Suchergebnisse

Indicators of the tightness and discreteness of poles in the international system, as well as of the distribution of capabilities and interaction opportunities among poles, are developed. With alliance bonds as the focus, scores for each indicator are presented for each year of the past century and a half, and several prevalent theories linking polarity to war are tested. The amount of major power war begun during five-year periods is found to be unrelated to the tightness of the poles, although increases in tightness are substantially associated with large amounts of war. Bipolar systems are found to experience less war than multipolar systems, with increases in the number of clusters being especially strongly associated with the amount of major power war during subsequent five-year periods. Neither changes in the discreteness nor the distribution of capabilities among the poles has any appreciable effect on the amount of major power war.

ONE OF THE MOST INTRACTABLE DEBATES IN THE FIELD OF WORLD POLITICS CONCERNS THE LINKAGE OF SYSTEMIC POLARITY TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. DESPITE MANY THEORETICAL EXPOSITIONS AND LIMITED TESTING, DISAGREEMENT PERSISTS OVER WHICH TYPE OF STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IS MOST STABLE. THE DIALOGUE ON POLARITY AND STABILITY HAS FOCUSED ON THE RELATIVE MERITS OF BIPOLAR AND MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURES; IN OTHER WORDS, WHICH CONFIGURATION OF POWER CENTERS IS MORE STABLE, TWO OR MORE THAN THAT NUMBER? ADVOCATES OF EACH SYSTEM HAVE THEIR ADHERENTS AND, FOR SOME TIME NOW, HAVE AGREED TO DISAGREE. MOST OF THE DEBATE ON POLARITY AND STABILITY THUS FAR HAS BEEN CAST IN TERMS THAT DO NOT FACILITATE ITS RESOLUTION. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PAPER IS TO REFORMULATE THE DEBATE, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE A MORE COMPELLING EMPIRICAL JUDGEMENT OF THE COMPETING CLAIMS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THIS INVOLVES REVISION OF THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS. POLARITY, IT WILL BE ASSERTED, CANNOT BE ASSESSED ONLY IN TERMS OF DISTRIBUTION OF POWER. THE CONCEPT ALSO SHOULD INCORPORATE THE NOTION OF AUTONOMOUS DECISION CENTERS. WITH RESPECT TO INSTABILITY, WAR IS HELD TO BE A LESS COMPREHENSIVE MEASUREMENT THAN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT RENEWED TESTING SHOULD FOCUS ON THE LINKAGE OF POLARITY TO STABILITY AS SO DEFINED.

I wish to show that the criterion of polarity is inconsistent with Murdock's conceptual frame for the analysis of kinship terminology. The ignoring or recognition of polarity is a consequence of the ignoring or recognition of the other criteria. However, the criterion of polarity is not merely an unnecessary addition; it might also lead to wrong conclusions. The main error is that Murdock tries to define polarity, only being relevant on the relational level, on the Egocentered level, where kinship terminology is normally analyzed. [kinship terminology]

Polarization simplifies and deforms language, ideas, and people and reduces social life into an oppositional binary based on harmful "us versus them" narratives. What can we do to bring about a transformation away from polarity to peace? What are the polarities obscuring the path to peace? Is it a question of belief versus belief? Does it make sense to appeal to reason, discourse, and compromise in a polarized climate? What is the difference between harmful and helpful polarities? In the pursuit of peace and justice, the authors in this volume answer these and other questions relating to polarity and politics.

In his article in the June 1991 issue of thisReview, Ted Hopf challenged the argument that bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar configurations of power. He reported that the international situation in sixteenth century Europe became only marginally more stable with a shift from a multipolar to a bipolar system. He argued for attention to the offensive-defensive balance, rather than systemic polarity. Manus Midlarsky accounts for Hopf's findings, and for evidence of multipolarity and increased conflict in the early seventeenth and twentieth centuries, by proposing a relationship between polarity and war that is contingent on scarcity of desired international resources. Midlarsky argues for more attention to contingent relationships generally and draws implications for current and future probabilities of conflict in a multipolar world. Hopf responds by pointing out the need for further development of Midlarsky's analysis, the possible compatibility between Midlarsky's formulation and his own focus on the offensive-defensive balance, and the desirability of a productive unity of the two research programs.

AbstractFounded in the mid‐1950s, the field of system dynamics has intellectual roots reaching much further into the past. This section seeks to publish material from that past that can contribute to current theory and practice. It welcomes previously unpublished but deserving system dynamics work, classics from past system dynamics literature that should receive renewed attention, and previously published articles from other disciplines of particular significance to current system dynamicists. Contributions emphasizing the philosophy and theory of model building, validation, implementation, education, and generic structures are particularly encouraged. Submissions may range in length from notes to main articles but may be edited. Send material, with a brief introduction placing it in historical and current contexts, to John D. Sterman, System Dynamics Group, MIT E40–294, Cambridge, MA 02139, U.S.A.

THE CURRENT POWER CONFIGURATION OF THE WORLD SYSTEM IS UNIPOLARITY WITHOUT HEGEMONY. NONHEGEMONIC UNIPOLARITY AFFECTS THE CHARACTERISTIC STRUCTURE OF "DEADLY QUARRELS" IN THE WORLD SYSTEM, AND ALLOWS SOME APPROACHES TO THE POLICY ISSUE OF "DEADLY QUARRELS" NOT READILY AVAILABLE IN LESS CENTRAIZED SYSTEM STRUCTURES. UNIPOLARITY WITHOUT HEGEMONY DESERVES FURTHER COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL ATTENTION.