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The purpose of the article is to analyse the role of the public prosecutor's office as an institution that is specifically embedded in between certain elements of the political system, particularly between the executive and judiciary powers. For this reason, the public prosecutor's office can be regarded, together with courts, as an institution that aims to be actively involved in administering justice and an instrument of the executive power to guarantee internal security and to execute internal functions of the state. The public prosecutor's office, given its specific operation area, is expected to prosecute crimes effectively as well as safeguard the rule of law, which may be threatened by the infringing actions of not only individuals and criminal groups but also of officials and state institutions. Hence, with respect to the accountability of the public prosecutor's office, it should be more independent of the executive power which is subject to political rules. It appears, however, that separating it officially from the executive power does not have to lead automatically to the public prosecutor's office independence of political influence when other direct (the Prime Minister's and the Minister of Justice's authority over the Attorney General) and indirect mechanisms of prosecutors' political dependency (clientelism, politicisation and political bonds of prosecutors with politicians) exist.

Stanisław Szukalski był z jednym z z najgłośniejszych i najbardziej kontrowersyjnych polskich artystów. Znany w Polsce międzywojennej, został zupełnie zapomniany po II wojnie światowej, kontynuował swoją pracę artystyczną w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki, gdzie zmarł w latach 90. Szukalski zafascynowany był słowiańszczyzną, pradawną przeszłością i tradycją Słowian, szczególnie na ziemiach polskich. W tych wątkach historii znajdował inspiracje dla swojej twórczości i koncepcji politycznych. Wzbudzając tradycje inne niż katolickie i łącząc je z myślą polityczną współczesnych sobie Polaków, stał się niezwykłym nie tylko artystą ale i politykiem. Niniejszy artykuł to próba odnalezienia prawdziwych źródeł inspiracji doktryny politycznej i sztuki Stanisława Szukalskiego w oparciu o kontekst historyczny, społeczny i kulturowy epoki.

The ethical analysis of The Theory of Moral Sentiments as well as 'n Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations presents A. Smith's (1723-1790) works in a completely new light than it is conventionally presented in the neoliberal interpretation. One of the most important issues appears to be the classification of moral sentiments. He divides them into social, neutral, and antisocial. The neutral sentiment - the so-called 'self love' forms the basis of acting in the best interests of oneself and as such it constitutes the foundations of the development of entrepreneurship. This can be transferred into an antisocial sentiment, i.e. selfishness. In such a case it has a devastating influence on economic activity, social life as well as public life. For this reason A. Smith shows the importance of the social emotion of sympathy understood as empathy and the acceptance of the behaviours that are acknowledged as proper. As the findings of his analysis clearly show, selfishness was the characteristic trait of the businessmen at that time, i.e. merchants and the owners of manufacturing plants. With reference to the works of A. Smith we should therefore identify and then describe all the psychological as well as economic mechanisms that in effect postpone or minimise the chances of the transformation of self love into selfishness, i.e. the activities based on rational economic grounds into the ones that are driven by mere greed. The interpretation of the issue presented in the article questions the conventional neoliberal interpretation. The latter reiterates that in the works of A. Smith the most important ones are the sentences taken out of the context that define the state as a night watchman and the market that is controlled by the invisible hand. The ethical analysis holds that in the opinion of A. Smith alone, one of the most fundamental problems of capitalism lies in the fact that self love should be realised within the boundaries set by the community. The Theory of Moral Sentiments is so vital then, in which he analysed sympathy, social sentiment, and selfishness, i.e. an antisocial emotion, along with 'n Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in which he addressed the issue of collective selfishness.

The authors analyze the essence of the problem of financialization of economy in the national and global perspectives, at the same time pointing out that this process also refers to the sphere of politics. The example of the 2007+ financial and banking crisis indicates the negative features of this process in reference to economy but also to the financial security of the states and their citizens. In the sphere of politics financialization in the external aspect is reflected in transferring public funds to private economic entities, mainly financial corporations, by virtue of political decisions. In the internal aspects financialization means an increasing role of financial instruments and resources in establishing public authorities, including parliaments and presidential offices. This tendency is considered by the authors to be an immanent feature of contemporary capitalism and a threat to democracy.

This article provides an overview of some of the most prevalent topics in post-Yugoslav memory politics as well as on some of the scholars working on these issues, focusing on the commemorative practices of the Second World War and the wars of the 1990s. Thirty years after the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the discourse of post-war memory politics continues to dominate nearly all of the successor states, even though two of them have seemingly left the past behind to join the European Union. While the wars of the 1990s created an entirely new memoryscape in the region, they also radically transformed the way in which each country commemorated the Second World War. Although the article examines in-depth the collective remembrance of sites of memory, such as Jasenovac, Bleiburg, and Knin, trends across the broader region are also addressed. The work of young scholars, as well as experienced researchers, who have introduced innovative approaches in memory studies in the former Yugoslavia, is highlighted to show how new studies focus on the cultural reproduction of dominant narratives in addition to top-down political discourse.

