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The historiography on Sweden's foreign policy during the Second World War can be characterized as being split between two paradigms of interpretation: One of them rooted in political realism, dominating for a long time and stressing the fact that the government had been able to keep the country out of the war and to avoid its occupation; the other one emphasizing moral values and growing in relevance, claiming that the country had not lived up to the obligation to line up against national socialism. This article reviews the most central existing literature seeking to relate it to this dichotomy. Finally some questions are posed that should be included in the future research agenda.

Although Hellmann's warning against a resocialization of German foreign policy as a traditional superpower role stimulates sympathy, his alternative, while morally honorable, is only realistic within the processes of European integration. The decisive elements in theoretical consideration of realism & offensive idealism are the fact that the definition of good & evil is dependent on the free will of people & is not normative, & that people are justified in the use of force to protect their ethical values. Yet force should not become the monopoly of any single group, & multipolarity is therefore a necessary structural characteristic of a peaceful future international system. It is unlikely that the offensive idealist concept of the fall of the national state will occur; rather multiethnic "national" states may become the model, which does not preclude European integration. Germany can support the integration process, so long as the resulting Europeanization of its partners leads to strengthened ties to the interest groups & EU institutions. L. Kehl

Although Hellmann's conclusion that German foreign policy is in crisis may be accurate, his analysis of power political resocialization that leads to his conclusion misconstrues the symptoms & overlooks the actual causes of the crisis. His key terms appear to be misleading & analytically imprecise, his analysis is based primarily on the rhetoric of the Red-Green coalition & its forerunners, & actual examples of power politics are lacking. The crisis in foreign policy is caused not by Germany's exertion of power, but rather through neglect of the specific power basis of Germany as a civil power, both with respect to its most important partners & its institutions. Hellmann seems to find the category of power itself to be negative, ignoring that power in the sense of implementation ability is a central dimension of any politics, & only the form of power is in question. Only by considering the goals, values, & capabilities of the civil power of Germany & through the subtle & prudent forms of politics will this crisis be overcome. L. Kehl

This article responds to Hellmann's analysis of German foreign policy & his cardinal point of resocialization, only superficially a value-neutral term. Hellmann consistently assails the school of realism that seeks to explain the behavior of governments in dealing with one another primarily as the pursuit of national interests. The classical international politics of European states developed historically, & it is questionable whether there were ever any other viable options. While Germany's behavior may occasionally be embarrassing, the fundamental problem with the EU is that two contradictory concepts of the EU exist. The French concept of a counterweight to the US stands in opposition to the American concept of a second pillar to NATO, & Germany must decide for itself whether it desires integration or cooperation. Nonetheless, the picture is not as dark as Hellmann portrays. A few foreign policy axioms of old should be maintained, & while these will not suffice for transition into the future of global politics, a middle-power is not capable of achieving this, whether or not the right of veto is given in the UN Security Council. L. Kehl

This response to Hellmann's diagnosis of the deepest crisis of German foreign policy since 1949 reflects on the nature of & resistance to power politics. While German foreign policy has a number of problems, particularly with respect to resources, dramatization of political affairs does little to illuminate them, & Hellmann's less than persuasive crisis is nothing more than a delayed & protracted adjustment process of foreign policy to a new international framework. As Hellmann knows, a general problem in social science disciplines is the use of metaphors instead of specific terms, & yet ironically he utilizes a vague resocialization metaphor in his critique. It is unclear why Germany should exclude itself from the typical mode of politics, & in light of the international approach Germany has taken, it is difficult to see how Hellmann's perspectives on resistance to power politics resulted in such a negative assessment. The true difficulty the German administration has with power politics is it requires that the important participants employ calculation, moderation, & dependability. L. Kehl

In contrast to Hellmann's diagnosis, this article presents a more optimistic & realistic analysis of German foreign policy. The problem with Hellmann's vision of offensive idealism is that it operates in the world of the ideal, & his foreign policy crisis, resulting from power politics resocialization, is more a crisis of lack of financing, interest, & expertise since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The change in foreign policy has been a long & slow shift from a bipolar to a quasi-multipolar approach. The long-standing core of belief, that unity must be achieved in the European & transatlantic relationship, has been challenged by reunification & democratization of the East, expansion of the EU, & the unilateral tendencies of the US. While Hellmann criticizes Germany's choice for a strengthened Europe to form a more balanced partnership, this approach is theoretically explainable through neorealism. There is no need to worry that German foreign policy is in crisis or that it threatens to return to the politics of the 19th & 20th centuries. This crisis is more a crisis of political science than foreign policy. L. Kehl

