Suchergebnisse

A number of interpreters & critics have often complained that Rawls's concept of the individual contains an element of schizophrenia. How is it possible that privately a person is a staunch believer in a moral doctrine, while publicly adopting the principles of political liberalism? The author tries to show how Rawls's concept of the overlapping consensus might avoid this objection. The paper brings two major critiques of Rawls's overlapping consensus: Gray's & Barry's. John Gray claims that the very pursuit of such a consensus is illusory; instead, he advocates a modus vivendi. According to him, the consensus promoted by Rawls is unfeasible even in the US due to the emergence of the so-called "moral majority," & the fact that a huge portion of the population practices rather bigoted variants of Christianity. Brian Barry criticizes Rawls because of his renunciation of his original position, which is apparent in his problematic search for the support from comprehensive doctrines. This maneuver is ill-advised, as it is hard to believe that those citizens who are ardent partisans of a comprehensive doctrine might simply "graft" political liberalism upon it & then, in case of a conflict between their concepts of the good & the justice that political liberalism requires, accept the primacy of justice. The author claims that these criticisms could not be refuted had Rawls believed that the overlapping consensus might be realized in the near future. Rawls, however, is not unrealistic; he only provides arguments why such a consensus might be possible. Rawls finds the grounds for his optimism in the belief that just institutions drastically advance the sense of justice. This means that those who would in the future embrace the overlapping consensus would not have to be schizophrenic after all. 6 References. Adapted from the source document.

To what extent is Marx's thought conceptually and analytically relevant for a systematic understanding of modern society -- this was the subject of the theoretical dialogue which engaged many researchers, including some of the most prominent ones. This text focuses on the theoretical critical confrontation of Dag Strpic (in the article "Market or Commodity Formation/Production of Society?", which is the third, partly reworked chapter of his book Karl Marx and the Political Economy of Modernity) with the philosophical project of reconstruction of Marx's science of history in Jacques Bidet's work What is To Be Done with "Capital"?. The discussion focused on two basic issues: the logical starting point and the character of exposition of Marx's theory of capital. Bidet advocates the thesis that commodity as Marx's starting point (Section I of Book I) is inadequate, and he demonstrates the non-dialectical ("genetic") character of the categorial exposition of the capitalist-way-of-production theory as a whole. In contrast therewith, Strpic demonstrates that the logical starting point of Marx's system is adequately apprehended as "commodity in general", if one perceives it from the viewpoint of the logic of the entire system and of the subject of his analysis as "capital in general". Bidet seeks to show that Marx, in defining the capital system logic, gradually abandoned, albeit inconsistently and only in part, the dialectical figures as epistemological obstacles. Strpic, on the other hand, shows what makes the Marxian modality of materialistic dialectics constitutive not only with regard to Marx's "critique", but also to the very reality of capitalist society and the possibility of surpassing it. Notwithstanding his agreement with Bidet and Strpic that a (truly indispensable) general theory of modernity can be constituted only through creative and interpretative relying on the great works of political thought of modernity, and his sincere commendation to both for their outstanding reading of Marx's work in this context, the author concludes in his final remarks that both are open to the following objection: their projects of a contemporary general theory of modernity, regardless of all aspects in which they differ, rely too much on further development of Marx's intention, and thereby lose from sight the fundamental "theological-political" problem, which Marx dissolves in the immanentism of the process of production/reproduction of the modern civil community. Adapted from the source document.

Democracy, as the government of the people by the people, is an inadequately defined notion, giving room for rival concepts of democracy: liberal, socialist, & Christian. The distinguishing features of the Christian outlook are respect for other human beings, the demand for individual involvement in politics, & the government's duty to look after everyone's well-being. The author points to the fact that Christian democracy, with its highlighted moral component of politics, was particularly attractive for the countries that went through fascist totalitarianism. Although the standards of the grand Christian precept of altruism have not been met in social & political life, the author concludes that today's global challenges reemphasize the relevance of the gospel message. Adapted from the source document.

Democracy, as the government of the people by the people, is an inadequately defined notion, giving room for rival concepts of democracy: liberal, socialist, & Christian. The distinguishing features of the Christian outlook are respect for other human beings, the demand for individual involvement in politics, & the government's duty to look after everyone's well-being. The author points to the fact that Christian democracy, with its highlighted moral component of politics, was particularly attractive for the countries that went through fascist totalitarianism. Although the standards of the grand Christian precept of altruism have not been met in social & political life, the author concludes that today's global challenges reemphasize the relevance of the gospel message. Adapted from the source document.

The author pleads for a renewal of political philosophy by asking what it means to think politically again. He also reexamines characteristics in the concept of democracy that renew its weight in relationship to totalitarianism & cannot be reduced to an institutional system. After looking critically at the works of Tocqueville, who -- contrary to most of his contemporaries -- saw democracy as a form of government, the author comes to the conclusion that democracy appears to be a historical social category, par excellence, of a society that, in its form, accepts & maintains undefinability. This is in significant contrast to totalitarianism, which, establishing itself with the slogan of building the new man, in fact acts against this undefinability & tries to conserve the rules of its own organization. Thus, in the contemporary world, totalitarianism manifests itself secretly as a society without history. Adapted from the source document.

