Suchergebnisse

Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioral model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 99 state elections.

In a meta study of 25 political stock markets conducted in Germany in the last decade we analyze their predictive success. Although the predictions of political stock markets are highly correlated with the corresponding polls, the markets are able to aggregate additional information. One explanatory variable for variations in predictive success of the German stock markets relative to the polls is market efficiency. Even though the overall predictions of the political stock markets are quite reliable on the aggregate level we find systematic prediction errors on the contract level that can be attributed to the vote share size and to individual trader biases.

Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioral model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 99 state elections.

In a meta study of 25 political stock markets conducted in Germany in the last decade we analyze their predictive success. Although the predictions of political stock markets are highly correlated with the corresponding polls, the markets are able to aggregate additional information. One explanatory variable for variations in predictive success of the German stock markets relative to the polls is market efficiency. Even though the overall predictions of the political stock markets are quite reliable on the aggregate level we find systematic prediction errors on the contract level that can be attributed to the vote share size and to individual trader biases.

In a meta study of 25 political stock markets conducted in Germany in the last decade we analyze their predictive success. Although the predictions of political stock markets are highly correlated with the corresponding polls, the markets are able to aggregate additional information. One explanatory variable for variations in predictive success of the German stock markets relative to the polls is market efficiency. Even though the overall predictions of the political stock markets are quite reliable on the aggregate level we find systematic prediction errors on the contract level that can be attributed to the vote share size and to individual trader biases.

Using monthly data for the period 1953-2003, we apply a real-time modeling approach to investigate the implications of U.S. political stock market anomalies for forecasting excess stock returns. Our empirical findings show that political variables, selected on the basis of widely used model selection criteria, are often included in real-time forecasting models. However, they do not contribute to systematically improving the performance of simple trading rules. For this reason, political stock market anomalies are not necessarily an indication of market inefficiency.

Ausgehend von der Beobachtung, dass in Debatten um Modelle der Wahlentscheidung zunehmend über meinungsklimaorientiertes Wählen diskutiert wird, stellt der Beitrag Online-Wahlbörsen als Orientierungsmöglichkeit vor. Am Beispiel der Online-Wahlbörse des Handelsblatts zur Bundestagswahl 2013 zeigt der Beitrag darüber hinaus, was die Prognosegüte determiniert. Dafür konzentriert sich die Studie auf die Teilnehmereigenschaften als Determinante. Um mehr als in bisherigen Studien über die Teilnehmer von Online-Wahlbörsen zu erfahren, die durch ihr Handeln die Prognose bilden, wurde der Online-Wahlbörse des Handelsblatts zur Bundestagswahl 2013 zwei Tage vor der Wahl ein Online-Fragebogen zugeschaltet. Wer sind die Teilnehmer der Wahlbörse und welche Erwartungen hatten sie an den Wahlausgang? Das Ergebnis zeigt, die Teilnehmer informierten sich hauptsächlich im Internet, waren überdurchschnittlich politisch interessiert und präferierten sehr stark die AfD, was zu Prognoseverzerrungen führte.

This paper assesses the attitude of investors towards Democratic change by performing an event study using Russian government bonds. The Revolution of 1905 offers an ideal occasion as, alongside the related revolutionary events, it was accompanied by two opposing constitutional changes within a short period of time. This study contributes to the debate as to whether Imperial Russia could possibly have followed other Western European states, i.e. gradually adopting a democratic rule, or whether a revolution was inevitable - as the writing of Soviet history suggests. Furthermore, the Russo-Japanese War is taken into consideration. The results are basically in line with the literature on the impact of wars on capital markets. Prices of two types of bonds on both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin stock exchange are employed. As it turns out, investors in the East and West were largely consistent in their reactions.

This paper assesses the attitude of investors towards Democratic change by performing an event study using Russian government bonds. The Revolution of 1905 offers an ideal occasion as, alongside the related revolutionary events, it was accompanied by two opposing constitutional changes within a short period of time. This study contributes to the debate as to whether Imperial Russia could possibly have followed other Western European states, i.e. gradually adopting a democratic rule, or whether a revolution was inevitable - as the writing of Soviet history suggests. Furthermore, the Russo-Japanese War is taken into consideration. The results are basically in line with the literature on the impact of wars on capital markets. Prices of two types of bonds on both the Saint Petersburg and the Berlin stock exchange are employed. As it turns out, investors in the East and West were largely consistent in their reactions.

