Suchergebnisse

This study aims to determine the optimization of the implementation of mediation in the Gorontalo Religious Court. This research is a field research with data collection methods in the form of observations, interviews and documentation. Data's were analyzed using qualitative descriptive. The results of the study found that the implementation of mediation in the Gorontalo Religious Court was not yet fully optimal. Based on the cases decided by the Gorontalo Religious Court in 2016 totaling 1524 and entering the mediation process as many as 87 cases and only 1 case that was successfully mediated (0.1%). Factor failure of the mediation process because the mediation room facilities are still not efficient enough, because the parties to queue, even some mediator judges carry out mediation in the judge's room itself, there is no certified mediator as explained in the Minister of Religion Regulation (PERMA) Number 1 of 2016 about Procedure for Mediation at Court.

This study aims to explain how the psychological process affects perceived organizational politics (POP) toward organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB). The paradoxical effect of POP to OCB needs to be explained through two psychological processes: First, the mediation effect of psychological safety which explains POP as a barrier to OCB. Second, the mediation effect of careerism which explains POP as an OCB driver. One of the government institutions in Malang District used as research objects, involving 97 employees as respondents. A quantitative approach using Partial Least Square (PLS) used as the method of this study. The results showed careerism mediated the relationship between POP and OCB. But the surprising result is that psychological safety cannot mediate the effect of POP to OCB because employees feel that there is no high threat of doing voice behaviour, helping behaviour and individual initiatives in the political environment. These results indicate that OCB is a safe activity when it does not contrary to other people's self-interest, so it does not cause a conflict.

Са политичким преокретом 2000. године у Србији отпочео је истовемено и процес идеолошког преобликовања јавних простора. Међу најпроминентнијим видовима оваквог деловања је именовање или преименовање урбаног простора, првенствено улица и тргова, те бављење постојећим споменицима и меморијалима, као и градња и планирање нових. Овакви су случајеви посебно били уочљиви у Београду. Њима су се у неколико наврата супротставиле одређене политичке партије, те неполитичке групе које су организовале уличне акције 'против-именовања' београдских улица, те кампање против новопланираних јавних споменика. Односи моћи и идентитетске политике у овим случајевима биће коментарисани у овом раду. Пропратиће се праксе неколико уметничких и политичких скупина које су спровеле акције и перформансе незваничног преименовања улица, или су пак дискутовале и противиле се подизању новопредложених споменика. (Пре)именовањем одређених градских простора, хегемонске политичке коалиције покушавају да конституишу сигнификантна симболичка места, док, са друге стране, опозиционе противакције покушавају да преузму та иста места и да их реинтерпретирају. У овом ће се раду покушати да прикажу и анализирају поједине идеолошке политике и званични дискурси сећања, те поједине уметничке и политичке контраполитике и опозиционе праксе алтернативне комеморације ; With the onset of political overturn in Serbia in 2000, the process of the ideological reconfiguration of public places was simultaneously being put in motion. One of the most promi- nent means of this endeavor was naming and renaming of urban space, primarily of streets and squares, but also treatment of existing memorial sites and monuments and commissioning and erection of new ones. These undertakings were especially prominent in Serbia's capital Belgrade. Such processes were opposed several times by certain political parties and groups which organized street-actions of counter-naming of Belgrade's thoroughfares and campaigns against newly designated public monuments, and power-play and identity politics of such proceedings will be commented on here. This paper will discuss practices of several artistic and political groups which carried out unofficial street-renaming actions and performances, or discussed and opposed proposed new memorials. By (re)naming certain urban spaces, hegemonic political coalitions are trying to construct significant symbolic places, while oppositional counter-actions are seeking to overtake those same places and reinterpret them. This paper will attempt to sum up and inquire into the ideological politics of official memory discourses and artistic and political counter-politics and actions of opposition or alternative commemoration.

