The article is dedicated to the discussion about the notions of the 'political system' and 'political regime' in the fields of its meanings as autonomous analytical constructions. The main arguments are that the 'political system' describes a stable and normal political process and determinate interrelations between power structures and civil society institutions as a complex sociopolitical unity. On the other hand, concept of 'political regime' stresses dynamic aspects of the government activity as a realization of the basic political functions. Pointing to the fact that a political system explains events and relations in the modern democratic context and a regime -- its peculiarities in the process of decision-making, the authors share attention to specific negative aspects of the separate interpretation and recognition of the various forms in the national politics spheres. All these conditions may sharp influence over the quality of the authority decisions, feedback among political institutions as a civic interests representatives etc. And otherwise, this implies that the political systems and political regimes realize an isomorphic similarity for taking evasive action between them. Adapted from the source document.
This article is focused on the relation between the political institutional conditions (regime properties) and collective violence. Relying on works of Charles Tilly, two most important properties of regimes (political institutional conditions) that could affect the occurrence and intensity of collective violence are discerned: regime (governmental) capacity and democracy level. Empirical-graphical analysis finds no relation between the democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence. However, statistically significant relationship between the governmental capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence is found. Moreover, higher levels of collective violence are observed in the low capacity- undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis). Adapted from the source document.
The paper seeks to explain the differences as to how successfully the three Baltic countries managed the economic crisis between 2008 and the first half of 2010. More specifically, it analyzes investors' confidence, Estonia being the most successful country in this regard, Latvia the least (the only country that applied for aid from the International Monetary Fund), while Lithuania staying in between. The paper aims to take into account the differences (and similarities) between the Baltic countries as well as emphasize the importance of political-institutional factors in explaining investors' confidence. The importance of investors' confidence as is discussed and different ways of measuring it are reviewed. Moreover, the relevance of political-institutional factors in explaining investors' confidence is established from the theoretical point of view. Based on existing literature, a number of explanatory factors are distinguished, namely electoral processes, non-electoral pressures on government, government stability as well as the quality of informal institutions. The paper argues that Latvia was indeed in a significantly worse situation in terms of economic pre-crisis vulnerabilities than Lithuania and Estonia, both of which had certain, albeit different, economic advantages. The main difference between Lithuania and Estonia emerges comparing political-institutional, rather than purely economic, factors: Estonia was better placed in terms of electoral cycles, the extent of non-electoral pressures, and -- most importantly -- better institutions (governance quality, corruption level, trust in political institutions). Both Latvia and Lithuania found themselves in a significantly worse situation regarding political-institutional factors. Adapted from the source document.
It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.
The paper deals with the specific features of the construction of an international identity by the EU & Lithuania. We do this by comparing the narrative of "Normative Power Europe" to that of "Lithuania, the regional center." The term "Normative Power Europe," though in use for some two years, still has no clear-cut place in the studies of European integration. So in the paper we first try to explicate its content by drawing a contrast with the more familiar concept of "civil power." We show that the term is an attempt at a new conceptualization of a problem that has been on the agenda of constructivist international relations studies for some time already, namely, that of the power of ideas in international politics. "Normative Power Europe" is defined as a discursive practice, as a narrative shaping the EU as a unique political institution which, by realizing itself via free exchange of ideas & opinions, is capable of changing the "normalcy" perception in international relations. In the EU political discourse the identity of EU as a normative power is constructed via the contrast of EU/USA politics, with America conceived as Europe's "Other." Next, in analyzing Lithuania's foreign politics in the context of the EU New Neighborhood Policy, we draw the parallels in the narratives made use of in constructing the identities of EU & Lithuania. A brief examination of the narrative "Lithuania, the regional center" shows its similarity to the narrative of "Normative Power Europe." First, the "Normative Power Europe" & the "Lithuania, the regional center" are both discursive constructions of their international identity. Second, both narratives are promoting a normative model, based on similar values & principles. Third, in both narratives regionalization is held a major instrument in spreading the values conducive to the creation of a common identity. Finally, both narratives perceive the common regional identity as a major security guarantee. The conclusion is that the narrative of "Lithuania, the regional center" is merely a nationalist replica of the "Normative Power Europe," with some peculiarities to be explained by differences in historical context & Lithuania's specifics in domestic politics. These are mainly due to Lithuania's attempt at reconciling her nation state identity & the ambitions of an active actor of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy. Adapted from the source document.
