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In this paper two disparate areas of social science theory, actor-network theory and policy networks, will be brought to bear on the problem of explaining the rapid development of an area of medical science and health policy in the UK. There has been a surge of interest in the treatment and management of personality disorder from within both the psychiatric profession and government ministries, and particularly those personality disorders deemed to be severe or dangerous. This has resulted in the development of a new psychiatric classification, the 'dangerous and severe personality disorder' (DSPD), and the funding and development of a new service to deal with it. Major new mental health legislation has been set in train to provide legal backing for the pre-emptive detention of patients with such a diagnosis, despite widespread uncertainty over its status, reliability or predictive capability. In the process of presenting and analysing this development, actor-network theory and policy networks will themselves be reviewed and compared, and common and incompatible elements, foci and mechanisms identified.

This article evaluates two competing dynamic policy-network models and one static network model by applying them to local politics in Amsterdam. In the dynamic models an influence relation results from the acceptance of an influence request. The first model, Control Maximization, represents the view that politics are primarily power driven, and the second, Policy Maximization, policy driven. Zn the static model (the Two-Stage), network relations are empirically investigated as in other policy-network models and used as a benchmark for evaluating the dynamic models. Policy Maximization is shown to be the most accurate predictor of decision outcomes, better even than the static model, and to generate richer networks. However, both dynamic models generate networks that are too hierarchical.

Germany is frequently perceived as a fore-runner in environmental policy, in particu-lar after the turnover in government in 1998. We contribute to the debate on ca-pacities for environmental policy by ex-plaining this position with the specific ac-tors configuration in the German policy network. The paper describes and analy-ses the German policy-network that formu-lates the national position in international climate change negotiations. We ask what activities have been performed by the members of this network regarding the introduction of an eco-taxation, analyse what resources the various organisations dispose of, and in how far the organisa-tions are interrelated among each other regarding the exchange of information, cooperation and opposition. We conclude that NGOs are well integrated despite of comparable low financial resources. The network is not fragmented, and coalitions are possible among the different types of actors. This may contribute to the explana-tion of the German position, however, comparative research is needed.

In this article the process of developing a policy for the recent comprehensive retrenchment operation in the Dutch university system is analysed from a theoretical point of view on decisionmaking. The article especially addresses the question whether some empirical evidence can be found for the rationalist view of collective decision-making, which states that a process of social communication should eventually lead to a unanimous and rational consensus concerning the selection of the optimal policy. The actual analysis concerns the way a retrenchment policy has been developed in a process of social communication between the most important actors: the Minister of Education and Science and the thirteen Dutch universities. It is assumed that the various communicative linkages between these actors can be interpreted as a policy network in which both governmental and non-governmental actors operate. The article concludes that in the Dutch university policy-network a complicated balance of interdependencies exists and that several sub-networks can be distinguished. It is also concluded that the Minister, while recognizing the interdependencies in the network, was able to use a special kind of (negative) incentive, inducing the universities to act as he wished. This negative incentive steering, however, also persuaded the universities to go to the utmost in their consultation efforts, thus trying to reach the rationalist ideal of collective decision-making. The final conclusion therefore is that the rationalist view of collective decision-making does not appear to be unrealistic. The article ends with a warning against a common mistake made regarding the normative appearance of the rationalist perspective.

This dissertation is a descriptive study of a policy network designed for U.S. government and global cooperation to promote Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). It is aimed at exploring the historical and structural features of the ITS policy network, and evaluating its roles in the policy process. Until now, the network literature has barely examined the full arrays of networks, catching just part of their full pictures. First, this study draws attention to transnational networks and their organic or systematic relationships with lower levels of networks. Second, it examines the individual properties and synergy of three core elements of the ITS policy network: public-private partnerships, professional networks, and intergovernmental networks. Third, it takes a close look at the pattern of stability change and power relations of the policy network from within the net. Finally, this study discusses what difference networks make, compared to hierarchies and markets. This dissertation employed multiple sources of evidence: unstandardized elite interviews, government documents, and archival records. Through a networking strategy to find the best experts, face-to-face, telephone, and e-mail interviews were conducted with twenty-two public officials and ITS professionals. It was found that the U.S. ITS policy network was a well-designed strategic governance structure at the planning level, but an experimental learning-focused one at the implementation level. It was initially designed by a new, timely, cross-sectional coalition, which brought together field leaders from both the public and the private sectors under the slogan of global competitiveness. Yet, day-to-day managers within the net often experience much more complex power relationships and internal dynamics as well as legal obstacles; also, they confront external uncertainty in political support and market. For better results, policy networks should be designed in flexible ways that will handle their disadvantages such as ambiguous roles, exclusiveness, and increased staff time. In this respect, it is inevitable for the networks to include some components of a wide range of conventional structures, ranging from highly bureaucratic to highly entrepreneurial, on the one hand, and ranging between issue networks (grounded in American pluralism) and policy communities (based on European corporatism), on the other hand. ; Ph. D.

