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Nomination: In search of the 'big:rsquo; model of political competition by Michael Laver, p.179 Reflections: Coalition politics and representative democracy by Norman Schofield, p.183

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Political Competition over a Single Issue: The Case of Certainty -- 2. Modeling Party Uncertainty -- 3. Unidimensional Policy Spaces with Uncertainty -- 4. Applications of the Wittman Model -- 5. Endogenous Parties: The Unidimensional Case -- 6. Political Competition over Several Issues: The Case of Certainty -- 7. Multidimensional Issue Spaces and Uncertainty: The Downs Model -- 8. Party Factions and Nash Equilibrium -- 9. The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Taxation -- 10.Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies -- 11. Distributive Class Politics and the Political Geography of Interwar Europe -- 12. A Three-Class Model of American Politics -- 13. Endogenous Parties with Multidimensional Competition -- 14. Toward a Model of Coalition Government -- Mathematical Appendix -- References -- Index

THE AUTHOR REFLECTS ON THE SCHOLARSHIP OF NORMAN SCHOFIELD, FOCUSING ON "POLITICAL COMPETITION AND MULTIPARTY COALITION GOVERNMENTS." IN THIS ESSAY, SCHOFIELD OFFERED A COMPETITIVE TWO-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF MULTIPARTY COALITION BEHAVIOR.

It is sometimes argued that political competition yields benefits to the citizens just as competition in economic markets yields benefits to consumers. We consider the economic costs and benefits of political competition and find that the story is somewhat more complicated. We first review the limited existing literature on this topic, and in the process, identify a number of distinct interpretations of what constitutes political competition. We then turn our attention to two forms of political competition based on what we refer to as accountability for incumbents and electoral politics. We find that, while political competition can yield allocative benefits for the public, it can also generate aggregate welfare costs by constricting the set of politically feasible public investments.

In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax competition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region, not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the existing results.

This paper continues the investigation of the logic of competing theories (be they scientific, social, political etc.) initiated in [4]. We introduce a many-valued, multi-type modal language which we endow with relational semantics based on enriched reflexive graphs, inspired by Ploščica's representation of general lattices. We axiomatize the resulting many-valued, non-distributive modal logic of these structures and prove a completeness theorem. We illustrate the application of this logic through a case study in which we model competition among interacting political promises and social demands within an arena of political parties social groups.

There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.

Is increasing political competition good for voters? We study this question in the political career concerns framework. Our results show that the relationship between political competition, viewed as the cost of challenging incumbent politicians, and the politicians' incentive to behave in the voters' interest is undetermined. The same holds for the relationship between political competition and voter welfare, where selection of politicians into office also matters. In particular, voter welfare need not be maximized when challenging incumbent politicians is costless. So, unlike in economy markets, where increased competition is beneficial, in political markets increased competition can have adverse effects. We tie our results to a contractual incompleteness that is typical of political markets, namely, that the set of instruments available to discipline politicians' behavior is limited.

This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies. Adapted from the source document.

This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. Voters view the public goods as a credible signal that their local candidate is in the right (i.e., powerful) faction. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.

In the developing areas, politics is often undemocratic, states lack a monopoly over violence, & politicians play upon cultural identities. To analyze politics in such settings, we develop a model in which politicians compete to build a revenue-yielding constituency. Citizens occupy fixed locations & politicians seek to maximize rents. To secure revenues, politicians must incur the costs of providing local public goods & mobilizing security services. Citizens must participate, ie, pay taxes; but can choose which leader to support. The model enables us to explore the impact of cultural identities & varying notions of military power. 3 Figures, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.