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The Journal of Australian Political Economy continues to be the go-to place for publishing political economy for local (and international) readers.
The journal's latest issue (Winter 2023) contains full-length articles on a variety of topics, with particular focus on Australian industry policy issues, bank lending policy and regional inequalities in housing affordability. A review article considers recent books dealing with climate change and capitalism. Four shorter articles on recent official reports are also featured, along with an array of reviews and notes on recent political economy publications. Overall, the contents of this latest issue show the continuing vitality of political economy scholarship and research in Australia [...]
The post JAPE: new and forthcoming issues appeared first on Progress in Political Economy (PPE).

This week we're looking at education policy. Should there be faith schools? Should there be private schools? And how should we decide such issues?

Curt Magleby is Vice President, U.S. Government Relations, Ford Motor Company and spoke to our Public Affairs Career Lecture Series on Thursday, September 26, 2019. He spoke about his position engaging with policymakers on a wide range of legislative and regulatory issues and overseeing Ford's federal, state and local government affairs. Magleby previously was director, […]

2022 will see the launch of the long awaited Covid inquiry. One key set of issues will involve the role of scientific advice: how it is gathered, and co-ordinated; how it is fed in to ministers; how uncertain or conflicting advice is handled; how transparent and accountable the whole process is; and how to improve the handling of scientific advice in future.

The country's Integrity Commission is embroiled in controversy, so when one of its senior members was shot and robbed, many threads began to unravel.

In recent years, speech inciting hatred, peddling dissemination, and encouraging self-harm has proliferated on social-media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, prompting calls for regulation to force platforms to tackle these challenges more aggressively. One of the most ambitious proposals is the UK's own Online Safety Bill, which looks likely to be passed (in some form) by the current government and will grant Ofcom substantial new powers over social media. Yet the Bill is highly controversial, prompting concerns over censorship of legitimate speech. What will this regulatory regime look like in practice? Will it effectively prevent harm? And is there merit to the concern that it will undermine free speech? To confront these issues and more, we are joined by leading experts and practitioners from academia, civil society, and Ofcom itself.

Brexit has shaken British politics and raised important questions about how our democracy functions.

Philip Rycroft, who was the lead civil servant on constitutional issues within the UK Government from 2012 to 2019, will examine how much Brexit has stressed the democratic process. He will look at trust in the institutions of the state and the state of democratic representation across the UK. He will ask what this means for the future of our democratic institutions and for the future of the United Kingdom itself.

About the speaker

Philip Rycroft worked in the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) between March 2017 and March 2019, from October 2017 as Permanent Secretary. He was responsible for leading the department in all its work on the Government's preparations for Brexit. From June 2015 to March 2019 he was head of the UK Governance Group in the Cabinet Office, with responsibility for advising ministers on all aspects of the constitution and devolution. From May 2012 to May 2015, he was the Director General in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg.

Through his career, Philip worked in a variety roles, in the civil service in Scotland and London, in the European Commission and in business.
He is now an academic and independent consultant.

•The only one of its kind in the UK: dedicated to understanding how the environment and politics intersect with issues of power and justice •You will work with and learn from one of the largest political ecology research groups in the UK •You will directly engage with both academic and non-academic practitioners of political ecology, … Read more New Masters (MA) in Political Ecology – Lancaster University

Do younger Californians have different opinions than older Californians on politics and policy? PPIC policy director and senior fellow Eric McGhee discusses a new report that examines the gaps between younger and older Californians in their partisanship, ideology, and opinions on current issues.

Topics covered include affirmative action, legacy preferences, the student loan forgiveness decision, refugee policy, indictments against Trump, Vladimir Putin, political ignorance, and more.

Women in Latin America make up a record-high presence in regional parliaments today. But issues like effective implementation, political parties’ decisions, and prejudices keep these numbers low in countries like Guatemala, Colombia, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Panama and Brazil. In their latest book, Flavia Freidenberg and Karolina Gilas (UNAM, Mexico) explain that defending and consolidating democracy … Continued