Comunicação apresentada na Secção de Economia Política da 23.ª Conferência da International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR), Barcelona, 21-26 Julho 2002. ; In the media policy arena, there are multiple (often conflicting) perspectives and political outcome reflects different pressures and opinions. Contending groups develop strategies and bargain to see their interests served. Notwithstanding the diversity and complexity of the policy-making literature, we will try to assess the utility of the policy network concept in an attempt to shed some light into the conception/implementation of media policy in Portugal. Whist analysing the eventual relevance of the policy network approach, we will consider two distinct political periods: the social democrats majority rule, from 1987 to 1995, and the socialist mandates, from 1995 to ...

Political governance in modern societies can no longer be conceived in terms of external government control of society but emerges from a plurality of governing agents. In contemporary policy making, governmental and non-governmental actors are interconnected in complex networks of interaction, exchanging information and other resources. This reader presents the results of empirical network studies in a variety of policy sectors and in different countries. It also provides insights into innovative quantitative and qualitative approaches to network analysis.

The paper begins with a reexamination of claims regarding the welfare-theoretical efficiency of various modes of non-hierarchical policy coordination which Charles Lindblom (1965) had subsumed under the label of Partisan Mutual Adjustment. It is argued that these claims are implausible if Lindblom's mechanisms of horizontal self-coordination are examined one at a time. They either will not assure significant welfare gains in the general case, or the attempt to raise the level of general welfare through self-coordination will encounter rapidly escalating transaction costs. As Lindblom had pointed out, however, several coordination methods will often be combined in real-world policy processes. The intuition that this might significantly increase the welfare efficiency of self-coordination is explored in a computer simulation study based on the game-theoretical reformulation of five simple coordination mechanisms. We can show that, in a given population of interdependent actors, Positive Coordination within relatively small coalitions who are required to obtain the agreement of outside actors through Negative Coordination and Bargaining, are able to achieve relatively high welfare gains while economizing on transaction costs. This pattern is by no means unusual in real-world policy processes. ; Der Aufsatz untersucht die Plausibilität von Behauptungen über die wohlfahrtstheoretische Effizienz von Methoden der nicht-hierarchischen Koordination politisch-administrativer Akteure, die Charles Lindblom (1965) unter dem Sammelbegriff des Partisan Mutual Adjustment zusammengefaßt hatte. Für jede einzelne dieser Methoden, so kann gezeigt werden, ist dieser Anspruch nicht generell zu begründen. Entweder können unter allgemeinen Bedingungen nur geringe Wohlfahrtsgewinne erzielt werden, oder die Koordination scheitert an eskalierenden Transaktionskosten. Allerdings hatte schon Lindblom darauf hingewiesen, daß in realen Politikprozessen typischerweise mehrere Koordinationsmethoden zugleich zum Zuge kommen. Die Vermutung, daß gerade dadurch die Wohlfahrts-Effizienz der horizontalen Selbstkoordination gesteigert werden könnte, wird hier in einer Computer-Simulationsstudie überprüft. Ausgehend von einer spieltheoretischen Rekonstruktion von fünf einfachen Koordinationsmechanismen kann gezeigt werden, daß insbesondere die Kombination von Positiver Koordination mit Negativer Koordination und mit Bargaining eine hohe Wohlfahrtseffizienz erreicht. Wenn die Mitglieder relativ kleiner Koalitionen sich intern positiv koordinieren, aber die Zustimmung der übrigen Mitglieder einer Population von interdependenten Akteuren durch Negativkoordination und Bargaining gewinnen müssen, dann können relativ hohe Wohlfahrtsgewinne bei moderaten Transaktionskosten erwartet werden. Eben dieses Muster läßt sich auch in realen Prozessen der Politikformulierung und Implementation wiederfinden.

