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The author shows that Rawls's conception of the overlapping consensus does not apply to value pluralism in general but only to the so-called reasonable pluralism. The author first gives an account of the criticisms directed at Rawls's neutralization of the political by Gray & Mouffe, & tries to demonstrate that neither of these critiques is entirely valid. A Weberian critique, however, would not display these shortcomings. Weber's liberalism is based on value pluralism, & its key assumption is that there is no hierarchy of values. Besides, no political concept may escape the fundamental features of political activity -- the spoils system or the system of the distribution of political gains & the ethical irrationality. The fundamentals of Weber's liberalism can be found in his maxim "Become what you are made for!" as well as in the "political characters" that belong to the world of classical liberalism. A political leader is a creator of institutions & liberal communities with which Weber eschews the traditional liberal foundationalism based on natural rights & utilitarianism. Hence, his liberalism is the least doctrinaire one because moral issues remain a part of the political conflict. 9 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author demonstrates that the envisaged solutions for the conflict between the liberal concept of freedom & the common good differ greatly. Also presented is a miscellany of possible solutions as well as the related contentious issues. However, the analysis has shown that almost all the mentioned authors see the need for some common good, for a "measure of freedom," but their proposed ways for solving the issue vary: while some think that the universal common good is necessary for regulating procedures conducive to the achievement of freely chosen individual aims, others think that the tolerance of cultural & value differences is a sufficient condition for solving the said problem. For example, J. Raz emphasizes moral pluralism as the basis of autonomy, while S. Nathanson thinks that pluralist aims can exist, but not morally varied ways of their achievement. These different concepts of the relationships between freedom & common good can have different effects on the concepts & the practice of public politics in contemporary societies. That is why the need for looking into the conflict between freedom & common good, differences & unity, private & public interest, is highly topical & represents a true challenge for all those who want to contribute to solving the problems of modern age & liberal democracies. Adapted from the source document.

Ernes Kulenovic's Ph. D. dissertation Pluralisticka teorija utemeljenja ljudskih prava (Pluralistic Theory of the Foundation of Human Rights), defended at the U of Zagreb in 2009, is presented, outlining its objectives, summarizing & commenting on its individual chapters, & expressing a few evaluative remarks in the concluding paragraph. A synopsis of the work's five chapters is given, focusing on the leading theme of each: (1) the political & theoretical context of a relativist conception of the universality of human rights, (2) the tradition of natural law as the foundation of human rights, (3) the implications of the theory of cultural relativism for the foundation of human rights, (4) major proposals of a relativist foundation of human rights; a critical survey of literature, & (5) a summary of research results. The work is praised for its contribution to the study of universalist & relativist conceptions of human rights, a clear & comprehensive style of exposition, & a very stimulating read. Adapted from the source document.

This paper deals with Bhikhu Parekh's theory of intercultural evaluation. Parekh's approach to multiculturalism is based on an open dialogue between minorities & the majority on cultural practices that should be tolerated. In the first part, author criticizes Parekh's concept of operative public values, which Parekh uses as a starting point for intercultural debate. In the second part, author deals with the problem of consistency between Parekh's theoretical arguments & their application to particular cases. In the conclusion, author argues that Parekh's aspiration to avoid both claims of liberal universalism & cultural relativism is unsuccessful because he fails to provide a convincing theoretical argument on how to resolve disputes on cultural values & practices. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author deals with the issue of the relationship between liberalism & multiculturalism & points out certain tensions stemming from the debate between liberals & multiculturalists. The paper mentions the theoretical interventions of political philosophers such as Charles Taylor (multiculturalist), John Gray (postmodern liberal conservative) & Brian Barry (liberal universalist). By looking into Barry's attack on Taylor & Gray, the author tries to show Barry's mistake in accusing those two of relativism derived from incommensurability, but also gives him credit for unerringly recognizing the weaknesses of the relativist criticism of liberalism. According to the author, many theoreticians participating in the academic dispute between the liberals & the multiculturalists assume that the real targets are the liberal egalitarians (Rawls & his disciples). This has created a dramatically erroneous impression that the USA are liberal in an egalitarian way. Thus, while the leftist critics of egalitarian liberalism were finding fault with the abominable universalist theory, the antiliberals (& the antimulticulturalists) have gained prominence. 7 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author presents two alternative concepts of democracy: the procedural, which values systems according to the procedures that a government makes use of in its day-to-day functioning; & the substantial, which insists on the political decisions' content as the criterion of a system's democracy. Based on these two concepts, the theoreticians of democracy have construed three different models of democracy (majority, pluralist & consensual); the first two are on the line of the procedural, & the third of the substantial theory of democracy. The advocates of the majority model are of the opinion that a government is primarily responsible to public opinion, ie, the citizens' majority; the pluralists consider democracy to be the government of several interest groups, of which none is powerful enough to impose its interest; the consensual model emphasizes the need for the government to guarantee, through its decisions, human & civil rights. This model also points out the need for protecting national minorities by employing mechanisms that enable their participation in the government. The author concludes that the latter model would best suit the societies of Central & Eastern Europe since they, due to their historical, social & cultural circumstances are not in the position to evolve Western models based on the procedural understanding of democracy. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper, the author has tried to describe the relationship between Rawls's concept of the person, social cooperation, & political education. Rawls precisely links political education with the liberal political outlook & not to life in general. Hence, the importance for his theory of the notion of "reasonable pluralism" & the reasonably disagreeing conceptions of a good life. The author has tried to show that, for Rawls, it is the concept of the reasonable individual that is the goal of political education, ie, the ability of a person to adopt the fundamental principles of justice as the conditions for social cooperation, while the "burdens of judgment" are the source & the framework of fundamental political virtues (toleration, respect, reciprocity, politeness, etc) that Rawls promotes & considers important for the idea of the public reason, ie, a sort of deliberative democracy, as well as for the very existence & stability of a political system. Thus, Rawls got involved in the debate on the conception of liberal virtues & the possibility of their political socialization & education. 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author suggests that the multilayered concept of secularization should be understood as the dezideologization of culture, religion, nation, language. economy, opening the space for democratic decision-making in the European Union, & consequently the space for politics with the capacity for collectively binding decisions in the democratically generated pluralism, & not in the historically generated pluralism of the old Europe. Secularization originally meant the transfer of clergy (priests or monks) from regular to secular thereby making them secularis or laypersons. Since the Westphalian Treaty of 1647 the word secularization has meant the transfer of ecclesiastical property to civil possession or use. Secularization means a strict separation of the church & the state. It also means a secular implementation of Christian postulates of universal equality of equals among equals. Today, the concept of secularization is used metaphorically as dezideologization i.e. as the criticism of state forms such as fascism and communism which possessed only ideological & not democratic legitimacy. In that sense the thesis of the cultural or spiritual unity of Europe as its legitimizing grounds is undemocratic as it replaces & conditions democracy with a vague concept of culture or spoken communication. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the relation between politics, state and religion from the political-science perspective, as part of an analysis and evaluation of tasks, achievements and failures of polity, policy or politics from the standpoint of normative-constructive philosophy of equity. At present the central task of policy is to stimulate and strengthen the Western political culture based on the fundamental distinction between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" pluralism. "Reasonable" pluralism rests on the assumption that the state is a just power, the sovereignty of which can be recognized in distinguishing the "public" and the "private", the just and the good, and, in connection therewith, it is almost self-understandable that such a liberal guaranteed private sphere must be the primary arena of religious practice and religious freedoms. The crucial trait of the relation between state and religion is manifest in the fact that only the legal state and the liberal constitution are competent to state what the freedom of individuals consists of within the framework of norms of what is just. The author defines "religion" in the comprehensive sense as central to the processes of forming cultural identity, and he deems that cultural policy (which, in principle, has to do with relations between state and religion), as policy of equitable integration of multi-culturally shaped political unities, must be oriented toward stimulation of those attitudes and values which make possible the reasonable pluralism defined according to Rawls. Since the political encompasses also the possibility to make enemies, the author advocates the cultural policy of "weakening the feelings of enmity" (N. Elias). In this way, a systematic concept of policy would be created, one which would reflect and preserve the conditions of reasonable pluralism. On the policy level and, in particular, on the politics level, cultural policy is a very demanding project. Perhaps it is precisely Switzerland, with its special prospects of civil democracy, that offers promising cultural-policy opportunities for activity, which are as yet still insufficiently researched. Adapted from the source document.

