Suchergebnisse

Gospodarske i društvene krize prilika su za protestne stranke da dignu svoj glas i da se izbore za nove pozicije na političkoj sceni. Mnogi analitičari smatraju da su stranke radikalne desnice dobile zamah upravo na protestima građana protiv globalizacije, ekonomske deprivacije i utjecaja gospodarske krize. Pomnijim proučavanjem radikalizacije politike vidi se da pojednostavljivanje te teze nema naročito čvrsto uporište. U nedostatku jasnih metodologija politolozi i drugi društveni znanstvenici pokušavaju uobličiti teorije zasnovane na empirijskim istraživanjima. Jedan je od čestih teorijskih okvira odnos populističkih stranaka prema socioekonomskom stanju u zemlji. Prema toj tezi, u vremenu globalne krize postotak glasača za radikalne političke opcije raste, većinom iz protesta, a ne antisustavnosti. Ovo izlaganje prati i stanje u Srednjoj Europi, odnosno rezultate ovogodišnjih izbora u Mađarskoj, Latviji i Slovačkoj kao zemljama sa snažnom radikalnom desnicom. Na primjerima tih zemalja nastoji se utvrditi može li se socioekonomska teorija aplicirati ili se radi o većim izazovima liberalnoj demokraciji s krajnjeg desnog pola. ; Economic and social crises provide an opportunity for protest parties to raise their voices and to win new positions in the political arena. Many analysts deem that the parties of the radical Right gained momentum exactly with the protests by citizens against globalisation, economic deprivation and the impact of the economic crisis. A more detailed study of the radicalisation of politics reveals that the simplification of this thesis does not have a particularly strong justification. In the absence of clear methodologies, political scientists and other social scientists seek to formulate theories based on empirical research. One of the frequent theoretical frameworks is the attitude of populist parties toward the socio-economic situation in the country. According to this thesis, in the period of a global crisis, the percentage of voters of radical political options increases, mostly out of protest, and not as an anti-systemic phenomenon. This paper also examines the situation in Central Europe, as well as the outcomes of this year's elections in Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia as countries with a strong radical Right. By analysing the cases of these countries, the author seeks to establish whether the socio-economic theory can be applied, or whether these countries are facing greater challenges to liberal democracy posed by the far-right pole.

Although our talk about human rights is part of the ethical awareness of contemporary politics, it still has not received adequate theoretical justification & foundation. Serious philosophical problems arose in the very beginning of the history of the "human rights" concept, with Locke's liberal natural right & Kant's reasonable right. According to the author, the difficulty stems from the concept of person, for in every liberal legal theory the person is perceived as bearer of human & fundamental rights. Meanwhile, the dominant constitutional theory of human & fundamental rights starts from the identical meanings of "person" as an individual, in its uniqueness, & of "man" as a general definition. It is, however, necessary to start from the fundamental difference between the two key concepts. While the "man" concept is defined universalistically, there is no universal concept for persons & no possibility of breaking them down into subcategories. While every individual, as instance of the concept, must be defined in the same way as everyone else, persons are defined individualistically; each person is a unique individual which can be neither duplicated nor multiplied. The author proposes a solution of the fundamental rights problem-matter within the framework of constitutional law. Personal rights are brought to existence as follows: organs of the state, in accordance with positive law, give to the individual the title of state-citizen as an individualistically unique legal person. Everyone receives it, in the same way, as a unique & irreplaceable person. In the normal conditions, the state has the obligation to make sure, via courts & the police, that everyone's personal right is untouchable. On the basis of this logic, a demarcation line can be drawn between the personal fundamental rights & the collective rights of citizens (such as political rights, which the individual can practice only together with others). Only such an interpretation would provide our libertarian fundamental rights with a consistently secular character, with no concession to the internal attachment, in whichever way it may be concealed, to metaphysical or religious presuppositions. Adapted from the source document.

The emancipation of the Commonwealth countries had a particular impact on the traditional British principle of inviolable sovereignty of the Parliament. Ever since 1931, when the Imperial Parliament, through the Westminster Act, renounced the unilateral exercise of legislative power in the Dominions, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty as unlimited legislative power has been subject to alterations under the pressure of political reality. The process was most pronounced in the 1982-1998 period, when the United Kingdom & several member-countries of the Commonwealth, as "the last democratic strongholds of traditional legislative supremacy," adopted various documents in which human rights are guaranteed. The author elucidates the characteristics of the new, Commonwealth model of constitutionalism, wherein the constitutionalization of fundamental rights has made possible not only specific forms of judicial supervision, but also an increase of judicial activism. Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with the political crisis of dualism in multi-ethnic Austria-Hungary caused by the strengthening political opposition of Hungarian magnates in the Hungarian Parliament, who demanded the introduction of the Hungarian language as command language of the Hungarian troops. The implication thereof was a separation of the joint army and a disproval of the joint supreme commander, Emperor Franz Josef. The Hungarian language issue was therefore primarily political, and in the final instance it meant further weakening of connections with the Western part of the Monarchy until the final Hungarian secession, but also a possibility of further Hungarisation within the Hungarian borders. The Emperor opposed this by announcing a new electoral law aimed at depriving the Hungarian minority of its supremacy over the non-Hungarian majority in Hungary. He was supported by the liberal party led by Istvan Tisza, who rightly estimated that dualism was first and foremost protective of Hungarian interests in Hungary. Fear of the new electoral law sobered up the Hungarian nationalists and they gave up on the revision of the Austro-Hungarian compromise. Subsequently, the Emperor, driven by immediate political interests, decided not to enact the law on universal suffrage in Hungary despite the fact that, under certain favourable political circumstances, which were, unfortunately, lacking, precisely such a law could potentially have become the foundation not for bringing down, but for preserving Austria-Hungary. Adapted from the source document.

