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ATLASES: Poetics, Politics, and Performance is a web exhibition of atlases from the Special Collections and School of Geographical Sciences of the University of Bristol (http://uobatlases.net/). It includes atlases produced between 1570 to approximately 1970.The exhibition consists of four thematic parts. Renaissance Theatres contains famous and les famous atlases produced between the end of the 16th century to the middle of the 17th century, such as atlases by Ortelius (1574), Camden (1610), Speed (1611) and four atlas tomes by Blaeu (1645). Rhetoric of Truth contains geological and archaeological atlases from the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. However, Rhetoric of Truth is not only limited to renaissance, but it also encompasses first computer generated atlases, e.g. Atlas of Breeding Birds in England and Ireland (1976) and others. The Colonial Gaze focuses on atlases applied in colonial projects and land exploitation in Africa and the Caribbean Islands, as well as in circulation of race theories in Europe and North America at the end of the 19th century. The last part, National Identities and Conflict explores the role of atlas as a powerful instrument for visualizing conflicts and shaping territorial-political ideas in the 20th century. ; ATLASES: Poetics, Politics, and Performance je izložba na mreži atlasa iz Specijalne zbirke i Škole geografskih znanosti (Special Collections and School of Geographical Sciences) Sveučilišta u Bristolu (http://uobatlases.net/). Uključeni su atlasi od 1570. do približno 1970. godine.Izložba obuhvaća četiri tematske cjeline. Renaissance Theatres sadrži slavne i manje poznate atlase od kraja 16. do sredine 17. stoljeća., među ostalim, Orteliusov atlas iz 1574., Camdenov iz 1610., Speedov iz 1611. i četiri toma Blaeuova atlasa iz 1645. Rhetoric of Truth sadrži geološke i arheološke atlase iz 18. i početka 19. stoljeća. Međutim, cjelina Rhetoric of Truth nije ograničena samo na stoljeća prosvjetiteljstva već prožima i prve računalno generirane atlase poput npr. Atlas of Breeding Birds in England and Ireland (1976) i neke druge. Treća cjelina The Colonial Gaze fokusirana je na atlase koji su primjenjivani u provedbi kolonijalnih projekata i eksploataciji zemljišta u Africi i na Karibima, ali i cirkulaciji rasnih teorija krajem 19. stoljeća u Europi i Sjevernoj Americi. Posljednji dio National Identities and Conflict istražuje ulogu atlasa kao moćnog instrumenta za vizualizaciju sukoba i oblikovanje teritorijalno-političkih ideja u 20. stoljeću.

U prvoj polovini 19- stoljeća dolazi do povijesnih i političkih previranja u Europi: pojava panslavizma, revolucija 1948., koja je trebala rušenjem Austrougarske Monarhije uspostaviti temelje demokraciji (u kojoj se hrvatski ban Jelačić stavio na stranu Beča), te intenzivan interes kulturne Europe za zaostali srpski narod pod turskom vlašću. I pored kontroverzne uloge J. Kopitara i Vuka Karadžića, Hrvati prihvaćaju Književni dogovor 1850. g. sa Srbima, koji već u ono vrijeme, očevidno uz pomoć politike i lingvistike, osporavaju Hrvatima identitet. ; In the first half of the 19th century Europe saw some historical and political changes like Pan-Slavism and the Revolution of 1848, which was to build up democratic fundaments through the abolition of the Austro Hungarian Empire (with the Croartian Banus Jelačić on the Viennese side). Europe's cultural interest in Serbia increased. The Serbs were under Turkish dominance and thus restricted in their development. In 1850, despite controversial roles of J. Kopitar and Vuk Karadžić, the Croats agreed to a literary arrangement with the Serbs, who had already at that time obviously disputed the Croatian identity by means of politics and linguistics.

