Suchergebnisse

THIS ARTICLE RECONSIDERS THE TRADITIONAL DICHOTOMY BETWEEN EVALUATING DESIRABILITY AND EVALUATING FEASIBILITY IN NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY. IT EXAMINES HOW THESE TWO APPROACHES DIFFER IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE NOTION OF FEASIBILITY IN POLITICAL THEORY. IT EXPLAINS HOW THAT NOTION IS OFTEN USED AND HOW IT SHOULD BE USED. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FEASIBILITY CONDITION IN POLITICAL THEORY AND SO-CALLED POLITICAL FEASIBILITY ARE DISCUSSED.

THE AUTHORS USE A DYNAMIC COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH REAL AND FINANCIAL SIDES TO SIMULATE THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AND THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO STABILIZATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE WELFARE OF THE POOR. THE BASIC MODEL REPRESENTS A LOWER-MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMY LIKE THAT OF ECUADOR. SINCE THERE ARE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN SHORT- AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS, THEY ASSESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF POLICY INTERVENTIONS IN THE SHORT- AND LONG-RUNS UNDER DIFFERENT DISCOUNT RATES. THEY EXPLORE HOW GOVERNMENTS CAN ACHIEVE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY FOR THE POLICIES THAT ARE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR STABILIZATION AND/OR WELFARE BY ENHANCING THEIR DEGREE OF RELATIVE AUTONOMY IN POLICY MAKING, LOWERING SUBJECTIVE DISCOUNT RATES, IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO ENHANCE FLEXIBILITY IN THE REAL AND FINANCIAL SIDES OF THE ECONOMY, PERSUADING THE PUBLIC TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF STABILIZATION POLICIES RELATIVE TO THE COUNTERACTING EFFECTS OF NO INTERVENTION, AND TARGETING TRANSFERS TO BRIBE THE POLITICALLY-POWERFUL AND COMPENSATE THE POOR.