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We test whether generosity is related to political preferences and partisanship in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using incentivized dictator games. The total sample consists of more than 5,000 respondents. We document that support for social spending and redistribution is positively correlated with generosity in all four countries. Further, we show that donors are more generous towards co-partisans in all countries, and that this effect is stronger among supporters of left-wing political parties. All results are robust to the inclusion to an extensive set of control variables, including income and education.

Aaron Wildavsky has argued that it is theoretically more useful to think of political preferences as rooted in political culture than to entertain alternative bases such as schemas or ideologies. In the APSA presidential address in which he made his case, Wildavsky also advocated a program of research on political cultures, and welcomed "challenges and improvements." David Laitin accepts the invitation; he variously takes issue with Wildavsky's concept of political culture.

This article shows that citizens consider policy positions for the formation of their political preferences when they actively seek and find high-quality information, while they dismiss passively acquired and low-quality information. The study develops an extended theory of information and political preferences that incorporates the process of information acquisition and its connection with information quality. A novel experimental design separates the effects on political preferences due to information behavior as an activity from those due to selective exposure to information. The study applies this design in a laboratory experiment with a diverse group of participants using the example of issue voting and European integration in the context of the 2014 European Parliament elections. ; Peer Reviewed

A study of 365 M members of the Eugene, Oregon LF to test the hypothesis that religious involvement is 'directly related to preference for the Republican Party among fundamentalists & inversely related to Republican preference among liberals, regardless of econ class. Moreover, when religious involved persons of the same econ class are compared, fundamentalists should be more inclined to be Republicans than liberals.' The various sects of `Ascetic Protestantism' - denominations within the Calvinist, Pietist, & Revivalist traditions - were classified as fundamentalist or liberal, & church attendance was used as the major index of religious involvement. Contrary to the usual relationship between SS & pol'al preference, 'the denominations which have come under liberal influence are relatively middle Uc in the composition of their membership, whereas the denominations where fundamentalism holds sway are relatively We in composition.' This may be accounted for by the fact that the higher class congregations have chosen ministers who received their training from the more influential & prestigeful seminaries, & these 'have participated in the trend toward liberal humanitarianism that has been going on in intellectual circles for many yrs.' Results confirmed the hyp's, & indicated that 'because of the relationship of the factions of Ascetic Protestantism to the class system, it is likely that religious influences operate far more frequently to reduce or narrow class-cased pol'al diff's than to accentuate them.' I. Taviss.

This article shows that citizens consider policy positions for the formation of their political preferences when they actively seek and find high-quality information, while they dismiss passively acquired and low-quality information. The study develops an extended theory of information and political preferences that incorporates the process of information acquisition and its connection with information quality. A novel experimental design separates the effects on political preferences due to information behavior as an activity from those due to selective exposure to information. The study applies this design in a laboratory experiment with a diverse group of participants using the example of issue voting and European integration in the context of the 2014 European Parliament elections.

We examine preferences for redistribution inherent in Swedish tax policy 1971–2012using the inverse optimal tax approach. The income distribution is carefully characterizedwith the help of administrative register data and we employ behavioral elasticities reflectingthe perceived distortionary effects of taxation. The revealed social welfare weights are highfor non-workers, small for low-income earners, and hump-shaped around the median. Atthe top, they are always negative, especially so during the high-tax years of the 1970s and80s. The weights on non-workers increased sharply in the 1970s fell drastically in the late80s/early 90s, and have since then increased.

We examine preferences for redistribution inherent in Swedish tax policy during 1971-2012 using the inverse optimal tax approach. The income distribution is carefully characterized with the help of administrative register data, and we employ behavioral elasticities reflecting the perceived distortionary effects of taxation. The revealed social welfare weights are high for non-workers, small for low-income earners, and hump-shaped around the median. At the top, they are always negative, especially so during the high-tax years of the 1970s and '80s. The weights on non-workers increased sharply in the 1970s, fell drastically in the late '80s and early '90s, and have since then increased.

We examine preferences for redistribution inherent in Swedish tax policy 1971-2012 using the inverse optimal tax approach. The income distribution is carefully characterized with the help of administrative register data and we employ behavioral elasticities reflecting the perceived distortionary effects of taxation. The revealed social welfare weights are high for non-workers, small for low-income earners, and hump-shaped around the median. At the top, they are always negative, especially so during the high-tax years of the 1970s and 80s. The weights on non-workers increased sharply in the 1970s fell drastically in the late 80s/early 90s, and have since then increased.