Millennial voters are a potential community that is a strategic target for pairs of candidates for regional election contestation to reap the coffers of votes. The campaign approach using religious and ethnic sentiments is an alternative strategy. This study looks at religion and ethnicity influencing millennial voters' voting intentions. The research method uses quantitative methods with multiple linear regression. The research sample was drawn randomly according to the criteria so that the answers to 280 respondents were analyzed. The study results found that religion significantly influenced millennial voter intentions, while ethnicity did not affect millennial voter intentions. Millennial voters tend not to be interested in practical politics. ; Pemilih milenial merupakan komunitas potensial yang menjadi sasaran strategis bagi pasangan calon kontestasi pemilukada untuk meraup pundi-pundi suara. Pendekatan kampanye yang menggunakan sentimen agama dan etnis merupakan strategi alternatif. Penelitian ini melihat agama dan etnisitas yang mempengaruhi niat memilih pemilih milenial. Metode penelitian menggunakan metode kuantitatif dengan regresi linier berganda. Sampel penelitian diambil secara acak sesuai kriteria sehingga dianalisis jawaban dari 280 responden. Hasil penelitian menemukan bahwa agama berpengaruh signifikan terhadap niat pemilih milenial, sedangkan etnisitas tidak mempengaruhi niat pemilih milenial. Pemilih milenial cenderung tidak tertarik pada politik praktis.

Economic growth is no longer just to improve the economy alone, but economic growth must also pay attention to the welfare of the community and be carried out by paying attention to the quality of the economic growth. Good economic growth is not only temporary but long term. One of the government's efforts by this concept is to create inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The measure of the quality of economic growth can be seen through the Inclusive Economic Development Index (IGI). However, achieving inclusive economic growth is not easy. The novelty of the research is that inclusive economic growth is not only approached with an economic approach but non-economic variables are also included, to see further this interrelation. The method used in this research is quantitative with a descriptive approach. Panel regression analysis models and techniques using stata. The results of this study indicate that technology and human resources have a significant and positive effect on inclusive economic growth in Indonesia from 2017 to 2019. Meanwhile, politics has a positive but not significant effect on inclusive economic growth in Indonesia from 2017 to 2019. From the results of this study, it can be seen that also that technology, politics, and human resources simultaneously have a significant and positive effect on inclusive economic growth in Indonesia from 2017 to 2019. The implications of this research include, among others, the government needs to optimize HR productivity. Keywords: Inclusive Economy; Political; Human Resources; Technology

In many of its areas, the writing of music history in Germany is characterised by the Romantic music outlook and its "Two-World-Model": the real world is seen as opposing the ideal world of music as a higher existence of ideas and ideals. Art music in the emphatic sense, commonly designated as serious music, pretends to represent that ideal world and makes claims to truthfulness. The science of music actually believes it is able to prove the universality of these claims. A large part of musicological publications are characterised by this assumption. However, a public discussion among musicologists as to whether such writings should belong to the field of theology rather than to historico-critical historiography (as a science in the strict sense) is non-existent. As a result, our field has not only disappeared from a public sphere that wishes to leave those claims to small elitist circles, but has also encountered a growing lack of understanding among other disciplines, even to the point of mockery. It would suffice here to refer to the lawyer Bernhard Weck, who wrote with regard to Beethoven's Opus 112: "Only musicology could prove that 'political ideas of freedom can be expressed through gestures of sound.'" ; У многим својим сегментима, писање историја музике у Немачкој карактерише романтичарска визура и њен "модел два света": реални свет се посматра као супротстављен идеалном свету музике као вишем ступњу постојања идеја и идеала. Уметничка музика у изворном смислу, обично означена термином "озбиљна музика", претвара се да представља тај идеалан свет и претендује на истинитост. Наука о музици заиста верује да може да докаже универзалност ових тврдњи. Знатан број музиколошких публикација карактерише ова претпоставка. Међутим, јавна дискусија међу музиколозима о томе да ли такви списи треба да припадају области теологије, а не историјско-критичкој историографији (као науци у строгом смислу) не постоји. Као резултат тога, наше поље није само нестало из јавне сфере, која жели да те тврдње остави малим елитистичким круговима, већ је наишло и на све већи недостатак разумевања међу другим дисциплинама, чак и до тачке ругања. Довољно је да се позовемо на речи адвоката Бернарда Века (Bernhard Weck), који је у вези са Бетовеновим опусом 112 написао: "Само музикологија може доказати да се 'политичке идеје слободе могу изразити звучним гестовима'." ; Часопис је индексиран на http://doiserbia.nb.rs/, http://dais.sanu.ac.rs/handle/123456789/914 и у међународној бази ProQuest. / The journal is indexed in http://doiserbia.nb.rs/, http://dais.sanu.ac.rs/handle/123456789/914 and in the international database ProQuest. Издавање ове публикације подржали су Министарство културе и информисања Републике Србије, Министарство просвете, науке и технолошког развоја Републике Србије и СОКОЈ - Организација музичких аутора Србије / The publication of this volume was supported by the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia and SOKOJ - Serbian Music Authors' Organization

