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This article argues that the emphasis on the global European vision necessitates a look at various aspects of nations, lands and regions relationaly rather than in aggregate, universal oversystemic terms. Moreover, the origins of ancient Greek idea of Europe are submitted for consideration.

This article argues that the emphasis on the global European vision necessitates a look at various aspects of nations, lands and regions relationaly rather than in aggregate, universal oversystemic terms. Moreover, the origins of ancient Greek idea of Europe are submitted for consideration.

The article discusses E. Frazer and N. Lacey's feminist project of the theory of justice. The project is being developed through a critique of formalist methodo­logy, characteristic of Kantian liberal theories of justice, and is based on the idea of a methodological synthesis of social and political theory. The possibi­lity of synthesis is revealed through a combination of interpretivist and ontological realist approaches to the issue of justice. Their main reproach to Kantian theories of justice is that they are ill-equipped to endogenize mechanisms of social exclusion and domi­nation, operating in society, which fails to distribute justice so that it may serve a well-being of each indi­vidual person.

The article discusses E. Frazer and N. Lacey's feminist project of the theory of justice. The project is being developed through a critique of formalist methodo­logy, characteristic of Kantian liberal theories of justice, and is based on the idea of a methodological synthesis of social and political theory. The possibi­lity of synthesis is revealed through a combination of interpretivist and ontological realist approaches to the issue of justice. Their main reproach to Kantian theories of justice is that they are ill-equipped to endogenize mechanisms of social exclusion and domi­nation, operating in society, which fails to distribute justice so that it may serve a well-being of each indi­vidual person.

The article discusses E. Frazer and N. Lacey's feminist project of the theory of justice. The project is being developed through a critique of formalist methodo­logy, characteristic of Kantian liberal theories of justice, and is based on the idea of a methodological synthesis of social and political theory. The possibi­lity of synthesis is revealed through a combination of interpretivist and ontological realist approaches to the issue of justice. Their main reproach to Kantian theories of justice is that they are ill-equipped to endogenize mechanisms of social exclusion and domi­nation, operating in society, which fails to distribute justice so that it may serve a well-being of each indi­vidual person.

The article discusses E. Frazer and N. Lacey's feminist project of the theory of justice. The project is being developed through a critique of formalist methodo­logy, characteristic of Kantian liberal theories of justice, and is based on the idea of a methodological synthesis of social and political theory. The possibi­lity of synthesis is revealed through a combination of interpretivist and ontological realist approaches to the issue of justice. Their main reproach to Kantian theories of justice is that they are ill-equipped to endogenize mechanisms of social exclusion and domi­nation, operating in society, which fails to distribute justice so that it may serve a well-being of each indi­vidual person.

The article deals with the problem of a rational con­sensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Ly­otard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Para­doxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.

The article deals with the problem of a rational con­sensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Ly­otard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Para­doxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.

The article deals with the problem of a rational con­sensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Ly­otard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Para­doxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.

The article deals with the problem of a rational con­sensus in contemporary political philosophy, arosed by postrnodern critique of modern Reason. In this context two important ideas - an "Overlapping consensus" of John Rawls and "the Diff erend" of Jean-Francois Ly­otard - are discussed, compared and criticized. Para­doxical implications produced by a comrnon antifunamentist approach are pointed out. An attempt is made to show that in both cases consensus or disensus are allready presupposed in advance: the kind of the thesis depends upon suppositions about the nature of epistemic pluralism and its link with the political.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.

The transition processes in post-soviet area show the lack of knowledge and experiences in conflict resolution, when the authorities, the organisations and individuals have to solve the controversial problems as well as conflicts of interests and values. The first part of the article represents the scope of ideas and practices of conflict resolution and conciliation in international relations. The actions of the Security Council of the UNO and some agreements of the European Conference for Security and Co-operation have been surveyed as having sense of peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building. In the process of European integration some political and legal mechanisms were approved with the mean to conciliate controversities between the members and candidates of the EU. Using them the European Community functions as a whole, and the process of joining new members is sequent and progressive. The philosophy and experience of conflict resolution and conciliation is applicable in many cases of the states internal affairs. In the next part of the article the author examines applications and development of conciliation procedures in social life of Lithuania. One of such examples is three parts roundtable between representatives of governmental bodies, employers and trade unions on issues of social politics, unemployment, payment etc. developing the rules and incentives for strengthening the culture of conflict resolution in social life serves the new democracy. The next direction in which conciliation and conflict resolution has been used is third party participation in community and family conflicts. Several projects on mediation have been accomplished in Lithuania. They were aimed to train mediators and to educate individuals in what circumstances they may be served by mediators. The author examines in which way peace-making procedures can be used in public administration. The Lithuanian laws regulate some principles of administrating to avoid or prevent disputes between the governmental bodies and the citizen and interest groups as well as (for example one-window rule in servicing the applicator). Lithuania as other post-communist countries has to develop the culture of conflict resolution and conciliation to ensure social and communal stability. ; Transformaciniuose procesuose, kuriuos mes išgyvename, išryškėjo žmonių ir organizacijų, verslo įmonių, valdžios institucijų bendravimo ir bendradarbiavimo, gebėjimo spręsti sudėtingus ir prieštaringus klausimus problemiškumas, vertybių ir interesų konfliktų prevencijos ir valdymo aktualumas. Straipsnyje pristatoma konfliktų sprendimo ir taikinamosios veiklos idėjų ir praktinio patyrimo raida pasaulyje. Apžvelgiamos tos mūsų gyvenimo sritys, kur pradeda rastis kryptinga taikinamoji veikla, svarstomos tolesnės plėtotės galimybės, ypač kreipiant dėmesį į žmogaus santykius su kitais ir į viešąjį administravimą.