Despite the polarization of Polish politics after 2005, there are appearing offers addressed to a moderate political centre. During the parliamentary campaign 2019, elements of such an offer resonansed in the election message of the "Law and Justice" (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) election committee as well. However, the essence of its campaign seems to be mobilizing various groups of voters by displaying the axis of political and social sharp divisions, and its moderate tones can be considered mainly as political rhetoric. The perspective of creating a moderate political centre is brought by the possible independence of "Agreement Jarosław Gowin's" (Porozumienie Jarosława Gowina). The redefinition of existing political polarization axes seems to be the way to build a political centre in Poland.
An important feature of the development processes in Mazovia is a deep polarization between Warsaw with its metropolitan area and the rest of the region. The capital (and surrounding municipalities) is a center for innovation in the country, but at the same time it leans more towards imitation of external solutions, rather than creation of original innovations. The situation in rural areas in the region is in this respect much worse. Public policy can stimulate innovative economy in these areas, although this is an extremely difficult task. The article presents recommendations on selected public policies, particularly enabling diversification of economic activities beyond agriculture which seems to be the most desirable direction of modernization changes.
Internet plays an increasingly important role in the political communication between citizens and institutions of the European Union. There are the potentials and constraints of the Internet in terms of mediating or facilitating the communication processes for citizens. The World Wide Web may contribute to the democratization of the Union. Nonetheless it appears that the right communication policy of the EU institutions is essential in this context. The results of content analysis of the European Commission's websites allowed to indicate main trends in the EU communications. Application of such techniques as simplifi cation, visualization, personalization, dramatization and polarization redounds to the changes in political communication in the EU. Prevalence of techniques that aim to increase communication attractiveness – being in thrall to the rules of marketing – may have a negative impact on civic participation in the political processes in the EU and also on the institution of European citizenship
This paper contains the author's original definitions of decentralization, territorial autonomy and an overview of the Spanish territorial structure, as well as definition of a regional party. Analysis of the 2011–2015 Cortes Generales and regional parliamentary elections leads one to conclude, that despite a dynamic development of regional parties their position on the state and regional level had nonetheless significantly declined. State-wide parties are still dominant, in spite of an acute decomposition in the party system and losing the dual-party feature. Election results show that the financial crisis and external threats positively influence the growth in power of state-wide parties. In this context the political and party situation in Catalunya is profoundly distinctive, but the role of traditional independence-centered regional parties after the last regional (September 2015) and parliamentary (December 2015) elections is in decline. Ideological and political polarization in that region, though intensified, does not grant a decisive advantage for independence-centered parties.
Celem analizy jest ocena wielkości i struktury inwestycji finansowanych ze środków unijnych pozyskanych przez władze samorządowe Poznania w kontekście potrzeb oraz prawidłowości zidentyfikowanych dla obszarów polaryzacji rozwoju w Polsce. Analiza odnosi się do dwóch pierwszych perspektyw finansowych Unii Europejskiej – 2004–2006 oraz 2007–2013 – w których Polska uczestniczyła jako państwo członkowskie, obejmując tym samym pierwszą dekadę naszych doświadczeń w realizacji polityk unijnych. Wyniki zidentyfikowane dla samorządu Poznania odnosi się w analizie porównawczej do pięciu największych miast Polski: Warszawy, Krakowa, Łodzi, Wrocławia i Gdańska. ; Abstract: The aim of the analysis is to assess the size and structure of investments financed from EU funds raised by the local authorities of Poznan in the context of the needs and the accuracy of the identified areas of polarization development in Poland. The analysis refers to the first two financial perspectives of the European Union – 2004–2006 and 2007–2013 – in which Poland participated as a member state, including the first decade of our experience in the implementation of EU policies. The results identified for Poznan refers to the comparative analysis of the five largest Polish cities: Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz, Wroclaw and Gdansk.