Познато је, и у научној литератури мање-више елаборирано да је повратак религији на подручју бивше СФРЈ ишао руку под руку са стварањем нових националних држава и успостављањем нових/старих етничких граница и идентитета. Због тога је логично што се ова појава често квалификује као религија нације и национализма. Међутим, из ове квалификације често изостаје увид у чињеницу да је повратак религији значио и повећање интересовања за религијска учења и знања, те масовније учествовање у црквеним обредима. Иако је извесно да од високог процента оних који су се на последњем попису идентификовали као православни Срби сасвим мали део одлази на активне вернике, евидентна обнова унутрашњег, литургијског живота Цркве сугерише одређена питања и опрезност при етикетирању савремених облика религиозности и улоге Цркве у њиховом формирању. Историјске околности које доводе до појаве религије нације у Србији у 19. веку чине оправданом хипотезу да религија нације ни тада, а ни данас није изникла из крила Цркве, већ да се она појављује као државни/секуларни идеолошки пројекат, чије су везе са религијом сасвим нерелигијске природе. Да бих поткрепила ову тврдњу, покушаћу да установим и покажем шта се налазило у основама ове световне религије 19. века, те да одговорим на питање начина обликовања њених садржаја. Ово ћу учинити на основу анализе политичке употребе мртвих тела, тј. доношења посмртних остатака Вука Караџића из Беча у Београд и обнављања гроба Доситеја Обрадовића том приликом. ; It is widely known and has been more or less elaborated in scientific literature that return to religion in the area of former SFRY was conducted hand-in-hand with the development of the new national states and establishment of new/old ethnic borders and identities. This is why it is logical that this phe- nomenon is frequently qualified as the religion of the nation and nationalism. However, this qualification frequently lacks insight into the fact that return to religion also meant increased interest in religious teachings and dogmas, as well as greater attendance at Church rituals. Even though it is certain that, among the large percentage of those who declared themselves as Orthodox Serbs during the last Census, a very small number of them are actually active believers; thus, the evident restoration of the internal, liturgical life of the Church suggests certain issues and advises prudence in labeling modern forms of religiousness and the role of the Church in their development. Historical conditions which led to the phenomenon of religion of the nation in Serbia in 19 century justify the hypothesis that religion of the nation was not, and still is not, something to have sprouted out under the auspices of the Church, but that it has occurred as a state/secular ideological project, whose links to religion are of purely non-religious nature. In order to corroborate this statement, I will try to determine and show what was in the basis of this secular religion of 19 century, and answer the question relating to the manner in which its content was shaped. I will do this based on an analysis of political use of dead bodies, i.e. relocation of mortal remains of Vuk Karadžić from Vienna to Belgrade, and restoration of the grave of Dositej Obradović, which was performed on the same occa- sion.

Demokratski optimizam devedestih godina prošlog veka zamenjuje osobita forma javnog razočarenja u demokratiju. Kriza demokratije praćena institucionalnim deficitima, konfuzijom, niskim stepenom upravljačke sposobnosti da se rešavaju pitanja siromaštva, nezaposlenosti, imigracije, korupcije, simptomi su ovoga stanja. Globalni val populizma najizoštreniji je izraz ove političke patologije. Početak novoga veka rađa uzlet otvorenog neprijateljstva prema demokratiji. Deskriptivni pristupi oslonjeni na proceduralnu dimenziju režima moći ("hibridni režimi", "ograničena demokratija" "iliberalna demokratija", "kompetitivni autoritarizam" ) pokazuju se nedostatnim. U ovome radu autor se vraća klasičnom konceptu "despotizma" i pokazuje normative i teorisjke prednosti ovoga koncepta ("novi despotizam") u analizi novoga režima moći koji izrasta na pretpostvkama sve šireg nepoverenja u demokratske instituciije. ; The democratic optimism of the 1990s has been replaced by a particular form of public disillusionment with democracy. The crisis of democracy, accompanied by institutional deficits, confusion, low levels of management capacity to tackle poverty, unemployment, immigration, corruption, are symptoms of this condition. The global wave of populism is the sharpest expression of this political pathology. The beginning of the new century has given birth to an open hostility to democracy. Descriptive approaches based on the procedural dimension of the regime of power ("hybrid regimes", "limited democracy", "liberal democracy", "competitive authoritarianism") are proving insufficient to capture the new political system. In this paper, the author returns to the classical concept of "despotism" and shows the normative and theoretical advantages of this concept ("new despotism") in the analysis of a new regime of power that grows on the premise of growing distrust of democratic institutions.