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U prvom dijelu ove studije, objavljenom u prvom broju časopisa "Svjetionik", autor je ukratko izložio osnovne elemente filozofije politike karakteristične za historiju savremenih nacija u kojem je analizirao odnose pojedinca, naroda, nacije i države. Drugi dio ove studije fokusira se na odnos Bošnjaka prema kolektivnom sjećanju koje je, kako autor smatra, pod utjecajem dugoročne političke strategije susjeda, dovedeno na prag amnezije. Autor smatra da poljuljana kolektivna memorija predstavlja najneuralgičniji problem i najveću opasnost za historijsku reintegraciju i homogenizaciju Bošnjaka kao naroda i nacije. Autor naglašava da je "Bosanac" teritorijalna odrednica i potpuno isključuje nacionalnu odrednicu "Bošnjak". Koketiranje s formulacijom "Bošnjaci/Bosanci", koja se često koristi, ne samo što ne afirmira etničku i nacionalnu pripadnost Bošnjaka nego još dodatno negira njihovu posebnost – a time dovodi u pitanje i samo postojanje Bošnjaka. Bošnjak se rađa, Bošnjak se ostaje. "Bosanac" se postaje, "Bosanac" se prestaje biti. Bošnjak koji živi u Bosni ujedno je i "Bosanac". "Bosanac" koji nije Bošnjak, nigdje, pa ni u Bosni, ne postaje Bošnjak. Bošnjak koji ne živi u Bosni ostaje Bošnjak, ali prestaje biti "Bosanac". Cilj supstituiranja historijskog imena Bošnjaci teritorijalnom odrednicom "Bosanci", očigledan je: Razbiti homogeno jezgro Bošnjaka brisanjem svijesti o njihovoj etničkoj posebnosti, imenu, nacionalnom jedinstvu, zajedničkoj historiji, kulturi, jeziku, ukratko – zajedničkoj prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti. Također u studiji se podsjeća na razliku savremenog shvatanja nacije od načina na koji je ovaj društveni fenomen bio tumačen sve do sredine 20. stoljeća. Iza razgraničenja nacije od naroda, kao njegove navodno superiorne forme, u pozadini se krije nastojanje da se narod, kao objektivna činjenica, relativizira, uzajamne veze njegovih pripadnika oslabe i da se cijelo stanovništvo podvede pod kontrolu centralne političke moći – kao prividno integrirana i homogena cjelina. ; In the first part of this study, published in the first issue of the magazine Illuminatio/Svjetionik/Almanar, the author briefly outlined the basic elements of the philosophy of politics characteristic of the history of modern nations in which he analysed the relations of the individual, the people, the nation and the state. The second part of this study focuses on the attitude of Bosniaks towards collective memory, which, according to the author, was brought to the threshold of amnesia under the influence of the long-term political strategy of their neighbours. The author believes that the shaken collective memory represents the most neuralgic problem and the greatest danger for the historical reintegration and homogenization of Bosniaks as an ethnicity and a nation. The author emphasizes that "Bosnian" is a territorial determinant and completely excludes the national determinant "Bosniak". Flirting with the phrase "Bosniaks/Bosnians", which is often used, is not only a denouncement of the ethnic and national affiliation of Bosniaks, but further denies their uniqueness – and thus calls into question the very existence of Bosniaks. A Bosniak is born, a Bosniak remains. A "Bosnian" becomes, a "Bosnian" cease to be. A Bosniak living in Bosnia is also a "Bosnian". A "Bosnian" who is not a Bosniak does not become a Bosniak anywhere, not even in Bosnia. A Bosniak who does not live in Bosnia remains a Bosniak, but ceases to be a "Bosnian". The goal of substituting the historical name Bosniaks with the territorial designation "Bosnians" is obvious: Break the homogeneous core of Bosniaks by erasing awareness of their ethnic identity, name, national unity, common history, culture, language, in short – a common past, present and future. The study also recalls the difference between the modern understanding of the nation and the way in which this social phenomenon was interpreted until the middle of the 20th century. Behind the separation of the nation from the ethnicity/people, as the supposedly superior form, lies the effort to relativize the ethnicity/people, as an objective fact, to weaken the mutual ties of its members and to bring the entire population under the control of central political power – as a seemingly integrated and homogeneous whole.
