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Icelandic politics are analysed from the perspectives of three normative models of democracy: the liberal, republican and deliberative democratic theories. While the Icelandic constitution is rooted in classical liberal ideas, Icelandic politics can be harshly criticized from a liberal perspective, primarily because of the unclear separation of powers of government and for the extensive involvement of politics in other social sectors. Despite strong nationalist discourse which reflects republican characteristics, rooted in the struggle for independence from Denmark, republicanism has been marginal in Icelandic politics. In the years before the financial collapse, Icelandic society underwent a process of liberalization in which power shifted to the financial sector without disentangling the close ties that had prevailed between business and politics. The special commission set up by the Icelandic Parliament to investigate the causes of the financial collapse criticized Icelandic politics and governance for its flawed working practices and lack of professionalism. The appropriate lessons to draw from this criticism are to strengthen democratic practices and institutions. In the spirit of republicanism, however, the dominant discourse about Icelandic democracy after the financial collapse has been on increasing direct, vote-centric participation in opposition to the system of formal politics. While this development is understandable in light of the loss of trust in political institutions in the wake of the financial collapse, it has not contributed to trustworthy practices. In order to improve Icelandic politics, the analysis in this paper shows, it is important to work more in the spirit of deliberative democratic theory ; Peer Reviewed

U prvom dijelu ove studije, objavljenom u prvom broju časopisa "Svjetionik", autor je ukratko izložio osnovne elemente filozofije politike karakteristične za historiju savremenih nacija u kojem je analizirao odnose pojedinca, naroda, nacije i države. Drugi dio ove studije fokusira se na odnos Bošnjaka prema kolektivnom sjećanju koje je, kako autor smatra, pod utjecajem dugoročne političke strategije susjeda, dovedeno na prag amnezije. Autor smatra da poljuljana kolektivna memorija predstavlja najneuralgičniji problem i najveću opasnost za historijsku reintegraciju i homogenizaciju Bošnjaka kao naroda i nacije. Autor naglašava da je "Bosanac" teritorijalna odrednica i potpuno isključuje nacionalnu odrednicu "Bošnjak". Koketiranje s formulacijom "Bošnjaci/Bosanci", koja se često koristi, ne samo što ne afirmira etničku i nacionalnu pripadnost Bošnjaka nego još dodatno negira njihovu posebnost – a time dovodi u pitanje i samo postojanje Bošnjaka. Bošnjak se rađa, Bošnjak se ostaje. "Bosanac" se postaje, "Bosanac" se prestaje biti. Bošnjak koji živi u Bosni ujedno je i "Bosanac". "Bosanac" koji nije Bošnjak, nigdje, pa ni u Bosni, ne postaje Bošnjak. Bošnjak koji ne živi u Bosni ostaje Bošnjak, ali prestaje biti "Bosanac". Cilj supstituiranja historijskog imena Bošnjaci teritorijalnom odrednicom "Bosanci", očigledan je: Razbiti homogeno jezgro Bošnjaka brisanjem svijesti o njihovoj etničkoj posebnosti, imenu, nacionalnom jedinstvu, zajedničkoj historiji, kulturi, jeziku, ukratko – zajedničkoj prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti. Također u studiji se podsjeća na razliku savremenog shvatanja nacije od načina na koji je ovaj društveni fenomen bio tumačen sve do sredine 20. stoljeća. Iza razgraničenja nacije od naroda, kao njegove navodno superiorne forme, u pozadini se krije nastojanje da se narod, kao objektivna činjenica, relativizira, uzajamne veze njegovih pripadnika oslabe i da se cijelo stanovništvo podvede pod kontrolu centralne političke moći – kao prividno integrirana i homogena cjelina. ; In the first part of this study, published in the first issue of the magazine Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar, the author briefly outlined the basic elements of the philosophy of politics characteristic of the history of modern nations in which he analysed the relations of the individual, the people, the nation and the state. The second part of this study focuses on the attitude of Bosniaks towards collective memory, which, according