Artykuł analizuje fenomen polityzacji na przykładzie obrazów Europy w politycznym dyskursie Polski w latach 1990–2016. Autorzy wychodzą od fazowego modelu polskiej polityki europejskiej (adaptacja, kontestacja, kooperacja, suwerenizm) i argumentują, że zmiana wewnątrzpolitycznych relacji władzy w Polsce nie jest wystraczającym wyjaśnieniem dla dynamiki faz polskiej polityki europejskiej. Z tego względu analizie poddane są obrazy Europy, z którymi związane są różne potencjały polityzacyjne. Po przedstawieniu konceptualizacji obrazów Europy przeanalizowane zostaną dwa przypadki znajdujące się w fazach konfrontacji i suwerenizmu, które to wykazują duży stopień polaryzacji politycznej: debata o europejskim traktacie konstytucyjnym (2005) oraz polityka wschodnia w trakcie wojny na Ukrainie (2014). Analiza potwierdza, że w przypadku Polski głównymi podmiotami polityzacji pozostają partie polityczne. Poprzez silną polaryzację obrazów Europy na poziomie elit politycznych odzwierciedlane są z jednej strony zróżnicowane nastroje społeczne. Równocześnie, silna polaryzacja powoduje, że nawet w ramach jednej partii politycznej widoczna jest silna dynamika polityzacyjna, a obrazy Europy cechują się wysoką niestabilnością. ; The chapter explores politicisation using the example of the images of Europe within the political discourse of the Third Polish Republic (1990 2016). Based on consecutive phases of Poland's EU politics (adaptation, contestation, cooperation and sovereigntism) the chapter argues that the phases cannot be explained with changing domestic power constellations alone. Therefore, the chapter scrutinizes the dynamics of the images of Europe in Poland, since these images can correlate with varying politicisation potentials. First, the chapter presents the theoretical approach focusing on the concept of the images of Europe. Next, two case studies with a high degree of polarisation are examined, as they can be attributed to the phases of confrontation and sovereigntism: the debate on the European constitutional treaty of 2005 and the Eastern policy in the course of the war in Ukraine in 2014. The case of Poland supports the hypothesis that political parties are the primary agents of politicisation. On the one hand, as a result of high polarisation of the images of Europe diverging political positions within the population can be reflected more visibly at the level of the political elites. On the other hand, polarisation can increase the volatility of the images of Europe even within one party, thus increasing the politicisation dynamics.
Artykuł analizuje fenomen polityzacji na przykładzie obrazów Europy w politycznym dyskursie Polski w latach 1990–2016. Autorzy wychodzą od fazowego modelu polskiej polityki europejskiej (adaptacja, kontestacja, kooperacja, suwerenizm) i argumentują, że zmiana wewnątrzpolitycznych relacji władzy w Polsce nie jest wystraczającym wyjaśnieniem dla dynamiki faz polskiej polityki europejskiej. Z tego względu analizie poddane są obrazy Europy, z którymi związane są różne potencjały polityzacyjne. Po przedstawieniu konceptualizacji obrazów Europy przeanalizowane zostaną dwa przypadki znajdujące się w fazach konfrontacji i suwerenizmu, które to wykazują duży stopień polaryzacji politycznej: debata o europejskim traktacie konstytucyjnym (2005) oraz polityka wschodnia w trakcie wojny na Ukrainie (2014). Analiza potwierdza, że w przypadku Polski głównymi podmiotami polityzacji pozostają partie polityczne. Poprzez silną polaryzację obrazów Europy na poziomie elit politycznych odzwierciedlane są z jednej strony zróżnicowane nastroje społeczne. Równocześnie, silna polaryzacja powoduje, że nawet w ramach jednej partii politycznej widoczna jest silna dynamika polityzacyjna, a obrazy Europy cechują się wysoką niestabilnością. ; The chapter explores politicisation using the example of the images of Europe within the political discourse of the Third Polish Republic (1990–2016). Based on consecutive phases of Poland's EU politics (adaptation, contestation, cooperation and sovereigntism) the chapter argues that the phases cannot be explained with changing domestic power constellations alone. Therefore, the chapter scrutinizes the dynamics of the images of Europe in Poland, since these images can correlate with varying politicisation potentials. First, the chapter presents the theoretical approach focusing on the concept of the images of Europe. Next, two case studies with a high degree of polarisation are examined, as they can be attributed to the phases of confrontation and sovereigntism: the debate on the European constitutional treaty of 2005 and the Eastern policy in the course of the war in Ukraine in 2014. The case of Poland supports the hypothesis that political parties are the primary agents of politicisation. On the one hand, as a result of high polarisation of the images of Europe diverging political positions within the population can be reflected more visibly at the level of the political elites. On the other hand, polarisation can increase the volatility of the images of Europe even within one party, thus increasing the politicisation dynamics. ; nr2/2017 ; 55 ; 78 ; Przegląd Politologiczny