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U ovom članku autor na sugestivan način ukazuje na važnost razumijevanja nacije i države u kontekstu evropske filozofske misli i prakse o naciji i državi. Iako su mu povod nacija Bošnjaka i bosanska država, autorova razmišljanja su aplikativna za sve skupine slične naciji Bošnjaka, kao i za države slične bosanskoj državi. Osnovna misao u ovom članku je da ideja univerzalne nacije, kulture i civilizacije niti osporava niti negira partikularni osjećaj i subjektivni doživljaj nacije i države. Članstvo u Evropskoj uniji ne oduzima pravo nijednoj naciji u Evropi da gaji i razvija svoju nacionalno-kulturnu i nacionalno-državnu svijest. Zapravo, u mjeri u kojoj je svaka nacija i svaka država u Evropi aktivno svjesna svoje nacionalne i kulturne specifične vrijednosti, čini Evropu, odnosno Evropsku uniju, snažnom i važnom u globalnom svijetu. Otuda i Bošnjaci, odnosno Bosanci, kao nacija i kao država (nacija) nemaju potrebe da se povlače, već imaju historijsku obavezu da istaknu svoju specifičnu bosansku kulturu i bosansku državu kao bogatstvo vrijedno pažnje ne samo u Evropi već i u svijetu. ; In this article, the author suggestively points to the importance of understanding the concept of nation and the state in the context of the European philosophical thought and practice regarding the nation and the state. Although the occasion is about the Bosniak/Bosnian nation and the Bosnian state, the author's reflections are applicable to all groups similar to the Bosniak/Bosnain nation, as well as to all the states similar to the Bosnian state. The basic premise of this article is that the idea of a universal nationality, culture and civilisation does not oppose or negate the particular feeling or the subjective experience of either the nationality or the state. The membership of European Union does not detract the right for any nation in Europe of the right to cultivate and develop its national culture as well as its particular state consciousness. In fact, in the extent of which every nation and every state in Europe has an active awareness of its national and cultural specific value, gives Europe, indeed – the European Union strong and important role in the global community. Hence, the Bosniaks/Bosnians, both as a nation and a state (nation) have no need to withdraw, but rather have the historical opportunity to feature their specific Bosnian culture and Bosnian state as a richness worthy of appreciation, not only in Europe, but also in the world.
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Treći, završni dio ove studije, analizira odnos Bošnjaka i Bosne kroz interakciju tri hronološki i problemski povezana procesa. Prvim postupkom, definiranim kao 'arheologija politike zaborava', rekonstruiraju se, u svim dosadašnjim istraživanjima potpuno zapostavljeni, aspekti geneze historijskih i političkih faktora projekta negiranja Bošnjaka kao posebnog naroda/nacije, brisanja njihovog historijskog imena, naziva jezika te etničkog, duhovnog, kulturnog i državotvornog identiteta. Drugo, razmatra se pitanje odnosa Bošnjaka kao naroda/nacije i Bosne kao njihove matične države, koju su oni stvorili i odbranili, iz generalne problemsko-teorijske perspektive kao i iz novijih zbivanja i aktuelne situacije. Treće, argumentira se teza da je očuvanje historijskog imena "Bošnjaci", vraćenog 28. septembra 1993. godine, trajni strateški imperativ svih Bošnjaka svijeta i conditio sine qua non opstanka Bosne kao države i kao koncepta. Kritički se analizira inicijativa da se umjesto historijskog imena upotrebljavaju teritorijalne odrednice "Bosanci", odnosno "Bosanci i Hercegovci" što ima za cilj definitivno ukloniti s historijske scene Bošnjake kao narod/naciju. Budući da je opstanak Bošnjaka nužni uvjet opstanka i postojanja Bosne, imperativ historijskog trenutka nalaže bezrezervno prihvatanje historijskog imena "Bošnjaci", obnovu osjećanja zajedničke pripadnosti i uzajamne povezanosti Bošnjaka kao naroda/nacije, jačanje emotivne veze sa sopstvenim nacionalnim bićem te uspostavljanje svijesti o moralnoj obavezi svakog pojedinca Bošnjaka prema svom narodu, Bošnjacima, i njihovoj matičnoj državi Bosni. ; The third, final part of this study, analyses the relationship between Bosniaks and Bosnia through the interaction of three chronologically problem-related processes: 1. The procedure defined as 'The Archeology of the Politics of Oblivion' reconstructs in all previous research completely neglected aspects of the genesis of historical and political factors of the project of denial of Bosniaks as a separate people / nation, erasing their historical name, language name and ethnic, spiritual, cultural and state identity; 2. The issue of the relationship between Bosniaks as a people / nation and Bosnia, as their home state, which they created and defended, from the general problem-theory perspective as well as from recent events and with the current situation being