'Wahlbörsen sind ein Instrument der Meinungsforschung, um Wahlergebnisse vorherzusagen, leisten aber aufgrund der ihnen zuteil werdenden öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit auch Funktionen der politischen Bildungsarbeit. Struktur und Methodik von Wahlbörsen, aber auch ihre Möglichkeiten und Grenzen werden ausführlich dargestellt. Detailanalysen beschäftigen sich insbesondere mit dem Kursverlauf und der Dateninterpretation einer von den Autorinnen betreuten Wahlbörse vor der österreichischen Nationalratswahl 2002 sowie mit neuen Erkenntnissen über Handelsentscheidungen und das politische Informationsverhalten der Händlerinnen. Die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass Wahlbörsen in Zukunft regelmäßig stattfinden werden, aber mit steigender Öffentlichkeit vermehrt Konflikte zwischen wissenschaftlichen Interessen und den Anliegen von medialen Veranstaltern entstehen, die den spielerischen Charakter in den Mittelpunkt stellen. Dementsprechend werden konkrete Empfehlungen für die zukünftige Gestaltung von Wahlbörsen gegeben.' (Autorenreferat)

'Wahlbörsen, Wählerstromanalysen und Hochrechnungen werden zwar in der Öffentlichkeit viel beachtet, in der politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung aber nur selten diskutiert, weil die Methodologie jeweils komplex und ungewohnt ist. Alle Verfahren weisen eine Reihe spezifischer Probleme auf, die die Wahlsoziologie nur in Kooperation mit den Experimental Economics, aus denen die Wahlbörsen kommen, und mit der Statistik, aus denen die Wählerstromanalyse kommt, lösen kann. Wahlbörsen haben nach ihren anfänglichen Prognose-Erfolgen eine Größe und eine Öffentlichkeitswirkung erlangt, die die Vorhersagegenauigkeit vermutlich wieder stark beeinträchtigen. In unserem Beitrag fassen wir die jüngste Geschichte der Political Stock Markets zusammen und geben einige Design-Empfehlungen. Wählerstromanalysen, die auch die Basis für Wahltagshochrechnungen liefern, sind mit einer Reihe von methodischen Herausforderungen konfrontiert. Wir belegen mit österreichischen Wahldaten die andernorts geäußerte Vermutung, dass einer adäquaten Gruppierung von Gemeinden zur Vermeidung eines aggregate bias die höchste Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden sollte.' (Autorenreferat)

AbstractWe define areas with strong geographic ties to powerful politicians as politically vibrant and show that they are characterized by greater value‐relevant information generation and symptomatic of equity market segmentation. Political vibrancy entails greater levels of local bias and local comovement and has two important return predictability implications. First, it enhances local institutions' informational advantages; their trades' ability to forecast local stock returns exceeds that of nonlocal institutions. Second, in support of the view that information diffuses slowly into prices, stock returns of firms from politically vibrant areas predict returns of similar firms in other areas.

We find that the average excess return in the stock market is higher under Democratic than Republican presidents– a difference of 9 percent per year for the value-weighted portfolio and 16 percent for the equal-weighted portfolio. The difference is economically and statistically significant, does not seem to be due to small sample biases, and is robust in different subsamples. There is a remarkable monotonicity in the difference of returns for size-decile portfolios, from 7 percent for large firms to about 22 percent for small firms. Presidential partisan cycles have a heterogeneous impact on industry returns: the tobacco, telecom, and chemical industries have performed better under Republican presidents, whereas the real estate, construction, and services industries have fared significantly better under Democrats. We test three plausible explanations for these findings. First, the relation might be due to political variables proxying for business-cycle factors. Second, the relation might be attributed to unexpected returns around elections, when information is revealed, rather than to expected returns varying with the political cycle. Lastly, differences in stock market riskiness across presidential regimes could account for the difference in average returns. We reject all three hypotheses. As it stands, the difference in excess returns during Republican and Democratic presidencies is a puzzle that cannot easily be explained. However, the cross-sectional evidence from size-sorted and industry portfolios suggests that the party in the presidency may affect the stock market through differences in fiscal and regulatory policies.