Article treats a 2003-2004 political crisis in Lithuania as not confined to the Presidential institution. This is the crisis of an entire political system that had been maturing since long before. Four groups of factors are identified: 1) exhaustion of the intellectual resources of the political process & the lack of regularity, characteristic to the newly emerging political forces; 2) political anomie, which spans all levels of the political system; 3) entropy of the presidential institution, stimulating the redistribution of authority among separate state structures; & 4) populism & radicalism. The first three groups of factors may conventionally be called 'pre-Paksist', whereas the fourth was particularly activated during the Paksas's presidential tenure. The article argues that the impeachment of the President brought to an end anything but the first stage of the political crisis resolution process. That is why the author leaves the results of the Presidential impeachment aside in this research. The second stage commenced along with the early presidential elections. In general one must note that the political crisis in Lithuania is solvable by democratic & legal means. Adapted from the source document.
Value orientations of Lithuanian civil servants are analyzed in the context of political culture of society. After the short summing-up on Lithuanian political culture research author concentrates on such features of political culture as distrust in authorities, public institutions, state & democracy; negative attitude towards legislation & attempts to drive through using informal rules & networks; inability to envisage difference between private and public. The role model of civil servant prescribed by Lithuanian legislation reflect the striving, meanwhile in reality officials' practiced values correspond with the orientations of consuming society & some negative habits & stereotypes inherited from the soviet times. Adapted from the source document.
Theoretical concepts of "structure" & "structural intersection" are analyzed in this article. The use of these concepts in political science & their critical interpretation is presented by analyzing positivist, ideational & post-modernist approaches. Sociological understanding of structure, which encompasses both material & ideational elements is created. Under the suggested definition, structure is seen as comprised of identity, institutions & material base. The interaction of these structural elements forms scientifically useful concept, which can be applied in the analysis of the socio-political processes in post-soviet transformations. Opportunities & limitations of "structural intersection" analysis, which include both international relations & internal policy perspectives are also presented. Adapted from the source document.
Article analyses processes of parliamentary control in Lithuania. The research is based on the "Agent -- Principal" theory approach, which demonstrates a simplified perception of parliamentary control in Lithuania. That induces the application of a limited, ie., information-based, means of parliamentary control in political practice. Parliamentary control in Lithuania is perceived as an act of subordinate coercion by governmental institutions, rather than continuous communication & cooperation. That causes the fragmentation of parliamentary control. Due to semi-presidential system's delegation of authority & accountability, parliamentary control is rather complicated in Lithuania. Efficient parliamentary control is impossible without political parties, which should be prepared to professionally govern or compete. Lithuanian political parties seem unprepared for these tasks. Research suggests that simplified perception of parliamentary control prevailing in Lithuania complicates its implementation in practice, though institutional preconditions for the implementation of efficient parliamentary control are present. Adapted from the source document.