to the author, was brought to the threshold of amnesia under the influence of the long-term political strategy of their neighbours. The author believes that the shaken collective memory represents the most neuralgic problem and the greatest danger for the historical reintegration and homogenization of Bosniaks as an ethnicity and a nation. The author emphasizes that "Bosnian" is a territorial determinant and completely excludes the national determinant "Bosniak". Flirting with the phrase "Bosniaks/Bosnians", which is often used, is not only a denouncement of the ethnic and national affiliation of Bosniaks, but further denies their uniqueness – and thus calls into question the very existence of Bosniaks. A Bosniak is born, a Bosniak remains. A "Bosnian" becomes, a "Bosnian" cease to be. A Bosniak living in Bosnia is also a "Bosnian". A "Bosnian" who is not a Bosniak does not become a Bosniak anywhere, not even in Bosnia. A Bosniak who does not live in Bosnia remains a Bosniak, but ceases to be a "Bosnian". The goal of substituting the historical name Bosniaks with the territorial designation "Bosnians" is obvious: Break the homogeneous core of Bosniaks by erasing awareness of their ethnic identity, name, national unity, common history, culture, language, in short – a common past, present and future. The study also recalls the difference between the modern understanding of the nation and the way in which this social phenomenon was interpreted until the middle of the 20th century. Behind the separation of the nation from the ethnicity/people, as the supposedly superior form, lies the effort to relativize the ethnicity/people, as an objective fact, to weaken the mutual ties of its members and to bring the entire population under the control of central political power – as a seemingly integrated and homogeneous whole.

U ovom članku autor na sugestivan način ukazuje na važnost razumijevanja nacije i države u kontekstu evropske filozofske misli i prakse o naciji i državi. Iako su mu povod nacija Bošnjaka i bosanska država, autorova razmišljanja su aplikativna za sve skupine slične naciji Bošnjaka, kao i za države slične bosanskoj državi. Osnovna misao u ovom članku je da ideja univerzalne nacije, kulture i civilizacije niti osporava niti negira partikularni osjećaj i subjektivni doživljaj nacije i države. Članstvo u Evropskoj uniji ne oduzima pravo nijednoj naciji u Evropi da gaji i razvija svoju nacionalno-kulturnu i nacionalno-državnu svijest. Zapravo, u mjeri u kojoj je svaka nacija i svaka država u Evropi aktivno svjesna svoje nacionalne i kulturne specifične vrijednosti, čini Evropu, odnosno Evropsku uniju, snažnom i važnom u globalnom svijetu. Otuda i Bošnjaci, odnosno Bosanci, kao nacija i kao država (nacija) nemaju potrebe da se povlače, već imaju historijsku obavezu da istaknu svoju specifičnu bosansku kulturu i bosansku državu kao bogatstvo vrijedno pažnje ne samo u Evropi već i u svijetu. ; In this article, the author suggestively points to the importance of understanding the concept of nation and the state in the context of the European philosophical thought and practice regarding the nation and the state. Although the occasion is about the Bosniak/Bosnian nation and the Bosnian state, the author's reflections are applicable to all groups similar to the Bosniak/Bosnain nation, as well as to all the states similar to the Bosnian state. The basic premise of this article is that the idea of a universal nationality, culture and civilisation does not oppose or negate the particular feeling or the subjective experience of either the nationality or the state. The membership of European Union does not detract the right for any nation in Europe of the right to cultivate and develop its national culture as well as its particular state consciousness. In fact, in the extent of which every nation and every state in Europe has an active awareness of its national and cultural specific value, gives Europe, indeed – the European Union strong and important role in the global community. Hence, the Bosniaks/Bosnians, both as a nation and a state (nation) have no need to withdraw, but rather have the historical opportunity to feature their specific Bosnian culture and Bosnian state as a richness worthy of appreciation, not only in Europe, but also in the world.