Gerardo L. Munck. University of Southern California (USC)@GerardoMunckSocial scientists have not discovered laws similar to those in the physical sciences. But they undersell what their disciplines have accomplished. That is why I like Josep Colomer's claim that 30 important propositions in political science should be treated as "things we know."  Nov 25, 2022252. Retweets.       16. Quote Tweets.      1,043. LikesTo convey a sense of Colomer's claim, I copy verbatim the 30 propositions. Sources: Josep Colomer, The Science of Politics: An Introduction (2011), Oxford University Press, pp. xxi -xxv.  - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259760896_The_Science_of_Politics_An_IntroductionCiencia de la politica (2010, 2017), Editorial Ariel.  - https://www.amazon.com/-/es/Josep-Maria-Colomer/dp/8434425289?asin=B06WD4Z1N7&revisionId=d87f6ef8&format=1&depth=1·1.PUBLIC GOODS. In contrast to private goods, public goods are indivisible & cannot be satisfactorily provided by the market or other private initiatives. The provision of public goods requires cooperation or coercion, whether by means of collective action or effective government2. GOVERNMENT SIZE. The demand for public goods and the relative levels of public expenditure by governments tend to increase with economic prosperity, institutional stability, and democracy.3. COLLECTIVE ACTION. Members of small, concentrated, and homogeneous communities or interest groups have more incentives to cooperate and participate in collective action than members of large, dispersed, and heterogeneous groups. /13. COLLECTIVE ACTION. In the public arena, small groups tend to have relatively more access to public resources at the expense of large groups. /24. VOICE VERSUS EXIT. Collective action for the advancement of collective interests, or "voice," weakens and may fail if the rival action of "exit," in search for an alternative provider, is less costly and more likely to give access to public goods.5. PRISONER'S DILEMMA. The "Prisoner's Dilemma," which is the most famous model in game theory, can represent the basic structure of collective action problems for the provision of public goods. /15. PRISONER'S DILEMMA. In this game, each actor has incentives not to cooperate, which may lead to an inefficient outcome in which all the participants are worse off than if all cooperated. /26. SUSTAINED COOPERATION. In interactions of the Prisoner's Dilemma type, sustained cooperation can emerge if actors apply the strategy of cooperating and doing unto others as they do unto yourself—also called "Tit for Tat." /16. SUSTAINED COOPERATION. Mutual cooperation is more likely the greater the uncertainty as to the length of the collective relationship and the higher the number of interactions you may be involved in. /27. LEADERSHIP. Collective action of communities and interest groups can develop thanks to leadership. Leaders distribute the costs of action among group members to provide public and private goods, /17. LEADERSHIP. while, in exchange, followers give the leaders votes or support and allow them to enjoy the benefits of power, fame, income, and a political career. /28. SMALL IS DEMOCRATIC. Small communities, which tend to be relatively harmonious in economic and ethnic terms, are comparatively advantageous for soft, democratic forms of government. /18. SMALL IS DEMOCRATIC. In recent times, small independent countries and self-governed communities have proliferated, thus making the average country size decrease. /29. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE. Multiple levels of government, including local, state, and global, are necessary for an efficient provision of public goods at diverse territorial scales.10. FEDERATION NEEDS MANY UNITS. Local democratic self-government and large-scale provision of public goods can be compatible by means of federalism. Many-unit federations, in which no unit is sufficiently large to dominate, tend to survive and endure. /110. FEDERATION NEEDS MANY UNITS. In contrast, two-unit-only federations tend to fail, leading to either absorption of the smaller unit by the larger one or secession of the small, likely dominated unit. /211. DICTATORSHIPS FAIL AND FALL. Dictatorships have self-appointed rulers holding on to power by coercive and violent means. They can survive on the basis of repression and their "substantive" performance, whether economic or other. /111. DICTATORSHIPS FAIL AND FALL. But they also tend to fall as a consequence of their failures, including military defeats, economic crises, or the dictator's death. /212. DEVELOPMENT FAVORS DEMOCRACY. Democracy is based on freedom and regular elections of rulers. Economic development favors the