The study is a contribution to the discussion on the definition of war in the modern era & focuses on contemporary debates. By exploring the essence of politics & nation, in line with Carl Schmitt's theory of politics & by taking into consideration the forms of national liberation wars, the author points to the inadequacy of von Clausewitz's instrumental/political definition of war & lists most critical remarks to this theory. The author describes other theories, such as the pure war theory (war separated from politics) & the existential war theory (a political entity is being shaped & coming into being). Then he systematically lays out the modern concept of the nation & the corresponding definition of war. In defining wars, the author relies on the modern philosophy of the subject, particularly by G. W. F. Hegel, & on Scheler's theory of nation & war. Finally, the study shows that international relations are still to a large extent determined by the nationally based politics, & that contemporary wars include many features of international & national-liberation wars. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article critically analyses the political thinking of the late Derrida. The basic assumption is that after the end of the idea of sovereignty of the nation-state we should create a new thinking that will no longer be derrived from the metaphysical context within which the policy of the new technology can be useful. End of the subject in globalization politics requires deconstruction of all concepts of modern politics: state, society, law, morality. Political thinking in contrast to political philosophy and theory of politics has no 'foundation' in present reality. Derrida and many other distinctive thinkers of upcoming community try to operate with the idea that the political can be reduced to any, even secularized, transcendental signifier. What would be able to connect with real political uncanny is comprehended in the provision of action (praxis). It requires a theoretical way of performativity in the event that cannot happen without a decision on the change of reality in a historical-epochal constellation of power and strength. The problem of Derrida's thinking of the political arises from the idea of upcoming democracy: it necessarily has some remnant of theological contents and messianic forms without Messiah and without God in the age of radical depoliticization of society and culture. In this respect, its focus on unconditional hospitality and unconditional friendship has some surplus of non-political acts and ethics, rather than fragments of real politics. Adapted from the source document.

Examines liberal democracy in relation to the European tradition from whence it sprung & enumerates the biggest differences between the historical forms of democracy & its modern guise. According to the author, the authentic enemies of modern liberal democracy are fascism & bolshevism. He summarizes his analyses into three points. (1) In western countries the principles of democracy have mostly been realized in the course of a long genesis following the conflict with monarchist absolutism & more recently, with fascism. (2) In the philosophy of modern day politics, mostly formal & quantitative aspects of democratic processes have been analyzed, which is the biggest shortcoming of these theories. That is why the author proposes an analysis of meaningful aspects of liberal democracy. (3) Focus is on the analysis of freedom & democracy as forms of the organization of political life of major human groups characteristic for the industrial age & modern capitalism. At the end of his study the author puts some light on the relationship between liberalism & democracy by describing the hermeneutical functions of morality in the modern age. The political culture & moral consciousness represent the base for the functioning of mediatory democracy. The hermeneutical nature of moral consciousness allows modern democracy to develop a practical relationship with its tradition without which it cannot function, as has been the case with those states in which democracy is being introduced today. Adapted from the source document.

U radu je provedena povijesno-filozofska rekonstrukcija Leibnizove obrazovne teorije. U uvodu se navode egzegetski problemi koji se tiču lociranja Leibnizove »filozofije obrazovanja« unutar šireg korpusa njegovih djela i iznalaženja adekvatnog teorijskog okvira unutar kojega je moguće kontekstualizirati i rekonstruirati Leibnizove misli o obrazovanju. Potom je pokazano da nam taj okvir pruža Leibnizova praktična filozofija, tj. njegove ideje o optimalnoj državi i općem dobru. Analizirane su ključne teze Leibnizove etike i političke filozofije u cilju otkrivanja pozadine ideje o respublica optima i objašnjeno je kakvo bi obrazovanje, slijedeći Leibniza, trebalo biti da bi omogućilo usavršavanje pojedinca i društva te doprinijelo ostvarenju općeg dobra. Na kraju, tvrdi se da je Leibniz u okviru svojega obrazovnog projekta artikulirao prosvjetiteljsku ideju koja je progresivnija od obrazovnih ideja filozofa koje obično asociramo s prosvjetiteljstvom osamnaestog stoljeća. ; This paper presents a historical-philosophical reconstruction of Leibniz's theory of education. In the introduction, I point out the exegetical problems involved in locating Leibniz's "philosophy of education" within the broader corpus of his works and in uncovering an appropriate theoretical framework within which it is possible to contextualise and reconstruct Leibniz's thought on education. It is then shown that this framework is provided by Leibniz's practical philosophy, i.e. his ideas about the optimal state and the common good. I analyse the key theses of Leibniz's ethics and political philosophy to uncover the background of the idea of the respublica optima and explain how education, in Leibniz's view, should enable the perfection of the individual and society and contribute to the realisation of the common good. Finally, it is argued that in his educational project Leibniz articulated an idea of the Enlightenment that is far more progressive than the educational ideas of the philosophers we usually associate with the eighteenth-century ...

