Suchergebnisse

El franquismo fue una dictadura brutal, pero no siempre fue igual. En los años cuarenta y cincuenta se vivió en una dictadura similar a las fascistas, en un clima de guerra civil, de represión y de terror. La sociedad vivía en el miedo y/o en la sumisión. Las minorías resistentes eran heroicas, pero no modificaban el régimen político. Durante los años sesenta, ciertos sectores de la sociedad empiezan a perder gradualmente el miedo; el Estado no controla la vida social ni la cotidianidad en el uso de la lengua; se desarrolla la lucha sindical pese a la represión; el mundo universitario y cultural menosprecia el franquismo y, a finales de los años sesenta, emergen demandas y protestas sociales en los barrios populares. En este marco, los núcleos políticos, la mayoría de izquierdas y nacionalistas, empiezan a enraizarse en los ámbitos más críticos del régimen. La Transición pactada era casi inevitable. La mayoría de la sociedad no quería la continuidad del franquismo, aunque temían un cambio traumático y violento. El resultado fue un inicio democrático formal. No obstante, el franquismo institucional estaba presente en las Fuerzas Armadas, en la alta burocracia, en la Judicatura, etc. La Transición fue un inicio de democratización. ; Francoism was a brutal dictatorship, but it was not always that way. During the 1940s and 1950s, people in Spain lived under a dictatorship like that of other fascist dictatorships, in a civil war atmosphere of repression and terror. Society lived in fear and/or submission; resistant minorities were heroic, but they did not change the political regime. In the 1970s, some segments of society gradually began to lose their fear; the Spanish state no longer controlled social or daily life regarding the use of language; the fight of the trade unions grew despite State repression; universities and cultural spheres despised Francoism and, by the end of the decade, social demands and protests emerged in working-class neighbourhoods. In this context, the political cores -most of the left as well as nationalists- began to take root in the most critical areas of the regime and an 'agreed transition' became almost inevitable. Most of society did not want the Franco regime to continue, but they also feared a traumatic and violent change. The result was a formal democratic beginning. However, institutional Francoism was still present, for example, in the armed forces, the upper echelons of bureaucracy, and the Judiciary. Transition was the beginning of democratisation. ; El franquisme va ser una dictadura brutal, però no sempre va ser igual. En els anys quaranta i cinquanta es va viure en una dictadura similar a les feixistes, en un clima de guerra civil, de repressió i de terror. La societat vivia en la por i en la submissió. Les minories resistents eren heroiques, però no modificaven el règim polític. Durant els anys seixanta, sectors de la societat comencen a perdre gradualment la por; l'Estat no controla la vida social ni la quotidianitat en l'ús de la llengua; es desenvolupa la lluita sindical malgrat la repressió; el món universitari i cultural menysprea el franquisme i, a finals dels anys seixanta, emergeixen demandes i protestes socials als barris populars. En aquest marc, els nuclis polítics, la majoria d'esquerres i nacionalistes, comencen a arrelar en els àmbits més crítics del règim. La Transició pactada era gairebé inevitable. La majoria de la societat no volia la continuïtat del franquisme, encara que temien un canvi traumàtic i violent. El resultat va ser un inici democràtic formal. Tanmateix, el franquisme institucional estava present en les Forces Armades, en l'alta burocràcia, en la Judicatura, etc. La Transició va ser un inici de democratització.

El present assaig examina alguns dels enfocaments crítics i teòrics en l'àrea dels estudis de la memòria històrica i de la identitat que han sorgit com a resposta als reptes culturals contemporanis resultants de les transformacions polítiques i socials que s'han esdevingut de manera global durant les darreres dècades. L'assaig es centra en el cas pràctic del paper de la memòria històrica en la formació d'identitats col·lectives en l'Espanya contemporània, en el període posterior a la dictadura i en la subsegüent transició política. L'estudi explora de manera concreta l'ús del trop dels fantasmes en la literatura i el cinema espanyols contemporanis com a forma simptomàtica l'espectralitat del passat col·lectiu reprimit. ; Este ensayo examina algunos de los enfoques teóricos y críticos del campo de la memoria histórica y los estudios sobre la identidad que han surgido como respuesta a los retos culturales contemporáneos resultantes de las transformaciones políticas y sociales que se han sucedido en el mundo en las últimas décadas. El ensayo se centra en un estudio práctico del papel que ha tenido la memoria histórica en la formación de identidades colectivas en la España contemporánea, el período post-dictatorial y la posterior transición política. Asimismo, este estudio explora, en particular, el uso del tropo de la aparición de fantasmas en la literatura y el cine español contemporáneos como una forma sintomática de espectralidad de un pasado colectivo reprimido. ; This essay examines some of the critical and theoretical approaches in the area of historical memory and identity studies that have emerged as a response to the contemporary cultural challenges that have resulted from the social and political transformations which have taken place globally in the last decades. The essay narrows its focus to a case study of the role of historical memory in the formation of collective identities in contemporary Spain, in the aftermath of the dictatorship and the subsequent political transition. This study explores in particular the use of the trope of haunting ghosts in contemporary Spanish literature and cinema as symtomatic form of spectrality of the repressed collective past.