Political corruption in Japan is a very important issue. According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2009 survey Japanese perceived political parties, public officials and civil servants to be the institutions which are the most affected by corruption. In addition, governmental measures against corruption are regarded to be ineffective and inadequate to the real situation. Japanese have keen concern toward Japanese political parties, intransparent activity of politicians and preventive measures taken by government. The purpose of this research is to examine political corruption phenomena in contemporary Japanese politics. Research questions are what are the structure, scale, and causes of political corruption in Japan during 2001-2009. For answering to these research questions first of all it is discussed the concept and definition of political corruption itself. Article overviews previous political corruption studies in Japan from the time of Second World War to the recent times, including the report of the Transparency International National Integrity System. In third chapter of article the scale, the varieties and the main practitioners of political corruption in Japan are to be analyzed. It reveals the biggest political corruption scandals in Japanese politics in given time-period. Last chapter focuses on the explanation of political corruption mechanism in Japan and in particular relationship with clientelism practises. Combination of primary and secondary sources led me to make the following conclusions on the main political corruption tendencies in Japan during 2001-2009. First, the Asahi Shimbun front page content analysis indicates that 2002 and 2007 are special years in the context of corruption studies because in those years published the largest number of political corruption articles and the biggest number of the new themes on the political corruption issue revealed. Second, the common point of the three most significant political corruption scandals during 2001-2009 is that all of them have the relationship with political finance issue and in particular a suspicion on the violation of the PFRL. This finding reaffirms the NIS statement that political finance is one of the top priority issues in Japanese corruption scheme. Third, illegal political donation and influence peddling are the most frequent types of corruption in Japan during the period of 2001-2009. Fourth, main practitioners of political corruption in Japan were the LDP members from the House of Representatives. In addition, in as many as nine cases the Diet member secretaries were involved in political corruption scandals. The Diet member secretaries play an important role in political corruption scheme because they are often responsible for the political fund management. Fifth, the most vulnerable institution to political corruption seems to be Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and Ministry of Construction. Finally, article concludes that political corruption in Japan, to some extent, could be explained through the analysis of political clientelism. Adapted from the source document.
In the article, while analyzing Lithuanian foreign policy, specific attention is paid to the link between the national identity & foreign policy. This link could be the key in analyzing the question, if in truth Lithuanian foreign policy has reached a particular point, which could be named as international isolation or at least a tendency towards it, & if yes, -- then why The article proposes the following answers to these questions -- to abandon the complex of bandwagoning & to acquire more self-reliance as democratic national state. Corrections of domestic politics & democratic legalization of political trends in Lithuania is necessary. Herewith, it is noticed that it would be a big mistake to go to the extremes, eventually even trying to reconsider the feasibility of EU & NATO membership. Euro-Atlantic institutions remain the major guarantee of stability in Europe, including Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.
Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
This article describes the problem of conflict of interest and its regulation in Lithuania. After a short introduction of conflict of interest and related notions, types, and forms of conflict of interest the Lithuanian case study is followed. After a short historical review of such conflict regulation in interwar Lithuanian Republic period the analyses turns to contemporary legislation concerning this ethical problem. Lithuanian Law on the Compatibility of Public and Private Interests in the Public Service was edited three times what allows the author to distinguish tendencies and evaluate them in the broader context. The author provides a snapshot of the conflict of interest in codes of ethics of Lithuanian public institutions. The analyses of legislation regulating conflict of interest in politicians and civil servants activity allows concluding that behavior of civil servants is more regulated due to their role. Adapted from the source document.
There are two important differences in the outcomes of postsocialist transformation of the Baltic countries: (1) Due to the inclusive citizenship laws the liberal democracy in Lithuania is more consolidated than in other Baltic countries. (2) However, in the economy Estonia has established reputation of "a shining star from the Baltics," while Lithuania during first decade of market transition acquired the reputation of a pupil that although made the homework asked by the international institutions, but always a bit too late & never with excellent marks. While the explanation of the first difference is relatively uncontroversial, the opinions clash around the explanation of the differences in the economic performance. The article analyzes how can the reemergence of the difference between Baltic South & North be explained after the levels of socio-economic development between Baltic states had converged during the Soviet time? Did better initial economic conditions, peculiarities in the political process (eg., exclusion of significant part of non-ethnical Estonian population that could be potential electorate for postcommunist party like the Lithuanian "Labourists"), Protestant cultural legacy, better public relation work -- or what? -- make Estonia "a shining star from the Baltics"? The paper closes with the discussion of the further difficulties of the culturalist explanation (including the Latvian riddle again) & possible solutions, & presents some proposals of further research relevant for the progress in the testing of conflicting explanations. Adapted from the source document.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.