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAPrijedlog zakona o šumama prošao je prvo čitanje u Saboru Republike Hrvatske. Njegova priprema trajala je skoro dvije godine. U povjerenstvu za izradu sudjelovali su predstavnici svih relevantnih sektorskih institucija, a prijedlog zakona prošao je i e-savjetovanje, nakon kojega je dio primjedbi usvojen. Na saborskom Odboru za poljoprivredu bilo je dosta rasprave o iznosu naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma, čija bi se stopa trebala zadržati na postojećoj razini od 0,0265 %, ali s oslobađanjem plaćanja naknade svim pravnim i fizičkim osobama koje ostvaruju godišnji prihod do tri milijuna kuna. Vezano za raspodjelu sredstava iz naknade OKFŠ-a buru među šumarskim znanstvenicima i stručnjacima izazvao je prijedlog pravilnika sa smanjenjem financiranja znanstveno-istraživačkih radova sa sadašnjih 5 % na samo 1 %, što bi u praksi značilo da se samo oko milijun i pol kuna raspodjeljuje za šumarsku znanost. Svjesni svih ugroza koje trenutno vladaju u hrvatskim šumama, ovakav prijedlog je stvarno nerazuman i podcjenjivački. Valja se nadati da će kritički komentari i prijedlozi uroditi plodom te da će se znanstveno-istraživačkim radovima propisati traženih 10 % od ukupnih sredstava iz fonda OKFŠ-a. Novi pak Pravilnik o nedrvnim šumskim proizvodima unosi nepotrebno i golemo administriranje zbog izdavanja dozvola za besplatno sakupljanje šumskih plodova za vlastite potrebe, bez mogućnosti kvalitetne kontrole ulaska u šumu na temelju kojega mogu nastupiti i značajne štete za dio šumskog ekosustava, a povećana je i opasnost od šumskih požara.Nedavno najavljeno osnivanje sedamnaeste podružnice Hrvatskih šuma u Slatini, za područje Virovitičko-podravske županije, možda je prošlo nekako nezapaženo i ne previše glasno komentirano u šumarskoj javnosti. Međutim, sama realizacija te ideje otvorila bi Pandorinu kutiju iz koje ne znamo što bi sve izašlo, a po mitologiji iz te kutije je izašlo zlo. Raspodjela državnih šuma i šumskih zemljišta u Republici Hrvatskoj ne prati političke granice županija i općina. To je davno napušteno. Trgovačko društvo Hrvatske šume d.o.o. u stopostotnom je vlasništvu Republike Hrvatske i brine se o gospodarenju državnim šumama, ne gledajući na lokalne granice, jer je interes šume u prvom planu. Naravno da lokalno stanovništvo treba imati koristi od resursa kojima raspolaže, ali to se rješava kroz zapošljavanje u Hrvatskim šumama d.o.o., prodaju ogrjeva, sakupljanje nedrvnih proizvoda i slično. Najavljena korist za Virovitičko-podravsku županiju osnivanjem nove podružnice kosi se s današnjim ustrojem i upravljanjem Hrvatskim šumama. Nijedna županija ne radi razvojne planove za Hrvatske šume d.o.o., no suradnja s jedinicama lokalne uprave posvuda postoji, jer su šumari oduvijek bili dio zajednice u kojoj su djelovali. Ne samo da je najava upravljanja eventualnom novom podružnicom iz županije nemoguća, nego bi se time otvorila mogućnost prekrajanja granica i ostalih podružnica po županijskim granicama. Neke podružnice mogle bi biti ukinute, a neke bi se proširile izvan povijesnih i tradicijskih granica. Svaki ustroj ima svojih nedostataka i ne može se reći da je sadašnji idealan, ali sa svakom najavom promjena, posebice ako nisu cjelovite nego parcijalne, provedbom istih dolazi do sukoba u kojima glavnu ulogu ne igraju racionalni gospodarski razlozi, nego trenutna politička moć. Trenutno postoji 21 županija s gradom Zagrebom, ali već godinama se vode rasprave treba li smanjiti broj tih administrativnih jedinica. Za koju godinu će možda postojati samo nekoliko regija. Da li bi onda ponovno trebalo prekrajati granice podružnica unutar Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o.? Današnje poslovanje trgovačkog društva u državnom vlasništvu, iako ima monopolistički položaj, nikako ne određuje tržišno poslovanje, nego državom uvjetovana raspodjela sirovine po dugo vremena najnižim cijenama u regiji, ali i u čitavoj Europskoj uniji. Najveću cijenu "darivanja" državnog resursa plaća šuma kojoj se ne vraća ono osnovno kroz dostatne šumsko-gospodarske zahvate, a kamoli da joj se poboljšava stanje sanacijom uslijed elementarnih nepogoda, promjene klime, pojave novih štetnika i drugih ugroza. U takvoj situaciji razmišljati o stvaranju nove podružnice zbog zadovoljavanja lokalnih apetita nikako nije mudro ni racionalno. Uredništvo ; EDITORIALThe forest law proposal has gone through the first reading in the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia. It has been prepared for almost two years. The conflict of interest committee was participated by the representatives of all relevant sector institutions; the Law proposal also underwent an e-consultation after which a part of the comments were accepted. At the Board of Agriculture there was considerable discussion on the amount of reimbursement for the nonprofit forest functions, the rate of which should be retained at the present level of 0.0265%, though with the exemption from payment granted to all legal and physical persons with a yearly income up to three million Kunas. In connection with the distribution of the means from the OKFŠ (nonprofit forest functions) fund, the proposed regulations that would reduce the finances for the scientific research from the present 5% to only 1% have caused a turmoil among the scientists; this would practically mean that only about 1.5 million Kunas would be alloted to forestry science. Considering the many current threatening issues related to the Croatian forests, a