The central undertaking in this thesis is to explore the explanatory power of the concept of policy networks. The main question is whether there is a relation between the structural features of policy networks and their performance? Does network structure matter for network performance, and in that case, in what sense? In order to investigate the relationship between structure and performance, five implementation networks, engaged in inter-organizational collaboration with the task to create multidisciplinary units, at Luleå University of Technology (LTU), are studied. Each network is analyzed regarding both structural properties and performances. First, network performance is measured by the level of effectiveness and innovation. Next, the structural features of the implementation networks are measured. Drawing upon previous work of Burt, the structural analysis is based on the examination of two specific network mechanisms, namely network closure and global structural holes. Basically, while the former refers to the degree of interconnectedness, the latter considers the extent to which the actors span global structural holes, meaning that they have contacts reaching outside the network in focus. A positive relation between the two above mentioned mechanisms and performance is proposed. The empirical analysis confirms the assumption that there is a relation between structure and performance. While the existence of global structural holes is a necessity for innovative networks to form, their level of effectiveness is positively related to the degree of network closure. Following this, an innovative network is a network in which the actors are tightly connected and, at the same time, have many connections to other actors, engaged in other network constellations. Further, on the basis of the empirical findings, two new hypotheses, specifying the relationship between structure and performance, are suggested. Firstly, it is proposed that the function of prioritizing, so vital for the process of organizing, is facilitated within centrally integrated networks. Secondly, the function of mobilization of resources is facilitated within networks that span a large amount of global structural holes. Accordingly, network structure does matter for the effectiveness of innovative policy networks. To conclude, there is certainly a lot of explanatory power in the concept of policy networks and the formal analytical approach, offered by social network analysis (SNA), is one way to explore its possibilities. ; Godkänd; 2004; 20070128 (ysko)

Successful international cooperation is a puzzling problem for social scientists. The ozone layer has been subject to both international treaties and domestic leg-islation. It is one of the foremost success stories in international relations, yet insufficiently understood. In this paper I argue that existing approaches - including the sophisticated and highly acclaimed epistemic community approach - do not take the underlying theoretical problems seriously enough. Departing from the epistemic community approach, I propose a framework for a network analysis combining interests, knowledge and power into a coherent model, which is derived from this case but can apply to similar cases sharing similar characteristics. It is argued that one of two rivaling policy networks gained hegemony over the other, mainly by winning over allies from the competing network. Ultimately this contributed to the competing network's breakdown. ; Erfolgreiche internationale Kooperation ist für Sozialwissenschaftler oft ein Rätsel. Eines der erfolgreichsten Beispiele internationaler Kooperation sind die Maßnahmen zum Schutz der Ozonschicht, die auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene ergriffen wurden. Dieser Erfolg wird bislang unzureichend erklärt: vorliegende Ansätze stellen sich den theoretischen Schwierigkeiten nicht in adäquater Weise. Dies gilt auch für den Epistemic-community-Ansatz, der in letzter Zeit viel Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen hat. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit diesem wird ein Netzwerkansatz entwickelt, in dem Macht, Interessen und Ideen als Erklärungsmomente zusammengeführt werden. Der zentrale Mechanismus, der zu internationaler Kooperation führt, besteht darin, daß es einem von zwei konkurrierenden Politikynetzwerken gelingt, Akteure aus dem gegnerischen Netzwerk herauszubrechen, wodurch dieses zerfällt. Dieser Ansatz sollte auf andere Fälle anwendbar sein, die ähnliche Eigenschaften wie der vorliegende aufweisen.

Public policy usually develops in complex networks of public, quasi-public and private organizations. It is now generally accepted that these networks set limits to the governance capability of the administration. A good deal less is known about the opportunities which policy networks offer for tackling social and administrative problems. This article deals with the way network management enables government organizations to benefit from networks. Building on the theoretical concepts of 'networks' and 'games', two forms of network management are identified: game management and network structuring. Four key aspects can be identified for both of these management fonns: actors and their relations, resources, rules and perceptions. At thesame time, criteria for the assessment and improvement of network management are examined. The article concludes with a consideration of the limits of network management.

