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This paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.

Este artículo trata sobre cómo los poetas Jordan Scott y ryan fitzpatrick rechazan la representación de corte conservador de las provincias de "las praderas" canadienses, y abogan por una poética de lo urbano y por lo que Sianne Ngai ha llamado "poética del desagrado". A través del uso de una dicción fragmentada, Scott y fitzpatrick crean interrupciones insalvables de lo consumible, construyendo así un lenguaje que desbarata las representaciones típicas de lo rural y lo geográfico. Como poetas de la ciudad de Calgary, se sienten constreñidos ideológicamente por el énfasis político en el crecimiento y la explotación petrolífera, distanciándose a su vez de la urgencia modernista por construir estructuras y significados. ; This essay deals with how poets Jordan Scott and ryan fitzpatrick reject the conservative prairie representation in favour of a poetics informed by urbanity and Sianne Ngai's "poetics of disgust." Using fragmented dictions, Scott and fitzpatrick create unmovable interruptions to the consumable, constructing language which disrupts typical representations of rurality and geography. As Calgarian poets, they are constrained ideologically by the political emphasis on growth and oil exploitation and distance themselves from the Modernist urge to construct either structure or meaning.

We study the impact of political intervention on a financial system that consists of banks and financial markets and develops over time. In this financial system, banks and markets exhibit three forms of interaction: they compete, they complement each other, and they co-evolve. Co-evolution is generated by two new ingredients of financial system architecture relative to the existing theories: securitization and risk-sensitive bank capital. We show that securitization propagates banking advances to the financial market, permitting market evolution to be driven by bank evolution, and market advances are transmitted to banks through bank capital. We then examine how politicians determine the nature of political intervention designed to expand credit availability. We find that political intervention in banking exhibits a U-shaped pattern, where it is most notable in the early stage of financial system development (through bank capital subsidy in exchange for state ownership of banks) and in the advanced stage (through direct lending regulation). Despite expanding credit access, political intervention results in an increase in financial system risk and does not contribute to financial system evolution. Numerous policy implications are drawn out.