considered; 3. The thesis is argued that the preservation of the historical name "Bosniaks", returned on September 28, 1993, is a permanent strategic imperative of all Bosniaks in the world and a conditio sine qua non of the survival of Bosnia as a state and as a concept. The initiative to use the territorial determinants "Bosnians" or "Bosnians and Herzegovinians" instead of the historical name, which aims to definitively remove Bosniaks from the historical scene as a people / nation, is critically analysed. Since the survival of Bosniaks is a necessary condition for the survival and existence of Bosnia, the imperatives of the historical moment require the unconditional acceptance of the historical name "Bosniaks", the renewal of the sense of common belonging and mutual connection of Bosniaks as a people / nation, strengthening the emotional connection with one's own national being and establishing the awareness of the moral obligation of every individual Bosniak towards his/her Bosniak people and their home state of Bosnia.
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The author discusses the reasons for relativization of the national minorities protection policy of the Council of Europe and the European Union in light of the problems with national minorities protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The minorities protection policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina had implications for minority rights protection in Hungary and Croatia after Croatia's accession to the EU . The European Union, the Council of Europe and other European institutions defined their position towards minority rights in light of the European Court for Human Rights decision in the Sejdić and Finci case. The decision specified mandatory constitutional changes in terms of equal protection of national minority rights. According to the demanded constitutional revisions, the representatives of national minorities would have a right to compete for legal and executive positions in the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the ECHR decision, only representatives of the three constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats could be nominated for positions in the legislature and in the executive institutions. The Council of Europe mediated by CoE Parliamentarian Assembly and Committee of Ministers threatened to suspend BiH membership to the CoE until the decision was implemented. At the same time, coordinated European Union institutions made the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiated with Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008 conditional upon the implementation of the Sejdić and Finci decision. The threat wasn't carried through and BiH became presiding country of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2014. In the meantime, the newly elected European Parliament as well as recently appointed European Commission accepted the SAA although the Sejdić-Finci decision was not incorporated in the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ; Evropska unija, Savjet Evrope i druge evropske institucije bitno su odredile svoj odnos prema Bosni i Hercegovini u odnosu na primjenu Odluke Evropskog suda za ljudska prava "u slučaju Sejdić i Finci", koji nalaže obavezu ustavnih promjena u pravcu zaštite jednakosti prava pripadnika nacionalnih manjina. Tim promjenama i predstavnici nacionlanih manjina imali bi pravo da budu kandidovani na sve pozicije zakonodavne i izvršne vlasti u Bosni i Hercegovini. Do odluke u spomenutom slučaju, poznatom kao "Sejdić – Finci", samo su pripadnici tri konstitutivna naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini – Srba, Bošnjaka i Hrvata, mogli da budu kandidovani za te funkcije. U više navrata Savjet Evrope je posredstvom Parlamentarne skupštine ili Komiteta ministara prijetio suspenzijom, čak i izbacivanjem Bosne i Hercegovine iz ove međunarodne organizacije. Istovremeno, čak i koordinisano, institucije Evropske unije raznih nivoa uslovljavale su ratifikaciju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SAA ), postignutog još 2008. godine, isto primjenom navedene odluke. Prijetnja se odnosila na nepriznavanja izbornih rezultata na lokalnim izborima 2012. i opštim izborima 2014. godine. To se nije desilo, a u međuvremenu BiH je bila zemlja – predsjedavajuća Komiteta ministara Savjeta Evrope. Novoizabrani saziv Evropskog parlamenta i nova Evropska komisija prihvatili su Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju nakon opštih izbora u BiH 2014, iako odluka Evropskog suda za ljudska prava nije primijenjena. Predmet rada biće razlozi relativizacije manjinskih politika Savjeta Evrope i Evropske unije u politikama zaštite prava nacionalnih manjina u BiH. Time su postale vidljive i upozoravajuće i druge politike relativizacije položaja i prava nacionalnih manjina, poput Mađarske i Hrvatske, do čega je došlo nakon prijema ove dvije države u Evropsku uniju.