In spite of the fact that Serbia is a multicultural state in which many ethno-cultural minorities live, that basic regulations have been issued which secure the rights of ethnic minorities, and that a system of multiculturalism has been established, only partial recognition of the identity and rights of ethnic minorities has been accomplished in Serbia. This has been carried out through introducing procedures, rules, institutions, mechanisms and instruments which guarantee the exercise of rights of ethnic minorities which live and develop their own identity alongside other minorities and the ethnic majority, with the actual effect that, regardless of the attained high level of multiculturalism, the minorities are still separated, mutually and with regard to the majority, i.e. ghettoised. This is caused by the established type of segregative multiculturalism, which contributes to the situation in which minorities are separated; they coexist, but are not intermixed in an integrated multicultural society. Adapted from the source document.

The author outlines the modern universalistic theories that assume the natural & historical unity of humankind &, using this as a starting point, predict a cosmopolitan & Eurocentric outcome of world history. Contrary to these universalistic theories, the contemporary globalist theories, the author claims, are pluralistic & multicultural & thus paradigmatically different from the panoptical theories of classic modernism. Adapted from the source document.

Modern states display a pluralism of ethical, religious, & philosophical convictions that brings into question the possibility of a strong identification of citizens with the political community. Due to these centrifugal tendencies, as well as to the disintegration of the traditional ties, modern political communities need more solidarity to be able to efficiently solve the complex problems of modern society. The burden of political decision making in modern societies is constantly growing, while its space is, at the same time, getting more confined due to the tendency of differentiation & separation of the administrative & economic sphere of power from the disposition of politics. How can modern societies surmount these challenges by linking tolerance & solidarity, democracy & social complexity? What are the cultural prerequisites for this & which institutional rules are necessary to overcome these difficulties? How is it possible in such a situation to achieve political unity & ensure the legitimation of activities necessary for a normal functioning of a political community? Here, the author outlines Rawls's answer regarding the pluralism of modern societies & the solutions he offered. First, he focuses on the changes in Rawls's original position that occurred after his book A Theory of Justice; then he highlights several themes contained in the criticisms that prompted Rawls to change his original position; next he analyzes the concept of justice as fairness from the point of view of pluralism; & finally, he outlines Rawls's concepts that are, according to him, conducive to political unity & legitimacy. 8 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting point is the argument that Rawls cannot be a Kantian, because he -- unlike Kant -- was faced with the pluralism of the contemporary innovative society, in which individuals are not divided into the existential winners & losers solely on the basis of different traditions but also of different innovations. Rawls thinks that this fact of pluralism may only be a posteriori politically regulated in a way that it is permanently cultivated to the level of political, moral, & legal order, acceptable for citizens, which gives legitimacy to the inequalities among them. Individuals are thus linked into a political community by means of justice understood as fairness. In this type of justice, citizens allow for the inequalities because they live in uncertainty or vagueness, which the author considers to be conditio humana in the innovative society. Under such circumstances. the author concludes, fairness is an ability to cope with ail unfamiliar injustice. 7 References. Adapted from the source document.