Transitions, democratization and recent democratic backsliding in CEE provide a rich context for examining the meaning and shifting of civic activism and how people participate and organize in civil society today. This article offers a fresh and comparative analysis based on empirical data on the question of what motivates formal and informal activism, and the potentially transformative role of civil society that has recently faced such challenges as democratic backsliding, shrinking public space and polarization. It looks specifically at the responses of Polish and Hungarian activists and advocacy CSOs to these new challenges. Their strategies bring an important lesson on how civil society actors can adapt, continue their mission, or even turn challenges into opportunities. These new trends indicate that civic space in CEE is shifting which is further influenced by the reactions to new forms of social, economic and political crises. It is argued that this shift and the new trends in civic activism require not only fresh empirical data, but also a revision of normative and methodological approaches that have so far been used in civil society and social movement research.
The crisis in relations between Russia and Ukraine, and the related increase in tensions between the Russian Federation and the European Union countries, reverberated in the Balkan Peninsula. Individual countries in the region have reacted in various ways to the new situation and changes in the international balance of power. This paper analyzes the manner in which the Ukrainian crisis has affected the international situation of the Republic of Serbia.Serbia found itself within the circle of political influence between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Serbian authorities refused to join the EU sanctions imposed on Russia; at the same time, they received President Vladimir Putin and politicians subjected to international sanctions, such as the President of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin, in Belgrade. This has been reflected in the reports of the European Commission on Serbia's progress towards the integration with the EU. Despite the apparent exacerbation of polarization in the European political arena, Serbia is striving to find the balance between the EU and the Russian Federation. Serbian representatives even made proposals suggesting that Serbia could bring about the 'reconciliation' between Russia and the EU, acting as a mediator.To some extent, Serbian authorities continue the political tradition of the time of Yugoslavia, governed by Josip Broz Tito, when Belgrade also tried to find the balance between East and West, the communist and the capitalistic blocs. Currently, Serbia is making attempts to take advantage of the new situation in the system of international relations in Europe in order to pursue its own political goals. ; The crisis in relations between Russia and Ukraine, and the related increase in tensions between the Russian Federation and the European Union countries, reverberated in the Balkan Peninsula. Individual countries in the region have reacted in various ways to the new situation and changes in the international balance of power. This paper analyzes the manner in which the Ukrainian crisis has affected the international situation of the Republic of Serbia.Serbia found itself within the circle of political influence between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Serbian authorities refused to join the EU sanctions imposed on Russia; at the same time, they received President Vladimir Putin and politicians subjected to international sanctions, such as the President of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin, in Belgrade. This has been reflected in the reports of the European Commission on Serbia's progress towards the integration with the EU. Despite the apparent exacerbation of polarization in the European political arena, Serbia is striving to find the balance between the EU and the Russian Federation. Serbian representatives even made proposals suggesting that Serbia could bring about the 'reconciliation' between Russia and the EU, acting as a mediator.To some extent, Serbian authorities continue the political tradition of the time of Yugoslavia, governed by Josip Broz Tito, when Belgrade also tried to find the balance between East and West, the communist and the capitalistic blocs. Currently, Serbia is making attempts to take advantage of the new situation in the system of international relations in Europe in order to pursue its own political goals.
