The article is dedicated to the discussion about the notions of the 'political system' and 'political regime' in the fields of its meanings as autonomous analytical constructions. The main arguments are that the 'political system' describes a stable and normal political process and determinate interrelations between power structures and civil society institutions as a complex sociopolitical unity. On the other hand, concept of 'political regime' stresses dynamic aspects of the government activity as a realization of the basic political functions. Pointing to the fact that a political system explains events and relations in the modern democratic context and a regime -- its peculiarities in the process of decision-making, the authors share attention to specific negative aspects of the separate interpretation and recognition of the various forms in the national politics spheres. All these conditions may sharp influence over the quality of the authority decisions, feedback among political institutions as a civic interests representatives etc. And otherwise, this implies that the political systems and political regimes realize an isomorphic similarity for taking evasive action between them. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with the analysis of the role of ideology in party activities. The empirical data show that ideology is not important part of party activities. In Lithuanian political map we can notice just one type of cleavage, ie., Communist -- anti-Communist cleavage. According to the data of empirical research, elite of party deputy dominates in institutionalized ways & sets the direction towards ideological position of the party. Interviews with the authorities of main political parties in Lithuania were conducted in 2007. The results of the interviews don't promise the long term political cleavages that could make the political life in Lithuania normal in nearest future. Though the authorities of Lithuanian parties have institutional possibilities to control party organization, however, they are not a power that may put Lithuanian parties in a clear ideological framework & foster coherence between parties & society. Adapted from the source document.
The paper discusses women's images & women related themes as they were presented in the Lithuanian national mass-media in the EP elections (May-June, 2004). Monitoring of the two largest Lithuanian dailies demonstrated that the EP elections had a second-rate status, which was enhanced by the first-round of the nation-wide Presidential elections, taking place on the very same day (May 14, 2004). Newspapers provided superficial references to women & did not produce any articulated discourse about women's representation in the EP. The result -- the Lithuanian delegation to the EP has 5 women among its 13 members -- is to be attributed to national political culture, appearance of the new populist party & individual candidates' electoral strategies, but not to women-friendly public discourse & political communication. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnyje nagrinejama, koki gyvenimo prasmes supratima isskleidzia moderni politikos samprata. Klasikineje graiku ir krikscioniu filosofijoje politine tvarka atspindejo zmoniu gyvenimo tikslus. Ikimoderni Vakaru civilizacija remesi finalistiniu kosmoso modeliu, nurodziusiu kiekvieno daikto bei zmogaus vieta ir paskirti. Todel politiniai sprendimai bent konceptualiai atspindejo zmogisku protu suvokiamus metafizikos ar dieviskojo istatymo postulatus. Nuo Renesanso ir Naujuju amziu finalistine mokslo samprata keicia kauzalistine, o gyvenimo prasmes problema dingsta is politines teorijos nagrinejamu klausimu saraso. Darbe teigiama, kad, nepaisant isorines modernybes sekuliarizacijos, kiekvienos politines teorijos branduoli sudaro teologiniu problemu sprendimas, todel gyvenimo prasmes klausimas niekada negali buti eliminuojamas is politines minties darbotvarkes. Modernybeje ivykusi slinktis nuo finalistinio prie kauzalistinio pasaulio supratimo zmonijai suteike iki tol neturetu priemoniu perdirbti bet kuria gamtine ir socialine tvarka. O Dievo mirtis prasmingo gyvenimo zenklu verte ieskoti siapus. Siu dvieju modernios minties elementu sujungimas igalino gyvenimo prasmes deficita pasalinti igyvendinant eschatono imanentizacija, t. y. perkeliant galutinius zmonijos tikslus i si pasauli. Straipsnyje konstatuojama, kad tokiu tikslu realizacija yra neatsiejama nuo politinio totalitarizmo. Del atviros modernybes laiko sampratos neimanoma nustatyti, kada galutiniu zmonijos tikslu realizavimas bus pasiektas. Sio sprendimo prerogatyva atiteko suverenui The study examines the place of meaning of life in the modern concept of politics. This can be done only by proving that political thought reflects the purpose of human life which actually is meaning of life. If a political body or political philosophy cannot prove this, it will always be possible to reject their arguments by stating that they are meaningless to humans. This created conditions for the idea that society should be permanently improved and the ultimate goal of such improvement is the salvation of every individual in this world. Although supporters of liberalism and socialism have a different understanding of this final stage of human development, both of them aim not at preparing individual for the salvation in another reality but they think that ideas of the heaven should be established in this world. Adapted from the source document.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.