The article explores the concept of civil society in connection with Web 2.0 and its transformative impact on society and politics, contrasting it with the earlier era of Web 1.0. Web 2.0, characterized by enhanced user interaction and content production, has given rise to a new media ecosystem that has reshaped the way people communicate, obtain information, and participate in the polity. The article highlights the emergence of popular social media platforms and how they have become integral to the platform society. These platforms have not only revolutionized online interactions but have also intersected with offline realms, including politics, commerce, and social relations. The article further explores the implications of Web 2.0 for civil society, contentious politics, and citizen engagement, examining the rise of protests, transnational movements, and the impact of digital resources on democracy and (digital) citizenship. Finally, the work discusses the potential of digital counter-democracy in the platform society and the need for democratic control in the digital age.

The term anti-politics refers to a whole catalog of phenomena such as the decline in citizens' interest in politics and participation in formal political institutions the process of depoliticization and technocratization of democracy and the rise inpopularity of right-wing populist parties and nationalism. The purpose of this article isto explore what anti-politics really is. This requires not only going beyond an analysis of current politicsbut also a pure descriptivism that simply registers changes in the attitudes of participants in public life. It is necessary to look at this complex phenomenon not only in the long termbut in different interpretive contexts

Przedmiotem artykułu jest ‒ w pierwszej części ‒ próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jakim stopniu fakt powoływania sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego przez organ polityczny, tj. Sejm RP, determinuje polityczny charakter samego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Autor wskazuje m.in. na podstawie swoich własnych doświadczeń sędziego TK, że poszukiwanie iunctim pomiędzy aktem politycznego wyboru sędziów a ich aktywnością orzeczniczą nie znajduje uzasadnienia, co wyraźnie potwierdzają przykłady konkretnych rozstrzygnięć sądu konstytucyjnego w tzw. hard cases. Sędziowie wyposażeni w bardzo silne gwarancje niezawisłości potrafią zachować obiektywizm ocen i niezależność także od swoich własnych przekonań politycznych. Prawdziwym zagrożeniem niezależności Trybunału Konstytucyjnego jest natomiast presja polityczna wywierana przez rządzących, której przejawem jest np. bezpośrednia personalna krytyka sędziów TK lub odmowa wykonywania orzeczeń sądu konstytucyjnego. Szczególnie niebezpiecznym instrumentem jest próba ingerowania ustawodawcy w sprawy wewnętrznej autonomii proceduralnej TK, zmierzająca m.in. do narzucenia kolejności rozpatrywanych spraw, wprowadzenia większości kwalifikowanej 2/3 przy podejmowaniu orzeczeń w pełnym składzie czy określenia quorum na takim poziomie, który może paraliżować funkcjonowanie sądu konstytucyjnego. W drugiej części artykułu podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy Trybunał może zbadać konstytucyjność procedur wprowadzonych nową ustawą o TK, zanim przystąpi do stosowania tych procedur. Autor udziela odpowiedzi twierdzącej na to pytanie, przytaczając argumenty na rzecz bezpośredniego stosowania Konstytucji, która w takich wypadkach staje się jedynym punktem odniesienia oceny nowych regulacji proceduralnych. ; In the first part of this paper an attempt is made to answer the question to what extent the fact that judges of the Constitutional Tribunal are appointed by a political organ (the Seym of the Republic of Poland) determines the political character of the Tribunal itself. Based, among otherthings, on his own experience, the author, a retired judge of the Constitutional Tribunal, states that the search for a iunctim between the political appointment of constitutional judges and their adjudicating activity is unjustified, as can be seen from the example of particular judgments delivered by the Constitutional Tribunal in what might be termed hard cases. Judges endowed with very strong guarantees of independence are capable of remaining impartial in their judgments and making decisions independently of their personal beliefs. The real threat to the independenceof the Constitutional Tribunal is political pressure exercised by government, which manifests itself in, for example, direct and personal criticism of Constitutional Tribunal judges or a refusal to implement judicial decisions issued by the Constitutional Tribunal. A particularly dangerous situation arises when a legislator attempts to intervene in the internal procedural autonomy of the Constitutional Tribunal with a view to determining the order in which the matters before the Tribunal should be dealt with, setting a 2/3 qualified majority for decisions 'when sitting as a full court' or determining the required quorum at a level which may paralyse the work of the Constitutional Tribunal altogether. In the second part of the paper the question is asked whether the Constitutional Tribunal may examine the constitutionality of the procedures being introduced by a new law on the Constitutional Tribunal before it proceeds to apply them. The answer to this question is in the affirmative, followed by arguments calling for the direct application of the Constitution which in such cases becomes the only point of reference when new procedural regulations are to be evaluated.

In the author's opinion we can agree that the theories of contractualism provide an excellent foundation for the legitimization of democracy. At the same time, he claims that democracy, and liberal democracy in particular, cannot be said to be the necessary outcome of social contract. Hobbes was the advocate of absolute monarchy, although his theory permiabsolute aristocracy as well as absolute democracy. Locke, a supporter of a limed monarchy, emphasized the principles of people's sovereignty. Rousseau, an apologist for thel will, tended to support such the solon that it is not the people's will but the wisest ones' whichrulthe sciety as long as they have the people's benefit in mind. Glorifying hisgeneral will, Roussau has become the founder of modern political totalitarianism. When discussing the relations between state and religion/church the above three classic speculators on the theory of social contract assumed the individual freedom of religious beliefs. Ultimately, it is the state though that regulates the external manifestations of faith, as it is the only political entity to arbitrate conflicts between individual interests, and express the pubgood, whatever that means.