This paper analyzes the issue of nations without states in contemporary Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals. The political map of the continent comprises forty-seven countries, most of which are nation-states. However, the cultural mosaic of Europe is far more complex; there are around fifty ethnic groups (in addition to historical, territorial, or indigenous ethnic minorities and an enormous number of immigrant ethnic communities) lacking a state-based organization. Together, these people add up to 78 million, or almost 15% of the European population. Twenty-seven groups can be considered nations without states; they are culturally and ethnically based and have various forms of territorial integrity and political organization. However, they did not create a state organization, despite many attempts by some through history. Without a state organization, those communities have poorer opportunities to protect their folk culture and to reproduce various elements of ethnic identity. This is why they seek territorial autonomy or independent statehood through nationalist movements. In many cases, these ambitions are encompassed in regional movements. These movements have been popular in Europe, particularly because the idea of a "Europe of regions" as part of the European Union has had broad political support and acceptance. However, it has not actually succeeded. The EU and Europe as a whole are still a Europe of (nation)-states. In general, regional movements have been successful and through this some nations without states have attained part of their political ambitions in the form of territorial autonomy. The regionalization of former centralist states (e.g., Spain and the United Kingdom) increased the chances of ethnic survival for the Catalans, Basques, Scots, and Welsh. On the other hand, the regionalization of nations without states represented territorial division, a kind of "divide and rule" strategy serving to reduce their ambitions towards national independence. The territorial and political reconstruction of nation-states has been successful, but it did not solve all ethnic problems. The European political map reveals another interesting phenomenon: a double state for some nations. These are particularly typical for the Balkans. Because of political and territorial development after the Second World War and during the transition period in the 1990s and beyond, the principle of immutable political borders (logically encompassing the creation of new nation-states as well) led to further political and territorial divisions and (in fact, paradoxically) fragmentation. Some of these "inner" autonomous territories are functioning as de facto states. The cases of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina are good examples of these processes. This development has not garnered much political support in most European countries or at the EU level. However, it is an undesirable reality and is certainly one of changes among the political and territorial (or even greater) challenges for the Europe of tomorrow. It forces a reexamination of the phenomenon and value of nations. The existence of nations without states represents a potential for the creation of new (nation) states.

Entre agosto y septiembre de 1991, los Países Bálticos forzaron su ruptura con la Unión Soviética, pocos meses antes de que ésta se desintegrara totalmente. A partir de ese momento, la recuperación de su independencia y soberanía nacional -fraguada por primera vez en la época de entreguerras y frustrada por el pacto germano-soviético de 1939-, así como la consolidación de la democracia y el Estado de Derecho y la economía social de mercado, fue de la mano de su aspiración de integración en la Unión Europea y en la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte. Después de más de una década de grandes transformaciones, tanto políticas como socioeconómicas, los tres Países Bálticos -Lituania, Estonia y Letonia- han logrado cumplir con éxito aquellos dos objetivos fundamentales para su futuro en paz, libertad, prosperidad y seguridad en el siglo XXI: el «retorno a Europa» en el marco de la Unión Europea y su vinculazión a la alianza militar euroatlántica dentro de la OTAN. ; Between August and September 1991, the Baltic States forced their break with the USSR, just a few months before the latter disintegrated. From that moment on, the recovery of national independence and sovereignty – first established during the inter-war period only to be thwarted by the pact between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 – as well as the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and a market economy, were given impetus by their desire to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After more than a decade of major transformations, both political and socio-economic in nature, the three Baltic States – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – have successfully achieved the two fundamental prerequisites for a future of peace, liberty, prosperity and security in the twenty-first century: their «return to Europe» as members of the European Union and their link with the Euro-Atlantic military alliance as members of NATO. ; El presente trabajo se inscribe en un proyecto de investigación (realizado conjuntamente con el prof. Dr. Ricardo Martín de la Guardia) sobre el ideal europeísta y su influencia en los países de la antigua Europa del Este en el camino de éstos hacia su integración en la Unión Europea. Dicho proyecto de investigación ha sido apoyado por el Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte mediante la vinculación del autor como «Salvador de Madariaga Fellow» al Instituto Universitario Europeo de Florencia en los años 1999 y 2003 (para este último año: Resolución de 28 de marzo de 2003, BOE 15 de abril de 2003).