proposal of this kind is irrational and degrading. We hope that the critical comments and suggestions will supports the efforts toward achieving the required 10% of the OKFŠ fund for scientific research. On the other hand, the new Regulations on the non-wood forest products are causing the unnecessary huge administration due to the issuing licences for free uncontrolled collection of forest fruits for personal use, which could lead to considerable damage to one part of the ecosystem; besides, this would increase the already high danger of forest fires. The recently announced foundation of the 17th branch office of the Croatian Forests in Slatina for the region of the Virovitica/Podravina county has been almost unnoticed and only marginally commented in the forestry environment. However, the realisation of the idea would open the Pandora's box, out of which who knows what would emerge; the myth says, all the evels of the world. The distribution of state forests and forest areas in the Republic of Croatia does not coincide with the political borders of the counties and municipal areas, as it used to be for a long time. The trading company Croatian Forests Ltd. is entirely owned by the Republic of Croatia, so that the state takes care of the management of its forests without considering the local border lines. The care for the forest comes first. The local population should benefit from the forest resources, which is achieved through employment in Croatian Forests Ltd., sale of fuelwood, collecting the non-wood products, etc. The announced benefit for the Virovitica/Podravina county through the foundation of the new branch is in conflict with the present constitution and management of the Croatian Forests. No county makes development plans in the name of the Croatian Forests Ltd.; however, there is a collaboration among the units of the local management because foresters have always been a part of the community in which they have been active. Not only that the announcement of the management of a new branch office in a county is unacceptable, but it would also open a possibility of changing the borders of other branch offices, some of which could then be cancelled, others would cross outside of the historical traditional borders. With all the disadvantages of the present constellation, we cannot claim that the present one is ideal; with every proposed change, particularly such that is not global but particular, its implementation usually results in conflicts, not caused by rational economic reasons, but by current political power. There are now twenty-one counties, including the City of Zagreb. Disputes have been going on for years on whether the number of these administrative units should be reduced. In a few years, there may be only several regions. Should the borders of the branch offices be then again changed within the borderlines of the Croatian Forests Ltd? Though monopolistic, the present business management of the trading company owned by the state is not defined by the market but by the distribution of raw materials at the lowest prices in the region and all European Union over a long time. The highest price of "giving away" the state resources has been paid by the forest without reimbursing it with what is fundamental - satisfactory forest management operations, not to speak of improvements by recovery after damages, climate change, new pests and other threats. At this time the opening of new branch offices in order to satisfy local appetites is neither wise nor rational. Editorial Board

U ovome broju časopisa Etnološka tribina objavljujemo temat koji problematizira turizam – njegove aktere, politike i procese – kako one koji oblikuju i usmjeravaju turizam tako i one koje turizam stvara i pokreće. Radovi u tematu bave se različitim vizijama i strategijama turističkog razvoja (Antonio Miguel Nogués-Pedregal, Raúl Travé-Molero i Daniel Carmona-Zubiri); primjenom načela stvaranja doživljaja u suvremenim muzejskim postavima (Daniela Angelina Jelinčić i Matea Senkić); vezom tradicijske prehrane, okusa i nostalgije u istarskim agroturizmima (Tanja Kocković Zaborski); oblikovanjem memorijalnih mjesta bitki na Soči u Prvom svjetskom ratu i posjetima tim lokalitetima u međuratnom razdoblju (Petra Kavrečič); okolišnim, društvenim i političko-ekonomskim procesima koji utječu na baštinu i turizam na Zlarinu i u Trenti (Peter Simonič); životom Danice Brössler u Dubrovniku kao primjerom turističkih aktivnosti pojedinaca (Tihana Petrović Leš). ; The thematic section of this year's issue of Etnološka tribina problematises tourism and its actors, politics and processes – both those which shape and direct tourism, and those which are created and sparked by tourism. The articles deal with different visions and strategies of tourist development (Antonio Miguel Nogués-Pedregal, Raúl Travé-Molero and Daniel Carmona-Zubiri); the application of the principles of experience creation in contemporary museum displays (Daniela Angelina Jelinčić and Matea Senkić); the relationships between traditional food, tastes and nostalgia in Istrian agrotourism (Tanja Kocković Zaborski); the construction of the memorial sites of the Soča front in WWI and visits to those sites in the interwar period (Petra Kavrečič); environmental, social and political-economic processes which influence heritage and tourism on Zlarin Island and in the Trenta Valley (Peter Simonič); and the life of Danica Brössler in Dubrovnik as an example of an individual's tourist activities (Tihana Petrović Leš).