viability of democratic regimes because it tends to reduce income and social polarization and lower the intensity of redistributive conflicts.13. DEMOCRACY FAVORS DEVELOPMENT. Democracy can favor economic development because it is strongly associated with the rule of law and is more competent in the provision of public goods.14. DEMOCRATIC PEACE. Democratic states are less likely to fight one another and engage in wars than dictatorships.15. PARTY OLIGARCHY. Political parties are organizations that present policy proposals and compete for political power. A political organization tends to become an "oligarchy," ie, it tends to be dominated by political leaders or professional politicians seeking votes & offices.16. EXTREME ACTIVISTS. Voluntary political activists hold more "extreme" policy or ideological positions than party voters and even party leadership.17.MEDIAN VOTER. In elections in which only 2 major parties compete, they may have incentives to approach each other and converge in their policy positions. Once they converge around the median voter's preference, neither party has electoral incentives to move away from the other party18. INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE. Electoral competition is asymmetric between the government and the opposition. The incumbent party in government can gain advantage in electoral competition by providing or hiding information on its record to obtain credibility.19. ISSUE OWNERSHIP. In spite of parties' convergence in their policy positions on some issues, a party can keep advantage and "own" an issue if its past record in government has given it credit for policy making on that issue.20. NON-DEBATE CAMPAIGNS. In electoral campaigns, rival parties and candidates tend to choose or emphasize different policy issues according to different issue ownership and the parties' or candidates' expected relative advantage.21. POLICY CONSENSUS. In the long term, broad policy consensus can be accumulated on an increasing number of issues. But in the short term, mediocre policies and incumbent parties with no good performance in government may survive for lack of a sufficiently popular alternative.22. CONSENSUAL PLURALISM. There is an inverse correlation between the number of political parties in a system and the degree of party polarization in electoral competition. /122. CONSENSUAL PLURALISM. High fragmentation of the party system is associated with a high number of issues on the policy agenda, which generates low polarization of political competition and more opportunities for consensus. /2123. MAJORITY BIPARTISM. Presidential and other one-office elections by plurality rule tend to be associated with single-party dominance or a balance between two parties.24. MORE SEATS, MORE PARTIES. In assembly and parliamentary elections, large size of the assembly and a high number of seats in each district and proportional representation are associated with a high number of political parties.25. MICRO-MEGA RULE. When choosing electoral rules, large parties prefer small assemblies and small districts by plurality rule, while small parties prefer large assemblies and large districts with proportional representation.26. SMALL ASSEMBLIES, LARGE DISTRICTS. The development of multiple parties favors the adoption of large multi-seat districts with proportional representation rules. In the long term, proportional representation rules have been increasingly adopted. /126. SMALL ASSEMBLIES, LARGE DISTRICTS. But in very large countries, a large federal assembly can be elected with different electoral rules, including small single-seat districts. /227.INSTITUTIONAL "DEADLOCK." Single-party government promotes a high concentration of power, which may foster effectiveness in decision-making. In contrast, separate elections for different offices & divisions of power may produce divided government, "deadlock," & policy stability.28.MINIMUMCOALITIONS.Parties in parliament tend to form minimum-size winning coalitions & prefer partners located in contiguous policy & ideology positions. The distribution of cabinet portfolios among coalition parties tends to be proportional to the N of seats controlled by each party.29. CABINET DURATION. Single-party majority cabinets tend to last longer than multiparty coalition or minority cabinets.30. TWO-PARTY STALEMATE. In a system with separation of powers between the presidency and the congress, policy change is relatively more viable if there are multiple parties or individual members of congress are not strongly tied to party votes.30. TWO-PARTY STALEMATE. In contrast, a two-party system with strong party discipline may prop up confrontation and inter-institutional stalemate. /2

