh. Such developments speak to both sides' interest in further improving bilateral ties. As Ambassador Alanazi put it, Saudi officials recognize the "importance of strengthening ties, increasing engagement…and taking the [relationship] to broader horizons."Tehran and Riyadh did not sign the diplomatic agreement in Beijing after almost two years of Iraqi- and Omani-facilitated mediation out of mutual love. Instead, the deal resulted from their respective interests in détente at a particular time. Ultimately, hostilities between the two regional powers over the past decade were not serving either side. Rather than continuing down the path of steadily mounting tension, Tehran and Riyadh both saw a "cold peace" as their best option, albeit for different reasons.Motivations for détenteCentral to the Ebrahim Raisi administration's foreign policy is the "Neighbors First" doctrine. As relations between Iran and the West continue deteriorating, Tehran wants not only to cultivate closer ties with China and Russia, but also have better relationships with Islamic countries in its own neighborhood, including with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Central Asian states and Pakistan. Iran hopes this will reap economic benefits while better positioning the Islamic Republic to circumvent U.S. sanctions and pressure.Riyadh understood that attracting sufficient foreign investment to make MbS's Vision 2030 succeed requires greater stability at home and throughout the region. This made de-escalating tensions with Iran necessary, especially given Tehran's influence over Yemen's Houthi insurgents, whose drone and missile attacks against Saudi infrastructure had caused considerable damage until the April 2022 truce's implementation."The decision to restore relations was made by both sides with cold calculation," Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center, told RS. "Iran wants to prove it is not isolated regionally while Saudi Arabia wants an insurance policy against external attacks while it tries to realize its ambitious economic goals."Yet Tehran and Riyadh continue harboring suspicions of each other. From Iran's vantagepoint, Riyadh's partnership with Washington remains a major threat to Gulf security, while Saudi Arabia still sees Iran's regional conduct as destabilizing.Indeed, nearly six months in, the Iranian-Saudi diplomatic agreement has only gone so far. "It hasn't evolved into a real rapprochement, but that was always far-fetched as long as Iran is at daggers-drawn with Riyadh's key strategic ally: the United States," said the International Crisis Group's Ali Vaez in an interview with RS. "The long shadow of the nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. will prevent the reestablishment of economic ties between Tehran and Riyadh and could eventually flare up regional tensions that could once again spill over into the bilateral relationship."The recent deployment of 3,000 American sailors and Marines to waters near Iran has only resulted in more threats from Tehran to the U.S. This development could have major implications for Iranian-Saudi relations."Like all diplomatic deals, the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iranian diplomatic effort, is—at best—a work in progress," Joseph A. Kechichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, told RS. "While many hastened to conclude that the two countries, under close Chinese supervision, would rapidly embark on fresh initiatives, reality stepped in because Riyadh was and still is wary of Tehran's pledges to end its interferences in internal Arab affairs. (Almost) six months in, neither side seems ready to be blinded by lofty declarations, which often belie serious differences."Enter IsraelSaudi Arabia has thus far refused to follow in Abu Dhabi's footsteps and join the Abraham Accords. Riyadh stresses that normalization with Tel Aviv would require significant Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, and with Israel's far-right government that is currently in power, such concessions are unlikely to be offered. Nonetheless, trying to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords is a top foreign policy priority for Team Biden. It is worth asking how this stands to impact the Iranian-Saudi détente.Depending on the degree to which there is convergence between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, there could be negative consequences for Iranian-Saudi relations. Ultimately, Tehran does not see diplomatic relations between GCC states and Israel as a threat per se. It is far more concerned with how the Abraham Accords could lead to a growing Israeli military footprint near Iranian territory."Iran will feel obliged to condemn Riyadh if it normalizes with Israel and will be on the alert for any military or intelligence component to such a deal. That it will not tolerate," explained Slavin."Iran is afraid of greater military and security convergence of the Persian Gulf Arabs with Israel in formats such as the joint air defense system," Javad Heiran-Nia, the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told RS."Iran knows that by forming such a system, a 'balance deficit' will be detrimental to it. For this reason, Iran has announced the unveiling of hypersonic missiles capable of passing through any missile defense system. Iran sends the message to the Persian Gulf states that expanding their relations and forming a strong convergence in the region with Israel will not ensure their security," added Heiran-Nia.Signs of improved tiesLooking ahead, certain indicators can help assess the evolving state of Iranian-Saudi relations.As Iran and Saudi Arabia have previously enjoyed periods of détente, such as during the 1990s and