Hegelove riječi iz Enciklopedije filozofskih znanosti, da revolucija nije moguća bez reformacije, mogu se shvatiti kao načelno upozorenje da svakoj korjenitoj političkoj promjeni mora prethoditi promjena u unutrašnjem svijetu uvjerenja pojedinca i zajednice. Te riječi povijesno preciznije upućuju na reformirano kršćanstvo kao na inherentni poticaj modernim revolucionarnim previranjima. Religiozno oslobođenje savjesti prethodilo je političkom oslobođenju i u tom smislu Hegel izdvaja protestantizam kao najviši lik religioznosti koji je u modernoj običajnosti moguć. Hegel favorizira protestantizam ne samo zato što je uvjeren da je religijska reformacija prethodila i da uvijek mora prethoditi revoluciji nego i zbog toga što smatra da s protestantizmom postaje očito da i reformiranje religije ostaje nedovršeno i apstraktno ne preraste li u politički prevrat. Razmatranje načina na koji Hegel problematizira odnos države i religije autora vodi k zaključku: revolucije ne može biti bez reformacije, ali ni istinske reformacije bez revolucije. ; Hegel's words from the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, that a revolution is not possible without a reformation, can be understood as the general warning that the change within the inner world of beliefs of individual and community must precede every radical political change. Historically more precise, these words point to the Reformed Christianity as the inherent impetus to the modern revolutionary movements. The religious liberation of conscience preceded the political liberation, and Hegel, therefore, points out Protestantism as the highest form of religiosity which is possible in the modern ethical life. On the other hand, Hegel favours Protestantism not only because he is convinced that the religious reformation preceded and must precede the revolution, but also because he considers that with Protestantism becomes evident that the reformation of religion remains incomplete and abstract if it does not grow into the political upheaval. Considering the way Hegel is problematizing the nature of the relationship between state and religion, the author concludes: there can be no revolution without a reformation, but neither a true reformation without a revolution.

Autor istražuje etničko nasilje usmjereno prema Srbima u Zadru 1990. i 1991. koristeći se različitim oblicima pisanih izvora (novine, sudski dokumenti, policijski izvještaji, nalazi psihijatrijsko-forenzičkih vještačenja i srodni izvori) i prikupljenim usmenim svjedočanstvima ljudi koji su tih godina živjeli u Zadru. Istraživanje obuhvaća prva otpuštanja s posla, stvaranje atmosfere straha i nepovjerenja, uništavanje imovine tijekom zadarske "kristalne noći" i nakon nje, te djelovanje "trojki" koje su upadale u stanove i zlostavljale Srbe s ciljem njihovog zastrašivanja i protjerivanja, te na kraju, ubojstva Srba u Zadru u drugoj polovici 1991., s osobitim naglaskom na umorstvo troje zarobljenih Srba u improviziranom zatvoru u listopadu 1991. Autor te događaje promatra u svjetlu diskurzivnog djelovanja državnih i lokalnih elita, koristeći teoriju kulturalne politike emocija koju je iznijela teoretičarka kulture Sarah Ahmed u svojoj studiji "The Cultural Politics of Emotions" u kojoj ističe kako emotivni iskazi osim deklarativnih imaju i performativnu ulogu u smislu da mogu stvarati, oblikovati i teritorijalizirati polje društvenih odnosa. Uloga emocije straha i emocije bijesa u stvaranju podjela bila je razvidna devedesetih, no u većini studija etničkih sukoba u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, nije joj pridana odgovarajuća težina. Autor istražuje kako je politički diskurs koji se u Hrvatskoj počeo artikulirati za vrijeme prvih višestranačkih izbora 1990., a postao sveprisutan početkom ratnih napetosti 1991., utjecao na stvaranje nacionalnih podjela i formiranje društvene situacije u kojoj je međuetničko nasilje postalo društveno prihvatljivim načinom političkog djelovanja. Također, u radu će biti istaknuti načini na koji su zadarski Srbi sami proživljavali vlastitu viktimizaciju, te nedostatak interesa institucija za nasilje prema njima. ; The author examines ethnic violence against the Serbs in Zadar in 1990 and 1991 by using different written sources (newspapers, judicial documents, police reports, medical and forensic ...