In 1976, Robert Gilpin distinguished three contrasting political economy perspectives: liberalism, Marxism, and mercantilism. Gilpin introduced these International Relations-derived categories as theories and ideologies of political economy, sometimes conceived either as explanatory models or future scenarios. He recognises that the three ideologies 'define the conflicting perspectives' that actors have, but he does not go as far as to theorise how the perspectives may be part of the dynamics of the world economy and generative of its history and future. Gilpin's models, scenarios, and theories are thus mainly cognitive attempts to understand reality from the outside. Since Gilpin's main works, a large number of critical and constructivist International Political Economy (IPE) and Global Political Economy (GPE) approaches have arisen, stressing the constitutive role of ideas and performativity of theories. Many of these studies, however, tend to focus on aspects of contemporary matters or specific issues and fall short of analysing broad historical developments and, most markedly, causation. In a recent book that is coming out as a paperback in May, I develop the idea that the conflicting political economy perspectives are fields that generate the dynamics of the world system.
The post Towards a 'field theory' of global political economy appeared first on Progress in Political Economy (PPE).

Governments and government agencies are frequently the subject of criticism from the public, media, and politicians, over issues of inefficiency and bureaucracy. In new research, Jan Boon, Jan Wynen and Koen Verhoest find that exposure to these criticisms and the reputational damage that they can do can lead to government agencies having more rigid bureaucracies. … Continued

Henry Kissinger will be one hundred
years old in a few weeks and has published five books since he turned ninety.
Along with President Nixon, he futilely prolonged and escalated the Vietnam
War for four years when defeat was already inevitable. But he also received
the Nobel Peace Prize precisely for negotiating the ceasefire for that same
war.     His doctrine also has these two faces. On the one hand, he conceives international politics as the interaction between states seeking power. On the
other hand, he favors the balance of powers so that no one is able to fully
impose its dominance on the others.   In the academic literature, Kissinger's
approach is called "realism" and is widely accepted. The main alternative is
the so-called "liberal" approach, which trusts in the ability of institutions
to prevent wars and keep peace. From there arose the League of Nations, which
failed, and the United Nations and its specialized organizations, which have
had significant success on many issues, but are also currently showing their
insufficiency.    The most accurate postulate of the realists is that the world
is more peaceful when there are multiple powers than when there are only two,
as in the Cold War, or a single super-dominant one, as seemed to be the case with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.   The success
of the formula requires that the multilateral equilibrium could only be overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount. As a historical example, Kissinger has
analyzed and praised the so-called Concert of Europe that was formed, after
the defeat of Napoleon's France, by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and also recovered France. According to his interpretation, the Concert
"came close to constituting the government of Europe" and achieved a long
period without European-wide wars. The balance was upset by the unification of
Germany at the end of the 19th century and its consequent aggressive
expansionism, which led to the absurd and catastrophic First World War. Taking
a similar approach, Kissinger continues to praise the construction of the
European Union, which has prevented new general wars on the continent.    During
his time in government, the biggest concern was that communism would end up
dominating the world according to the domino theory, whereby the fall of a
piece like Indochina would be followed by Burma and Thailand, as well as
Indonesia (which, in fact, was very close), and from there, India, Japan, the
Middle East... That's why the Vietnam war extended to Laos and Cambodia. But
this is also the reason for the diplomatic opening to China, to break the
Sino-Soviet bloc and achieve a certain multilateral balance.    The current
interest of the discussion is that the role of the United States as the only
superpower may be less exclusive and exclusionary than it seemed. A version of
political realism in academia tends to analyze international relations "after
hegemony" as a ground for "anarchy", that is, destructive conflicts
and wars. However, the changes around the Ukrainian war can be read
as a new opportunity for multilateral cooperation.    The United States has the
initiative and many economic and military resources, but, paradoxically, it
may have a good opportunity to expand pluralism. In the new situation of
divided government between the Presidency and Congress, the most ambitious
projects in domestic policy are paralyzed, so Joe Biden can focus on foreign
policy, where he has more power, and expand multilateral cooperation.    The
European Union is beginning to develop, for the first time, a spirited common
international policy, in contrast to the dissent during the Iraq war, when the
governments of Britain and Spain were on one side and those of France and
Germany on the other. The rulers of China and India, which are rivals to each
other, have told Russia that the world is not ready for war.    This
configuration with more than three major powers points to a balance of powers
capable of avoiding polarization, since, otherwise, a coalition of two-to-one preludes conflict.     Specifically, the Group of Seven, which is the nucleus
of a latent world government, needs to work more closely with some members of
the Group of Twenty, which includes India and China, so that its decisions are widely
accepted and effective.    Negotiations between the US and the EU for the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in which substantive
agreements had been reached, were paralyzed by Trump, and could now be
revived.    The Trans-Pacific Agreement for Economic Cooperation was also
abandoned by Trump, but the other eleven initial countries went ahead on their
own and ended up signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which China has presented its candidacy.
Many in the United States are clamoring for re-entry in what had been its own initiative.    And after the war in Ukraine, a new international structure
will have to be defined, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, in which,
as Kissinger said in a recent interview, "Russia should find a place."    Realism
shows that the seeking for power explains many things, and the balance of power
can prevent a general war. But when there is neither a single dominant power
nor a confrontation between two, "liberal" rules and institutions may be the
best mechanism for peace and multilateral cooperation.Also in Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia-click