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The author analyzes the content of the new National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, compares it with previous documents on national security, and determines its compliance with requirements of the law "On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation." The article highlights the main features of the modern model of ensuring national security: the inseparable relationship and interdependence of national security and socio-economic development of the country; a focus on the factor of force and commitment to the use of political means; emphasis on the need to ensure civil peace and harmony in the country; recognition that preservation and multiplication of the people and human development is the highest national priority; and orientation to strengthening the role of the state as a guarantor of security. The author considers the recognition of national interests as the main object of national security to be the main innovations of the Strategy. The article determines the validity of assessing the current state of Russian national security given in the Strategy. It is emphasized that strengthening Russia is taking place against the background of new threats to national security that have a complex and interrelated nature. In conclusion, National Security Strategy 2021 is a basic document in the field of strategic planning for the development of the national security system; its content meets the requirements of the federal law "On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation"; and taking into account the transformation of external and internal factors, it preserves its fundamental foundations, and creatively develops and complements them.

"Indonesia provides a fruitful case study of differences between radicalization processes in liberal and authoritarian regimes. Political Science hereby tends to emphasize regime type as the determinant of Islamist political strategy (radical, militant or moderate) and therefore as the main explanatory factor for radicalization processes. Although this is true of the role of Islamists in various Middle Eastern countries, where electoral participation has moderated political programs and strategies, it is of little relevance to Indonesia. The democratic opening in 1998 provided Islamists with new opportunities to participate in electoral politics, and even become co-opted by formally 'secular' forces, but at the same time opened up spaces for militant, radical Islamist groups. Whereas radical Islam faced severe state repression under Suharto's New Order, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islamists, expressed in operational terms as a parallelism of repression and cooptation. This article tries to make sense of the relationship between the post-authoritarian state and radical Islam in Indonesia by transcending the institution-centered understanding of the role of Islam through an examination of the configurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of radical Islam within Indonesia's new experiment with democracy." (author's abstract)

"Dedication" -- "Preface" -- "Note" -- "Contents" -- "More Praise for The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan" -- "Part I" -- "Chapter 1: Introduction" -- "Introduction" -- "Notes" -- "Chapter 2: Sunni, Shia, and Kurd: A Brief History of Islamism in Kurdistan" -- "Islam in Kurdistan: To What End?" -- "The Tribe and the Sheikh: Kurdish National Identity" -- "Religious-Nationalist Rebellion in Kurdistan: A First of Its Kind" -- "The Mahabad Republic" -- "A Short But Important Existence" -- "The Sunni–Shia Divide" -- "The Fire of Revolution That Never Spread" -- "A Shia Revolution" -- "Conclusion" -- "Notes" -- "Part II" -- "Chapter 4: Prison Under the Pahlavi Regime, and the Lead Up to 1979" -- "Moftizadeh Returns to Tehran with the KDPI" -- "Imprisonment for Separatist Activities, and Ideological Transformation" -- "Moftizadeh's Release and Return to Sanandaj" -- "Out of Tragedy, Moftizadeh Resumes Activism" -- "Moftizadeh Regalvanized" -- "The Unlikely Developments of a Society in Conflict" -- "Moftizadeh Is on the Air" -- "The Birth of a School, Turned Movement" -- "Conclusion" -- "Notes" -- "Chapter 5: Revolution, Kurdistan, and the Maktab Quran Movement" -- "News from Tehran" -- "A Speech at Iqbal Square" -- "The Shah's Departure" -- "Rebellion in Kurdistan" -- ""The Promise of Autonomy Is in My Pocket"" -- "A Constitutional Sham, and a Fallout with the Regime" -- "The Hijrah" -- "A War Imposed" -- "Conclusion" -- "Notes" -- "Chapter 6: Letters from Prison: The Legacy of a Progressive Islam of Nonviolence" -- "The Fall of 1982" -- "The Quran Is Alive" -- "The Shura System of Governance" -- "The Practical Separation of Islam and Politics" -- "Nonviolence in Islam" -- "The Empowerment of Women" -- "No Compulsion in Religion" -- "The Poetry of Moftizadeh's Life, and Death".

