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A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.

Books that matter. ; Includes bibliography. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Introduction.--The centenary of modern government.--The first century's changes in our state constitutions.--Absolute power, an American institution.--The exemption of the accused from examination in criminal proceedings.--Freedom of incorporation.--American jurisprudence.--The decadence of the legal fiction.--The recognition of habitual criminals as a class to be treated by itself.--The defence by the state of suits attacking testamentary charities.--Salaries for members of the legislature.--Permanent courts for international arbitration.--The Monroe doctrine in 1898. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Institutions-organizations and institutions-rules (norms), levels of institutionalization and its influence on political development of political system, constitutions and constitutional interpretation, structural-functional characteristic of the main political institutions (parties, party and electoral systems, legislatures and executive power, public administration, interest groups, local governance, judicial and political communication institutions), variuos types, models of these institutions and activity, interaction between political institutions and their influence on real politics, institutional engineering, institutionalization of the political institutions, democratization and democratic consolidation processes – all these questions were discussed in this methodical book.

Institutions-organizations and institutions-rules (norms), levels of institutionalization and its influence on political development of political system, constitutions and constitutional interpretation, structural-functional characteristic of the main political institutions (parties, party and electoral systems, legislatures and executive power, public administration, interest groups, local governance, judicial and political communication institutions), variuos types, models of these institutions and activity, interaction between political institutions and their influence on real politics, institutional engineering, institutionalization of the political institutions, democratization and democratic consolidation processes – all these questions were discussed in this methodical book.

Institutions-organizations and institutions-rules (norms), levels of institutionalization and its influence on political development of political system, constitutions and constitutional interpretation, structural-functional characteristic of the main political institutions (parties, party and electoral systems, legislatures and executive power, public administration, interest groups, local governance, judicial and political communication institutions), variuos types, models of these institutions and activity, interaction between political institutions and their influence on real politics, institutional engineering, institutionalization of the political institutions, democratization and democratic consolidation processes – all these questions were discussed in this methodical book.

This paper explores universities as political institutions in the first place. Some principles related to interest groups, power, competition for scarce resources and negotiation in search of compromise are found to be common to businesses and the academic environment as well. We then reviewed the main characteristics of political systems which we also found to be present in universities. We argue that politics in universities is not necessarily a bad thing since using it in an appropriate, rational way is proven to have more advantages than disadvantages. Next, we analyzed universities as coalitions, looked into their sources of power and decision making processes and discussed the relationship between authorities and partisans. Finally, we discussed some leadership issues in political systems using examples from our own experience as employees in different Romanian universities*. Our concluding remarks support the idea that political action in universities may be used as an instrument for reaching goals if it is backed by leadership skills as drivers for promoting collaborative and interdependent relationships between internal and external audiences. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n2s2p9

Political institutions determine the degree of freedom people enjoy and their capacity to influence their social and political environment. This chapter provides historical evidence on the evolution of political institutions drawing upon two major research projects: the PolityIV dataset and the Vanhanen dataset, which focuses on electoral participation and competition. Strengths and weaknesses of both databases are discussed. The chapter shows that global averages are tending to rise according to both datasets, but with significant differences in timing. Both datasets also show that the Western Offshoots and Western Europe took the lead in this process, while other parts of the globe often experienced a much less gradual evolution, with occasional violent swings in political rights. Yet in the long run, there has been an impressive improvement in the quality of political institutions worldwide.

Although firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption, and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not.

This dissertation studies the interaction between financial markets and political institutions in a historical context. The body of this dissertation consists of four chapters in the fields of monetary and financial history. Chapter 2 concerns the history of the Russian rouble between 1856 and 1875. This chapter's main question is to what extent the Russian government was able to credibly stabilise its currency in the aftermath of the Crimean War. This chapter shows that foreign bondholders never saw currency reforms by the Tsarist government as fully credible. Chapter 3 concerns the gold standard, the main monetary regime between 1870 and 1914. This chapter studies why countries did or did not adopt the gold standard. Its main result is that countries that had more democratic institutions were, all else equal, less likely to do so. Chapter 4 studies the effects of the introduction of the corporate tax (Vennootschapsbelasting) in the occupied Netherlands in 1942. This chapter shows that the introduction of this tax cost Dutch shareholders over 200 million guilders. Furthermore, firms responded to this tax by attracting additional debt, thus avoiding part of the tax burden. Chapter 5 studies the remuneration of members of Canadian parliaments in the second half of the twentieth century. The main research question is how politicians respond to changes to their remuneration. This chapter shows that the introduction of pension schemes for members of parliament enticed them to remain in office longer, or at least to try to do so by running for re-election.

In the modern political process, an important role is played by political actors who really influence the political process. The most active actors in the political process include political leaders, political parties, public organizations, etc., which, depending on the level of maturity of civil society in a particular country, influence political decision-making processes and the implementation of national and local policies. The political regimes of different states stimulate or inhibit the initiative of the subjects of the political process. However, the subjects of the political process are able to change the features of a particular political regime. Political institutions functioning in the political process go through the following eight stages. First, it is important for a political institution to define a goal that allows you to clearly define the goals and directions of its activities, which in turn increases its subjectivity. Second, political institutions must make political predictions to increase the effectiveness of their political activities. Third, the ability to make the right political decisions is important for a political institution. Fourth, in order to achieve their goal, political institutions must carry out political socialization and political mobilization, which increases their subjectivity. Fifth, political institutions implement the planned goals and adjust tactical activities. Sixth, political institutions must monitor the implementation of political decisions. Seventh, political institutions must analyze and summarize their political activities. Eighth, political institutions must define new strategies in their political activities, which allows them to increase their subjectivity.

The political institutions within which a voter exercises his or her vote will structure the choices that are available to him or her. In turn, these choices act to shape the eventual voting decision. The interaction between these system-level characteristics and the voter's own characteristics determines the voting decision. Voting is therefore not simply a personal choice, but one that is shaped by the context within which the choice is made.

The political institutions within which a voter exercises his or her vote will structure the choices that are available to him or her. In turn, these choices act to shape the eventual voting decision. The interaction between these system-level characteristics and the voter's own characteristics determines the voting decision. Voting is therefore not simply a personal choice, but one that is shaped by the context within which the choice is made.

Although firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption, and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not. ; ISSN:1744-1374 ; ISSN:1744-1382

Does the creation of nominally democratic institutions help dictators stay in power by diminishing the risk of coups? We posit that the effectiveness of political institutions in deterring coups crucially depends on the types of plotters and their political goals. By providing a means to address the ruling coalition's primary concerns about a dictator's opportunism or incompetence, institutions reduce the necessity of reshuffling coups, in which the ruling coalition replaces an incumbent leader but keeps the regime intact. However, such institutions do not diminish the risk of regime-changing coups, because the plotters' goals of overthrowing the entire regime and changing the group of ruling coalition are not achievable via activities within the institutions. Our empirical analysis provides strong empirical support for our expectations. Our findings highlight that the role of "democratic" institutions in deterring coups is rather limited as it only applies to less than 38% of coup attempts.