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In the present, we find industry engaged in factory farming on a massive scale, resulting in the torture of a great number of animals; we find many nations with nuclear weapons, resulting in the constant possibility of nuclear warfare; we find sea levels rising rapidly due to climate change, with the result that low-lying nations are at threat of being completely submerged. We might ask: 'is abolishing factory farming feasible?' 'Is universal nuclear disarmament feasible?' 'Is a radical reduction in the global concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere feasible?' We do not know the answers to these questions, but we can make more or less educated guesses. This is an article about those more or less educated guesses. Adapted from the source document.

To date there is no systematic exploration of the concept of 'political feasibility'. We believe that feasibility is a central issue for political philosophy, conceptually as well as practically, and that it has been given background status for far too long. Roughly, a state of affairs is feasible if it is one we could actually bring about. But there are many questions to ask about the conditions under which we are justified in thinking that we could bring about a political state of affairs. In this article we bring together several aspects of the concept of feasibility defended in the literature thus far, and build upon them to give an analysis of the notion of political feasibility. We suggest that the notion involves a relation between agents and the pursuit of certain actions and outcomes in certain historical contexts, and that there are two important roles for feasibility to play in political theory, corresponding to two feasibility 'tests': one categorical, the other comparative. We show how the tests operate in the assessment of three different levels of a normative political theory: core normative principles, their institutional implementation and the political reforms leading to them. Focusing on the third level, which has received the least attention in the literature, we proceed to explain how feasibility considerations interact with desirability and epistemic considerations in the articulation of normative political judgments.

This article argues that rising economic inequality and the decline in political trust across Western countries have systematic normative implications for Western governments' pursuit of climate justice. The article argues that it is an essential but neglected task of nonideal political theory to identify political feasibility constraints on the pursuit of climate justice and reflect on how to overcome them. The article identifies two feasibility constraints in contemporary Western countries, the inequality constraint and the legitimation constraint, as important elements of a nonideal theory of climate justice. It argues that the French Gilets Jaunes (yellow vests) movement arose as a form of bottom-up motivational resistance to President Macron's decarbonization policies, precisely because those policies did not take sufficient heed of the inequality and legitimation constraints. Furthermore, the article sketches elements of a roadmap for a feasible pathway for Western governments to decarbonize and observe their citizens' duties of climate justice and argues that the framework of feasibility constraints offers a coherent, novel and urgent rationale for adopting redistributive measures such as the Carbon Fee and Dividend and participatory-democratic measures such as Citizen Assemblies as component parts of a feasible pathway to a decarbonized economy.

ABSTRACTIn a positive, as opposed to a normative or prescriptive, approach to policy analysis, the critical examination of the conditions of feasibility of public policies assumes paramount importance. A proposal is feasible if it satisfies all relevant constraints. But while the notion of economic or technical feasibility can be explicated by pointing to the corresponding constraints, "political feasibility" is generally used in a much less precise sense; and lack of conceptual precision severely restricts its analytical usefulness. For instance, questions of political feasibility are often confused with considerations of political costs or of political opportunity. I argue that the analyst should always be prepared to translate a judgment of political feasibility or infeasibility in terms of the specific political constraints operating in the problem under consideration. In this paper, three main groups of political constraints are considered: those resulting from the limitation of the available political resources; those relating to the permissible distribution of the benefits and costs of a policy (distributional constraints); and those imposed by the institutional framework.

Attitudes to road pricing at last are showing signs of change. In addition, the existing road‐building and public transport lobbies are now becoming matched by the growth of information technology. Development from now on must be at local level, and the time is now ripe to re‐examine the interests involved so as to maximise satisfaction.

Although market-based environmental measures like uniform CO2 taxes reach a given standard at minimal cost, they do not prevail in real world policies. An efficiency oriented environmental policy fails, as it involves a redistribution of pollution rights, resulting in a strong and generally effective opposition of the groups that forego economic rents. The present paper analyzes the trade-off between efficiency and political feasibility of several CO2 tax and reimbursement schemes, using a computable general equilibrium model of Switzerland. The simulation results indicate that a policy combining a uniform CO2 tax with differentiated labor subsidies preventing intersectoral redistribution is a better solution for the tradeoff than the presently existing tax schemes in various countries.

The actual level of income inequality and the scope of policy options influence the redistribution policy chosen by a social planner. We show how the interaction between the two attributes may lead to the formation of social perception of inequality. An axiomatic system on social preferences is suggested and demonstrated to characterize a measure of social perception of inequality. Our contention is that social perception, as conceptualized in this paper, is closely related to both the objective inequality and the prospect level of equality. The prospect equality reflects the ideal level of equality, among which are politically feasible, and serves as a reference point for perception. Our notion indicates that a social planner may not take action on inequality if the relevant policies are not politically viable. These insights may help explain the differential redistribution policies across the nations.

The actual level of income inequality and the scope of policy options influence the redistribution policy chosen by a social planner. We show how the interaction between the two attributes may lead to the formation of social perception of inequality. An axiomatic system on social preferences is suggested and demonstrated to characterize a measure of social perception of inequality. Our contention is that social perception, as conceptualized in this paper, is closely related to both the objective inequality and the prospect level of equality. The prospect equality reflects the ideal level of equality, among which are politically feasible, and serves as a reference point for perception. Our notion indicates that a social planner may not take action on inequality if the relevant policies are not politically viable. These insights may help explain the differential redistribution policies across the nations.

The actual level of income inequality and the scope of policy options influence the redistribution policy chosen by a social planner. We show how the interaction between the two attributes may lead to the formation of social perception of inequality. An axiomatic system on social preferences is suggested and demonstrated to characterize a measure of social perception of inequality. Our contention is that social perception, as conceptualized in this paper, is closely related to both the objective inequality and the prospect level of equality. The prospect equality reflects the ideal level of equality, among which are politically feasible, and serves as a reference point for perception. Our notion indicates that a social planner may not take action on inequality if the relevant policies are not politically viable. These insights may help explain the differential redistribution policies across the nations.