The author writes about Jefferson's political philosophy. There is no text by Jefferson that would set out a certain political issue. There are numerous texts of his, written in the course of fifty years, but a collage of them would not amount to a political theory or a doctrine. Jefferson was not interested in theoretical but solely in technical & practical issues. This makes him a typical 18th-century lawyer of the common law vein. Common law of that time was an amateur area, devoid of any technical or professional expertise & part of general moral principles. Jefferson was deft at formulating the widely held ideas of his time, embracing some century-old well-known political truths by Grotius, Milton, Locke, & Burlamaqui. The author suggests that Jefferson was first & foremost a statesman, & his judgments were politically tainted. Nevertheless, he was the most educated statesman ever among American presidents. Adapted from the source document.

It is with good reason that decisionism stresses the crucial importance of decisions in the political process. But it is necessary to evaluate critically its dramatic pretension (from Schmitt to Agamben), according to which the normality of life is juxtaposed with the pathos of the state of exception & crisis. This erases not only every distinction between normality & the state of exception, but even between democracy & dictatorship. The proper framework from which an explanation of decisionism & its dramatizing forms can be derived is the modern age as a whole. The birth of decisionism from the crisis of tradition & commonality can be observed already in the beginning of modernity: with Machiavelli & Hobbes. We find the peak of dramatisation in Schmitt's decisionism, in the use of political theology for the dramatization of politics as drama of the subject which obtains his self-willed freedom through a secularist disempowerment of God. The other strand of political philosophy advocates the political priority of discussion & discourse, as opposed to the priority of decision. The author is interested in forms of discourse which revolve in a Habermasian or Rawlsian way around the concept of deliberative democracy. The theories of deliberative democracy are mostly characterized by the following postulates: demand for equality & inclusion, for non-coercion & communicativeness, oriented towards mutual understanding. The author points out that these demands reflect too great expectations, which cannot be fulfilled by discourse & discussion (expectations of consensus & rationality, underestimating of pre-discursive assumptions). In the final section, the author concludes that both decisionism & theory of discourse resulted from the modern-age loss of tradition & commonality. Decision & discussion could be perceived as feuding brothers, although they are doing their best to negate their kinship. A mediation of opposition is possible insofar as the feuding brothers recognize the fact that they are related. Unification at least protects them from the danger of irrationalism & excessive expectation of rationalism. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this article, through an analysis of Veljko Vujacic's text & other pamphlets & manifestos by the Serbian political elite, was to show that the Serbian elite & the Serbian society have not got rid of their nationalist bias in explaining the events that led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. They claim that the main culprit for this failure was the communist national policy & the failure to use adequate means (meaning Rankovie's technology of violence) in order to preserve the unity of the state. The second part of the article serves to demonstrate how Weber's view on the politics of power does not suffice to explain away the bolshevist & the communist form of the populist Serbian nationalism. The moment when the former Yugoslav political elite split into the anticommunist & anticentralist on the one hand, & the bolshevist & the centralist on the other, there was no possibility for a compromise. The third part suggests that Vujacic (& not only he) thinks that a way of overcoming the Serbian "dominant" nationalism is the catharsis of Serbian intellectuals & the Serbian society. However, as the latest events & proclamations of the Serbian elite show, his is a solitary case. Adapted from the source document.

For many pre-20th-century legal & political authors, the crucial issue was to find the answers to the questions of why one cannot support every claim to the right of absolute rule & how to curtail power & authority. In this text, the author reviews the contribution of three classics of the modern debate on constitutionalism -- C. H. McIlwain, C. J. Friedrich, & F. A. Hayek -- whose political/legal theories represent the most glorious pages of the contemporary theory of state & rights & comparative political systems. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the interpretations by Jean-Marie Guehenno & Helmut Willke of the end of the national state in the context of contemporary debates on globalization. The author thinks that both authors have come up with similar insights, particularly those regarding assessment of the functional role that may be analytically attributed to the national state in the present & the future. Although their observations coincide with the debates on globalization going on in political economy & political science, their conclusions are not in line with the special structure of political activity. Unlike their state/theoretical "Hegelianism" (Guehenno) & system theory functional definition of government activity (Willke), the author looks into the contemporary operation of the state from the legal/philosophical perspective. Adapted from the source document.

The author shows that Rawls's conception of the overlapping consensus does not apply to value pluralism in general but only to the so-called reasonable pluralism. The author first gives an account of the criticisms directed at Rawls's neutralization of the political by Gray & Mouffe, & tries to demonstrate that neither of these critiques is entirely valid. A Weberian critique, however, would not display these shortcomings. Weber's liberalism is based on value pluralism, & its key assumption is that there is no hierarchy of values. Besides, no political concept may escape the fundamental features of political activity -- the spoils system or the system of the distribution of political gains & the ethical irrationality. The fundamentals of Weber's liberalism can be found in his maxim "Become what you are made for!" as well as in the "political characters" that belong to the world of classical liberalism. A political leader is a creator of institutions & liberal communities with which Weber eschews the traditional liberal foundationalism based on natural rights & utilitarianism. Hence, his liberalism is the least doctrinaire one because moral issues remain a part of the political conflict. 9 References. Adapted from the source document.