Ko slišimo za pojem korupcija, takoj pomislimo na zlorabo javne službe za doseganje lastnih koristi. Posamezniki in podjetja podkupujejo administrativne uslužbence, da le-ti uredijo zadeve, ki morajo biti rešene. Gre torej za izsiljevanje rent od gospodarskih udeležencev in posledično od ekonomije same izključno za zasebne koristi politikov in uradnikov. Tovrsten pristop k obravnavanju pojava je v zadnjih letih začrtal popolnoma novo smer analiziranja in merjenja korupcije. Korupcija se predstavi v popolnoma novi podobi, v kateri posamezniki, skupine oziroma podjetja vplivajo na formulacijo zakonov, ali celo spreobračajo že oblikovana pravila igre, da bi si s tem zagotovili pomembne ugodnosti. Korupcija je in vedno bo obstajala v svetu, edina razlika je v tem, da se z razvojem družb spreminja, prevzema bolj prefinjene oblike, zaradi katerih jo je težje odkrivati in preprečevati. Vse bolj razsežne in destruktivne posledice, ki jih ima korupcija na gospodarsko rast in družbeno stabilnost, nujno zahtevajo praktične strategije omejevanja korupcije. Problem korupcije se ne omejuje na določeno regijo, kajti z njenimi grožnjami se ubadajo tako razvite države kot tudi države v razvoju in tranzitne države. V postsocialističnih državah so sočasni procesi razvijanja tržne ekonomije, oblikovanja novih političnih in socialnih institucij ter prerazporejanje družbene lastnine ustvarili rodna tla za pojav korupcije. Zaradi kompleksnosti fenomena in predvsem zaradi vse večjega zavedanja, da vzroki za prevzem države presegajo golo neučinkovitost in šibkost državne uprave, je potrebno za razumevanje in odpravljanje state capture razsvetliti problem širših strukturalnih povezav, kot so interna organizacija političnega sistema, odnosi in zveze med ključnimi državnimi institucijami, interakcije med podjetji in državo ter povezave med državo in civilno družbo. ; When we think about corruption, an image quickly comes to mind of abuse of public office for private gains. Individuals and firms are bribing bureaucrats to »get things done«. Behind this view lies an understanding of the state extracting rents from the economy for the exclusive benefit of politicians and bureaucrats. Such an aprroach has had a powerful impact on the way corruption has been analyzed and measured in recent years. Corruption has taken on a new image – that of individuals, groups, or firms manipulating policy formation and even shaping the emerging rules of the game to their own, very substantional advantage. Corruption has always existed across the world and it will never disappear, the difference is that has become more sophisticated and thus more difficult and costly to detect. With the increasing recognition across the globe of the damaging effects of corruption on economic growth and social stability, the demand for practical strategies to reduce corruption has grown dramatically. The problem is not confined to any particular region, and developed, developing and transition countries alike are confronting these challenges. In postcommunist states the simultaneous processes of developing a market economy, designing new political and social institutions and redistributing social assets have created fertile ground for corruption. With regard to complexity of phenomena and with increasing recognition that the roots of state capture extend far beyond weaknesses in the capacity of government, we need to be aware of factors underlying the persistence of corruption that is broader structural relationships, including the internal organization of the political system, relationships among core state institutions, the interactions between the state and firms, and the relationship between the sate and civil society.

Abstract. Nativism does not only present a concept,
but also an ideological framework as well as a political practice related to identity politics. In the article we
firstly present the theoretical reflection of nativism and
operationalise the most important terms and characteristics of this phenomenon. Later, we apply the concept of nativism to the analysis of conservative populist
and/or nativist political actors in the Central European
region. The analysis shows how nativism, as a relatively
peripheral issue in the first 10–15 years after the democratic transition, became stronger in the next period
characterised by a set of crises after 2008. The analysis
demonstrates how the mainstream parties in Central
Europe adopted the nativist and conservative populist
agenda and implemented it into mainstream politics.
Furthermore, the analysis shows how Central European
nativism correlates with the long-term existence of antiliberal streams that were revitalised after the fall of
Communist regimes. These anti-modern societal groups
were reformulated as the counter-cosmopolitan camp
within the polarisation process that is clearly visible in
the political arena.
Keywords: nativism; national conservatism; identity
politics; Central Europe

A Indonèsia, els anys posteriors a la caiguda del règim de Suharto han estat marcats per una proliferació de la cultura devota popular en els mitjans de comunicació. Aquesta proliferació se situa en el context de la transició política d'un règim autoritari a la democràcia, la industrialització dels mitjans de comunicació i la irrupció de l'islam com una de les claus essencials per a entendre l'actual transformació en els àmbits polítics, socials i culturals de la societat indonèsia contemporània. A grans trets, la meva tesi analitza el paper de l'islam en aquesta transformació i com la cultura popular n'ha format part integral. Per mitjà del cas pràctic de la producció d'una telenovel·la religiosa, m'interessa explorar la complexitat que impregna les pràctiques religioses quan el moviment de devoció religiosa s'apropia dels mitjans de comunicació laics/capitalistes per a promoure el culte. En altres paraules, aquest article es pregunta el següent: quan la lògica del moviment de devoció religiosa i la lògica de la indústria mediàtica convergeixen, quin tipus de pràctiques religioses i cinematogràfiques es mantenen, es negocien i es qüestionen? Partint d'un marc metodològic basat en les teories sobre les pràctiques mediàtiques (Bourdieu, 1977 i 1993; Couldry, 2004; Hobart, propera aparició; Rajagopal, 2001), he estructurat en dues dimensions la meva anàlisi sobre com i per què es construeixen, ratifiquen i qüestionen les pràctiques i els estàndards: dimensió interna (on-site) i dimensió externa (off-site). ; In the last few years, Indonesia's post-Suharto's era has been marked by a proliferation of popular piety culture in the media. This proliferation is situated within the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the industrialization of media and the emergence of Islam as one of the important keys to unlocking the ongoing transformation of the political, social and cultural spheres of contemporary Indonesian society. My thesis, in general, is a study of the role of Islam in this transformation and how popular culture is an integral part of it. Through my study case of the production of a religious TV series, I want to explore the complexity that makes up religious practices when the piety movement takes up secular/capitalist media to further their movement. In other words, this paper asks: when the logic of the piety movement and the logic of the media industry converge, what kinds of practices in terms of religious practices and film-making practices are maintained, negotiated, and challenged? Building my methodological framework on theories of media practices (Bourdieu, 1977 and 1993; Couldry, 2004; Hobart, forthcoming; Rajagopal, 2001), I divide my analysis into how and why practices and standards are constructed, affirmed and challenged in two foci: on-site and off-site. ; En Indonesia, los años posteriores a la caída del régimen de Suharto han sido marcados por una proliferación de una cultura devota popular en los medios de comunicación. Esta proliferación se sitúa en el contexto de la transición política de un régimen autoritario a la democracia, la industrialización de los medios de comunicación y la irrupción del islam como una de las claves esenciales para entender la actual transformación en los ámbitos políticos, sociales y culturales de la sociedad indonesia contemporánea. A grandes rasgos, mi tesis analiza el papel del islam en esta transformación y cómo la cultura popular ha formado parte integral de ella. Por medio del caso práctico de la producción de una telenovela religiosa, me interesa explorar la complejidad que impregna las prácticas religiosas cuando el movimiento de devoción religiosa se apropia de los medios de comunicación laicos/capitalistas para promover el culto. En otras palabras, este artículo se pregunta lo siguiente: cuando la lógica del movimiento de devoción religiosa y la lógica de la industria mediática convergen, ¿qué tipo de prácticas religiosas y cinematográficas se mantienen, se negocian y se cuestionan? Partiendo de un marco metodológico basado en las teorías sobre las prácticas mediáticas (Bourdieu, 1977 y 1993; Couldry, 2004; Hobart, próxima aparición; Rajagopal, 2001), he estructurado en dos dimensiones mi análisis sobre cómo y por qué se construyen, ratifican y cuestionan las prácticas y los estándares: dimensión interna (on-site) y dimensión externa (off-site).