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Considering that in the spectrum of juvenile criminal sanctions punishment of deprivation of liberty is the most severe criminal sanction, international documents related to juveniles in conflict with the law proclaim standards that this sanction has to be imposed only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period. Issues like possible duration of subject sanction and scope of its imposition, represents some of the basic features of the legal and judicial policy of sanctioning of juveniles, and represent the subject of this paper. The author analyzes how these issues are regulated in Bosnia and Herzegovina"s and comparative law, and how aforementioned standards are applied in practice. Applying the comparative analysis it was determined that there are certain indicators that Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the countries that has in its heritage "humane" sanctioning policy of juvenile offenderes, and that the aforementioned international standards are consistently accepted in domestic law as well as in the jurisprudence. ; Imajući u vidu da u spektru maloljetničkih krivičnih sankcija kazna lišenja slobode predstavlja najstrožiju krivičnu sankciju, međunarodni dokumenti iz oblasti postupanja sa maloljetnicima u sukobu sa zakonom proklamiraju standard da se ona ima izricati samo kao krajnje sredstvo (ultima ratio) i u što kraćem trajanju. Upravo pitanja mogućeg trajanja predmetne sankcije, te obima njenog izricanja predstavljaju neka od osnovnih obilježja zakonske i sudske politike sankcioniranja maloljetnika, te čine predmet istraživanja ovog rada. Autor je analizirao kako su ova pitanja uređena u bosanskohercegovačkom i uporednom pravu, te kako su spomenuti standardi oživotvoreni u praksi. Primjenom komparativnopravne analize utvrđeno je kako postoje određeni pokazatelji da Bosna i Hercegovina spada u red zemalja koje baštine "humanu" politiku sankcioniranja maloljetnih učinitelja krivičnih djela, te da su spomenuti međunarodni standardi dosljedno prihvaćeni kako u pravu, tako i u sudskoj praksi ove zemlje.
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Political parties are often conceptualized as unitary actors that have consistent preferences. This 'hidden assumption' often turns out to overlook heterogeneity within parties and, therefore, intra-party dynamics in explaining attitudes. Concerning devolution and federalisation, parties or MP's belonging to the same region are also often implicitly considered as having homogeneous viewpoints and attitudes. Relying on an original MPs survey carried out during the Belgian political gridlock of 2010-2011, this article uncovers some of the key dimensions of the intra-party dynamics through the analysis of MPs' preferences towards institutional reform in Belgium. Far from being explained by party or community lines, our results demonstrate how MPs' political and sociological background, national/regional identity, political career and inter-community relations strongly shape their preferences.
