Suchergebnisse

Since the Sixteenth century there have been 2 basic problems to which liberal thought has sought a solution: to fix moral limits on the powers of governments and to mediate between the different perceptions of the 'goodlife' reasonable people hold. (SJK)

The business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and person. John Locke

Table of Contents; Preface, by Thom Brooks and Martha C. Nussbaum; List of Abbreviations; Introduction, by Martha C. Nussbaum; 1. Changing Constructions, by Onora O'Neill; 2. Legitimacy and the Project of Political Liberalism, by Paul Weithman; 3. Isolating Public Reasons, by Jeremy Waldron; 4. The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism, by Thom Brooks; 5. The Priority of Liberty: Rawls and "Tiers of Scrutiny", by Frank I. Michelman; Index

Ting-Yat Chui. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-95). ; Abstract also in Chinese. ; INTRODUCTION --- p.1 ; Chapter (I) --- JOHN RAWLS´ة POLITICAL LIBERALISM --- p.4 ; Chapter 1. --- Why political liberalism? --- p.4 ; Chapter A. --- Reasonable Pluralism --- p.4 ; Chapter B. --- Stable for the Right Reasons --- p.7 ; Chapter 2. --- What is political liberalism? --- p.9 ; Chapter A. --- The aim of PL --- p.9 ; Chapter B. --- Two stages of the exposition --- p.11 ; Chapter a. --- The first stage of the exposition --- p.11 ; Chapter i. --- The political conception of justice --- p.11 ; Chapter ii. --- Political constructivism --- p.14 ; Chapter b. --- The second stage of the exposition --- p.15 ; Chapter i. --- The reasonable overlapping consensus --- p.15 ; Chapter ii. --- Public reason --- p.20 ; Chapter C. --- Liberal Principle of Legitimacy --- p.21 ; Chapter (II) --- WHY NOT POLITICAL LIBERALISM --- p.24 ; Chapter 1. --- The reasonable overlapping consensus? --- p.24 ; Chapter 2. --- Why should the citizens endorse the political conception of justice? --- p.28 ; Chapter A. --- Being reasonable? --- p.29 ; Chapter B. --- Prevailing ideas? --- p.34 ; Chapter 3. --- Why can the citizens endorse the political conception of justice? --- p.40 ; Chapter A. --- Why can't the burdens of judgment cause the disagreement on the political conception of justice? --- p.41 ; Chapter B. --- Is political conception of justice really political? --- p.47 ; Chapter a. --- The affirmation of the burdens of judgment --- p.47 ; Chapter b. --- The fundamental liberal idea of person --- p.49 ; Chapter C. --- Political virtue? --- p.59 ; Chapter a. --- The reasons for the stableness of a well-ordered society --- p.59 ; Chapter b. --- It is impossible for all reasonable citizens to respect political virtues in the political aspect --- p.61 ; Chapter i. --- The aim of social cooperation --- p.61 ; Chapter ii. --- It is impossible to privatize the good --- p.65 ...

This book examines Rawls's theory of political liberalism in the context of€Muslim societies, where religion wields a significant social and political influence. Contrasting a sociological analysis with a theoretical approach, the author explores the political questions brought up by religious individuals, organizations, and minorities, and examines fundamental notions such as neutrality of state, public/private distinction, and individual autonomy.

This article examines the discussion among Russian scholars and activists concerning the principles of political liberalism in Soviet Russia during the Gorbachev era (1985–1991) and in independent Russia during the Yeltsin presidency (1991-present). After a review of the emergence of liberalism during the Gorbachev years, the analysis focuses on three models of political liberalism which have emerged in the context of Russian postcommunist state construction. Each competing model of liberalism—statist, rule of law, and social—offers a different vision of the principles of political liberalism and the strategies necessary to institutionalize liberalism as the foundation of the postcommunist polity.

We provide a justification for political liberalism's Reciprocity Principle, which states that political decisions must be justified exclusively on the basis of considerations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. The standard argument for the Reciprocity Principle grounds it in a requirement of respect for persons. We argue for a different, but compatible, justification: the Reciprocity Principle is justified because it makes possible a desirable kind of political community. The general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle, we will argue, helps realize joint political rule and relationships of civic friendship. The main obstacle to the realization of these values is the presence of reasonable disagreement about religious, moral, and philosophical issues characteristic of liberal societies. We show the Reciprocity Principle helps to overcome this obstacle.