This paper is devoted to the analysis of the socio-political changes that occurred in Poland in 2016 as a result of the outbreak of the so-called black protests. The protests, which later became known as the All-Poland Women's Strike, were activated several times in the following years, as a result of subsequent events related to the provisions regulating the right to abortion in Poland. The empirical findings contained in this text result from the analysis of statistical data (CBOS reports), dedicated to the research of political party electorates, which was carried out in 2015, 2017 and 2021. Moreover, the article presents own research conducted in the period from April to July 2021 using the method of analysis of the content published on social media by entities established after 2016. The results of the research confirm that the outbreak and the subsequent periodic activation of protests, supported by the activities of entities promoting the right to abortion, initiated two significant changes in Poland. The first is the clear polarization of political party electorates regarding the right to abortion, and the second is the intensification of the discourse on the very right to abortion, introducing new arguments regarding termination of pregnancy to the agenda (as well as other topics related to the situation of women and broadly understood sex education). Both of the indicated outcomes resulted in the phenomenon of abortion being visible in the public discourse, especially in social media. The following analysis is part of the trend of social research devoted to the importance of socio-political protests in democratic countries and the role of social media as an immanent tool used in the activity of new social movements.
The COVID-19 pandemic that has affected the world in 2020 and 2021 has had, is having and will have an impact on most areas of human life. This is a direct impact – such as health or economic consequences, as well as indirect – reevaluation of social relations, systems of values and culture norms. Since the fight against pandemic is in most regularly functioning countries a matter of public policy, this pandemic has a very serious impact also on the sphere of politics in general. This article aims to analyze what impact this pandemic had on the political situation in the United States in 2020. The year 2020 was a presidential election year in the United States, an election for which a significant part of the international community was waiting for mostly because of the clarity and diversity of the candidates. The aim of this paper is to answer the question to what extent the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic influenced the course of the campaign and especially the rhetoric and behavior of the candidates. It will also consider the impact going in the other direction, i.e. how and if at all, the fact that in 2020 we were dealing with the election period influenced the actions taken by the authorities at different levels in the fight against the pandemic. One of the main conclusions of the analysis is that the pandemic, given both the context of this particular election, the specific polarization of American society, and the opinions of individual electorates on important values, put Donald Trump in a particularly uncomfortable position and knocked out of his hands many of the advantages that had contributed to his victory four years earlier. The specific constellation of analyzed factors meant that, in the opinion of the author of the article, Donald Trump could not emerge victorious from this situation unlike many other leaders of countries whose ratings and evaluation in the reality of the fight against the pandemic were growing and improving. ; Pandemia COVID-19, która dotknęła świat w 2020 i 2021 r., miała, ...
A political transformation that has started in Argentina in 1983 put an end on the reign of military junta, but at the same time it was related with a number of challenges for both first democratic governments and the argentine society as a whole. One of the most problematic issues resulting from the confrontation with the crimes from 1976 – 1983 was so called transitional justice and the problem of identity and collective memory of societies coming out of the period of trauma, which are characterized by a high polarization due to different, even contradictory at times interpretations and ideas about the past. The article attempts to analyze the difficult process of settlement of the dirty war period, including the characteristics of the preceding events, the policy of the first democratic governments and the original strategies developed by the argentine movement for human rights, which on the one hand aimed to combat with the impunity of the perpetrators, and on the other hand to counteract the social amnesia and to keep the memory about the tragic past events alive. ; Zapoczątkowany w 1983 r. proces transformacji ustrojowej w Argentynie zakończył okres rządów junty wojskowej, ale jednocześnie wiązał się z wieloma wyzwaniami zarówno dla pierwszych demokratycznych rządów, jak i całego argentyńskiego społeczeństwa. Jednymi z najbardziej problematycznych kwestii determinowanych koniecznością konfrontacji ze zbrodniami z lat 1976 – 1983 okazały się tzw. sprawiedliwość okresu transformacji oraz kwestia tożsamości i pamięci zbiorowej społeczeństwa wychodzącego z okresu traumy, charakteryzującego się wysokim stopniem polaryzacji ze względu na odmienne, często sprzeczne interpretacje i wyobrażenia na temat przeszłości. W niniejszym artykule dokonano próby analizy trudnego procesu rozliczania się z okresem tzw. brudnej wojny, z uwzględnieniem charakterystyki wydarzeń, które do niego doprowadziły, polityki pierwszych demokratycznych po dyktaturze rządów oraz oryginalnych strategii wypracowanych przez argentyński ruch praw człowieka, które z jednej strony służyły walce z bezkarnością winnych, z drugiej zaś miały na celu przeciwdziałać społecznej amnezji i podtrzymać pamięć na temat tragicznych wydarzeń z przeszłości.