This article is focused on the relation between the political institutional conditions (regime properties) and collective violence. Relying on works of Charles Tilly, two most important properties of regimes (political institutional conditions) that could affect the occurrence and intensity of collective violence are discerned: regime (governmental) capacity and democracy level. Empirical-graphical analysis finds no relation between the democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence. However, statistically significant relationship between the governmental capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence is found. Moreover, higher levels of collective violence are observed in the low capacity- undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis). Adapted from the source document.
In the sphere of construing regional identity, political science can accomplish less than philosophy. Common regional identity can never be derived from scientific cultural studies conducted in certain countries. A new cultural & philosophical meaning can never be devised on the basis of political science. It can only be the end result of philosophical imagination. Scientists can present facts which bear proof of merely cultural & political affinity. However, so far they have failed to propose any more significant concepts or images for the future of Central Europe. Mere knowledge of empirical facts cannot be treated as a philosophical discovery. Both politicians & scientists can be aware of & handle an abundance of facts, & yet a philosophical idea is needed to bind all these facts into one coherent whole. In construing the identity of Central Europe, there is no need whatever to get involved in discussions about certain given objective facts, similar to objects studied by natural sciences. There are no natural characteristics, which could predetermine the perception of regional identity, irrespective of a moral awareness of its citizens. Morality is an independent motive of human conduct, which can exert influence on the perception of regional identity. Nevertheless, today it is one of the most unpopular subjects of geopolitical discussions. Geopoliticians claim that cultural & political identity of a region must be objectively predetermined, be it by geography, economy or military power. Political philosophers seem to be the only ones who can take a stand against such a naturalist perception of regional identity. Adapted from the source document.
It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.
Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
Galios savoka yra viena is pagrindiniu, taciau taip pat ir viena is labiausiai gincijamu savoku politikos moksle bei gimininguose socialiniuose moksluose. Straipsnyje apzvelgiami teoriniai debatai del galios savokos reiksmes tarp sociologu ir politologu, prasideje XX amziaus septintajame desimtmetyje - vadinamieji 'galios veidu debatai' - bei galios santykis su giminingomis autoriteto (teisetos valdzios) ir prievartos savokomis. Straipsnio tikslas yra sudaryti 'tarpparadigmine' savokos taksonomija ir isskirti konceptualias 'galios' ribas. 'Galios' savokos ribozenkliais pasirenkamos butent 'autoriteto' ir 'prievartos' savokos, pirmaja is ju tapatinant su galios maksimumu, o antraja - su visisku galios eliminavimu, kai ja pakeicia fizine kontrole. Tai nera vienintele politologiniame diskurse aptinkama galios samprata, nes kai kurie politikos mokslu atstovai, ypac tarptautiniu santykiu tyrinetojai, galia tapatina butent su fizine jega. Vis delto dauguma sociologu ir politikos teoretiku palaiko pozicija (jai atstovaujama ir straipsnyje), jog galia baigiasi ten, kur prasideda prievarta Power is one of the basic, but at the same time one of the most disputed concepts in political science, as well as other social sciences contiguous to it. The article starts by reviewing an ongoing debate between political scientists and sociologists which started around 1960s - the so-called 'faces of power debate' - and moves on to evaluate the conceptual relation between power, on the one hand, and authority and coercion on the other. The somewhat modest goal of this endeavour is to design a taxonomy of, as well as to mark the limits of the concept in question. 'Authority' and 'coercion' (meaning 'physical force') are thus chosen as conceptual markers, the former corresponding to the maximum power with minimum opposition and the latter denoting the complete loss of power in exchange for sheer physical control over outcomes. This is not the only perception of power typical to the political science discourse; some political scientists, namely scholars of international relations, identify the exercise of power precisely with physical coercion by which certain object of value is secured. However, most of the more sophisticated accounts of power in social and political theory favour the conceptual limits proposed in this article. Adapted from the source document.
The primary aim of this article is to analyze how the interpretation of "universal" geopolitical ideas, especially those related to images of US power, depend on national, publishing & rhetorical interests. By comparing various predominant intellectual stances, one can see that even after the end of the Cold War its' rhetorical tropes still propel further disputes. As a result, national interests & ambitions of some politicians merge & the lines between political realism & ideologies become blurred. For example, phrases such as "the new world order," but even more often, "the new world disorder" are used indiscriminately in hundreds of titles promising accounts of the international system & its events. Thus instead of seeing rhetoric & reality as mutually exclusive opposites (which happens whenever the rhetoric is relegated to the field of myths & lies), new studies of the Cold War now generally recognize the rhetorical component of reality. This article uses Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "cultural fields" & his theoretical focus on the international circulation of ideas to discuss the rhetoric of "soft power.". Adapted from the source document.