Rad istražuje načine na koje su rodni odnosi izraženi kroz specifičnu komunikativnu infrastrukturu grada – nazive javnih prostora i urbane plastike – čija svrha, tvrdimo, nadilazi funkcionalnu (orijentir; komemoracija verzije nacionalne povijesti) i su-određuje odnose moći u sferi roda. Analizirajući obrasce označavanja, oblikovanja i pozicioniranja imena, ploča i spomenika u Zagrebu, kombinacijom statističke obrade, mapiranja i istraživačke šetnje, pokazujemo da urbano znakovlje glavnog grada Hrvatske, u vremenu širenja debate o rodnoj ravnopravnosti, zadržava dominantno patrijarhalno uređenje koje je nasljeđeno iz perioda posvemašnjeg rasta, s kraja 19./početka 20. i sredinom 20. stoljeća, i znatno preferira muškarce kao aktere i tumače javnog prostora i povijesti. Usvojena prostorna analiza obuhvaća ne samo učestalost nego i prostornu distribuciju te tipove reprezentacije žena u urbanom znakovlju (imena, ploče, spomenici) Zagreba. Dobiveni rezultati propituju se pod lupom kritičke i konstruktivističke škole kulturnih studija i kontekstualiziraju procesima medijske posredovanosti gradova i urbanog života tranzicijskih društava. ; This paper investigates the ways in which gender relations are articulated through a particular communicative urban infrastructure, such as names of public spaces and public art. We argue that their selective design and distribution suggest meanings beyond functional purposes (to serve as orientation points or as national commemorative sites) and co-constitute gendered power relations. Reading the patterns of signification, formulation and positioning of names, plaques and statues in Zagreb, through our raft of statistical analysis, mapping, and ethnographic walks, we show that the urban signage of the capital of Croatia, in a time of increased debates about gender equality and identity, continues to uphold the patriarchy inherited from earlier periods of city growth, namely the late 19th/early 20th centuries and mid-20th century. Our spatial analysis concerns not only the frequency but also spatial distribution and forms of representation of women in the names of public spaces and commemorative plaques and statues. The research presented here suggests that Zagreb's public urban signage significantly prefers men to women as actors in public space and nation's history. We discuss our findings from the perspective of critical and constructivist approaches in cultural studies and contextualise them with reference to the ways in which contemporary urban spaces are said to be 'mediated cities'.

Ovaj diplomski rad bavi se razdobljem pozitivizma u Poljskoj koje je trajalo od 1863. do 1890. godine. U radu se opisuje društveno-politička situacija u Europi i njezin utjecaj na Poljsku koja je još 1795. bila podijeljena na austrijski, pruski i ruski dio. Objašnjavaju se zatim temeljni pojmovi programa poljskog pozitivizma. Osim društveno-političke scene, riječ je i o pozitivizmu u poljskoj književnosti, o vrstama književnosti kao što su tendenciozna i agitacijska književnost, te o cenzuri. Pozitivizam u sociologiji utemeljio je Auguste Comte u svome djelu "Zakon triju stadija". Poljski pozitivisti preuzeli su neke vrijednosti i prilagodili pozitivizam svojim potrebama. Promjene u Europi potaknule su politička previranja u Poljskoj: želju za asimilacijom Židova, ali i rast antisemitizma te emancipacija žena i seljaka. Prikazani su također problemi društvenih skupina koje nisu imale status poljskog plemstva. ; This graduate thesis deals with the period of positivism in Poland (1863 – 1890). The theisis addresses the socio-political situation in Europe and its impact in Poland, which was divided in 1795 into Austrian, Prussian and Russian part. The basic concepts of the Polish positivism program are explained. Apart from the socio-political scene, it is also about positivism in Polish literature, about types of literature such as tendentious and agitational literature, and about censorship. Positivism in sociology was founded by Auguste Comte in his work "The Law of the Three Stages". Polish positivists have taken on some values and adapted positivism to their needs. Changes in Europe have fueled political turmoil in Poland: the desire to assimilate Jews, but also the rise of anti-Semitism and the emancipation of women and peasants. Problems of social groups that did not have the status of Polish nobility are also presented.