The study, based on publications and online CSO resources, attempts to analyze the current demographic structure, and selected labor market elements characteristic for a separate, closed area known as Polish and Eastern Europe. It is composed of five provinces, four of them: Lubelszczyzna, Podlasie, Subcarpathian and Świetokrzyskie administratively belonging to the Eastern Region and the fifth one - Warmia and Mazury, which is an administrative unit of the Northern Region. These regions constituting a third of the country's area, and being home to the fifth part of the whole Polish population, are among the most marginalized areas of the country in terms of spatial, economic and social aspects. The analysis found that during the observation period, the Polish eastern provinces, both the availability of space and the structure of the population by age (inter alia resulting in the highest demographic dependency ratio in the country), as well as the employment structure (high share of employed in the agriculture, low share of those employed in services), or both unemployment rates, do not present an optimistic outlook. They all constitute a considerable threat to the state's regional policy guidelines, all in favor of a trade-promotion polarization and diffusion model, favoring the so-called 'locomotives of growth', the richest provinces, which means further marginalization of the most vulnerable regions. ; Przedmiotem opracowania, opartego na publikacjach i zasobach internetowych GUS, jest analiza aktualnej struktury demograficznej i wybranych elementów rynku pracy charakteryzujących wyodrębniony, zwarty obszar określany mianem Polski Wschodniej. W jego skład wchodzi pięć województw, cztery: lubelskie, podlaskie, podkarpackie i świętokrzyskie należące administracyjnie do Regionu Wschodniego i piąte warmińsko-mazurskie, będące jednostką administracyjną Regionu Północnego. Wymienione województwa zajmujące trzecią część powierzchni kraju i zamieszkiwane przez piątą cześć ogółu ludności Polski, należą do najbardziej zmarginalizowanych pod względem przestrzennym, ekonomicznym i społecznym regionów naszego kraju. W wyniku przeprowadzonej analizy stwierdzono, iż w okresie objętym obserwacją, w województwach Polski Wschodniej, zarówno dostępność przestrzenna, jak i struktura ludności wg wieku (skutkująca m.in. najwyższymi w skali kraju wskaźnikiem obciążenia demograficznego) podobnie jak struktura zatrudnienia (wysoki udział pracujących w rolnictwie, niski w usługach rynkowych) czy wartości obu stóp bezrobocia nie stwarzają optymistycznej perspektywy rozwoju. Niebagatelne zagrożenie stanowią założenia polityki regionalnej państwa, lansujące model polaryzacyjno-dyfuzyjny, faworyzujący tzw. lokomotywy wzrostu, czyli województwa najbogatsze, co oznacza dalszą marginalizację województw najsłabszych.