A Indonèsia, els anys posteriors a la caiguda del règim de Suharto han estat marcats per una proliferació de la cultura devota popular en els mitjans de comunicació. Aquesta proliferació se situa en el context de la transició política d'un règim autoritari a la democràcia, la industrialització dels mitjans de comunicació i la irrupció de l'islam com una de les claus essencials per a entendre l'actual transformació en els àmbits polítics, socials i culturals de la societat indonèsia contemporània. A grans trets, la meva tesi analitza el paper de l'islam en aquesta transformació i com la cultura popular n'ha format part integral. Per mitjà del cas pràctic de la producció d'una telenovel·la religiosa, m'interessa explorar la complexitat que impregna les pràctiques religioses quan el moviment de devoció religiosa s'apropia dels mitjans de comunicació laics/capitalistes per a promoure el culte. En altres paraules, aquest article es pregunta el següent: quan la lògica del moviment de devoció religiosa i la lògica de la indústria mediàtica convergeixen, quin tipus de pràctiques religioses i cinematogràfiques es mantenen, es negocien i es qüestionen? Partint d'un marc metodològic basat en les teories sobre les pràctiques mediàtiques (Bourdieu, 1977 i 1993; Couldry, 2004; Hobart, propera aparició; Rajagopal, 2001), he estructurat en dues dimensions la meva anàlisi sobre com i per què es construeixen, ratifiquen i qüestionen les pràctiques i els estàndards: dimensió interna (on-site) i dimensió externa (off-site). ; In the last few years, Indonesia's post-Suharto's era has been marked by a proliferation of popular piety culture in the media. This proliferation is situated within the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the industrialization of media and the emergence of Islam as one of the important keys to unlocking the ongoing transformation of the political, social and cultural spheres of contemporary Indonesian society. My thesis, in general, is a study of the role of Islam in this transformation and how popular culture is an integral part of it. Through my study case of the production of a religious TV series, I want to explore the complexity that makes up religious practices when the piety movement takes up secular/capitalist media to further their movement. In other words, this paper asks: when the logic of the piety movement and the logic of the media industry converge, what kinds of practices in terms of religious practices and film-making practices are maintained, negotiated, and challenged? Building my methodological framework on theories of media practices (Bourdieu, 1977 and 1993; Couldry, 2004; Hobart, forthcoming; Rajagopal, 2001), I divide my analysis into how and why practices and standards are constructed, affirmed and challenged in two foci: on-site and off-site. ; En Indonesia, los años posteriores a la caída del régimen de Suharto han sido marcados por una proliferación de una cultura devota popular en los medios de comunicación. Esta proliferación se sitúa en el contexto de la transición política de un régimen autoritario a la democracia, la industrialización de los medios de comunicación y la irrupción del islam como una de las claves esenciales para entender la actual transformación en los ámbitos políticos, sociales y culturales de la sociedad indonesia contemporánea. A grandes rasgos, mi tesis analiza el papel del islam en esta transformación y cómo la cultura popular ha formado parte integral de ella. Por medio del caso práctico de la producción de una telenovela religiosa, me interesa explorar la complejidad que impregna las prácticas religiosas cuando el movimiento de devoción religiosa se apropia de los medios de comunicación laicos/capitalistas para promover el culto. En otras palabras, este artículo se pregunta lo siguiente: cuando la lógica del movimiento de devoción religiosa y la lógica de la industria mediática convergen, ¿qué tipo de prácticas religiosas y cinematográficas se mantienen, se negocian y se cuestionan? Partiendo de un marco metodológico basado en las teorías sobre las prácticas mediáticas (Bourdieu, 1977 y 1993; Couldry, 2004; Hobart, próxima aparición; Rajagopal, 2001), he estructurado en dos dimensiones mi análisis sobre cómo y por qué se construyen, ratifican y cuestionan las prácticas y los estándares: dimensión interna (on-site) y dimensión externa (off-site).