Treći, završni dio ove studije, analizira odnos Bošnjaka i Bosne kroz interakciju tri hronološki i problemski povezana procesa. Prvim postupkom, definiranim kao 'arheologija politike zaborava', rekonstruiraju se, u svim dosadašnjim istraživanjima potpuno zapostavljeni, aspekti geneze historijskih i političkih faktora projekta negiranja Bošnjaka kao posebnog naroda/nacije, brisanja njihovog historijskog imena, naziva jezika te etničkog, duhovnog, kulturnog i državotvornog identiteta. Drugo, razmatra se pitanje odnosa Bošnjaka kao naroda/nacije i Bosne kao njihove matične države, koju su oni stvorili i odbranili, iz generalne problemsko-teorijske perspektive kao i iz novijih zbivanja i aktuelne situacije. Treće, argumentira se teza da je očuvanje historijskog imena "Bošnjaci", vraćenog 28. septembra 1993. godine, trajni strateški imperativ svih Bošnjaka svijeta i conditio sine qua non opstanka Bosne kao države i kao koncepta. Kritički se analizira inicijativa da se umjesto historijskog imena upotrebljavaju teritorijalne odrednice "Bosanci", odnosno "Bosanci i Hercegovci" što ima za cilj definitivno ukloniti s historijske scene Bošnjake kao narod/naciju. Budući da je opstanak Bošnjaka nužni uvjet opstanka i postojanja Bosne, imperativ historijskog trenutka nalaže bezrezervno prihvatanje historijskog imena "Bošnjaci", obnovu osjećanja zajedničke pripadnosti i uzajamne povezanosti Bošnjaka kao naroda/nacije, jačanje emotivne veze sa sopstvenim nacionalnim bićem te uspostavljanje svijesti o moralnoj obavezi svakog pojedinca Bošnjaka prema svom narodu, Bošnjacima, i njihovoj matičnoj državi Bosni. ; The third, final part of this study, analyses the relationship between Bosniaks and Bosnia through the interaction of three chronologically problem-related processes: 1. The procedure defined as 'The Archeology of the Politics of Oblivion' reconstructs in all previous research completely neglected aspects of the genesis of historical and political factors of the project of denial of Bosniaks as a separate people / nation, erasing their historical name, language name and ethnic, spiritual, cultural and state identity; 2. The issue of the relationship between Bosniaks as a people / nation and Bosnia, as their home state, which they created and defended, from the general problem-theory perspective as well as from recent events and with the current situation being considered; 3. The thesis is argued that the preservation of the historical name "Bosniaks", returned on September 28, 1993, is a permanent strategic imperative of all Bosniaks in the world and a conditio sine qua non of the survival of Bosnia as a state and as a concept. The initiative to use the territorial determinants "Bosnians" or "Bosnians and Herzegovinians" instead of the historical name, which aims to definitively remove Bosniaks from the historical scene as a people / nation, is critically analysed. Since the survival of Bosniaks is a necessary condition for the survival and existence of Bosnia, the imperatives of the historical moment require the unconditional acceptance of the historical name "Bosniaks", the renewal of the sense of common belonging and mutual connection of Bosniaks as a people / nation, strengthening the emotional connection with one's own national being and establishing the awareness of the moral obligation of every individual Bosniak towards his/her Bosniak people and their home state of Bosnia.

This chapter explores the possible influences of Sweden, Denmark and Finland on the Environmental Policy of the EU. We focus specifically on the reputation, expertise and role model behaviour of the Nordic EU members and their possibilities to use these factors as cognitive power resources.The chapter discusses several examples where the Nordic EU member states have successfully promoted their national environmental interests within the EU. We also make use of interviews with environmental representatives at the Swedish, Danish and Finnish Permanent Representations to the EU in Brussels, officials from other member states, DG Environment of the Commission and the European Environment Agency. The results indicate that the Nordic EU members have to some extent minimised their quantitative disadvantages, such as small administrations and limited voting powers, by successfully using the cognitive power resources in question within the Environmental Policy of the European Union.