early 2000s, Vaez told RS that "this one is unlikely to withstand the test of time unless it is institutionalized in the form of frequent high-level political engagement, standing bilateral committees that would proactively work to deepen ties between the two nations on multiple levels, and an inclusive regional security dialogue that starts thinking about a mutually tolerable and sustainable modus vivendi for all the key stakeholders."The main indicator of how Iranian-Saudi relations develop will not be the absence of conflict or disagreement, explained Aziz Alghashian, a fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. "Rather, it is how both Iran and Saudi react to these sensitive issues [such as the Dorra/Arash Gas Field dispute and unresolved tensions over Yemen], what kind of language will they use, and what kind of sentiments will they have in negotiating these sensitivities."Roughly six months after the diplomatic deal was announced in China, Slavin has somewhat low expectations for improved bilateral ties. "I would expect an improved atmosphere for Iranian pilgrims going on the hajj and a modest uptick in sports and other exchanges, plus limited trade in non-sanctioned goods." But she assesses that Iranian-Saudi reconciliation will be "very superficial."Nonetheless, as much as any optimism about a full rapprochement must be tempered, the current state of Iranian-Saudi relations is far more stable than the 2011-22 period. That is positive for the whole Middle East. The Gulf and the wider region stand to benefit, at least to some degree, from Tehran and Riyadh finding a way to "share the neighborhood," as former President Barack Obama once put it."A cold peace is…better than the alternative," said Slavin.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing Gaza war and an enraged Arab street, the future of 2,500 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq is once again in question. Despite a full withdrawal in 2011, the government of Iraq "invited" U.S. forces to return in 2014 to combat Daesh, or ISIS. But seven years after the "Caliphate" was pronounced defeated, the multinational Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve maintains a large military presence in Iraq, ostensibly to "work by, with and through regional partners to militarily defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, in order to enable whole-of-coalition governmental actions to increase regional stability."Despite those laudable intentions, attacks against U.S. military personnel have intensified and so has political pressure to conclude the mission, far beyond similar calls for expulsion following the targeting of Qassim Soleimani in 2020. The presence of foreign forces in general and the U.S. troops in particular is vexing to Iraq with its long history of occupation (although calling 2,500 non-combat forces an occupation is a bit of a stretch), but is also an opportunity, particularly among Iranian-backed political parties and militias, to create a strawman responsible for all of the country's ills.For many Iraqis the counter-ISIS coalition is like the guest who has overstayed his welcome."The presence of U.S. military forces on Iraqi soil has been increasingly causing problems to Iraq and its neighbors; it also gives a pretext to terrorists to resume their attacks on Iraqis," said Dhia Al-Asadi, former minister of state who headed the Al-Ahrar (Sadrist) Bloc in parliament. "These forces should withdraw immediately so that a legitimate, nationalist Iraqi government can take the lead and build its military and security capacity without unsolicited U.S. interference."Yet, not all Iraqis concur with those views."Despite the considerable strength of militia forces in Iraq, surpassing that of the Iraqi national army, their calls for the withdrawal of Americans and allies are primarily rhetorical," said Nahro Zagros, editor in chief of Kurdistan Chronicle and former vice president of Soran University in Erbil. "If the decision rested with the Iraqi populace, the majority would prefer the continued presence of Americans. However, Iraqi affairs are not under Iraqi control but influenced by neighboring powers."According to Falah Mustafa, a close adviser to the president of the Kurdistan Region on Foreign Policy Affairs, "any decision [on the future of the coalition forces] must be based on national consensus.""For the Kurdistan Region, certainly we are part of Iraq and we will abide by any decision that Iraq makes, but one single group of Iraqi society cannot determine this alone, because Iraq is a diverse country. Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Christians, we all need to agree on this issue because it is about the stability, security of this country," he said.While the U.S. has sought to maintain a military presence in Iraq, arguments to keep them there do not stand up to scrutiny. There is an unspoken proposition that Iraq could be used as a launch platform for attacks against Iran or elsewhere, but this is specifically prohibited by the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which remain the foundational document for the Iraq-U.S. relationship. It says, "The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq."Besides, Iraq is not needed for this purpose. The U.S. currently has a major logistical base in Kuwait with over 13,000 army troops, a naval base in Bahrain housing the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Al Udeid Air Base in Doha is the largest military installation in the region with over 8,000 troops. The Persian Gulf can fit a Carrier Battle Group with ease. These, in addition to other bases in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan and Turkey, maintain more than sufficient ground, air and naval assets to challenge any military force in the region. A second argument is the often-stated rhetorical trope that leaving Iraq would be a victory for the Iranians. While it may be a rhetorical victory for Iran, rhetoric should not be the basis for foreign policy. A military withdrawal from Iraq would be seen in Tehran as stabilizing Iran's western borders, but it must be acknowledged that the U.S. seeks the same outcome on its borders. The Monroe Doctrine has been the cornerstone of U.S. hemispheric policy for 200 years, just as Persian influence has driven similar aspirations towards Iraq for over a millennium. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif famously said, "Look at the map. The U.S. military has travelled 10,000 kilometers to dot all our borders with its bases. There is a joke that it is Iran that put itself in the middle of U.S. bases."The U.S. argument conflates influence with interference. The economies and cultures of the two societies are vastly intermingled, shown most clearly with the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims which peacefully cross the borders annually to visit Qom and Najaf. Yet, the fundamental U.S. concern should not be one of Iranian influence but of Iranian interference, of which its insinuation into the political and economic structures will continue, regardless of the U.S. troop presence.Last, some would argue for a continued U.S. troop presence, asserting that the counter-ISIS mission is not finished, and ISIS remains a significant threat to both Iraq and the international community. While there may be some validity to this argument, it begs the question whether the Iraqis need continued foreign assistance or can accomplish this mission unilaterally. A U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission has recently been meeting to analyze these and other concerns to determine the rationale for a continued military mission. Mustafa, who previously served as head of KRG's Department of Foreign Relations, said it is important to remember that "this should not be emotional; it should not be affected by other factors.""Iraqis, the U.S. — the relevant people — need to sit down together, discuss and assess the situation on the ground, review the extent of engagement, assess the threats, Iraqi capabilities and determine together the nature and shape of future arrangements and future relations between Iraq and the U.S., and the rest of coalition countries," he said.According to Al-Asadi, "Daesh, like al-Qaida before it, will not cease to exist as a threat not only to Iraq but to the region and the entire world. Names, strategies and means may change, but the masterminds and beneficiaries of such groups will always keep them ready to strike, and sometimes they serve as a hired gun."However, he added: "Iraqi forces are qualified and capable of dealing with this threat. They may need some up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation with regional and world countries who ought to share the same amount of concern about the growing danger of these terrorist groups."While the need for "up-to-date technology, training and honest cooperation" is important, it could be provided by other nations' forces, contractors or remotely, rather than by the physical presence of U.S. forces.A final argument suggests the continued presence of U.S. forces is an insurance against internal Iraqi threats. According to Zagros, "the most significant danger originates from within Iraq itself, where militia forces persist in attacking fellow Iraqis and opposing factions.""I firmly believe that without the presence of Americans and their allies, Iraq and the broader region face the risk of fragmentation and collapse," he said.Yet, those same militia forces are using the presence of U.S. forces as a casus belli to wage a deadly campaign against the forces of occupation, aligning themselves with the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" to receive equipment, training and funding from the Quds Force. Counterintuitively, the very presence of U.S. troops strengthens the hands of the militias and creates instability, especially when the United States unilaterally targets militia leaders and infringes on Iraqi territorial sovereignty to do so.These four factors, alone, imply that the U.S. troop presence comes at high costs and marginal benefits. The U.S. continues to be painted as an occupier, an aggressor, a foreign agitator and the cause of Iraqi society's near-collapse since the 2003 invasion.As Al-Asadi notes, "Why does the U.S. want to negotiate its withdrawal from Iraq? If they really want to stabilize Iraq and the region, they should withdraw their military troops first, then they can diplomatically negotiate their future relations with Iraq. Given the fragility of the situation and institutional dysfunctionality, we cannot hope for a better situation. The major denominator is the existence of foreign military troops in Iraq."Since October 7, U.S. support for Israel has aggravated the anger, and has brought the question of continued U.S. presence to the fore. While some arguments for remaining may exist, and Iraq is certainly more important than Otto von Bismarck's famous quote that the Balkans are not "worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier," the U.S. should reflect, clear-eyed, on the risk to American lives, the provocation to Iran, the almost paternalistic view that the Iraqi security establishment can't succeed against ISIS on its own, or can't find other alternatives, and the significant animosity against U.S. policy throughout the region. The Counter-ISIS Coalition performed brilliantly, but it is time to say, "Mission Accomplished."