Namen dela je predvsem proučiti oblikovanje, delovanje, vlogo in pomen Demosa kot instrumenta in akterja nacionalne emancipacije in demokratične tranzicije na Slovenskem. Pred osrednjim delom analize so opredeljeni ključni pojmi in koncepti: definicija nacionalizma ter glavni teoretični pristopi k nacionalizmu, opredelitev demokracije in demokratizacije. Za celovito razumevanje vloge in pomena posameznih političnih akterjev, kakršen je bil konec osemdesetih in v začetku devetdesetih Demos, je potrebno dobro poznati zgodovinske okoliščine. Najprej sem v poglavju o zgodovinskih mejnikih oblikovanja slovenske nacionalne identitete poskušala dokazati, da pomembni procesi v osemdesetih in devetdesetih letih niso vznikli sami od sebe, ampak imajo dolgo zgodovinsko podlago. V nadaljevanju obravnavam širjenje političnega prostora, obdobje liberalizacije in razcveta civilne družbe ter ključne procese in dogodke na poti v pluralno družbo. Procesi liberalizacije so soustvarjali tudi politično okolje, v katerem je začela nastajati politična opozicija. Konec osemdesetih let, tik pred nastankom Demosa, sta se izoblikovala dva konsistentna in nekompatibilna narodno-politična programa, ki sta simbolizirala politično polarizacijo. Nove, alternativne 'zveze' so se začele povezovati v pričakovanju demokratičnih volitev in soočenja s skupino družbenopolitičnih organizacij z Zvezo komunistov na čelu. Osrednji del disertacije predstavlja obravnava Demosa, akterja demokratizacije. Znotraj tega obdobja namenjam posebno pozornost najvidnejši osebnosti združene demokratične opozicije Jožetu Pučniku, analiziram predvolilne programe, rezultate volitev, ter oblikovanje novih oblastnih organov. V tem kontekstu analiziram tudi njihovo sodelovanje s Predsedstvom republike Slovenije. V nadaljevanju orišem vlogo Demosa v osamosvojitvenih procesih. Demos je v svojih glavnih namerah uspel, kljub temu, da ga niso ustrezno podpirali mediji, ni imel ustrezne zaslombe v gospodarstvu, pa tudi ne v državni upravi in, razen slovenske vojske in do neke mere policije, v represivnih organih oblasti. Kljub temu je uresničil glavne cilje, za uspešno izpeljano tranzicijo oziroma bolj popolno in konsolidirano demokratizacijo pa mu je zmanjkalo tako časa kot politične moči. Proces uvedbe demokracije, kot drugi od Demosovih ciljev, je bil uresničen v institucionalnem smislu, z vzpostavitvijo temeljnih demokratičnih struktur. Istočasno pa je bil Demos ključni dejavnik ne le pri oblikovanju splošnega soglasja o nujnosti osamosvojitve slovenskega naroda, ki se izraža v visokem rezultatu slovenskega plebiscita 23. decembra 1990, ampak je bil tudi glavni akter in instrument nacionalne osamosvojitve, obrambe slovenske samostojnosti v vojni za Slovenijo ter mednarodnega priznanja. ; The purpose of the thesis is primarily to examine the creation, operations, role and importance of Demos – Democratic Opposition of Slovenia as an instrument and actor of national emancipation and democratic transition in Slovenia. Prior to the central part of the analysis key terms and concepts are identified: definition of nationalism and the main theoretical approaches to nationalism, definition of democracy and democratization. For comprehensive understanding of the role and importance of individual political actors, like Demos was in the late eighties and early nineties, we should also be familiar with historical circumstances. At first I tried to stress that the main events and processes in the eighties and nineties had not emerged by themselves but were results of long historical development. Next I discuss broadening of political space, a period of liberalization and flourishing of civil society and also key processes and events on the way to a pluralistic society. The liberalization processes co-created also the political environment, in which the political opposition started to take shape. At the end of the eighties, just before the establishment of Demos, two consistent and incompatible national-political programmes were formed which symbolized the political polarization. New, alternative 'unions' began to link pending democratic elections and confrontations with a group of the so-called socio-political organizations with the Communists Party at the head. The central part of the thesis is the analysis of Demos, the actor of democratization. Within this period I pay particular attention to Jože Pučnik, the most prominent personality of the united democratic opposition, I analyse election programs, results of elections and the creation of new public authorities. In this context, I analyse also their cooperation with the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia and outline the role of Demos in the independence processes. Demos succeeded in its main intentions, despite the fact that it had not adequate support of the media, no support of the economy nor in the public service and, with the exception of the Slovenian Army and to some extent police forces, the repressive authorities. Despite all these Demos accomplished its main objectives, however, for a successful transition or a more complete and consolidated democratization it ran out of time and political power. The process of introducing democracy was realized in a formal sense, with the establishment of basic democratic structures. At the same time Demos was a key factor in the creation of the general consensus on the necessity of the Slovenian independency which is shown in the high score of the plebiscite on 23rd Dec 1990. Demos was also the key actor and an instrument of the national independence process, the defence of the Slovenian territory in the war for Slovenia as well as in the process of the international recognition of the new Slovenian sovereign state.

