Suchergebnisse

It is impossible accurately to determine whether the more potent line of causation of the recent attack on the orthodox theory of the state is to be found in the field of the developing science of jurisprudence, or in that of practical experience, economic, religious, social, and political, inasmuch as both of these factors are so largely involved. There is reason to think, however, that the more important cause lies in the latter field. The conditions of modern life are changing so rapidly and are becoming daily so much more complex that to many the existing political organization no longer adequately expresses or reflects the social organization behind it. These individuals and groups have in consequence become so discontented with the present system that they have not been satisfied with suggesting new governmental forms and machinery, but failing in their enthusiasm to distinguish state from government, have undertaken in many cases to overthrow the very citadel of the state itself. Nor has the movement halted even at this point, for in this attempt not only has the attack been launched against the nature of the state and of sovereignty, through the calling into question of its two fundamental attributes, unity and absolutism, but the charge has been carried over into the realm of right as well, in the challenging of the right and the justification of the absolute sovereign state.

It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that the terms monism and pluralism have been injected into the discussion of political theory and doubly unfortunate that they have been put forward as rival theories between which we are expected to choose. Both words are in fact very general, both are capable of many meanings and both have about them the connotations of centuries of philosophical dispute. And yet the one clear lesson from these disputes is that both monism and pluralism are inescapable aspects of our world and as such can neither of them be neglected. An effort to set the two in opposition, to picture them as incompatible, and to force a choice between them is surely wasted. The truth is that monism and pluralism are not theories but points of view or modes of attack, and any reasonable political theory will have to take account of both and both will have to be interpreted in such a way that they can be joined in one theory. It is not the purpose of this paper to undertake so large a task as this final reconciliation; but merely to state as exactly as may be what is connoted by such phrases as "a monistic theory of the state" and "a pluralistic theory of the state," in order that the different points of view may be made as clear as possible and may be compared.By political monism I understand a theory which holds that the state is ultimately a single indivisible authority, not subject to any other authority and therefore able itself to fix the limits and the content of the obligations to which it gives rise.

Federalism has been described by Dicey as "a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and power with the maintenance of 'state right'". Dr. Schmitt, a contemporary German student of federal institutions, has stated that "the nature of union consists in a dualism of the political existence, in a combination of federative common existence and political unity on the one hand with the continuance of plurality, of a pluralism of political individual unities, on the other". Lord Bryce had expressed the same thought in more picturesque language in his earlier study of federal institutions in the United States.The central or national government and the State governments may be compared to a large building and a set of smaller buildings standing on the same ground yet distinct from each other. It is a combination sometimes seen where a great church has been erected over more ancient homes of worship. First the soil is covered by a number of small shrines and chapels, built at different times and in different styles of architecture, each complete in itself. Then over them and including them all in its spacious fabric there is reared a new pile with its own loftier roof, its own walls, which may rest upon and incorporate the walls of the older shrines, its own internal plan. The identity of the earlier buildings has, however, not been obliterated; and if the later and larger structure were to disappear, a little repair would enable them to keep out wind and weather, and be again what they once were, distinct and separate edifices.

Theories of the nature of the political community vary with conditions. Just as political pluralism was a phase of the late mellowness of liberalism, so the organic theory of the state is suited for more heroic moments. When integral nationalism was discovered in the United States after the defeat of the South, it was not inappropriate that organic theories should have been supported in order to explain the place of the American nation in history. Nor can it be surprising that today some of the leaders of the United States are looking at the nation as a kind of social organism.If one reads with attention the words of President Lincoln during the early days of the Civil War, it can be seen that the Union was more than just a voluntary association of political communities. The states had their being within the Union, and the Union itself had given birth to the states. Even the history of Texas and its relation to the Union did not impress Lincoln as simply consensual, for if there was consent it was all on the side of Texas. Whatever liberty and authority the states possessed they derived from the Union, and not from any original powers of their own. When the Union became a symbol of organicity in the mind of the North, the earlier individualistic theory of the state was remote enough. The social contract, the consent of all to government, was suitable in the American Revolution, since protest was being made against the specific, arbitrary actions of the British government, animated it would seem by a total conception of Empire. To Lincoln, states, like individuals, were a part of the Union, and the Union might be broken neither by citizens nor by states.