Politički savjetnici obilježje su suvremene državne uprave. Predstavljaju osobe koje temeljem imenovanja prema nedefiniranim kriterijima pružaju savjete ministru ili premijeru u pogledu javnih politika, političkih aspekata i koordinacije ili odnosa s javnošću. Dolaze i odlaze s ministrom, a njihov je status u pravilu nejednako reguliran u pojedinim državama, ako je uopće i reguliran. Javljaju se zbog promjena u upravljanju, potrebe za jačanjem koordinacije, vodstva i strategije kao i odgovora na intenziviranje komunikacija. Dovode do promjena u odnosu između politike i uprave u državnoj upravi, a osnovne zamjerke i nepovjerenje javnosti proizlaze iz netransparentnosti, izostanka regulacije i nedostatka odgovornosti. U radu se razmatraju razlozi zbog kojih politički savjetnici postaju neizostavan dio ministarskih kabineta, analiziraju se pojam, vrste i funkcije političkih savjetnika te opisuju posljedice i ključni elementi koncepta. Naglašava se važnost uređenja statusa političkih savjetnika i transparentnosti radi osiguravanja ostvarivanja javnog interesa i povjerenja javnosti u institucije. ; These days political advisors are indispensable to state administration. They are appointed to their positions to advise ministers and the prime minister on public policy, various political aspects and coordination, or on public relations and aspects of communication. Their appointments depend on the minister's term of office. Political advisors are not part of the civil service and different states take different approaches, if any at all, to regulating their status. The need for political advisors arises in conjunction with changes in management, the need to strengthen coordination, leadership and strategy, as well as the need to address a growing intensity of communication. Political advisors constitute a new factor in the dynamic between politicians and civil servants, and they bring about changes in the relationship between politics and administration. They generate a mistrust among the general public, due to a lack of transparency and accountability, as well as the fact that, as a rule, their position is governed by specific regulations, if any at all. Conflict of interest, in particular, is a cause for concern. The paper examines the reasons why political advisors may become key members of ministerial cabinets, analyses the concept of the political advisor and their various types and functions, and describes the consequences and key elements of the concept. Trends in some countries are also included.

Crna Gora je Ustavom iz 2007. godine postavila temelje modelu multikulturalizma u odnosu države prema činjenici etnokulturnog pluralizma. Puna integracija svih etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica može biti ostvarena isključivo poštovanjem i priznavanjem njihovih kolektivnih identiteta u političkoj dimenziji, zabranom asimilacije i svih oblika diskriminacije manjinskih nacionalnih zajednica. U demografskom smislu, prema rezultatima posljednjeg popisa stanovništva, radi se o multikulturalnoj državi u kojoj postoji izražen etnokulturni pluralizam. Sa aspekta ostvarenih rezultata u procesu integracije etnonacionalnih manjina u Crnoj Gori, najlošiji rezultati ostvareni su u pogledu integracije romske etničke zajednice. Teškoće u procesu integracije ove zajednice u crnogorsko društvo rezultat su i pravno-institucionalnih nedostataka, posebno u dijelu koji se tiče njene političke participacije. ; The 2007 Constitution of Montenegro has laid down the foundation for the model of multiculturalism which is the basic principle of the states' relation towards the fact of ethnic pluralism within Montenegrin society. Full integration of all ethnic and national communities can be achieved only through recognition and respect of their collective identities in political dimension, prevention of the assimilation and all forms of discrimination of minority national communities. In demographic terms, according to the last census, Montenegro is multicultural state with significant level of ethno cultural pluralism. From the perspective of achieved results in the integration process of minority communities in Montenegro, integration of the members of Roma community was the least successful. The difficulties in the integration process of this community in Montenegrin society are the result of institutional shortcomings, especially in terms of its political participation.