Razvoj družbe je nujen in za dosego razvoja je treba največ pozornosti nameniti ravno razvoju ljudi. Če konceptu razvoja ljudi dodamo mednarodno perspektivo, dobimo celosten pogled na trenutno stanje v družbi. Ravno mednarodna perspektiva razvoja ljudi in celotna obravnava tematike sta botrovali k izvedbi analize razvoja ljudi v izbranih državah. Z metodo analize so bili pridobljeni vsi potrebni podatki, ki so celotno analizo zaokrožili. Prek analize pridobljenih podatkov so bile države razvrščene v tri skupine. Pri tem so vse razvite in tranzicijske države zajete v vzorec, v primeru razvijajočih se pa so bile države izbrane tako, da so zajeti predstavniki vseh delov Afrike, Azije ter Latinske in Karibske Amerike. Rezultati analize so precej nedvoumni. Izkazalo se je, da samo indeks razvoja ljudi in politična stabilnost države ne zagotavljata močne medsebojne povezave. Pomembno vlogo igrajo tudi pretresi iz začetka 90. let 20. stol. in t. i. svetovni policisti razvitih držav, kar vnaša določeno mero neravnovesja. Na drugi strani pa je bilo pričakovati padec moči povezanosti med razvojem ljudi in izobraževalnim indeksom od razvitih k razvijajočim se. Izkaže se, da je moč povezave največja v tranzicijskih državah, sledijo razvite in na koncu razvijajoče se države. Ugotovitve analize imajo širše učinke za družbeno okolje. Razvoj omogoča oblikovanje razvite družbe in uveljavitev človeku dostojnega življenja. Na osnovi tega bo v prihodnosti mogoče prilagoditi programe razvoja ljudi predvsem v tranzicijskih državah in ostalih delih sveta, ki so precej nestabilni in brez zunanje pomoči. Dejstvo pa je, da so nekatere razvijajoče se države lahko zgled kakovosti primarnih razvojnih programov. ; Development of the country is necessary and for achieving it the biggest focus must be on human development. If we add international perspective to human development, we get a fairly comprehensive view of the current situation in society. It was precisely the addition of an international perspective to the human development and the overall treatment of the topic that contributed to the design of the analysis of human resource development in selected countries. Using the analysis method all necessary data were obtained, which rounded the analysis into a whole. By analysing the data obtained, the countries were classified into three groups. In this, all developed and transition countries are included into the sample, and in the case of developing countries, the countries have been selected to include representatives of all parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. The results of the analysis are quite unequivocal. It turned out that only human development index and the political stability of the country do not guarantee a strong interconnection. Shouts from the early 90s of the 20th century and the role of so-called world-wide police officers of developed countries also play an important role, which introduces a certain amount of imbalance. On the other hand, the drop in the strength of the relation between the human development index and educational index from the developed to the developing was expected. It turns out that the power of connections is greatest in transition countries, followed by the developed and ultimately developing countries. The findings of the analysis have broader effects on the social environment. Development enables the creation of developed society the promotion of a decent man's life. On this basis, in the future, human development programs can be adjusted in the transitional countries and other parts of the world, which are rather unstable and without external assistance. It is true that some developing countries can serve as an example of the quality of primary development programs.

Dogajanje v času komunistične revolucije bistveno vpliva tako na stanje kot tudi na razumevanje sodobne slovenske družbene situacije. V disertaciji avtorica v luči idejnega nasprotja med krščanstvom in komunizmom ter na podlagi konflikta, ki se je obenem razvil v obdobju revolucije, razišče vzroke in podlage za omenjeni vpliv. Avtorica v delu pokaže na temeljno povezanost sodobnega položaja in komunistične revolucije na Slovenskem. Kot pojmovni okvir ter orodje za razumevanje izbere Girardovo mimetično teorijo in teorijo o grešnem kozlu. Girard namreč kulturo opisuje kot mimetični cikel, kjer posameznik posnema drugega (tako se začne že v samem otroštvu, ko otrok posnema starše in s tem postane družbeno bitje). Posnemanje je gonilo vsake družbe. Poleg tega pa posnemanje lahko omogoči tudi uničenje družbe, kulture. Girard vpelje grešnega kozla kot razrešitev konflikta, kjer imata dva subjekta enako željo in se skupaj obrneta proti grešnemu kozlu, ki zanju predstavlja vzrok mimetične krize, in je njegovo žrtvovanje pogoj za ponovno vzpostavitev družbenega reda in socialne varnosti. Ta teo-retični okvir omogoča tudi raziskovanje preteklih družbenih konfliktov, posebej pa tudi njihovih posledic v sodobnosti, vključno z vidiki spravnih procesov ter tranzicijske pra-vičnosti. Zato ga avtorica plodno uporabi pri omenjenem raziskovanju. Kot dve nasprotujoči idejni podlagi avtorica predstavi krščanstvo in komunizem, ki sta že v svojem idejnem temelju diametralno nasprotni, posebej pa ju prikaže preko Girar-dove teorije. Krščanstvo s krističnim pojmovanjem osebne svobode izstopi iz cikličnosti mehanizma grešnega kozla, komunizem pa prav nasprotno temelji na mimetičnosti. Žrt-vena znamenja v Girardovem pojmovanju, ki opravičijo umor grešnega kozla, temeljijo na dejstvih, ki postanejo sprejemljiva za umor, ne glede na (ne)resničnost le-teh. Implementacija Girardove teorije na slovensko situacijo zajema dva ključna vidika. Prvi vidik je žrtvovanje nasprotnikov komunistične revolucije z žrtvenimi znamenji kolabo-racije, nemirov … Omenjeno žrtvovanje omogoči vzpostavitev totalitarnega komunisti-čnega režima v kraljevini Jugoslaviji in s tem tudi