Ernes Kulenovic's Ph. D. dissertation Pluralisticka teorija utemeljenja ljudskih prava (Pluralistic Theory of the Foundation of Human Rights), defended at the U of Zagreb in 2009, is presented, outlining its objectives, summarizing & commenting on its individual chapters, & expressing a few evaluative remarks in the concluding paragraph. A synopsis of the work's five chapters is given, focusing on the leading theme of each: (1) the political & theoretical context of a relativist conception of the universality of human rights, (2) the tradition of natural law as the foundation of human rights, (3) the implications of the theory of cultural relativism for the foundation of human rights, (4) major proposals of a relativist foundation of human rights; a critical survey of literature, & (5) a summary of research results. The work is praised for its contribution to the study of universalist & relativist conceptions of human rights, a clear & comprehensive style of exposition, & a very stimulating read. Adapted from the source document.

In Hobbes' Theory of Authorization I it was shown how Hobbes, by means of his theory of authorization, managed to resolve the difficult points which, in the previous formulations of his science of politics, weighed on the issue of creation of the state conceived as a doubly impersonal apparatus relying on the representative relation between the sovereign & the subjects. In this text the author re-examines both the approach & the conclusion of his research through critical inquiry into Quentin Skinner's & Hanna Pitkin's interpretations of Hobbes' understanding of representation. In his recent works, Skinner attempted to demonstrate that it had to be interpreted, above all, as an instrument in the ideological conflict between the republicans & the monarchists in England in Hobbes' time. Hanna Pitkin, in turn, brought into question the representative character of sovereign power. As opposed to both of them, the author expounds the thesis that, in order to be understood properly, the theory of authorization must be examined within the more comprehensive framework of Hobbes' science of politics & thus brought in connection with other important elements of its problem-matter, such as the right to punish, the relation between the sovereign's rights & the subjects' freedom, & the duties of the sovereign. By interpreting the theory of authorization primarily as part of a system which is conditioned by & co-formative of the logic of the study as a whole, this text strives to show that the authorization-based relation between the sovereign & the subjects, in spite of the fact that one-sided authorization on the part of the subjects established a sovereign who has no legal obligations to them, is indeed determined by the logic of representation. Adapted from the source document.

If it is true that a systematic understanding of modern society cannot be constituted without relying on the major works of the political thinking of modernity, the opposite is also true, ie., that none of those works cannot be properly understood unless from the viewpoint of a developed theory of modernity. In his General Theory of Modernity, Jacques Bidet points out that his metastructural theory of the modern epoch finally makes it possible to critically reexamine & reconstruct the entire "political metaphysics" of modernity. His intention is sufficiently (at the very least) outlined in his interpretations of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, Kant & Hegel. The author singles out Bidet's pregnant interpretation of Hobbes, & faces the question: what is to be done with the Leviathan? The first part of the article gives a detailed account of Bidet's basic hypotheses & insights into Hobbes' crucial role in finding an adequate conceptual definition of the logical starting point of exposition of the theory of modernity as a purely discursive relation in the formula of the social agreement. The second part puts forward a critical appraisal of Bidet's key reconstructional thesis that Hobbes' theory of authorization is perceived as the actual logical starting point of exposition of metastructural theory categories. In part three it is shown that Hobbes' theory of political representation & authorization could indeed be the starting point to a political theory of modernity (because it establishes man as the "author" of politics, & his representative or the sovereign as his "actor" or representative). In the author's judgment, Bidet's reconstructional thesis, which denies the epistemological status of the "natural state" as the first & most general concept in the sequence of exposition, is not valid. In the natural state, man's nature is not ahistorically postulated as that of a wolf; it is essentially dual. At issue here is primarily the modern man (and not merely man in general) in the epochal constellation wherein he, simultaneously & contradictorily, exists as a particular individual (bourgeois), which pursues his natural right, & as a moral subject (a Christian believer), which, as a being of conscience, fathoms & follows the imperatives of the natural or moral or divine laws. Precisely this duality, his inner cleavage of modern man, is also the starting supposition of Hobbes' theory of modernity encompassed in the key concept of the "natural state." In view of Bidet's argumentation, & relying above all on Zarka's fundamental interpretation of Hobbes' political philosophy as semiology of power, we are constantly faced with the Leviathan as an incomparable challenge to our cognitive faculty. Adapted from the source document.