Bibliography: pages 201-210. ; The dissertation attempts to analyse the novella Die Reisebegegnung by Anna Seghers not as an isolated "work" by an isolated "author" but as a symptom of the possibilities and limits of innovative writing in the German Democratic Republic in the seventies. While it therefore situates the novella within the context of literary politics, it also tries to show how Anna Seghers expanded the boundaries of literary political debates, which focused on the concepts of cultural heritage and social realism, by using the form of fiction instead of a critical essay. The first chapter deals with the historical context of the novella. It tries to show Anna Seghers' allegorical depiction of the literary figures of "Nikolai Gogol", "E. T. A. Hoffmann" and "Franz Kafka" as representations of the aesthetics of realism, romanticism and modernism respectively. The use of allegory marks a significant breakaway from the method of social realism. The chapter also tries to show the intertextuality of the novella. The second chapter focuses on the debate on cultural heritage in the GDR. It retraces Anna Seghers' changing attitudes to the controversial cultural heritage of romanticism and modernism in the Marxist debate on realism from the thirties up to the publication of the novella Die Reisebegegn.ung in 1973. The third chapter deals with the theory of socialist realism as developed by Georg Lukacs and simplified by the Stalinist cultural functionary Andrei Zhdanov. It attempts to define the position taken by Anna Seghers in the Marxist debate on realism in which she argued on the same side as Ernst Bloch and Bertolt Brecht against the concept of realism upheld by Lukacs. The fourth chapter deals with the depiction of the three literary figures in the novella. It attempts to show in how far this figuration deviates from the orthodox Marxist reception of the three authors on the one hand and from that of alternative Marxist and non-Marxist interpretations on the other. The fifth chapter analyses Anna Seghers' literary representation of time. She lets the three authors travel freely through "objective" historical time, which constitutes the most significant deviation from the theory of socialist realism in the novella. The chapter discusses the implications this has for innovative writing in the GDR. While Anna Seghers tries to incorporate the divergent concepts of realism of the three authors - each situated within his own literary historical framework - into her variety of socialist realism in the GDR in the seventies, she adapts and changes the complexity and specificity of their representations of reality. The unresolved contradictions of the novella, however, constantly subvert the claim to an extraliterary reality, which the literary figures and the novella make. The limits of this novella in its literary historical context were in turn expanded by writers in the GDR in the seventies who saw in it a legitimisation for their own literary experiments.

Hellmann's own qualifications regarding the risk of dramatization of the power political resocialization of Germany cannot dispel his carefully expressed, but one-sided, exaggerated views of German foreign policy. His reproach of a power-politics driven German administration requires differentiation between civil & military power, & his promotion of an isolationist, primarily national German foreign policy is not realistic in today's world. The threat presented by resocialization is implausible given Germany's firm basis in the EU, & the largely common viewpoints advocated. In addition, Hellmann's formulation of "offensive idealism" is not very persuasive. Before pursing utopian & transformational global politics, debate, constructs, & models should be developed on smaller entities. A utopian path incapable of minimizing dangers or opening constructive perspectives does not help resolve the difficulties of European politics & the Russian relationship. L. Kehl

This article discusses whether the influence of Pierre Bourdieu is responsible for the renewal of French political science. Observable intellectual dynamics are not only influenced by intellectual motivational powers, but also by historical realism. French political science changed in the 1970s at the peak of Bourdieu's work, but the question remains as to whether this demonstrates coincidence or causality. Examining the history, the introduction, & spread of sociological thought in French political science can be shown to relate back to institutional movements. Bourdieu's work was used to provide the desired reflection in the pursuit of political influence, & current French political science should be examined as an end product of a particular history, in which an institutional autonomy was achieved, without that the institutional autonomy changing into intellectual autonomy. 12 References. L. Kehl