na Slovenskem. Komunizem kot tota-litarni režim ne dopušča alternative, človeka uniformira in osami. Obenem vzpostavi totalni nadzor in teror. Krščanstvo po drugi strani človeka opolnomoči z bogopodobnos-tjo in s tem edinstvenostjo, nedotakljivostjo, nezamenljivostjo ter svobodo. Drugi vidik pa zadeva dejstvo, da konflikt iz časa komunistične revolucije še vedno ni razrešen ter je vladavina prava in vzpostavitev demokratične družbe še vedno nedokon-čan projekt. Kljub demokratični državni ureditvi in propadu komunizma kot dolgoroč-nega družbenopolitičnega in ekonomskega sistema avtorica poudari dva izziva sodobne družbe na Slovenskem. Prvi je prisotnost komunistične ideologije v razmišljanju in delovanju posameznikov, drugi izziv pa je nezadostna uveljavitev tranzicijske pravično-sti. Omenjeni vidiki analize temeljijo najprej že v samem idejnem nasprotju in zasnovi tako komunizma kakor tudi krščanstva. Krščanstvo in komunizem sta v svojem temelju različna. Poseben poudarek je na vidikih dojemanja človeka kot svobodnega in razumskega bitja v obeh idejnih okvirih. Komunizem s komunistično revolucijo nastopi proti človeku, proti človekovemu dostojanstvu in proti človekovi svobodi in s tem krščanstvo postavi v obrambno držo. S tem pa tudi Cerkev, ki je kot ene vidnejših institucij komunistična revolucija ni prevzela in obvladovala, postane braniteljica človekovega življenja in človekovih pravic, obenem pa je postavljena nasproti komunistični revoluciji. Krščanstvo in tudi Cerkev se posluži različnih načinov obrambe in upora, ki niso vselej povsem skladni s krščanskim naukom. Metode obrambe so bile: krščanska drža v odnosu do vojne, do sočloveka, do okupatorja in do revolucionarnih sil, fizična obramba, sodelovanje tako z okupacijskimi kakor tudi revolucionarnimi silami, kulturna, medijska in politična udejstvovanja. Kljub temu je revolucionarno nasilje eskaliralo predvsem v zadnjih letih druge svetovne vojne in prvih letih po revoluciji. Situacije, v katere so bili postavljeni posamezniki na Slovenskem, niso bile enoznačne ali enostavne. Ni šlo zgolj za izbiro med revolucionarno ali protirevolucionarno stranjo, temveč so bile okoliščine zaradi okupacijskih sil bolj zapletene. Ljudem je grozilo neodobravanje, preganjanje ali nasilje z vseh strani. Komunistična partija je monopolizirala odpor proti okupacijskim silam. Že zametki kakršnekoli druge neodvisne organizacije upora so bili lahko kaznovani. Nemalo kristjanov je z namenom domoljubnosti ali nezmožnosti izognitve mobilizaciji postalo del osvobodilnega gibanja, ne glede na ideološko podlago gibanja ali organizacije, ki je gibanje organizirala. Cerkev kljub temu ni bila preveč zaželen partner v uporu, o čemer priča tudi Kardeljevo navodilo: "Duhovne v četah vse postreljajte" (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109). Ne zgolj navodilo, tudi načrtno degradiranje duhovnikov z zaporom, priporom, deportacijami in usmrtitvami so priča odnosu komunistične partije do cerkvenih dostojanstvenikov. Revolucionarno nasilje je pustilo neslutene posledice ne zgolj v tedanjem obdobju, temveč tudi za sedanji čas, pri čemer pri avtoričinem raziskovanju teh posledic pomembno vlogo igrajo tudi osebne zgodbe, odgovornost na osebni ter družbeni ravni in medgeneracijski prenos travm, ki onemogočajo pravo tranzicijo iz totalitarnega v demokratični sistem. Tranzicija in tranzicijska pravičnost je torej mehanizem, ki si prizadeva v polnosti izpeljati tranzicijo na osebni in družbeni ravni ter vzpostaviti zaupanje v državne institucije, delovanje državnih struktur. Situacija na Slovenskem sicer nakazuje na nekatere pozitivne učinke tranzicijske pravičnosti, kot sta denacionalizacija in odprtje arhivov. Še vedno pa umanjka uveljavitev pravičnosti na osebni ravni, pri čemer so pomemben vidik spravni procesi ter prekinitev medgeneracijskega prenosa travm. Podobno kot na osebni ravni umanjka pravičnost v javni sferi, na primer pluralizacija medijskega prostora, urejene gospodarske pobude, dialog med različnimi družbenimi skupinami, vključno z vstopanjem verskih skupnosti v javno razpravo, vzpostavljanjem zaupanja v državne institucije ipd. Pogled na komunistično revolucijo na Slovenskem skozi prizmo Girardovega grešnega kozla ponudi edinstven okvir, ki poveže razumevanje komunistične revolucije in komu-nističnega sistema s sodobnim položajem slovenske družbe. Po eni strani Girardov mehanizem grešnega kozla lahko razumemo kot dopolnjenega v komunistični revoluciji, po drugi strani pa mehanizem stremi k dopolnitvi v smislu celovite uveljavitve tran-zicijske pravičnosti. ; The events during the communist revolution significantly influence the state and understanding of the contemporary Slovenian social situation. In the dissertation, in the light of the ideological contradiction between Christianity and Communism, and on the basis of the conflict that developed during the revolution, the author explores the causes and grounds for this influence. In this work the author shows the fundamental connection between the contemporary situation and the communist revolution in Slovenia. She chooses Girard's mimetic theory and scapegoat as a conceptual framework and tool for understanding. Girard describes culture as a mimetic cycle, where the individual imitates the other (this starts from the very childhood, when the child imitates his parents and thus becomes a social being). Imitation is the driving force of every company. In addition, imitation can also become a destruction of society, culture. Girard therefore implements the scapegoat as a conflict resolution where the two entities share the same desire and together turn against the scapegoat, which causes them a mimetic crisis and its sacrifice is a condition for restoring social order and social security. This general theoretical framework also makes it possible – to explore past social conflicts, and in particular their consequences in the present, including