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By Veronica Anghel. This contribution delves into the intricate interplay between formal and informal institutions in contemporary
European political landscapes. It investigates the vital role of informal institutions in supplementing and at times
circumventing the formal rules that define the parameters of political functioning.

I draw on Nora Berenstain's concept of "epistemic exploitation" and present a series of precisions to consider the asymmetric relation between marginalized groups and public and private institutions. I am particularly interested in those interactions in which the former are called upon to collaborate, under conditions that sustain and reinforce the asymmetry, with institutional projects that will affect their communities and will be executed with or without their participation. I will focus on trans groups, but epistemic extortion is not exclusive to them.
Der Beitrag Epistemic extortion, between epistemic obligation and political duty erschien zuerst auf Philosophie InDebate.

In this conversation with RevDem editor and a re:constitution fellow Kasia Krzyżanowska, Krzysztof Izdebski (Batory Foundation) and Bartosz Pilitowski (Court Watch Poland) discuss all the current challenges the Polish government is facing with the legal legacy left by the Law and Justice party. How to restore trust in the judicial institutions? How to deal with the irregularly established Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary? What should be the role of the judges in designing the judicial system?

— Panel 1.C Institutions of Uncertainty und 7.B. Uncertainty and the turn to empirical engagement in political theory — Der Theoriekongress bot einen spezifischen Blick auf die politische Theorie: Der Schwerpunkt lag auf kritischen, radikaldemokratischen bzw. poststrukturalistischen Ansätzen. Die dadurch aufgetretenen Versäumnisse, die auch mit Beibehaltung dieser Schwerpunkte hätten vermieden werden können, möchte ich anhand […]

In this article, the Palistinian sociologist Mohammed A. Bamyeh, outlines a "No-State Solution" to the area between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean Sea. This "No-State Solution" was discussed at an event on January 28, 2024, hosted by a number of local institutions in Victoria, Canada by the author and Israeli political scientist Uri Gordon. The idea of no-state was understood to foreground the virtues of free association, multiple loyalties, and uncoerced order — all as counterweights to centralized control, militarized states, fanatic loyalties, and permanent mobilization of populations.

Syria has returned to the stage of regional diplomacy with the readmission of Damascus to the Arab League after a 12-year suspension. The country's comeback is the outcome of regional diplomatic efforts that started in 2018 but reached their climax after the devastating earthquake in Syria and Turkey in February. Normalization with Syria comes without any accountability for the crimes the Syrian regime has committed against its own people nor a change in behavior that would signal the end of the suffering of Syrians. We argue that despite international and regional factors setting the stage, domestic factors are Arab states' main incentives for normalization.
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Mustafa Karahamad



Mustafa Karahamad ist Doktorand im Programmbereich "Transnationale Politik" und Mitglied der Forschungsgruppe "Terrorismus" an der HSFK. Er forscht zu muslimischen religiösen Institutionen und der Legitimierung politischer Gewalt im Nahen Osten. // Mustafa Karahamad is a doctoral researcher in PRIF's research department "Transnational Politics" and member of the research group "Terrorism". His research interests are Muslim religious institutions and legitimization of political violence in the Middle East.

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Der Beitrag Arab States' Incentives Towards (not) Normalizing Relations with Syria – Islamists and Drug Trafficking? erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.

Spain is going through turbulent times, marked by a strong political polarization and an increasingly evident decline in the rule of law due to the partisan takeover of institutions. This situation has been exacerbated by President Sánchez's investiture agreements with pro-independence parties, particularly Junts, led by the fugitive Puigdemont, who spearheaded the Catalan secessionist insurrection in the autumn of 2017. The bill grants amnesty for crimes committed in connection with secessionist efforts, including, among others, misappropriation of public funds, prevarication, and attacks against authority. The amnesty, as it currently stands, violates both the Spanish Constitution and basic tenets of the rule of law.

The political co-optation of the Constitutional Tribunal has eliminated its role in Poland's checks and balances. The judges, although associated with the ruling party, are conflicted and some of them refuse to rule, the number of proceedings has fallen dramatically, and the Tribunal's authority has all but disappeared. It is not enough now to pick it up, shake it off, straighten it out, and put it back to where it was in 2015. Instead, if the opposition wins the election, it must rebuild an institution that is both an effective constitutional player, capable of checking the government and a trustworthy and reliable avenue for Polish citizens to assert their constitutional complaints.

The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is described as one of the few success stories of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In contrast to the state-level legislature, the Court's decision-making process in principle cannot be vetoed. Voting rules do not condition the presence of all three ethnic groups. This has made it difficult for Republika Srpska's (RS) political leadership to block, boycott or undermine the work of the Court compared to other state-level institutions. However, recent months saw the RS identifying and seizing a rare moment of vulnerability with potentially severe consequences. If RS does not elect new judges in the meantime, not even a Court's small chamber will be able to operate.

Since February 24th, 2022, the world has witnessed Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, which has become a serious challenge to many countries but particularly to those in the Euro-Atlantic community. A year and a half of brutal aggression has compelled Western governments to elaborate and implement a range of complex decisions at unprecedented scales and on a very short timelines. Further, Russia's invasion has tested West's ability to predict and assess security threats and to generate and sustain adequate political attention to the crisis. The shocking massacre of Israelis by Hamas on October 7th, 2023, has forced Western policy makers to react quickly to another crisis in another part of the world. Understandably, the Ukrainian government's anxiety has increased with the uncertainty as to how it might be possible for the West would cope with two crisis situations simultaneously, and what—if anything— Kyiv should do about the situation in Israel.
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Olena Podvorna



Dr Olena Podvorna is a Project Leader and Senior Researcher at PRIF in the Research Department "International Institutions" with a focus on the Arctic. She is currently conducting a research project on the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on the European Arctic. Her research interests include, inter alia, Ukraine's foreign policy.

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Der Beitrag How War in Israel Affects Russia’s War Against Ukraine erschien zuerst auf PRIF BLOG.