The author discusses the reasons for relativization of the national minorities protection policy of the Council of Europe and the European Union in light of the problems with national minorities protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The minorities protection policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina had implications for minority rights protection in Hungary and Croatia after Croatia's accession to the EU . The European Union, the Council of Europe and other European institutions defined their position towards minority rights in light of the European Court for Human Rights decision in the Sejdić and Finci case. The decision specified mandatory constitutional changes in terms of equal protection of national minority rights. According to the demanded constitutional revisions, the representatives of national minorities would have a right to compete for legal and executive positions in the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the ECHR decision, only representatives of the three constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats could be nominated for positions in the legislature and in the executive institutions. The Council of Europe mediated by CoE Parliamentarian Assembly and Committee of Ministers threatened to suspend BiH membership to the CoE until the decision was implemented. At the same time, coordinated European Union institutions made the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiated with Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008 conditional upon the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci decision. The threat wasn't carried through and BiH became presiding country of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2014. In the meantime, the newly elected European Parliament as well as recently appointed European Commission accepted the SAA although the Sejdić-Finci decision was not incorporated in the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ; Evropska unija, Savjet Evrope i druge evropske institucije bitno su odredile svoj odnos prema Bosni i Hercegovini u odnosu na primjenu Odluke Evropskog suda za ljudska prava "u slučaju Sejdić i Finci", koji nalaže obavezu ustavnih promjena u pravcu zaštite jednakosti prava pripadnika nacionalnih manjina. Tim promjenama i predstavnici nacionlanih manjina imali bi pravo da budu kandidovani na sve pozicije zakonodavne i izvršne vlasti u Bosni i Hercegovini. Do odluke u spomenutom slučaju, poznatom kao "Sejdić – Finci", samo su pripadnici tri konstitutivna naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini – Srba, Bošnjaka i Hrvata, mogli da budu kandidovani za te funkcije. U više navrata Savjet Evrope je posredstvom Parlamentarne skupštine ili Komiteta ministara prijetio suspenzijom, čak i izbacivanjem Bosne i Hercegovine iz ove međunarodne organizacije. Istovremeno, čak i koordinisano, institucije Evropske unije raznih nivoa uslovljavale su ratifikaciju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SAA ), postignutog još 2008. godine, isto primjenom navedene odluke. Prijetnja se odnosila na nepriznavanja izbornih rezultata na lokalnim izborima 2012. i opštim izborima 2014. godine. To se nije desilo, a u međuvremenu BiH je bila zemlja – predsjedavajuća Komiteta ministara Savjeta Evrope. Novoizabrani saziv Evropskog parlamenta i nova Evropska komisija prihvatili su Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju nakon opštih izbora u BiH 2014, iako odluka Evropskog suda za ljudska prava nije primijenjena. Predmet rada biće razlozi relativizacije manjinskih politika Savjeta Evrope i Evropske unije u politikama zaštite prava nacionalnih manjina u BiH. Time su postale vidljive i upozoravajuće i druge politike relativizacije položaja i prava nacionalnih manjina, poput Mađarske i Hrvatske, do čega je došlo nakon prijema ove dvije države u Evropsku uniju.

Considering that in the spectrum of juvenile criminal sanctions punishment of deprivation of liberty is the most severe criminal sanction, international documents related to juveniles in conflict with the law proclaim standards that this sanction has to be imposed only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period. Issues like possible duration of subject sanction and scope of its imposition, represents some of the basic features of the legal and judicial policy of sanctioning of juveniles, and represent the subject of this paper. The author analyzes how these issues are regulated in Bosnia and Herzegovina"s and comparative law, and how aforementioned standards are applied in practice. Applying the comparative analysis it was determined that there are certain indicators that Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the countries that has in its heritage "humane" sanctioning policy of juvenile offenderes, and that the aforementioned international standards are consistently accepted in domestic law as well as in the jurisprudence. ; Imajući u vidu da u spektru maloljetničkih krivičnih sankcija kazna lišenja slobode predstavlja najstrožiju krivičnu sankciju, međunarodni dokumenti iz oblasti postupanja sa maloljetnicima u sukobu sa zakonom proklamiraju standard da se ona ima izricati samo kao krajnje sredstvo (ultima ratio) i u što kraćem trajanju. Upravo pitanja mogućeg trajanja predmetne sankcije, te obima njenog izricanja predstavljaju neka od osnovnih obilježja zakonske i sudske politike sankcioniranja maloljetnika, te čine predmet istraživanja ovog rada. Autor je analizirao kako su ova pitanja uređena u bosanskohercegovačkom i uporednom pravu, te kako su spomenuti standardi oživotvoreni u praksi. Primjenom komparativnopravne analize utvrđeno je kako postoje određeni pokazatelji da Bosna i Hercegovina spada u red zemalja koje baštine "humanu" politiku sankcioniranja maloljetnih učinitelja krivičnih djela, te da su spomenuti međunarodni standardi dosljedno prihvaćeni kako u pravu, tako i u sudskoj praksi ove zemlje.