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Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Photini Danou, The words of the voiceless Did ordinary men and women in pre-modern England have an opinion about politics? What was "politics" for the common people at a time when they had not any say in choosing who would rule them? Was popular engagement in state politics only to secure subsistence? Were "knife and fork" politics of the masses so separate from issues of "high politics" of the State? Was pre-modern commoners' mentality, "pre-political" as well? This paper discusses early modern popular political awareness. I argue that commoners in Tudor England pursued their own political agenda, by exploiting the sovereign's self-image as the "protector of the poor". However, as I set out to show, in pursuing their political agenda commoners also raised issues on the content of Englishness, common good, patriotism, legitimate governance and the right of resistance. The political identity of the lower strata was not an entity fixed in its essence. On the contrary, plebeian political identity was rather shifting, changeable, and always constituting its content in particular historical contexts. The commoners' commitment to the ideal of the"nation", their loyalty to the government, their allegiance to their Queen, their obedience to her laws, or their active participation in the enforcement of state policies were not unconditional. The ways they practiced their political identity was interrelated to their superiors' behavior and draw its legitimacy from the public transcript of the English Common wealth. Common prosperity, reciprocity, solidarity and, in general, protection of the poorer and weaker members of English society were ideals that constituted the meaning of "common wealth" in the plebeian mind. Those ideals were prerequisites for their giving of devotion and loyalty to the state. Thus, the commoners' political mentality and behavior ranged from national loyalty to indifference or even animosity to state officials; from cooperation and acquiescence to covered or overt forms of opposition and active resistance.
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Transparency is a widely used concept in debates on international politics, from transnational anti-corruption campaigns to renewed requests for greater disclosure on health, finance, or even security issues. Calls for transparency date back at least to the League of Nations, when internationalists demanded open diplomacy. Yet, it is in the subfield of GEG, and its developments on nonstate actors as a key research topic (see introduction), where the practice and theory of transparency has made the most profound inroads (Gupta 2010a). GEG has been a particularly fertile ground for the development of informational governance (Mol 2008) and the rise of numerous transparency initiatives which have been analyzed in a rapidly developing literature. Importantly, current GEG research is also highly relevant for other IR subfields. For one, recent GEG research can help IR scholars to further refine the concept of transparency and to increase conceptual clarity and sophistication. Second, research on GEG has improved our understanding of the factors that determine the effectiveness of transparency as a governance tool in international politics.
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In: European Policy Research Unit series
Simitis examines the European debt crisis with particular reference to the Greek case. He investigates its spillover from a Greek-specific problem to a Eurozone-wide crisis and chronicles the policy responses to combat it. His central argument is that the main cause of the Eurozone's problems was, and still remains, the indecisiveness of European elites to tackle its underlying deficiencies. Leading Eurozone countries have been unwilling to commit to a common long-term plan which could deal convincingly with complex and inter-related problems affecting both its 'core' and its 'periphery'
Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Eleni Fournaraki, «Wherefore deprive her of the vote?». Universal male suffrage and the exclusion of women from politics in 19th century Greece Through study of the Greek case, this article tries to explore the exclusion of women from political rights in the context of liberal democracy as a historiographical problem. In contrast to the vast majority of representative states at the time, political circumstances prevailing in Greece led to the constitutional establishment of universal male suffrage in 1864, though not without provoking the discontent of a sizeable portion of the political scene for several years thereafter. According to «conventional» historical accounts, there can be no doubt that women's exclusion from «universal suffrage» in 1864, while not explicity articulated in the Constitution or any pertinent legislation, was regarded as self-evident. Furthermore, prior to 1910-20 the possibility of attributing the vote to women did not preoccupy party politics, while a suffragist movement did not appear before the Inter-war period. Our own approach can be summarized as follows: exploration of the meaning of women's exclusion from political rights in a democratic conjuncture that assured those rights to all adult men may reveal the full dimensions of the conflict dynamic that democratic conquests presuppose. In the first place, this dynamic applies to men themselves, or more precisely to the less privileged among them. As empirical data reveal, the question of women's political rights, even if acquiring those rights was not an existing possibility, could appear as a constructive element of the political discourse: women's exclusion could have been put forward as one of the issues in the argument against universal male suffrage. It is precisely the self-evident and trivial nature of this exclusion together with that of children which could offer a more convincing argument against the conception of suffrage as a natural right. A lack of internal coherence and consistency in the argument of the advocates of «universal suffrage», could be pointed out through the emphasis, conversely, on the irrationality of a regime that guaranteed political participation down to the very last «illiterate» or «vagrant» man, while depriving all women of the vote, especially those who had the ability to possess and administrate property. Support for suffrage for those women was not totally absent from such argumentation, which served to reveal the contradictions that women's exclusion from political rights brought to the heart of the modern system for the legitimization of sovereignty. Through examination of the arguments employed by the science of constitutional law to justify exclusion, we observe a broader process of redefinition and rationalization of the existing gender hierarchy, in modern terms. Crystallized in the last quarter of 19th century, this process appealed to the notion of the biological and psychological «specificity» of «female nature)) in order to legitimize the incompatibility of women as a whole with politics.
