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Due to a lack of time and expertise, policy makers often rely on others, such as bureaucrats, experts, or advisers, when policy decisions have to be made. A nontrivial problem is that those who possess information have a vested interest in the policy outcome; this gives them an incentive to manipulate or conceal information. In this book, we examine a penalty for lying and the power to replace an advisor as a means of restraining information providers from information manipulation. We argue that these two institutional arrangements may not always help a policy maker to attain a better decision (Chapters 2 and 3). Inasmuch as consequences of policies are complicated and difficult to foresee, small groups like committees often assist policy makers to collect information, deliberate over policies, and devise policy recommendations. As information is not for free, committee members must be motivated to collect it. We shed some light on how deliberation affects committee members' incentives to gather the costly information, and thus the quality of collective decision-making (Chapter 4). Outside the political arena, agency problems between politicians and voters also exist. In Chapter 5, we examine how elections play their role of disciplining and selecting politicians and how policy choices are made when politicians differ in their motivations in running for political office.

Risk is a central feature of political decision making. Prospect theory, an empirically correct theory of choice under risk that deals precisely with this condition, therefore seems to have much to offer political science. Prospect theory's central finding is that individuals' attitude toward risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. Confronting gains, individuals are risk averse in their decision making; confronting losses, they are risk accepting. Where do these preferences come from? Do they also hold for collective decision making? How can prospect theory help us to solve puzzles in political science? This article addresses these questions by discussing some advances in evolutionary biology, behavioural economics, psychology, neuro-economics and political science. The article shows that there is increasing evidence that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin and that these preferences extend to collective decision making. Moreover, it demonstrates that political science can indeed gain from applying prospect theory, as insights from prospect theory help to solve puzzles such as why some governments pursue electorally risky welfare state reform but others do not. © 2011 The Author. Political Studies Review © 2011 Political Studies Association.

Risk is a central feature of political decision making. Prospect theory, an empirically correct theory of choice under risk that deals precisely with this condition, therefore seems to have much to offer political science. Prospect theory's central finding is that individuals' attitude toward risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. Confronting gains, individuals are risk averse in their decision making; confronting losses, they are risk accepting. Where do these preferences come from? Do they also hold for collective decision making? How can prospect theory help us to solve puzzles in political science? This article addresses these questions by discussing some advances in evolutionary biology, behavioural economics, psychology, neuro-economics and political science. The article shows that there is increasing evidence that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin and that these preferences extend to collective decision making. Moreover, it demonstrates that political science can indeed gain from applying prospect theory, as insights from prospect theory help to solve puzzles such as why some governments pursue electorally risky welfare state reform but others do not.

Economic rights can be instantiated in a variety of ways. This article investigates the problem associated with making economic rights into policy through one source: the political policymaker. By considering the policymaker's decision problem, we can identify particular decision flaws and possible corrective measures that might prompt economic rights instantiation through "enlightened self-interest." A complementary approach involves constitutionalizing economic rights as directive principles and enforceable law, which could work somewhat independently of the policymaker's preferences and/or beliefs. The final part of the article examines a sample of actual constitutions to determine whether government effort toward fulfilling economic rights is related with constitutionalization. The evidence considered here suggests a positive relationship: countries with better economic rights provisions in their constitutions demonstrate greater economic rights effort.

"This encyclopedia traces the development and future of research on political decision making through an exploration of its central theoretical approaches, methodologies, and substantive topics of perennial interest. The focus is on political decision making as a question of individual psychology: individual preferences, information search, evaluation, and choice. Through peer-reviewed contributions by leading researchers, the encyclopedia provides a general framework for studying political decision making that applies to both everyday citizens and political elites"--

International audience ; In this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced. Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition, where a policy consists of policies on given issues. A party evaluates all governments the party belongs to with respect to some criteria. We allow the criteria to be of unequal importance to a party. These criteria concern winning coalitions and policy issues. Parties may be advised to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation concerning some government(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better political consensus.

International audience ; In this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced. Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition, where a policy consists of policies on given issues. A party evaluates all governments the party belongs to with respect to some criteria. We allow the criteria to be of unequal importance to a party. These criteria concern winning coalitions and policy issues. Parties may be advised to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation concerning some government(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better political consensus.

International audience ; In this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced. Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is defined as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition, where a policy consists of policies on given issues. A party evaluates all governments the party belongs to with respect to some criteria. We allow the criteria to be of unequal importance to a party. These criteria concern winning coalitions and policy issues. Parties may be advised to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation concerning some government(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better political consensus.

Decision-making processes are studied using non-standard all-pay structures. Our interest is motivated by regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications in which individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the general public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, a winner-takes-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule. Adapted from the source document.

Vietnam's decision making process is often described as either consensus-based or simply confusing and inexplicable. This book provides an approach to understanding political decision making in Vietnam by recognizing enduring values that are derived from State-controlled education and official historical narratives

Political decision-making means a country's political parties, leaders or leadership compare and select implementing principles and approaches and means to achieve the target in political practical activities for the purpose, principles and direction of activities. The process of political decision-making is a dynamic political process that is related to the formation and implementation of major and general decisions of the national, political and social interest groups. This process is to integrate major and general decisions regarding national and social interests. The subjects are state organs, political parties and individual decision makers or decision-making participants, and the finally formed decision is backed by the country's coercive power with mandatory features. Meanwhile, political decision-making is influenced by system pressure. In the decision-making process, there will be a certain degree of bias between the final decision and the targeted decision.