Katastrofa samolotu TU-154 z 10 kwietnia 2010 roku, w której zginęli prezydent Polski, Lech Kaczyński, oraz 95 osób wchodzących w skład prezydenckiej delegacji, miała przede wszystkim konsekwencje ustrojowe - konieczne stało się zapewnienie ciągłości władz państwowych oraz zorganizowanie przyspieszonych wyborów głowy państwa. Kontrowersje w sprawie wypadku, jakie pojawiły się już kilka dni po tragedii, spowodowały jednak także wyraźną polaryzację opinii publicznej. Symbolicznym wyrazem podziału stała się tzw. sprawa krzyża ustawionego przed Pałacem Prezydenckim przez harcerzy w hołdzie ofiarom katastrofy. Język debaty publicznej towarzyszący temu wydarzeniu nabrał z czasem cech swoistych, które chcemy w niniejszym artykule ledwie naszkicować. Zwracamy uwagę na trzy istotne elementy konstytuujące dyskurs okołokrzyżowy: a) kontekst religijny; b) kontekst patriotyczno-martyrologiczny; c) kontekst polityczny. Ukazujemy ponadto, że komunikacja polityczna po 2010 roku unaoczniła jedynie podział społeczny, którego pierwszych symptomów upatrywać należy w rekonfiguracji polskiego systemu partyjnego na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. ; The crash of TU-154 plane on 10 April 2010, which killed the Polish president, Lech Kaczyński, and 95 other members of the presidential delegation, had most of all the consequences on the political system - it became necessary to ensure continuity of the state's authorities, and to organize early elections of the head of state. Controversies over the accident, which occurred just a few days after the tragedy, caused a conspicuous polarization of Polish public opinion (Niżyńska, 2010). The so-called "case of the cross" (concerning the cross which was erected in front of the Presidential Palace by a group of Polish scouts in honour of the victims of the disaster) turned out to be a symbolic expression of the split in Polish society. The language of the public debate about that event took on specific qualities that we want only to sketch in the presented paper. We draw attention to three important factors that constitute "the discourse on the cross": a) areligious context, b) a context ofpatriotic martyrdom, c) a political context. Furthermore we tend to show that political communication in Poland after 2010 has revealed only the existing social split, the first symptoms of which are to be sought in the reconfiguration of the Polish party system at the turn of the 20th and 21st century.
The purpose of the article is to assess the degree of presence of the idea of secularism in the election programs of the main political parties participating in the Polish parliamentary elections in 2019. The article adopts the understanding of the so-called political secularism which was referred to the institution of the Roman Catholic Church due to the context of research, as well as the fact that Catholics constitute the dominant part of Polish society and because of the major socio-political importance of the Catholic Church in Poland. The research material were the electoral programs of party election committees, as well as the speeches of their political leaders delivered during the main electoral program conventions. The article increases the cognitive value of the issue of political communication regarding the idea of secularism during the parliamentary campaign of 2019. Research has shown that religion has become an important factor in political discourse during the parliamentary campaign in Poland in 2019. The topic about the role of the Catholic Church institutions in the public sphere was, however, taken up only through Law and Justice and the Left. A clear polarization of views of these election committees was noted. Law and Justice spoke out against the idea of secularism, while the Left supported this idea. The Confederation, Polish People's Party and Civic Coalition remained silent in the election programs about the idea of a secular state. ; Celem artykułu jest ocena stopnia obecności idei sekularyzmu w programach wyborczych głównych partii politycznych startujących w polskich wyborach parlamentarnych 2019 roku. W artykule przyjęto rozumienie tzw. sekularyzmu politycznego i odniesiono je do instytucji Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego ze względu na kontekst badań, a także na fakt, że katolicy stanowią dominującą część społeczeństwa polskiego i ze względu na doniosłe znaczenie społeczno-polityczne Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce.Materiał badawczy stanowiły programy wyborcze partyjnych komitetów wyborczych, jak również przemówienia ich liderów politycznych wygłoszone podczas głównych wyborczych konwencji programowych.Artykuł zwiększa wartość poznawczą zagadnienia komunikowania politycznego dotyczącego idei sekularyzmu w okresie kampanii parlamentarnej 2019 r. Badania dowiodły, że religia stała się istotnym czynnikiem dyskursu politycznego w czasie kampanii parlamentarnej w Polsce w 2019 r. Temat dotyczący roli instytucji Kościoła katolickiego w sferze publicznej był jednak podjęty jedynie przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość oraz Lewicę. Odnotowano wyrazistą dychotomiczność poglądów tychże komitetów wyborczych. PiS wypowiedział się przeciw idei sekularyzmu, zaś Lewica tę ideę wsparła. Konfederacja, PSL oraz KW Koalicja Obywatelska przemilczały w programach wyborczych kwestię idei państwa świeckiego.