Over the summer month of August 2008, Georgia launched a large-scale military offensive against South Ossetia in an attempt of reconquering the territory. Four years later, on October 1, 2012, Georgia is holding its first Parliamentary Elections after the conflict that caused so much harm. The Parliamentary Elections constitute the 7th legislative elections held since Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. It is however the first time for Georgia to elect an alternative party from the ruling party solely based on principle of democratic vote.
The article examines the almost ten years of President Saakashvili's Administration. During this decade, Saakashvili's United National Movement government realized many positive works. Works like the successful reform of police forces and the determined force-back of corruption. These liberating works were all eagerly welcomed by Europe and other western nations. However, in the apparent loss of sense of reality towards the end of its reign, Georgia's United National Movement government turned to dictating and ordering as a main style of governing. This in turn pushed citizens away from Saakashvili's politics into voting for the opposition.
Unforeseen by even the most experienced Southern Caucasus and Georgia experts, Georgia's 2012 Parliamentary Elections gave way to the opposition coalition Georgian Dream to sweep to victory, leaving President Saakashvili to ceded defeat.
Despite President Saakashvili's statement that he would go into opposition there has not been a complete paradigm shift in Georgia's domestic politics. With the Georgian Dream's failure to gain a constitutional majority and questions over the ideological compatibility of the coalition – along with the fact that United National Movement still has the greatest representation in Parliament relative to the other parties, Saakashvili and his supporters keep hold to substantial political leverage. Also, Saakashvili will remain President until the October 2013 election. His opponent, Prime Minister Ivanishvili is expected to manifest himself, bringing in a less contentious, more pragmatic approach to relations with the country's giant neighbour to the north.
Overall, it can be said that Georgia's unrivalled ballot-box transfer of power elevated the country to a category fundamentally higher in terms of democratic development than virtually all other post-Soviet states. This has been the more remarkable even since Georgia had been widely cited as an example case of a failed state, with a destroyed infrastructure and economy, dysfunctional state institutions and something approaching anarchy as its governance model.
The impact of the ongoing reform of Georgia's constitution and electoral law has lead to major shifts in Georgia's political landscape. However, opinions vary as to whether the farsighted amendments made to the Georgian constitution on the initiative of the United National Movement are a genuine attempt to improve the country's system of governance or that they rather are an effort by the incumbent president to cling on to power. The adoption of the amendments and the timing of their entry into force strongly suggest that the latter might be the case. Meanwhile, as a result of the changes to the Georgian constitution, a system of dual power has come in place. These and other factors suggest that Georgia's political landscape is set to become more predictable. The article examines the degree to which this can be held true.
In the streets of Tbilisi, hundred days into the reign of the new government, there is an air of optimism amongst the people. This holds especially true when it comes to youth. The hope is that the Georgian Dream becomes a Georgian reality. The disappointment otherwise might be shattering. In spring 2013, the new leadership offers new opportunities for Georgia. It can improve its democratic system and economic growth and establish a dialogue with Russia and the breakaway districts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This would alleviate the frozen conflict and tense security dilemma' on the Administrative Boundary Lines. Yet, if the transition of power does not go well, there will be prolonged power struggles that could cripple the policy making and cast Georgia back to pre-Saakashvili times.
The article addresses the overall question whether the smooth transfer of power Georgia achieved after October's election sets a standard for democracy in the region depending on whether the new government can strengthen the independence and accountability of state institutions in what remains a fragile, even potentially explosive political climate. The victory of the Georgian Dream Coalition over the United National Movement has brought pluralism into Georgian policymaking. However this political pluralism also includes that awkward dual powers; Georgia's good cop and bad cop.

The UK housing system has been described as being in 'crisis', but suddenly in 2020 homes were on the COVID-19 frontline, used for shielding, isolating and care. Most were used by more people, for more hours, for more activities. Many households were cut off from normal services and contacts, and many lost the means to pay for their homes. Millions of infections occurred at home, and inequalities in household type, housing space, cost and tenure contributed to the unequal impact of the pandemic. This book brings together a wealth of data, individual testimony and analysis, in one convenient resource for students, scholars and practitioners

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Is Reform Possible? The Need for Change and the Forces Against It -- Chapter 2. What Is Disease and What Should We Treat? -- Chapter 3. Saving Lives Individually or in Populations -- Chapter 4. The Murky Challenge of Mental Health -- Chapter 5. The Activated Patient and the Doctors' Dilemma -- Chapter 6. The Neglect of Long-Term Care -- Introduction -- Chapter 7. The Quest for Quality -- Chapter 8. Setting Fair Limits -- Chapter 9. Restoring Trust in the Health System -- Introduction -- Chapter 10. The Challenge of Change -- Chapter 11. Steps in Our Health Future -- Notes -- Index -- About the Author

In this collection, four philosophers and four economists consider the Third Volume of Marx's Capital. The essays take up each of the major themes of Volume III - competition, for formation and development of the general rate of profit, the credit system and finance capital, rent, the Trinity formula and the concept of class - and consider them in the light of the two previous volumes. The authors share a focus on the concept of social form in Marx's work and on the method of his argument. The collection is intended both for specialists in Marxian theory and for students of the history of economic thought and of methodology.

Ethiopia's 2015 elections confirm that the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)—having won 100 percent of parliamentary seats—has chosen to entrench an authoritarian system. We argue that this total election victory was meant as a signal to party cadres that defection is not tolerated. Our analysis of intra-regime dynamics shows how the EPRDF has responded to the death of Meles Zenawi through greater reliance on trusted party stalwarts for high-level posts. We conclude that growing demands from lower-level party cadres threaten to transform the ruling party from a disciplined national organization into a patronage-based alliance of ethnic factions.

Different models of electoral reform were presented in ZParl 2/2010. They are all designed to avoid the effect of inverted votes, but in different ways and with different implications. The different models of reform are divided into two groups: models that keep the conjunction of party lists and models that remove it. The former either have significant unwanted implications or are not suitable at all. The best alternative for preserving the structure of the German electoral system and removing the effect of inverted votes -- without major unwanted implications -- is an electoral reform that removes the conjunction of party lists. Adapted from the source document.