The empirical study of the institutional subculture of the German Federal Parliament, conducted together with Friedhelm Neidhardt, aimed to identify and describe the content and formal characteristics of informal social norms relating to the behavior of deputies. Most prominent are norms relating to solidary behavior in the parliamentary party group. Legislative performance, in contrast, appears to be guided more by cognitive orientations. Prevalent normative expectations have the formal character of complex evaluative algorithms, and are basically restrictive (rather than positively motivating). Informal norms specific to the parliamentary arena clearly reflect the institutional context, but cannot necessarily be interpreted in functionalist terms. ; Die gemeinsam mit Friedhelm Neidhardt durchgeführte empirische Untersuchung der Parlamentskultur im Deutschen Bundestag zielte darauf ab, auf das Verhalten von Bundestagsabgeordneten bezogene informelle Normen zu identifizieren und sowohl inhaltlich wie bezogen auf ihre formalen Merkmale zu beschreiben. Am stärksten ausgeprägt sind informelle Normen, die sich auf das solidarische Verhalten innerhalb der Fraktionsgemeinschaft beziehen. Die legislative Tätigkeit der Abgeordneten scheint dagegen stärker von kognitiven Orientierungen gelenkt zu werden. Die sozialen Normen schreiben selten Verhalten konkret vor, sondern haben oft den Charakter komplexer Kalküle; sie sind außerdem eher restringierend als motivierend. Offensichtlich prägt der institutionelle Kontext die empirisch gefundene Parlamentskultur, die sich deshalb jedoch nicht funktionalistisch erklaren läßt.

In policy networks actors use access relations to influence preferences of other actors. Establishment and shifts of access relations and their consequences for outcomes of decisions are the main focal points in this paper. Unlike most policy network studies, we therefore do not take the network and its relations as given and constant. Instead we device computer simulation models to account for the dynamics in policy networks. We compare different models and investigate the resulting network structures and predicted outcomes of decisions. The choice among the alternative models is made by their correspondence with empirical network structures and actual outcomes of decisions. In our models, we assume that all relevant actors aim at policy outcomes as close as possible to their own preferences. Policy outcomes are determined by the preferences cSf the final decision makers at the moment of the vote. In general, only a small fraction of the actors takes .part in the final vote. Most actors have therefore to rely on access relations for directly or indirectly shaping the preferences of the final decision makers. For this purpose actors make access requests to other actors. An access relation is assumed to be established if such a request is accepted by the othcr actor. Access relations require time and resources. Actors are therefore assumed to be restricted in the number of access requests they can make and the number of requests they can accept. Moreover, due to incomplete information and simultaneous actions by other actors, actors have to make simplifying assumptions in the selection of their "best" requests and learn by experience. We device two base models that correspond to two basic views on the nature of political processes. In the first view politics is seen as power driven. Corresponding to this view, actors aim at access relations with the most powerful actors in the field. They estimate their likelihood of success by comparing their own resources with those of the target actors. Power also determines the order in which actors accept requests. In the second view, policy matters and actors roughly estimate the effects access relations might have on the outcome of decisions. Actors select requests to "bolster" Their own preference as much as possible. We will show that these base models and some intermediate ones result in fundamentally different network structures and predicted outcomes. Moreover, we will show that the policy driven models do fundamentally better than the power driven models.

Traditional approaches to policy-making, in Australia and elsewhere, have assumed that policy-making processes are, and ought to be, centralised and hierarchical. However, policy networks have emerged as an alternative model of policy-making, particularly in Europe. Policy networks have been a regular feature of Australian policy-making, though usually under government sponsorship and on the government's terms. Recent developments suggest that governments may be encouraging a more independent and less 'top-down' approach to the use of policy networks. The Coalition Government's engagement of a 'social coalition' in welfare reform, particularly through the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, provides an interesting case study of this trend.

Traditional approaches to policy-making, in Australia and elsewhere, have assumed that policy-making processes are, and ought to be, centralised and hierarchical. However, policy networks have emerged as an alternative model of policy-making, particularly in Europe. Policy networks have been a regular feature of Australian policy-making, though usually under government sponsorship and on the government's terms. Recent developments suggest that governments may be encouraging a more independent and less 'top-down' approach to the use of policy networks. The Coalition Government's engagement of a 'social coalition' in welfare reform, particularly through the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, provides an interesting case study of this trend.