U ovome radu želimo ukazati na korijene Moltmannove »nove političke teologije« koje je izgradio uz J. B. Metza krajem 1960-ih i početkom 1970-ih godina s posebnim naglaskom na značenje križa u političkom i društvenom angažmanu kršćanskih vjerskih zajednica i vjernika. Moltmannova koncepcija »nove političke teologije« u velikoj se mjeri oslanja na poimanje smrti Boga koje crpi kako iz povijesti Isusa iz Nazareta, tako i iz Hegelova razumijevanja spekulativnog Velikog petka. Postavljajući veliki naglasak na smrt Boga, Moltmann je u mogućnosti križ postaviti kao radikalnu kritiku bilo kakvih obogotvorenja kolektivnih identiteta koje nameće društvo, politika i religija, pri čemu revolucionarnost križa vidi u neprestanoj kritici tih identiteta. ; In this paper, we want to point to the roots of Moltmann's "new political theology" which he initiated along with J. B. Metz at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, with special emphasis on the meaning of the cross in the political and societal engagement of Christian communities and believers. Moltmann's conception of "new political theology" is mainly relying on his conception of the death of God which he draws from the history of Jesus of Nazareth, but from Hegel's understanding of the speculative Good Friday as well. Mainly emphasising the death of God, Moltmann was able to posit the cross as a radical critique of the divinization of collective identities that the society, politics and religion push forward. Along those lines, he sees the revolutionary potential of the cross in the critique of these identities.

Vrijeme kada nisu postojali odnosi između politike i sporta, bilo da se radi o svakodnevnoj praksi ili znanstvenoistraživačkim pristupima povezanosti tih dvaju pojmova, ako ga je ikada i bilo, svakako je odavno iza nas. Usprkos tome danas se čini da se, osobito u znanstvenoistraživačkom radu na području nekadašnjih sportskih socijalističkih velesila, tim odnosima ne posvećuje odgovarajuća pozornost i da se oni često a priori negiraju i smatraju nevažnima. Zbog toga je glavni cilj ovoga članka potaknuti raspravu o važnosti i smislu istraživanja odnosa između politike i sporta gledano iz dvije perspektive – s obzirom na iskustva znanstvenika iz cijeloga svijeta te s obzirom na dosad provedena istraživanja znanstvenika iz bivše Jugoslavije. Stoga smo u ovome članku najprije teoretski odredili kontekst odnosa politike i sporta, a zatim smo analizom postojeće svjetske literature i radova znanstvenika s prostora bivše Jugoslavije analizirali međusobnu povezanost sporta i politike. Na temelju dobivenih rezultata, koji potvrđuju stalnu i čvrstu povezanost, ali ujedno i suviše apstraktno i paušalno razumijevanje odnosa sporta i politike, nudimo politološki relevantnu tipologiju odnosa između politike i sporta. Smatramo da razlike između odnosa politike kao borbe za vlast, institucionalne strukture te koncepta javnointeresnog djelovanja i sporta presudno utječu na buduća obilježja odnosa sporta i politike. ; Times when relations between politics and sports did not exist – be it in everyday practices or within scientific research – is definitely long gone, if they ever even existed. Nevertheless, it seems today that, especially within scientific research, these relations do not receive appropriate attention in the territories of former socialist sports superpowers, being a priori denied and considered as unimportant. That is why the key motive of this article is to initiate a discussion about the relevance of knowledge and research of the relations between politics and sport from two perspectives – the existing world-wide political science research experiences gained so far and already conducted researches in the territory of former Yugoslavia. In doing so, we first theoretically define the context of sports and politics, and then with the use of the literature review method analyse their mutual connectivity in the world and, more narrowly, within the work of the scientific community in the region of former Yugoslavia. Based on the gained conclusions which confirm a tight and constant, but also often abstract and flat-rate understood interplay between both analysed phenomena, a special typology for their in-depth and political-science-focused study is delivered. It is believed that distinctions between political, polity and policy approaches to sport decisively influence the mode of their future interplay.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.