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Some states are widely recognized by policy makers and scholars as middle powers. The characteristics that were highlighted for these countries have become the basic guidelines for understanding middle powermanship and developing the corresponding theory. While those analyses offer rich in-depth insights into the foreign policy of specific countries, they have so far lacked a further step of generalization. When establishing such power-based rankings, we assume the possibility to determine states' capacities so as to identify their position in said ranking. As appealing as this theoretical model may be, the reality of international politics increasingly challenge it. Thus, we argue that this theoretical inadequacy is due to the fact that middle power theory as it has been developed so far should be understood as an inductive, not a deductive, approach . Consequently, the contemporary reality calls for yet another stage of development in this theory. The choice of Pakistan as our case study arises from the observation that while Pakistan can hardly fit into the current classification(s) of middle powermanship due to its poor economic and development performances, it is a nuclear state and is –at least– in the top twenty armies of the world. Moreover, we find several cases in which Pakistan has used the diplomatic tools characterizing middle powers, such as mediation or niche diplomacy. Our paper aims at answering two questions: (1) can middle power theory bring some light on Pakistan's positioning in world politics? (2) Alternatively, what does the case of Pakistan tell us about the (ir)relevance of middle power theory? We build upon role theory to develop the case of middle powermanship as a status-role bundle, by analyzing three specific cases of Pakistan's foreign policy: Pakistani nuclear posturing, its Afghan policy and its posturing vis-à-vis the Saudi-Iranian regional competition.
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In Belgium, the idea of 'openness' is a well spread notion in electoral political discourses and the 2012 local election in Wallonia is no exception to this trend. Despite a clear victory, it is indeed very common for local political leaders in Belgium to announce that they will open their majority to other lists. The idea of 'openness' is also part of the local electoral campaign in terms of recruitment: non-partisan candidates – who clearly want to distinguish themselves from the party – are recruited to figure on the lists as 'independent candidates'. They are called 'candidates d'ouverture' as a sign of openness towards the civil society, the opposition, or dissidents from other political parties. Actually, these candidates are recruited for various reasons: there are sometimes used to demonstrate the citizen character of the list, to enhance the fact that the list 'makes politics differently from established political parties', to underline the local roots of the list, and sometimes the 'candidates d'ouverture' are simply used to complete vacancies on a list.
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In: Impact of Empire Volume 34
In: Impact of empire, Roman Empire, c. 200 B.C.-A.D. 476 Volume 34
Introduction / Koenraad Verboven, Olivier Hekster -- Culture politique imperiale et pratique de la justice : regards croises sur la figure du prince "injuste" / Stephane Benoist, Anne Gangloff -- The decreta and imperiales sententiae of Julius Paulus : law and justice in the judicial decisions of Septimius Severus / Elsemieke Daalder -- The value of the stability of the law : a perspective on the role of the emperor in political crises / Francesco Bono -- Legal education, realpolitik, and the propagation of the emperor's justice / Matthijs Wibier -- Koinoi nomoi : Hadrian and the harmonization of local laws / Juan Manuel Cortes-Copete -- Justice, res publica and empire : subsidiarity and hierarchy in the Roman empire / Frederic Hurlet -- Substantive justice in provincial and Roman legal argument / Clifford Ando -- Zwischen Theorie und Wirklichkeit : Romische Sicherheitsgesetze und ihre Realisierung / Peter Herz -- Geschlechterrollen im romischen Erbrecht im Spiegel des zeitgenossischen Gerechtigkeitsverstandnisses und am Beispiel der lex Voconia / Elena Kostner -- La femme : objet et sujet de la justice romaine / Pilar Pavon Torrejon -- The spectacle of justice in the Roman Empire / Margherita Carucci.
The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.
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