aspects of reconciliation processes and transitional justice. Therefore, the author fruitfully uses it in the mentioned research. The author embraces Christianity and communism as two opposing ideological bases, which are already diametrically opposed in their conceptual bases, and are especially illuminated by Girard's theory. Christianity, with its cristian notion of personal freedom, stands out from the cyclical nature of the scapegoat, but communism is, on the contrary, based on mimeticism. Victims of character in Girard's conception that justify the murder of a scapegoat are based on facts that become acceptable for murder, regardless of the (un) reality of them. The implementation of Girard's theory on the Slovenian situation thus encompasses two key aspects. The first aspect is the sacrifice of the opponents of the communist revolution with the sacrificial signs of collaboration, riots, … This sacrifice makes it possible to establish a totalitarian communist regime in Yugoslavia, and thus in Slovenia. Communism, as a totalitarian regime, does not allow an alternative, it uniforms and isolates man. At the same time, it establishes total control and terror. Christianity, on the other hand, empowers man with uniqueness, inviolability, irreplaceability and freedom. Another aspect concerns the fact that the conflict from the communist revolution has still not been resolved, and that the rule of law and the establishment of a democratic society are still, in the eyes of many Slovenians, an unfinished project. Despite the democratic state system and the collapse of communism as a long-term socio-political and economic system, the author emphasizes two challenges of contemporary society in Slovenia. The first is the presence of communist ideology in the thinking and action of individuals, and the second challenge is the insufficient implementation of transitional justice. The aforementioned aspects of the analysis are based first of all on the very conceptual contradiction and conception of both communism and Christianity. Christianity and communism are fundamentally different. Particular emphasis is placed on aspects of the perception of man as a free and rational being in both conceptual frameworks. Communism, by communist revolution, stands against man, against human dignity and against human freedom, thereby placing Christianity in a defensive posture. In doing so, the Church, which as one of the most prominent institutions has not been taken over and controlled by the Communist Revolution, becomes a defender of human life and human rights, while at the same time it stands against the Communist Revolution. Christianity, as well as the Church, uses various methods of defense and rebellion that are not always completely in line with Christian teaching. The methods of defense were the Christian stance in relation to war, to fellow human beings, to the occupier and to the revolutionary forces, physical defense, cooperation with both occupation and revolutionary forces, cultural, media and political activities. Nevertheless, revolutionary violence escalated, especially in the last years of World War II and the first years after the revolution. The situations in which individuals in Slovenia were placed were not straightforward or straightforward. It was not merely a choice between a revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary party, but the circumstances were more complex rather than straightforward because of the occupying forces. People were threatened with disapproval, persecution or violence from all sides. The Communist Party monopolized resistance to the occupation forces. The rudiments of any other, independent organization of resistance could have been punished. Quite a few Christians, for the sake of patriotism or inability to evade mobilization, became part of the liberation movement, regardless of the ideological basis of the movement or the organization that organized the movement. The church was not, however, a much-desired partner in the resistance, as evidenced by Kardelj's instruction: "Shoot the priests in the troops." (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109) Not only the instruction, but also the deliberate degradation of priests through imprisonment, detention, deportation and execution, are witnesses to the Communist Party's attitude towards Church dignitaries. Revolutionary violence has left unprecedented consequences not only in that time but also in the present, with the author's exploration of these consequences also playing a significant role in personal stories, personal and social responsibility, and the intergenerational transmission of traumas that they preclude a real transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system. Transition and transitional justice is thus a mechanism that seeks to fully complete the transition on a personal and social level, and to establish trust in state institutions, the functioning of state structures. Although the situation in Slovenia points to some of the positive effects of transitional justice, such as denationalization, the opening of archives, it still lacks the enforcement of justice on a personal level ; for example, with regard to aspects of media pluralization, orderly economic initiatives, dialogue between different social groups, including the entry of religious communities into public debate, building confidence in state institutions, etc. The view of the communist revolution in Slovenia through the prism of Girard the scapegoat offers a unique framework that connects the understanding of the communist revolution and the communist system with the contemporary position of Slovene society. On the one hand, Girard's mechanism of the scapegoat can be understood as supplemented in the communist revolution, and on the other, the mechanism seeks to supplement in the sense of the full implementation of transitional justice.