U radu se razmatra Lockeovo poimanje prirodnoga stanja kao prve sekvence njegove kontraktualističke naracije te razlozi za napuštanje toga prirodnoga stanja i dragovoljni ulazak pojedinaca u političku zajednicu. Pojedinci na temelju izričitog pristanka, odnosno društvenog ugovora, postaju članovima političke zajednice. Motiv za stvaranje političke zajednice je očuvanje vlasništva koje je u Lockeovoj filozofiji politike, suprotno teoretičarima njegova doba kao što su Grotius, Hobbes i Pufendorf, pojmljeno kao pretpolitička kategorija. Locke vlasništvo poima na dvostruki način: u širem smislu riječi ono podrazumijeva život, slobodu i imetak pojedinca, a u užem smislu riječi vlasništvo označava samo imetak. Političkoj zajednici kao ustanovljenoj državi namijenjena je samo instrumentalna uloga koja se sastoji od toga da kao nepristrani sudac razrješava sporove, osigura očuvanje imovine te da među pojedincima sprečava moguće nasilje i prevare koje nastaju zbog velikih razlika u vlasniš¬tvu. Država sprečava osobno provođenje prirodnog zakona jer se time politička zajednica i njezini građani štite od pristranosti posrnulih pojedinaca. Autor u članku nastoji ponuditi kritičko-analitičku rekonstrukciju Lockeove argumentacije prirodnog stanja i kontraktualističkog opravdanja same konstitucije i načina djelovanja političke zajednice. ; This paper discusses Locke's conception of the natural state as the first sequence in his contractualism narration, and the reasons for the abandonment of natural state and voluntary entry of individuals into political community. Individuals under the explicit consent apropos social contract become the members of political community. The motive for the creation of political community as the preservation of property was conceived as a pre-political category in Locke's philosophy of politics, contrary to the theorists of his time such as Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. Locke thinks of the ownership in two ways: in the wider sense of the word, it means life, liberty and property of the individual, but in the strict sense it means to posses property. Political community, established as state, is intended to have an instrumental role which consists of having an impartial judge settling disputes, ensuring the preservation of property, and preventing possible violence and deception among individuals, arising from large difference in the property possession. The state prevents the personal implementation of natural law because it is the way in which the state can protect political community and its citizens from biased troubled individuals. The author seeks to offer the critical and analytical reconstruction of Locke's argument of natural state and the contractualist justification for the constitution and modus operandi of the political community.

Rad je podijeljen na četiri dijela. U prvom dijelu se predstavlja nauk konstitucije Gaudium et spes o odnosu Crkve i politike. Obrađuje se: narav i svrha političke zajednice, suradnja svih u političkom životu te politička zajednica i Crkva. Stavovi Ivana Pavla II. o vjernicima u politici predstavljeni su prikazom dokumenta Sinode o laicima 1987.: Christifideles laici koji je objavljen 1990. Papa je snažno tražio od laika da se uključe u politički život i smatrao da je grijeh ne baviti se politikom, s mišlju: svi su predmet i protagonisti politike. Poziva se na promicanje solidarnosti i karitativnog rada kroz politiku. Crkva i laici su dužni evangelizirati društveno-ekonomski život kao i kulturu. Zatim se iznose osnovne ideje iz Katekizma Katoličke Crkve i na koncu se obrađuje Doktrinarna nota o katolicima u politici, Zbora za nauk vjere iz 2002. godine. Nauk novijih crkvenih dokumenata o ovoj temi može se sažeti ovako: Vlast i država izviru iz ljudske naravi i moralnog zakona, a onda to znači i da imaju i božanski izvor. One su potrebne za funkcioniranje ljudskog života. Opće dobro i poštovanje osobe ključni su kriteriji za prosudbu svake vlasti, političara, režima i stranke. Priznaje se autonomija i odvojenost Crkve i države. Priznaje se pluralizam stranaka i režima. Poziva se sve kršćane da se uključe u politički život, dapače grijeh je ne baviti se politikom. Ako se zakoni i vlast protive općem dobru i dobru osobe, onda se vjernik političar treba distancirati i ne glasati za takve zakone. Crkva treba biti kritička svijest i savjest društva. ; This article is divided into four parts. The first part presents the doctrine of the constitution as described in Gaudium et spes: in other words it deals with the relationship between church and politics. It deals with the nature and purpose of political community, the cooperation of all in political life, and the political community and the Church. The views of John Paul II on the role of believers in politics are presented through an analysis of the 1987 Synod document on the laity, Christifideles laici, which was published in 1990. The pope strongly urges the laity to become involved in political life and takes the position that abjuring from politics can be sinful, noting that all are subject to and all are protagonists in politics. The pope stresses the necessity of promoting solidarity and charitable works through politics. Church and laity are obliged to evangelize in social and economic life as well as culture. The paper goes on to present the basic ideas of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and finally the ideas of the Doctrinal Note on Catholics in Politics, issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 2002. The doctrine of recent Church documents on this topic may be summarized as follows: authority and the state stem from human nature and the moral law, and this means that they have a divine source. They are necessary for the functioning of human life. The common good and respect for persons are the key criteria for judging governments, politicians, regimes and parties. The autonomy and separation of church and state should be recognized. The pluralism of parties and regimes should be recognized. All Christians are called to become involved in political life: in fact, it is sinful not to be involved in politics. If laws or authorities are against the common good and the good of the person, then the believer politician should distance himself from such laws and authorities and should not vote for such laws. The Church should be a critical conscience of society.